Facts:

The appeal challenges an order summoning the appellant, Hardei, to face trial in a case related to embezzlement of funds from the MNREGA Scheme.

The FIR was filed based on a complaint by R.D. Sharma, alleging embezzlement by Rahul Yadav and Omkar Singh.

The trial progressed, and an application under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. was filed to summon additional accused, including the appellant, based on evidence recorded during the trial.

The appellant's defense highlighted her absence in the FIR and the lack of a charge sheet against her.

Issues:

Whether the trial court's summoning order under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. based on evidence recorded during the trial is justified.

The relevance of the appellant's absence in the FIR and the lack of a charge sheet against her.

Held:

The court, after giving due consideration to the rival submissions, found no good reason to interfere with the order under appeal. The key points include:

An FIR is not expected to contain all details, especially in complex cases involving conspiracy, economic offenses, or those without eyewitness accounts.

The fact that the police chose not to send a suspect to face trial does not affect the trial court's power under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. to summon such a person based on evidence recorded during the trial.

The appellant, being a cosignatory, was found accountable for jointly withdrawing money from the MNREGA account, supporting the prima facie evidence against her.

The court dismissed the appeal, clarifying that the observations made in the orders should not adversely affect either party, and the appellant is free to present her defense during the trial.

Relevant Paragraphs in the Judgment:

Paragraph 9: Acknowledges complexities in investigating crimes and emphasizes the trial court's power under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. to summon based on recorded evidence.

Paragraph 10: Dismisses the appeal and clarifies that observations made in the orders should not adversely affect either party, granting the appellant the liberty to present her defense during the trial.

Referred Cases:

Decided on : 30-03-2016

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) - Section 161, Section 319

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 409, Section 420, Section 467, Section 468, Section 471

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 319 — Summoning of additional accused to face trial — Fact that Police chose not to send up a suspect to face trial does not affect power of trial Court under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. to summon such a person on account of evidence recorded during trial — F.I.R. may not contain all details of occurrence or even names of all accused — It is not expected to be an encyclopedia even of facts already known — There are varieties of crimes and by their very nature, details of some crimes can be unfolded only by a detailed and expert investigation — This is more true in crimes involving conspiracy, economic offences or cases not founded on eye witness accounts — Appeal dismissed.

Facts:

The Respondent, Uttaradi Mutt, filed a suit for perpetual injunction against the Appellant, Raghavendra Swamy Mutt.

The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court partially allowed the appeal, imposing certain conditions.

The Appellant filed a second appeal, and during the pendency, sought an interim order through IA No. 1/2015.

The High Court observed procedural irregularities in the grant of the interim order and vacated it without admitting the second appeal.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in vacating the order of stay and interim orders without admitting the second appeal.

Whether the High Court had the authority to entertain IA No. 1/2015 without formulating substantial questions of law.

Held:

The High Court must formulate substantial questions of law before admitting a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC.

The Court clarified that an ex parte order under Order XLI Rule 5(4) can be passed during the pendency of an appeal, but it does not exempt the High Court from formulating substantial questions of law for the purpose of admission.

The judgment emphasized the importance of adhering to the procedural requirements and not passing an interim order without first formulating substantial questions of law.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision to vacate the interim order.

Referred Cases:

A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu Vs. S. Chellappan, AIR 2000 SC 3032

Ishwar Dass Jain Vs. Sohan Lal, (2000) 1 SCC 434

Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur Vs. Punjab SEB, (2010) 13 SCC 216

Ram Phal Vs. Banarasi, (2003) 11 SCC 762

Roop Singh Vs. Ram Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 708

Umerkhan Vs. Bismillabi alias Babulal Shaikh, (2011) 9 SCC 684

Facts:

The case involved a writ petition (C) No. 235 of 2012 filed by Savelife Foundation and others against the Union of India and others. The petition focused on the protection of Good Samaritans - bystanders and passers-by who render help to victims of road accidents.

Issues:

The development of a supportive legal framework, the constitution of a committee to create guidelines for protecting Good Samaritans, and the enforceability of such guidelines.

Held:

The court asserted its authority to issue guidelines and directions under Article 32 read with Article 142 until a proper legislation is enacted. These guidelines are necessary for the protection of rights under Article 21 read with Article 14, providing immediate help to accident victims and protecting Good Samaritans (Para 18).

The guidelines, as per the notification dated 12.5.2015, were accepted with modifications. The court directed the issuance of acknowledgments to Good Samaritans, and until a standard format is prescribed, acknowledgments can be issued on official letterheads (Para 19).

The notification dated 21.1.2016, regarding the examination of Good Samaritans by the police, was modified. The affidavit of a Good Samaritan, if filed, shall be treated as a complete statement during the investigation (Para 19).

