Facts:

The appellant's daughter married respondent No. 2, but due to societal non-acceptance, she lived with the appellant.

The daughter died during a trip with respondent No. 2, allegedly due to a car accident.

The appellant filed an FIR under sections 498-A, 302, and 120-B IPC.

The State Government transferred the case to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

Respondent No. 2 was arrested but granted bail by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to grant bail to respondent No. 2 was appropriate considering the seriousness of the charges against him.

Held:

The Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant bail to respondent No. 2.

The Court emphasized the limited scope of interference with an order granting bail and the parameters on which such an order can be challenged.

It was noted that the reasons provided by the High Court for granting bail were reasonable and not perverse.

The Court emphasized that the seriousness of the offense alone cannot be the sole ground for denying bail if other compelling circumstances justify its grant.

Reports from agencies such as CRRI, AIIMS, CFSL, and IIT were mentioned, but their evidentiary value was yet to be tested in trial.

The burden of proof lies on the prosecution to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the death was a result of murder and that respondent No. 2 committed the crime.

Relevant factors were considered by the High Court while granting bail, and the order was supported by reasoning.

The Court highlighted that initially, there was no suspicion after the incident, as postmortem was conducted in the presence of family members and doctors who did not raise any doubts.

The delay in lodging the FIR (nine days after the incident) was also considered.

Material collected by the CBI during investigation was primarily documentary and based on photographs, which needed to be tested during trial.

Decision: The appeals challenging the grant of bail to respondent No. 2 were dismissed by the Court.

Facts:

An agreement was made between Puri Constructions Pvt Ltd and the State of Madhya Pradesh for the construction of an Assembly building in Madhya Pradesh.

Disputes arose from this agreement, leading to arbitration proceedings and the issuance of an award.

Execution proceedings were initiated by Puri Constructions Pvt Ltd, and the matter was taken up before the High Court of Delhi.

Issues:

The enforceability of the decree depended on the outcome of another pending appeal (FAO (OS) No. 23/1998) between the parties.

Treatment of the arbitration proceedings and their transfer under the M.P. Act.

Held:

The Division Bench, in an order dated 5th July 2012, stated that the enforceability of the decree would depend on the outcome of another pending appeal between the parties.

Given that the award had been issued long ago and not challenged by the respondents, and the matter was still at the execution stage, the Court directed that the award should be treated as if rendered under the M.P. Act.

Therefore, the Court ordered that the pending arbitration proceedings be transferred to the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal under the M.P. Act, to be handled according to its provisions and the law.

Decision: The appeal was disposed of accordingly, and the parties were instructed to appear before the High Court/Tribunal for further proceedings on 9th July 2018.

Facts:

The dispute centered around 500 square yards of land in Survey No.87 of Lingampally Village, Chikkadapally Mandal, Hyderabad District. The appellants claimed ownership of the land, while the respondents were accused of land grabbing. Litigation ensued over several decades, spanning multiple suits and proceedings in civil courts and eventually before the Special Court established under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.

Issues:

Jurisdiction of civil courts versus Special Courts under the Act.

Ownership of the disputed land.

Allegations of land grabbing against the respondents.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellants' repeated litigation over several decades, despite the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, was unwarranted. The Court found that the appellants failed to establish their ownership of the disputed land and could not prove the respondents' involvement in land grabbing. Additionally, there was ambiguity regarding the location, extent, and boundaries of the alleged grabbed land.

The Court emphasized that the appellants' persistence in pursuing litigation in civil courts, even after the enactment of the Act, was misguided. The Court opined that the appellants should have approached the Special Court under the Act if they believed that civil courts lacked jurisdiction. The Court dismissed the appeal and imposed costs of Rs. 50,000 on the appellants for engaging in continuous and fruitless litigation.

Facts:

The case involved Gangotri Enterprises Ltd. as the appellant and Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation and another as the respondents. The matter pertained to the interpretation of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 ("1983 Act").

