Facts:

Plaintiffs filed a civil suit against defendants seeking specific performance of an agreement for sale of properties.

Defendants were served by substituted service but remained ex parte throughout the proceedings.

Trial Court passed an ex parte decree against defendants. Subsequently, defendant Nos. 3 and 4 applied for setting aside the ex parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC, which was allowed by the Trial Court.

Trial Court failed to issue fresh notice of the suit to defendant Nos. 1 and 2 after restoration, as required by the local amendment made by the State of Kerala in the first proviso to Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC.

Despite this irregularity, Trial Court again decreed the suit ex parte against defendant Nos. 1 and 2 without issuing a fresh notice.

Issues:

Whether the Trial Court's failure to issue a fresh notice of the suit to defendant Nos. 1 and 2 after restoration, as required by the local amendment, constituted an irregularity?

Whether the High Court's decision to set aside the Trial Court's judgment and decree and remand the case for fresh trial on merits was justified?

Held:

The Court discuss the irregularity committed by the Trial Court in failing to issue a fresh notice to defendant Nos. 1 and 2 after restoration of the suit. The Court held that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were entitled to a fresh notice of the suit once restored, despite their non-appearance in the initial proceedings. This failure constituted an irregularity that called for remand of the case.

The Court upheld the remand order of the High Court, considering the aforementioned irregularity and additional grounds. It directed the Trial Court to issue a fresh notice to defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and proceed with the trial on merits. Defendant Nos. 3 and 4, having already been served, were not entitled to further notice.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the Trial Court was directed to conduct a fresh trial on merits, ensuring compliance with the law and providing due notice to all parties.

Facts:

Ramaiah Reddy, the head of the family, had two wives, Hemavathi and Nirmala, and children from both marriages.

The dispute arose over certain immovable properties owned by Ramaiah, with Sharmila, daughter of Hemavathi, and Umesh, her son, claiming ownership based on a will dated 12.03.1980.

Nirmala and others denied the existence of the will and relied on a compromise decree obtained in a previous suit.

Issues:

Whether Sharmila could prove the existence of the will dated 12.03.1980 in accordance with the law.

Held:

The Supreme Court concurred with the High Court's decision, holding that Sharmila had successfully proven the will dated 12.03.1980.

The Court found that the will was registered and executed by Ramaiah in favor of his minor children, which was a natural bequest out of love and affection.

Since the original will was not in Sharmila's possession, she relied on secondary evidence to prove its existence.

The Court noted discrepancies in a later will dated 20.05.1995, which did not mention the earlier will dated 12.03.1980.

Therefore, the compromise decree obtained in another suit was not binding on Sharmila.

Consequently, the appeal filed by Nirmala was dismissed, and Sharmila was declared the lawful owner of the properties bequeathed to her in the will dated 12.03.1980.

Facts:

The appellants, landlords, filed an eviction suit against the respondent, tenant, alleging default in payment of rent, bona fide need, sub-letting, and making of unauthorized construction in the suit shop by the respondent.

The Trial Court partly decreed the suit, finding grounds of sub-letting and unauthorized construction made out against the tenant.

The High Court reversed this decision and dismissed the eviction suit entirely.

Issues:

Whether the ground of sub-letting was made out against the respondent.

Whether the Trial Court or the High Court was correct in their findings regarding sub-letting.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the ground of sub-letting was made out against the respondent. The Court found the respondent's contradictory statements regarding the presence of Joynal Mullick in the suit shop significant. Despite the respondent's denials and conflicting testimonies, the Court inferred that the respondent failed to prove the nature of Joynal Mullick's presence adequately.

Therefore, the burden fell on the respondent to prove the nature of Joynal Mullick's presence, either as an employee or a business partner, which the respondent failed to discharge.

The Court emphasized the tenant's duty to prove that he retained exclusive possession over the premises despite the presence of another person, which the respondent failed to establish. Referring to Section 13(1)(a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and the principles laid down in Bharat Sales Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, the Court concluded that the appellants successfully proved the case of sub-letting against the respondent.

Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the Trial Court's decree in part, decreeing eviction based on the ground of sub-letting. The respondent was granted three months to vacate the premises, subject to fulfilling certain conditions regarding payment of rent and mesne profits.

Facts:

An agreement was entered into between a broadcaster and multi-system operators (MSOs) for the transmission of a news channel. The MSOs terminated the agreement, leading to a complaint to the Competition Commission of India.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the agreement by the MSOs constituted an abuse of dominant position and denial of market access?

Whether the Competition Commission's finding of abuse of dominant position was justified?

Whether a penalty should be imposed on the MSOs for the termination of the agreement?

Held:

The MSOs abused their dominant position by terminating the agreement, resulting in denial of market access to the broadcaster. This constituted a violation of Section 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act, 2002.

The Competition Commission's finding of abuse of dominant position was upheld, as the MSOs held a dominant position in the relevant market, and their action of termination constituted an abuse of this position.

Although an abuse of dominant position was established, the Court decided not to impose a penalty on the MSOs due to justifiable reasons provided for termination, such as low viewership ratings of the broadcaster.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal and the penalty imposed by the Competition Commission.