The court emphasized that courts should not normally insist on the personal appearance of Good Samaritans to avoid delays and expenses. Courts can appoint a Commission for examination under Section 284 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Para 20).

States were directed to issue guidelines without prejudice to the liability of the driver of a motor vehicle under section 134 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Para 21).

The scheme framed by the Central Government and the court's order were to be widely published through electronic and print media to raise public awareness (Para 23).

Referred Cases:

Common Cause Vs. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 1

D.K. Basu Vs. State of W.B., (1997) 1 SCC 416

Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skipper Construction Co. P Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 622

Delhi Judicial Service Assn. Vs. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406

Dinesh Trivedi, M.P. Vs. Union of India, (1997) 4 SCC 306

K. Veeraswami Vs. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655

Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav, (2005) 3 SCC 284

Lakshmi Kant Pandey Vs. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 244

Pt. Parmanand Katara Vs. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 286

State of W.B. Vs. Sampat Lal, (1985) 1 SCC 317

Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. Vs. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441

Union Carbide Corpn. Vs. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584

Union of India Vs. Association for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294

Vineet Narain Vs. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226

Vishaka Vs. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241

Facts:

The State Governments of Punjab and Haryana appointed Law Officers without a realistic assessment of their requirements.

No formulation of schemes, policies, or standards for appointing Law Officers was observed.

The prevailing system lacked transparency and a credible selection process for State Counsel appointments.

Issues:

Whether the appointment of Law Officers can be questioned on the ground of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14.

Lack of realistic assessment and absence of formulated norms for appointment.

Held:

The power to appoint Law Officers must be exercised in a fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory, and objective manner. Arbitrary exercise of such power makes the legitimacy of the appointment questionable.( Para 8)

A fair and realistic assessment of the requirement for Law Officers is essential to prevent appointments for political aggrandizement or personal benevolence. The absence of such assessment poses a risk to the rule of law and public faith.( Para 9)

The States of Punjab and Haryana failed to follow a credible selection process for Law Officers. The dominant purpose of selecting the most meritorious candidates for public interest is defeated by the current appointment method.( Para 15)

Public bodies are trustees of power, and their functions must be exercised in the best interest of the public. Duty to act fairly is a facet of the Rule of Law, and arbitrariness has no place in a polity governed by Article 14 of the Constitution.( Para 36)

The duty to select and appoint State Counsel includes adherence to Article 14, ensuring non-arbitrariness and protection of public interest. States must not frustrate or delay the judicial process heavily reliant on the assistance of the Bar.( Para 37)

Appointment of Government Counsel is not merely a professional engagement but has a "public element." Appointments must be in public interest, and the process should be transparent, fair, and objective.( Para 38)

A check on the power of the government to appoint a Public Prosecutor should also apply to the appointment of State Counsel, especially in unregulated situations.( Para 44)

Lawyers do not have a right to be appointed as State Government counsel. Consideration for appointment or extension must align with norms and criteria.( Para 45)

A consultative process involving the District & Sessions Judge or the High Court is required for appointment or extension. The Chief Justice should constitute a Committee of Judges for the review.( Para 47)

The States of Punjab and Haryana are directed to undertake a realistic assessment, constitute a Selection Committee, and follow a transparent process for Law Officer appointments. Other states are encouraged to reform their systems.( Para 48)

Referred Cases:

D.S. Nakra Vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305

Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons Vs. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293

E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3

Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1980) 4 SCC 1

Mahabir Auto Stores and Others Vs. Indian Oil Corporation, (1990) 3 SCC 752

Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621

Neelima Misra Vs. Harinder Kaur Paintal, (1990) 2 SCC 746

Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489

S.G. Jaisinghani Vs. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427

Sharma Transport Vs. Government of A.P., (2002) 2 SCC 188

Shrilekha Vidyarthi Vs. State of U.P., (1991) 1 SCC 212

Som Raj Vs. State of Haryana, (1990) 2 SCC 653

State of U.P. Vs. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714

State of U.P. Vs. U.P. State Law Officers Association, (1994) 2 SCC 204

United States Vs. Wunderlick, (1951) 342 US 98:96 Law Ed 113

Facts:

An agreement was executed between the Government and a party involved in the hotel industry under Section 41 of the Land Acquisition Act. Clause 4(viii) of the Agreement restricted the construction on the acquired land by the concerned party. The court had previously ordered the demolition of constructions on January 20, 2009.

Issues:

The constitutional validity of the Goa Amendment Act of 2009, which deleted Clause 4(viii) of the Agreement through amendments to Section 41, was challenged.

Held:

The court upheld the validity of the Land Acquisition (Goa Amendment) Act, 2009.

