Facts:

The case involved a partition suit filed by a son of a deceased coparcener (GS) against his widow, two daughters (the appellants), and other family members.

Issues:

Whether the rights of daughters in coparcenary property, as per the amended Section 6, are preserved if a preliminary decree has been passed in a partition suit?

How does the amended Section 6 affect the division of joint family property among the heirs?

Held:

The Amendment Act, 2005, amending Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, unequivocally grants daughters equal rights as sons in coparcenary properties.

The court clarified that the rights of daughters in coparcenary property are not extinguished by a preliminary decree in a partition suit; final partition occurs only with the passing of a final decree.

The daughters' rights crystallized in 2005 when Section 6 was amended, and the preliminary decree needed to be amended to reflect this change in the law.

As per the amended law, the daughters (appellants) were entitled to a share in the joint family property, along with the sons and widow of the deceased coparcener. The court outlined the distribution of shares among the family members based on their entitlements.

Decision: The court ruled in favor of the appellants, affirming their right to a share in the joint family property as per the amended Section 6.

Facts:

The respondent, Ultratech Cement Ltd., availed Cenvat Credit of service tax paid on outward transportation of goods from their premises to the customer's premises. The Commissioner of Central Excise issued a show cause notice alleging the inadmissibility of this credit, leading to subsequent appeals and legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the service of a Goods Transport Agency used for the transportation of goods from the factory to the customer's premises could be considered as an input service under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Cenvat Credit on goods transport agency service availed for the transport of goods from the place of removal to the buyer's premises was not admissible to the respondent. This decision was based on the amended definition of "input service" under Rule 2(l), which limited the credit only up to the place of removal.

The Court emphasized that the Board's circular, which clarified the definition of "place of removal," applied to the unamended regime and could not be applied post-amendment.

Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the High Court was set aside, restoring the Order-in-Original dated August 22, 2011.

Facts:

Upon receiving information, the police intercepted the respondent, Jarooparam, and found him in possession of 7.2 kg of contraband material (opium). The prosecution alleged violations of Sections 8/18 (B) read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act. The trial court convicted the accused, but the High Court acquitted him due to discrepancies in the prosecution's case.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution adequately proved the case against the accused.

Whether proper procedures were followed regarding the disposal of seized property and the recording of the accused's statement.

Whether there were inconsistencies in witness testimony.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment and dismissed the appeal. The court found that discrepancies existed regarding the disposal of seized property and the recording of the accused's statement, which undermined the prosecution's case.

The failure to produce the bulk quantity of seized opium raised doubts about the genuineness of the samples drawn from the contraband. The court emphasized that proper procedures under Section 52A of the NDPS Act were not followed for the disposal of seized property.

Additionally, inconsistencies in witness testimony and the recording of the accused's statement further weakened the prosecution's case.

The court stated: "For the aforesaid reasons, we are in complete agreement with the judgment of the High Court. We do not find any reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgment. The appeal lacks merit and is dismissed."

Facts:

On December 1, 2016, the appellant-accused was arrested. An application for extension of time to file the charge-sheet was filed by the Additional Public Prosecutor on February 28, 2017, before the expiry of the initial 90-day period. The appellant filed a bail application on March 2, 2017, after the expiry of the 90-day period. The judicial custody was extended until March 8, 2017, when the charge sheet was filed.

Issues:

Whether the appellant had an accrued right for statutory bail on the ground of default.

The impact of filing the supplementary charge-sheet on the appellant's claim for bail.

Held:

The Additional Public Prosecutor's report for extension of time was filed within the initial 90-day period, before the appellant's first bail application. The appellant had no accrued right for bail on the ground of default. The mere lapse of the 90-day period did not automatically entitle the appellant to statutory bail.

No right had accrued to the appellant before the filing of the charge-sheet; at best, it was an inchoate right until March 8, 2017. Granting statutory bail after filing the charge-sheet and during the pendency of the application for extension of time was impermissible.

The consideration of the statutory bail application depended on the rejection of the request for extension of time by the Additional Public Prosecutor. The court should first deal with the extension request before considering bail.

The judicial custody was extended until March 8, 2017, when the charge sheet was filed. The High Court's approach in extending the period for filing the charge-sheet until March 8, 2017, was correct.

The appellant's statutory bail application on March 2, 2017, was premature as the request for extension of time by the Additional Public Prosecutor remained pending until March 8, 2017.

The Additional Public Prosecutor's request for extension remained pending until March 8, 2017, and was disposed of as infructuous after the charge-sheet was filed. The High Court correctly affirmed this decision.

Considering the circumstances, the report was submitted before the expiry of the initial 90-day period, and the request was disposed of as infructuous after the charge-sheet was filed. The appellant's right to statutory bail would have enured only after the rejection of the request for extension of time.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Rule 8D under Section 14A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, specifically focusing on whether the rule operates retrospectively or prospectively.

Issues:

Whether Rule 8D under Section 14A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is prospective or retrospective in nature?

Held:

The court emphasized the principle that every statute is prima facie prospective unless expressly or impliedly made retrospective .

Amendments to Section 14A, including the insertion of sub-sections (2) and (3), were intended to have effect from 01.04.2007, as per the Finance Act, 2006, and circulars issued by the CBDT .