Facts:

The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai filed a complaint against the respondents due to structural issues in a building, endangering its inhabitants. The Metropolitan Magistrate refused to take cognizance of the complaint due to a delay in filing it. The Corporation appealed to the High Court, which dismissed the application but granted liberty to file appropriate proceedings. Subsequently, the Corporation filed a criminal writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which was also dismissed by the High Court, citing finality to earlier observations.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was correct in dismissing the writ petition without examining its merits based on earlier observations made without jurisdiction.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition without examining its merits. The observations made in the earlier order were not binding as they were made without jurisdiction. The Court clarified that these observations were not foundational to the jurisdictional issue and, therefore, could not be treated as final or preclusive. The Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the writ petition, directing the High Court to afford an opportunity for hearing and dispose of the case on its merits expeditiously. It was clarified that the Supreme Court hadn't expressed any opinion on the case's merits.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court clarified the jurisdictional issue and instructed the High Court to reconsider the case on its merits, emphasizing that earlier observations made without jurisdiction were not binding.

Facts:

The appellant issued a tender enquiry for the supply of Defoamers.

The respondent successfully submitted its bid and supplied the Defoamers.

A dispute arose when the respondent demanded payment, but the appellant contended that nothing was due and payable.

The respondent invoked arbitration.

The arbitrator first addressed the issue of limitation, deciding it in favor of the respondent-claimant.

Issues:

Whether an award on the issue of limitation can be considered an interim award?

Whether a decision on a point of limitation falls under the jurisdiction of Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?

Held:

The language of Section 31(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, allows for a broad interpretation of interim arbitral awards, covering any matter in dispute between the parties. Such awards can be challenged separately under Section 34 of the Act. The award in this case, addressing the issue of limitation, is deemed an interim award and is challengeable under Section 34.

The Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle under Section 16 of the Act relates to the tribunal's jurisdiction concerning the validity of the arbitration agreement, constitution of the tribunal, and adherence to the agreement regarding submitted matters. The award on limitation does not fall under Section 16's jurisdictional scope and can be challenged independently under Section 34. Legislative amendments may be considered to consolidate interim awards with final arbitral awards to streamline the challenge process.

Decision: The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal arising from a bail granted to Resham Chand Kaler by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. Resham Chand Kaler was granted bail in a case involving serious charges including murder, attempted murder, and violations of the Arms Act.

Issues:

Whether the High Court granted bail to Resham Chand Kaler without proper consideration of the serious nature of the charges and the evidence against him.

Whether there was a likelihood of Resham Chand Kaler tampering with the investigation.

Held:

The Court observed that there was a prima facie case against Resham Chand Kaler based on the evidence available, particularly from a compact disk submitted with the petition. The Court noted the seriousness and gravity of the offenses allegedly committed by Resham Chand Kaler. The Court also emphasized that the nationality of the accused should not affect the application of bail laws, stating that every accused is treated the same under the law regardless of nationality.

The Court clarified that the appeal was not seeking the cancellation of bail but rather challenging the legality of the bail order. It distinguished between the two and noted that there were no grounds for cancellation of bail as there had been no breach of bail conditions.

The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the bail granted to Resham Chand Kaler by the High Court. The Court directed the concerned authorities to take Resham Chand Kaler into custody immediately.

Facts:

Deceased, Brijitha, a widow living alone on agricultural land, employed Natarajan, father of accused no.1.

Accused no.1 (Issac alias Kishor) started staying with Brijitha to assist with agricultural work after Natarajan ceased employment due to directions from Ronald Cheriyan, Brijitha's son.

On 06.02.2006, cries were heard from Brijitha's house, and Brijitha was found unconscious while accused no.1 was found tied with a rope in the kitchen, claiming that thieves had suffocated Brijitha and stolen valuables.

Accused no.2 was arrested later, leading to the recovery of stolen items.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court's judgment and directing retrial.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the powers of the Appellate Court under Section 386 of the CrPC and established that retrial should only be ordered in exceptional cases where there is a material defect affecting the trial or causing prejudice.

The Court referred to previous judgments to delineate the circumstances under which retrial may be ordered. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeal and directed the trial court to proceed with the retrial as directed by the High Court.

Facts:

The case involves petitions concerning the interpretation of Article 233 of the Constitution of India regarding the appointment of District Judges via direct recruitment. The petitioners raised two main contentions: (i) whether candidates with seven years of advocacy experience are eligible despite being in the service of the Union or State at the time of application/appointment, and (ii) whether members of the judicial service with seven years of service should be considered eligible candidates.

Issues:

Interpretation of Article 233 regarding eligibility criteria for appointment as District Judges.

Determination of eligibility based on the duration of advocacy experience and membership in the judicial service.

Held:

The court concluded that the case raised substantial questions of law regarding the interpretation of Article 233. It recommended the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for the constitution of an appropriate bench.

Notably, the court highlighted the distinction between candidates from the judicial service and those from the bar in terms of eligibility criteria, emphasizing the requirement for candidates to have seven years of continuous practice as advocates immediately preceding the application.

The court also clarified that eligibility for appointment as a district judge should be assessed at the time of application, appointment, or both. It noted the special circumstances of petitioners who had participated in examinations and interviews pending the resolution of their cases, suggesting seeking appropriate orders for an early posting from the Chief Justice of India.