The power to invalidate a legislative or executive act lies with the court, but the legislature is competent to pass an amending or validating act with retrospective effect, removing the basis of the court's decision. The court may not approve a retrospective deprivation of accrued rights arising from a judgment.

Section 41(6) to (9) introduced by the Goa State Amendment renders ineffective Clause 4(viii) of the Agreement. With Clause 4(viii) being deleted, the embargo on constructions on the acquired land is removed. The State Amendment Act, by no means, sets the law in a collision course with the Central/Principal enactment.

The legislature was well within its domain to bring about the Amendment Act with retrospective effect. The balancing act between the judiciary and the legislature is guided by well-defined values.

The Goa State Amendment was not intended solely to benefit a singular entity (the third respondent), as per the available materials.

Referred Cases:

Bhaktwar Trust Vs. MD Narayan, (2003) 5 SCC 298

Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha Vs. Narayanamma, (2003) 1 SCC 228

M. Karunanidhi Vs. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 431

Madan Mohan Pathak Vs. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCC 50

Facts:

The appellants, accused Nos. 1 to 5, 10, and 25, along with others, faced trial for alleged offenses under various sections of the Indian Penal Code. The charges included rioting, abduction, and murder. The trial court convicted some accused while acquitting others. The appeals were filed against the judgment of the High Court, confirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the Sessions Court. The appeals and the same are dismissed.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were present during the incident and whether they shared a common object throughout the assembly.

Held:

The court emphasized that there was no contradiction in the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses regarding the presence of the appellants. The accused, in their responses under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, did not deny their presence. The court held that the prosecution needed to establish the presence of the appellants and their shared common object. The appellants, from the inception of the incident to the abduction, were found to have a common object, involving raiding a house, being armed with deadly weapons, and attacking individuals.

Referred Cases:

Akbar Sheikh Vs. State of West Bengal, (2009) 7 SCC 415

Facts:

The predecessor of the appellants leased out land for 199 years.

Secured creditors of the lessee filed a winding-up petition.

The appellants sought a permanent injunction against the sale of company assets, particularly the leased property.

The Company Judge issued a winding-up order and appointed the Official Liquidator (OL).

The appellants, citing the winding-up order and default in rent payment, applied for the return of the leased property.

Issues:

The case include non-payment of rent, subletting, and the impact of the winding-up order on the possession of the leased property.

Held:

The court addressed Section 12 of the Rent Act, emphasizing the importance of a notice from the landlord for the tenant to pay unpaid rent. In this case, no such notice was issued. The court held that the readiness and willingness of the tenant to pay rent, even without actual payment, would not deprive the tenant of protection under the Rent Act.( Para 17)

The court considered the liability of the Official Liquidator under Section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rent Act, emphasizing that the non-obstante clause in Section 13(1) overrides other provisions but is subject to Section 15. The court clarified that the mere fact of the company being ordered to be wound up does not automatically entitle the landlord to possession of the land.( Para 18)

The court discussed the argument of subletting by the Official Liquidator. It noted that the case involved an attempted assignment through notice/advertisement but emphasized that this did not amount to a completed action. The court highlighted the relief sought in the Company Applications regarding the sale/transfer/assignment of the leased property.( Para 18)

The court considered the liability under Section 13(1)(k) of the Bombay Rent Act, focusing on unjustified non-user for over six months. The court emphasized that the pending liquidation proceedings and the potential revival of the company were relevant factors. It reiterated that the winding-up of a company does not automatically lead to possession by the landlord.( Paras 19, 20, 21)

Referred Cases:

Decided on : 29-03-2016

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 - Section 11(2), Section 11(3), Section 12, Section 12(2), Section 12(3), Section 13, Section 13(1), Section 13(2), Section 15, Section 15(1), Section 18, Section 19

Companies Act, 1956 - Section 525

Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 - Section 21, Section 21(1)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 106, Section 106(2), Section 108, Section 114, Section 118

Winding up of Company — Creditor of Prasad Mills Ltd. had in the year 1984 filed a company petition seeking the winding up of the aforesaid Prasad Mills Ltd. While the company petition was pending some of the legal heirs of Predecessor of Appellants had filed a suit in the Small Causes Court seeking permanent injunction against the sale of assets of company more particularly the sale of the leased property. — Occupant Company i.e. Prasad Mills had no document in its favour entitling it to be in possession of the demised land — Admitted non payment of rent for a period of over 15 years rendering the company and now the official liquidator liable to eviction Under Section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act — Admitted non user of the land for a period of over 6 years attracting Section 13(1)(k) of the Rent Act — Sub-letting in favour of the company, Prasad Mills, in violation of Section 13(1)(e) of the Rent Act. — Mere fact that the company has been ordered to be wound up cannot be a ground to direct the official liquidator to handover possession of the land to the owners inasmuch as the company in liquidation continues to maintain its corporate existence until it stands dissolved upon completion of the liquidation proceedings in the manner contemplated by the Companies Act. In the present case it has been repeatedly submitted before this Court by both sides that presently revival of Prasad Mills is a live issue pending before the Gujarat High Court, a fact which cannot be ignored by this Court in deciding the above issue against the Appellants.

