Facts:

Capt. Paul Nadar Bennet Singh applied for the position of Pilot Officer at Tuticorin Port Trust and was appointed on a regular basis subject to conditions.

His appointment was terminated by the appellants citing regulations related to temporary service.

Capt. Singh challenged the termination, leading to the High Court's decision in his favor.

The appellants contended that Capt. Singh's certificate of competency as Master, issued by the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, was not recognized by the Government of India.

Issues:

Whether Capt. Singh's termination was valid due to the alleged invalidity of his certificate of competency.

Whether the High Court's decision to reinstate Capt. Singh with back wages was justified.

Held:

The Court found no substance in the appellants' contention regarding the invalidity of Capt. Singh's appointment based on his certificate of competency.

The Court noted that the advertisement for the Pilot Officer position did not specify recognition by the Government of India, and the appointment letter did not raise any objections to Capt. Singh's certificate.

The Deputy Nautical Advisor clarified that while the certificate issued by Singapore was not recognized under Indian law, the port trust could be guided by its own regulations.

Capt. Singh had passed the examination for the pilot license, and his appointment was on a regular basis, which further supported the validity of his appointment.

Therefore, the Court upheld the High Court's decision to reinstate Capt. Singh with back wages, modifying the back wages to 40% from 2012 until the date of joining.

This judgment was passed based on the specific facts of the case and was not intended as a precedent for future cases.

Facts:

The case involved the eligibility criteria for the post of Technician-III in the Power Development Department of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The J & K State Service Selection Board (SSSB) had advertised the position, specifying the qualification as "Matric with ITI." Several individuals, including the appellants, possessed diplomas in Electrical Engineering or Electronics and Communication, rather than the specified ITI qualification. After the selection process, the SSSB excluded the appellants from the select list because they did not possess the required ITI qualification.

Issues:

Whether the appellants, who possessed diplomas but not the specified ITI qualification, were eligible for the post of Technician-III.

Whether the actions of the SSSB in excluding the appellants from the select list were justified.

Held:

The Court held that the prescribed qualification for the post of Technician-III was "Matric with ITI," as specified in the advertisement issued by the SSSB. The Court rejected arguments that a diploma should be considered a higher qualification and that candidates should be eligible based on a presumption of acquiring the lower qualification. It emphasized that such presumptions could only be made under specific statutory rules, which were absent in this case.

The Court also addressed the enabling provision in Note 12 of the advertisement, which allowed the SSSB to grant weightage to higher qualifications. However, it emphasized that the decision to grant such weightage was within the discretion of the SSSB and did not create a vested right for candidates.

Ultimately, the Court upheld the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, which had ruled that the appellants did not meet the prescribed qualifications. However, considering the prolonged legal process and the potential age-barred status of the appellants for future applications, the Court granted them an age relaxation of four years for any future posts advertised by the State of Jammu and Kashmir until November 30, 2020.

Facts:

The appellant, Vivek Mudgil, challenged the order passed by the U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board regarding his appointment as Principal.

The appellant's appointment was cancelled due to not fulfilling the required qualification of possessing ten years of teaching experience.

The appellant, initially a Lecturer, had his services regularized in 1990. He had a period of study leave from 1992 to 1996, during which he pursued higher studies in Czechoslovakia.

The Board considered this period as not counting towards teaching experience. The appellant fell short of the required teaching experience by nine months when he applied for the Principal position.

Issues:

Whether the appellant met the eligibility criteria for the position of Principal.

Whether the period of study leave should count towards teaching experience.

Whether the exemption granted by the Board affected the appellant's eligibility.

Held:

The Court dismissed the appeals and disposed of the transferred case. The Court held that the possession of ten years of teaching experience was a necessary qualification for the appointment as Principal.

The exemption granted by the Board did not cure the appellant's disqualification as of the last date of application submission and the date of preparing the panel. The Court emphasized that the exemption was not granted retrospectively and did not affect the appellant's eligibility at the time of application.

The Court left open the question of whether the respondent authorities had the power to grant exemptions under Section 16-E(3) of the 1921 Act after the enactment of the 1982 Act, allowing parties to approach the High Court if necessary to decide this issue independently.

Facts:

The appellant, S.C. Singh, challenged a resolution of the High Court of Uttarakhand that terminated the College Development Council (CDC) but allowed its continuation without the appellant as its Director.

The appellant was appointed as Director, CDC, in November 1992, for a tenure of three years, based on an advertisement by the University.

The revised guidelines by the University Grants Commission (UGC) specified a tenure of three years for the Director, extendable for another term of three years.

Issues:

Whether the tenure limitation for the Director of CDC applied only to deputationists or to all appointments.

Whether the appellant could continue as Director, CDC, beyond the prescribed tenure.

Held:

The Supreme Court interpreted the relevant clause of the revised guidelines and rejected the appellant's argument that the tenure limitation applied only to deputationists. It held that the tenure limitation applied to all appointments to the post of Director, CDC.

The Court upheld the judgment of the High Court, stating that the appellant had served the prescribed tenure and could not continue as Director, CDC.

The appeal was dismissed, and consequently, the contempt petition also did not survive. No costs were awarded.

Facts:Squadron Leader (Retd.) Navtej Singh appealed against the invalidation of his service on medical grounds and sought recognition of his marriage to a foreign national, along with benefits for his family. He had married without prior permission as required by Air Force regulations. Despite the lack of permission, no disciplinary action was taken against him.

Issues:

Recognition of marriage with a foreign national by a retired Indian Air Force officer.

Entitlement of family members to benefits.