Issues:

The interpretation of the term "dispute" as defined in Section 2(d) of the 1983 Act and the eligibility criteria for arbitrators under Section 4(3)(iii) of the same Act.

Held:

The judgment clarified the definition of "dispute" under Section 2(d) of the 1983 Act, stating that it includes a claim of ascertained money valued at Rupees 50,000 or more arising from the execution or non-execution of a works contract. It further clarified that "ascertained money" encompasses both the amount already determined and the amount that may be determined during proceedings based on the claims or counterclaims of the parties.

Additionally, the judgment referred to Section 4(3)(iii) of the 1983 Act, stating that an employee of a party to the dispute cannot act as an arbitrator. The provision specifies qualifications for appointment as a member of the Tribunal, excluding employees of the concerned department to which the dispute relates.

The appeal was disposed of accordingly. Delay in related special leave petitions was condoned, and they were disposed of in line with the order in another related special leave petition. Pending applications were also disposed of.

Facts:

The plaintiff, Shri Ramchander Ji, filed a civil suit against the defendant, Chandrabhan Singh, seeking eviction from the suit house due to non-payment of rent. The defendant contested the suit, denying the allegations made by the plaintiff. The trial court, as well as subsequent appellate courts, ruled in favor of the plaintiff, granting the eviction of the defendant based on arrears of rent.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 20(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Act and its proviso. Specifically,

Whether the defendant, Chandrabhan Singh, could claim the benefit of Section 20(4) to avoid eviction despite the presence of the proviso.

Held:

The court upheld the eviction decree against the defendant, Chandrabhan Singh, stating that his son, a member of the family as defined under the Act, had built his own house in the same city. Therefore, Chandrabhan Singh could not claim the benefit of Section 20(4) to avoid eviction.

The court emphasized the importance of the proviso to Section 20(4), which disentitles a tenant from claiming the benefit of avoiding eviction if the tenant or any family member has built or acquired a residential building in the same city. The court found no merit in the defendant's argument that the proviso should only apply if the family member was living with him in the tenanted premises.

Accordingly, the appeal by Chandrabhan Singh's legal representatives was dismissed, and they were given three months to vacate the premises, provided they deposited all arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation.

Facts:

The Ministry of Home Affairs, Union of India, formed a committee to address the shortage of police officials in the IPS.

The committee recommended the introduction of the Limited Competitive Examination (LCE) as a method of recruitment to the IPS, in addition to direct recruitment and promotion from State Police Services.

The Union of India partially accepted the committee's recommendations and introduced recruitment through LCE.

Despite conducting examinations and interviews, the results of the LCE held in 2012 had not been declared.

Legal challenges were raised against the introduction of LCE and the subsequent delays in the selection process.

The Union of India ultimately decided to scrap the LCE held in 2012, citing various reasons including a decrease in vacancies, delays in the selection process, pending litigation, and potential seniority disputes.

Issues:

Whether the decision of the Union of India to cancel the recruitment process through LCE is legal and valid.

Held:

The Court held that merely being selected through a recruitment process does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment.

While candidates may have legitimate expectations, the government has the discretion to change policies for valid reasons.

The decision to scrap the LCE was found to be reasonable, not arbitrary, discriminatory, or capricious, and was taken in the public interest.

The Court emphasized the duty of the government to act fairly and justified the decision in light of the reasons provided by the Union of India.

Consequently, all transferred cases were rendered infructuous and disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The appellant-husband filed a petition seeking dissolution of marriage on grounds of desertion and cruelty.

The Family Court granted the divorce and directed the husband to pay permanent alimony of Rs. 15,00,000/- to the wife, along with litigation expenses.

The husband appealed against the alimony amount to the High Court, which dismissed the appeal.

The husband then appealed to the Supreme Court via a special leave petition.

Issues:

Whether the courts adequately considered the factual and legal aspects concerning the award of permanent alimony.

Whether the absence of reasoning in the lower courts' orders prejudiced the appellant.