Cases Referred

Hans Raj Vs. Bejoy Lal Sel, AIR 1930 PC 59

Laxmidas Bapudas Darbar Vs. Rudravva Smt., (2001) 7 SCC 409

Ram Kinkar Banerjee Vs. Satya Charan Srimani, AIR 1939 PC 14

Shri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises P Ltd. Vs. Syeda Vajhiunnissa Begum Smt., (1994) 2 SCC 671

V. Dhanapal Chettiar Vs. Yesodai Ammal, (1979) 4 SCC 214

Facts:

The case involves MIS. CASIO INDIA CO. PVT. LTD. against the State of Haryana. The dispute centers around the interpretation of a notification dated 04.09.1995 issued under Section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and Rule 28A of the Haryana General Sales Tax Rules, 1975.

Issues:

Whether the notification, as per Section 8(5), relates to the exemption of goods or the person selling them. Additionally, the interpretation of the inter-state sales of goods manufactured by an "exempted unit" under Rule 28A is a point of contention.

Held:

The notification specifies that no tax is payable under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, from April 1, 1988, on the sale of goods during the exemption period, manufactured in Haryana by any dealer holding a valid exemption certificate under Rule 28A. Sub-section (5) of Section 8 empowers State Governments to issue notifications for exemption conditions.( Para 14-16)

Rule 28A(4)(c) supports the interpretation, exempting all intra-state sales, including subsequent sales. The intention is to exempt all subsequent stages within the State of Haryana, allowing eligible products to be sold multiple times without tax.( Para 17)

The exemption focuses on goods manufactured within the exemption period by a dealer holding an exemption certificate. There is no stipulation that limits exemption only to the first sale or the sale by the eligible industrial unit in interstate or intra-state trade.( Para 18)

The proviso in the notification, emphasizing that the manufacturing dealer should not have charged tax, serves as an exception and qualification. It should not nullify the main provision or unreasonably restrict its interpretation.( Para 19-20)

Contrary to the revenue's contention, the court rejects the limitation that the exemption applies only if the eligible industrial unit makes the sale in interstate trade. Rule 28A and the notification aim to exempt goods manufactured in the state during further transfers in interstate or intra-state trade.( Para 21)

Referred Cases:

Bansal Wires Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 6 SCC 545

CIT, Mysore etc. v Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd., AIR 1959 SC 713

Commissioner of Sales Tax Vs. Industrial Coal Enterprises, (1999) 114 STC 365

Govt. of A.P Vs. P. Laxmi Devi, (2008) 4 SCC 720

International Cotton Corporation P Ltd. Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Hubli, (1975) 35 STC 1

Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1966 SC 12

NOVOPAN India Ltd., Hyderabad Vs. Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Hyderabad, (1994) Sup 3 SCC 606

Parle Biscuits P Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 9 SCC 669

Pine Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Assessing Authority, (1992) 85 STC 432

Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (2011) 10 SCC 292

Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory Vs. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596

State Level Committee Vs. Morgardhsammar India Ltd., (1996) 101 STC 1

State of Rajasthan Vs. Sarvotam Vegetables Products, (1996) 101 STC 547

Village Soap Industries Association Vs. State of Haryana, (1992) 85 STC 432

Facts:

The appellant, Punjab & Sind Bank, offered an OTS to the first respondent for settlement of dues.

One condition of the OTS was a restriction on the sale of mortgaged properties for three years.

The first respondent entered into an agreement for the sale of half of the mortgaged property with a third party.

The entire settlement amount was paid as per the OTS, but the bank declined to settle, claiming entitlement to 50% of the fair market value due to the third-party interest.

Issues:

Whether the appellant bank is entitled to fifty percent of the increase in the fair market value of the property under the OTS Scheme.

Validity of the restriction on sale and the bank's claim in light of the third-party interest.

Held:

The OTS proposal, dated 01.03.2012, imposed a restriction solely on the sale of the mortgaged property for a period of three years.

Admittedly, the property had not been sold within the three-year lock-in period.

The bank had not released the mortgage, and possession of the mortgaged property had not been delivered to the first respondent.

The scheme did not provide any other restriction on the involvement of third-party interest for settlement of dues.

The appellant bank cannot claim a share of the increase in fair market value as recompense, as there was no loss or suffering on the bank's part.

The High Court's direction to release the title deed and hand over possession to the first respondent was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.