Held:

The Court held that since the appellant was no longer subject to the Indian Air Force Act, he could validly contract marriage with a foreign national after his release or retirement. The Court directed the respondents to include the names of the appellant's wife and daughter in his Service Certificate from the date of his release or retirement. Additionally, the respondents were ordered to extend all benefits entitled to the spouse and children of a retired officer to the appellant's family.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, we therefore direct the respondents to include the names of the wife and daughter of the appellant in the Service Certificate at least from the date of his release or retirement and direct the respondents to extend to the wife and the daughter of the appellant all such benefits which a spouse and children of a retired officer would be entitled.

Facts:

Indian Oil Corporation issued an advertisement inviting applications for different Kisan Seva Kendra (Retail Outlet) dealerships, including one located on Falka Gerabari Road in Bihar.

Sanjay Kumar Jha (appellant) and Prakash Chandra Chaudhary (respondent) applied for the dealership.

A panel of candidates was prepared, with Jha ranked first and Chaudhary second.

Chaudhary challenged the allotment in the High Court, alleging discrepancies in the evaluation process.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's intervention was justified in this matter.

Whether the decisions of the Single Bench and the Division Bench were erroneous.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's intervention was not justified. It criticized both the Single Bench and the Division Bench for errors in their judgments.

The Court stated that the High Court should not have adjudicated disputed factual issues, as it falls outside the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution. Additionally, the Court emphasized that the High Court erred in making a comparative assessment of the suitability of different candidates for the dealership.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court found fault with the Division Bench for proceeding on a mistaken understanding of the facts, particularly regarding the location of the land in question. It noted that the Division Bench disregarded reports from Revenue Authorities and made errors in its analysis.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgments of both the Single Bench and the Division Bench. The writ petition filed by Prakash Chandra Chaudhary was dismissed, and each party was directed to bear its own costs.

Facts:

The appellant, a contractor, entered into an agreement with the Union of India for the construction of permanent shelters in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Differences arose between the parties regarding the construction work, leading to arbitration.

The arbitrator made an award in favor of the appellant, directing the respondent to pay a certain sum.

The respondent filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to set aside the arbitral award, but faced delays due to jurisdictional issues and administrative difficulties.

Issues:

Whether the delay of 514 days in filing the application under Section 34 can be condoned.

Whether the statutory provisions and precedents support the condonation of such a delay.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the delay of 514 days could not be condoned as it exceeded the strict timeline prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court analyzed the statutory provisions and precedents, emphasizing that the extension beyond the specified timeline of three months could only be granted for a further period of thirty days on showing sufficient cause, but not thereafter.

Despite considering the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which deals with the exclusion of time spent in prosecuting another civil proceeding, the Court found that there remained a delay of 131 days in filing the application. This exceeded the statutory limitation prescribed in Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act.

Therefore, the Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismissed the petition under Section 34, ruling that it was barred by limitation.

Facts:

The case of Mahender Chawla & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 156 of 2016) involved petitioners alleging threats from the accused if they testified against them. The petitioners contended that numerous witnesses had been attacked, and some had even been killed. The matter concerned the abysmal state of witness protection in India and its impact on the administration of criminal justice.

Issues:

The court was the inadequacy of witness protection measures in India, leading to witnesses facing intimidation and reluctance to testify truthfully.

The court needed to address the constitutional implications of failing to protect witnesses and the consequent denial of a fair trial.

Held:

The court recognized the indispensable role of witnesses in the judicial system, particularly in criminal cases where testimonies often determine factual findings.

Despite their significance, witnesses in India face dire circumstances, including threats and trauma, due to the lack of a comprehensive witness protection program.

The failure to provide adequate protection to witnesses results in many turning hostile, especially in cases involving influential or violent accused individuals.

Witness protection is crucial for ensuring fair trials and upholding the rule of law, as failure to hear material witnesses amounts to a denial of justice.

The Witness Protection Scheme, 2018, prepared by the Union of India, was recognized as a temporary measure until suitable legislation is enacted. The scheme aims to identify threats to witnesses and ensure their safety during legal proceedings.

The court directed the States of Uttar Pradesh and Haryana to provide adequate security to the petitioners.

It mandated the establishment of vulnerable witness deposition complexes in district courts across India within a year to facilitate secure testimony.

Facts:

The case involved a complaint filed by Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited (RJIL) alleging anti-competitive practices by three major telecom operators (IDOs) and the Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI). RJIL asserted that the IDOs intentionally ignored requests for Point of Interconnection (POI) augmentation, causing network congestion and call failures. Allegations were also made regarding the denial of Mobile Number Portability (MNP) requests by IDOs and COAI's alleged bias towards IDOs.

Issues:

The primary issues revolved around the jurisdiction of the CCI to handle the matter, considering the specialized regulatory framework governing the telecom sector under the TRAI Act.

Additionally, the maintainability of writ petitions challenging CCI's jurisdictional authority was in question.

Held:

The court held that TRAI, as a specialized regulator for the telecom sector, should initially address disputes related to telecom regulations, including interconnection agreements and compliance with license conditions. These issues fall within TRAI's expertise and statutory mandate. Therefore, CCI's jurisdiction is limited until TRAI determines jurisdictional aspects. [

While TRAI deals with regulatory aspects, the CCI retains authority to investigate and address anti-competitive practices in the telecom sector. The CCI's role is crucial in ensuring fair competition and preventing practices that adversely affect competition.

The court affirmed the maintainability of writ petitions challenging CCI's jurisdictional authority, emphasizing the importance of judicial review in such matters.

CCI's order directing an investigation based on prima facie evidence was administrative in nature. The High Court couldn't adjudicate on the merits of the case but could review jurisdictional issues.

Decision: The court upheld the High Court's decision to quash CCI's order, as it was premature for CCI to proceed before TRAI resolved jurisdictional aspects. However, the court emphasized that CCI's role in addressing anti-competitive practices remains significant, complementing TRAI's regulatory functions.