Rule 8D, introduced by notification dated 24.03.2008, provided a methodology for computing expenditure, aligning with the amendments to Section 14A, and was thus prospective in nature .

The retrospective application of Rule 8D would conflict with subsequent amendments, such as the Income Tax (Fourteenth Amendment) Rules, 2016, indicating its prospective operation .

Decision: The court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue, affirming that Rule 8D operates prospectively and cannot be applied to any assessment year prior to Assessment Year 2008-09.

Facts:

The appellant, Ashish Kumar, applied for the position of Psychologist, advertised by the Social Welfare Department of Uttar Pradesh. He claimed to meet the qualifications mentioned in the advertisement but was denied appointment due to a lack of L.T./B.T. B.Ed. qualification.

Issues:

The central issue was the interpretation of the advertisement's qualification criteria—whether a graduate degree in Psychology was sufficient or if it needed to be accompanied by L.T./B.T. B.Ed. certification.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the language of the advertisement and concluded that the qualifications mentioned—graduate in Psychology or L.T./B.T. B.Ed. with Psychology—were alternative qualifications. The use of a stroke (/) between the qualifications indicated that either qualification sufficed. Furthermore, the Court examined the relevant statutory rules, specifically the Janjatiya Vikas Shikshan Aur Kermchariverg Sewa Niyamawali, 1991, which governed the recruitment process. According to these rules, the essential qualification for the post of Psychologist was a Master's degree in Psychology, with B.Ed. being a preferable but not mandatory qualification.

The Court emphasized that when there is a conflict between the advertisement and statutory rules, the latter prevails. Since the appellant met the qualifications prescribed in the 1991 Rules, his denial of appointment based on the misinterpretation of the advertisement was deemed arbitrary and illegal.

Consequently, the Court directed the respondents to issue an appointment order to the appellant for the post of Psychologist within two months from the date of the order. The judgments of the High Court were set aside, and the appeals were allowed in favor of the appellant.

Facts:

Municipal Council demanded external development charges from National Fertilizers Limited and Gas Authority of India Limited based on a government notification.

Respondents contested, arguing they were not liable under the notification as they were Central Government entities providing housing for their employees.

District Judge ruled in favor of respondents, but the High Court overturned this decision on procedural grounds.

Issues:

Whether the respondents are liable to pay external development charges to the Municipal Council as demanded.

Whether the suits were maintainable without certain notices under procedural laws.

Held:

The Court, after thorough consideration, held that the respondents were not liable to pay external development charges. The charges, as per relevant government orders, were meant for housing construction societies, colonizers, or individuals, which did not apply to the respondents who were government entities providing housing for their employees.

The Court upheld the judgments of the trial court and High Court, dismissing the appeals filed by the Municipal Council. This was held in light of the fact that the lower courts had correctly examined the issue and concluded that the respondents were not obligated to pay the charges.

The Court thus affirmed the decision of the lower courts based on legal interpretation and factual analysis.

Facts:

The case involved the question of whether videography of the crime scene or recovery scene during investigation should be necessary to inspire confidence in the collected evidence.

Arguments were made regarding the applicability of Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, which mandates a certificate for electronic evidence produced.

Issues:

The admissibility of electronic evidence, especially when the party producing the evidence is not in possession of the device generating the evidence.

Discussion also involved the necessity of videography in crime scene investigation and the potential benefits of new technological devices for evidence collection.

Held:

The court clarified the legal position on the admissibility of electronic evidence:

The requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act may not always be mandatory, especially if the interest of justice justifies relaxation.

A party not in possession of the device from which electronic evidence is produced cannot be required to produce such a certificate.

Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act are procedural provisions and not a complete code on the subject.

The court adjourned the matter to finalize the roadmap for the use of videography in crime scenes and the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the same.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that six accused persons, motivated by old enmity, assaulted PW-2 and his brother. While one accused (A-1) was apprehended at the scene, the others managed to flee.

The deceased brother initially did not name two of the accused (A-2 and A-3) in his statement to the police. Subsequent statements by PW-2 included these names without specific attributions of actions or weapons to them. Moreover, there was no recovery of weapons or expert opinions implicating A-2 and A-.

Issues:

Whether the Courts below were justified in convicting the accused-appellants.

Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The court emphasized that oral evidence takes precedence over medical evidence unless the latter completely refutes the possibility of the incident. It highlighted the necessity for the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, emphasizing that convictions cannot be based on suspicion or probability.

Regarding the involvement of accused A-5 and A-6, their names were mentioned in the FIR and in statements by the deceased. Additionally, the recovery of weapons supported the case against them. Despite the absence of specific overt acts attributed to them, the evidence of injuries sustained by the deceased and consistent statements of prosecution witnesses established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ultimately, the court set aside the convictions of accused A-2 and A-3 due to lack of evidence beyond reasonable doubt. However, it upheld the convictions and sentences of A-1 under section 302 IPC and A-5 and A-6 under section 307 read with section 34 IPC, as their roles were proven with cogent evidence.

Decision: The conviction and sentence against A-2 and A-3 are set aside . However, the conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC with respect to A-1 and the conviction and sentence under Section 307 read with 34 IPC with respect to A-5 and A-6 are maintained.