Whether the matter should be remanded back to the Family Court for fresh consideration.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the lower courts failed to provide reasoned orders regarding the award of permanent alimony, causing prejudice to the appellant. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of both the High Court and the Family Court regarding the permanent alimony amount and remanded the case back to the Family Court for fresh consideration.

The Family Court was directed to determine the quantum of permanent alimony afresh, considering the legal principles and evidence presented, within a timeframe of six months.

Additionally, the appellant was instructed to continue paying the monthly maintenance amount until the final determination of the permanent alimony amount. It was clarified that the decision to remand the case did not imply any opinion on the merits of the controversy, and the Family Court was directed to decide the matter strictly in accordance with the law, granting the parties liberty to amend pleadings and present evidence if required. (Para 10-24)

FACTS:

The appellant-husband filed for dissolution of marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in India, while the respondent-wife initiated divorce proceedings in a court in Florida, USA, citing irretrievable breakdown of marriage among other reliefs. The appellant sought an anti-suit injunction to prevent the respondent from pursuing the case in the US court.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellant-husband is entitled to an anti-suit injunction against the respondent-wife.

Whether the court in Gurgaon, India, has jurisdiction over the matter.

Whether the proceedings in the US court should be stayed.

HELD:

The court emphasized that anti-suit injunctions are to be granted sparingly and with caution due to their impact on the jurisdiction of another court. The principles governing the grant of such injunctions were outlined, with reference to Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Discusses the limitations outlined in Section 41(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, regarding situations where injunctions cannot be granted.

The court interprets Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and references previous judgments to establish principles for granting anti-suit injunctions, emphasizing the need for comity between courts.

Concludes that there is no evidence to suggest that the appellant-husband would suffer grave injustice if the injunction was not granted. The court found that the proceedings in the US court were not oppressive or vexatious, and thus, declined to interfere with the decision of the High Court. The appeal was dismissed.

Refered Cases:

Harmeeta Singh Vs. Rajat Taneja, (2003) 67 DRJ 58

Modi Entertainment Network Vs. WSG Cricket PTE Ltd., (2003) 4 SCC 341

Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Western Company of North America, (1987) 1 SCC 496

Rakesh Kumar Vs. Ms. Ashima Kumar, AIR 2007 P&H 63

Y. Narasimha Rao Vs. Y. Venkata Lakshmi, (1991) 3 SCC 451

Facts:

The case involved three respondent companies deciding on a de-merger/amalgamation, with various agreements such as Share Subscription Agreement (SSA), Share Purchase Agreement (SPA), Open Offer, and Market Purchases being part of the transaction. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) sent a notice under Section 6(2) to the appellant-Commission, notifying only the 'Demerger' and 'Amalgamation' and not the other transactions like market purchases. However, these other transactions were disclosed while claiming exemption under Section 5.

Issues:

Whether the failure to notify certain transactions under Section 6(2) warrants the imposition of penalty under Section 43A of the Competition Act, 2002.

Whether the interconnected nature of transactions affects the obligation to notify under Section 6(2) and the subsequent imposition of penalty under Section 43A.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that all the transactions were part of the same transaction, intrinsically connected and interdependent on each other, forming one viable part of a business transaction.

Regulation 9(4) of the Competition Commission of India (Procedure in Regard to the Transaction of Business Relating to Combinations) Regulations, 2011 acknowledges the possibility of business transactions being interconnected or interdependent steps of such transactions.

The court emphasized that the substance of transactions is more relevant in assessing their effect on competition, irrespective of whether they are pursued through one or more steps/transactions. Structuring transactions to avoid compliance with the Act's provisions is not permissible.

Mens rea (intent) is not necessary for the imposition of penalty under Section 43A, as it deals with civil obligations. The breach of the provision itself is punishable, and the penalty is attracted on its violation.

The court held that the order passed by the CCI imposing the penalty was just and proper, and the Tribunal's decision to set it aside was incorrect. Therefore, the court allowed the appeal and reinstated the penalty imposed by the CCI.

Decision: In light of the above findings, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and reinstated the penalty imposed by the CCI.