Facts:

The appellant firm, engaged in the business of purchasing and selling sandalwood oil, had sandalwood oil seized from its premises by the Kasargod Police. Subsequently, a show cause notice was issued proposing confiscation of the seized sandalwood oil under the Kerala Forest Act, 1961. The appellants contested the confiscation, claiming ownership of the seized quantity.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in upholding the order of confiscation under Section 61-A of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961.

Whether confiscation of sandalwood oil can be ordered under Section 61-A or Section 69 of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the order of confiscation was made under Section 69 of the Act, not under Section 61-A as cited by the High Court. Sandalwood oil was not covered under Section 61-A, which only pertains to certain specified items. Section 69 merely establishes a presumption of government ownership and does not confer the power of confiscation. Therefore, the confiscation order was deemed illegal and was set aside.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh and another party against Keti Construction. The dispute pertained to an impugned order that needed reconsideration in light of relevant legal precedents.

Issues:

Whether the impugned order should be set aside and the matter remanded to the High Court for further consideration in accordance with the law as established by the newer judgment of the Supreme Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the arguments and perusing the record, held that the impugned order should indeed be set aside. The matter was to be remanded to the High Court for reconsideration as per the law established by a newer judgment of the Supreme Court, which had overturned a previous decision. Civil Revision No. 509 of 2005 was restored to its original number. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The appeal was filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr against Ashoka Infraways Ltd & Anr. The impugned order relied on a judgment which had been overruled by a larger bench of the High Court.

Issues:

The validity of the impugned order in light of the subsequent overruling of the judgment it relied upon.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the impugned order was set aside because the judgment it relied upon had been overruled by a larger bench of the High Court, as stated in the case of Viva Highways Ltd. vs. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation, (2017) 2 MPLJ 681.

The Court further clarified that any pending arbitration proceedings would now be governed by the judgment of the High Court in the aforementioned case.

Facts:The appellant society initially established a college as a secular institution. Later, it sought minority status for the college. The National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions (NCMEI) declared the college as a minority educational institution and issued a minority status certificate. Subsequently, the Society and the Governing Body of the College filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the declaration and the issuance of the certificate.

Issues:

Whether the NCMEI had jurisdiction to make the declaration of minority status to the educational institution.

Whether the orders issued by the NCMEI were valid.

Held:

The Supreme Court interpreted Section 11(f) of the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004 broadly, empowering the NCMEI to decide any question related to the right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions. This includes the power to declare an institution as a minority educational institution. (Para 16)

While the Amendment Act, 2006 introduced Section 10(1) for granting a no objection certificate to minority educational institutions at their inception, Section 11(f) retains the power for the declaration of minority status to educational institutions at any stage post-establishment. (Para 17)

The fundamental right under Article 30 cannot be waived. The court observed that the acceptance of NCMEI's order by the University of North Bengal binds the parties, and there's no need for a fresh hearing. (Para 22)

The court declared the orders by NCMEI as valid, affirming its jurisdiction to issue a certificate regarding the status of a minority educational institution. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the judgment of the Calcutta High Court is set aside. In view of the above, the present batch of appeals is disposed of. (Para 23 - 24)

Facts:

The case involved an incident where the appellants, along with others, were accused of assaulting the victim, resulting in his death. The prosecution's case relied primarily on the testimony of two key witnesses, PW1 and PW5. However, the Supreme Court found significant contradictions and discrepancies in their testimonies, particularly regarding the genesis of the FIR and the roles attributed to the accused.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the trial court and the High Court erred in convicting the appellants based on assumptions and presumptions rather than credible evidence.

Held:

In view of the contradictions and discrepancies in the testimonies of the key witnesses, as well as the lack of corroborative evidence and support from other prosecution witnesses, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court and the High Court were criticized for convicting the appellants based on assumptions and presumptions rather than credible evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and acquitted the appellants of all charges, overturning their convictions and sentences.

Facts:

The appellant's daughter married respondent No. 2, but due to societal non-acceptance, she lived with the appellant.

The daughter died during a trip with respondent No. 2, allegedly due to a car accident.

The appellant filed an FIR under sections 498-A, 302, and 120-B IPC.

The State Government transferred the case to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

Respondent No. 2 was arrested but granted bail by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to grant bail to respondent No. 2 was appropriate considering the seriousness of the charges against him.

Held:

The Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant bail to respondent No. 2.

The Court emphasized the limited scope of interference with an order granting bail and the parameters on which such an order can be challenged.

It was noted that the reasons provided by the High Court for granting bail were reasonable and not perverse.

The Court emphasized that the seriousness of the offense alone cannot be the sole ground for denying bail if other compelling circumstances justify its grant.

Reports from agencies such as CRRI, AIIMS, CFSL, and IIT were mentioned, but their evidentiary value was yet to be tested in trial.

The burden of proof lies on the prosecution to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the death was a result of murder and that respondent No. 2 committed the crime.

Relevant factors were considered by the High Court while granting bail, and the order was supported by reasoning.

The Court highlighted that initially, there was no suspicion after the incident, as postmortem was conducted in the presence of family members and doctors who did not raise any doubts.

The delay in lodging the FIR (nine days after the incident) was also considered.

Material collected by the CBI during investigation was primarily documentary and based on photographs, which needed to be tested during trial.

Decision: The appeals challenging the grant of bail to respondent No. 2 were dismissed by the Court.

Facts:

An agreement was made between Puri Constructions Pvt Ltd and the State of Madhya Pradesh for the construction of an Assembly building in Madhya Pradesh.

Disputes arose from this agreement, leading to arbitration proceedings and the issuance of an award.

Execution proceedings were initiated by Puri Constructions Pvt Ltd, and the matter was taken up before the High Court of Delhi.

Issues:

The enforceability of the decree depended on the outcome of another pending appeal (FAO (OS) No. 23/1998) between the parties.

Treatment of the arbitration proceedings and their transfer under the M.P. Act.

Held:

The Division Bench, in an order dated 5th July 2012, stated that the enforceability of the decree would depend on the outcome of another pending appeal between the parties.

Given that the award had been issued long ago and not challenged by the respondents, and the matter was still at the execution stage, the Court directed that the award should be treated as if rendered under the M.P. Act.

Therefore, the Court ordered that the pending arbitration proceedings be transferred to the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal under the M.P. Act, to be handled according to its provisions and the law.

Decision: The appeal was disposed of accordingly, and the parties were instructed to appear before the High Court/Tribunal for further proceedings on 9th July 2018.

Facts:

The dispute centered around 500 square yards of land in Survey No.87 of Lingampally Village, Chikkadapally Mandal, Hyderabad District. The appellants claimed ownership of the land, while the respondents were accused of land grabbing. Litigation ensued over several decades, spanning multiple suits and proceedings in civil courts and eventually before the Special Court established under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.

Issues:

Jurisdiction of civil courts versus Special Courts under the Act.

Ownership of the disputed land.

Allegations of land grabbing against the respondents.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellants' repeated litigation over several decades, despite the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, was unwarranted. The Court found that the appellants failed to establish their ownership of the disputed land and could not prove the respondents' involvement in land grabbing. Additionally, there was ambiguity regarding the location, extent, and boundaries of the alleged grabbed land.

The Court emphasized that the appellants' persistence in pursuing litigation in civil courts, even after the enactment of the Act, was misguided. The Court opined that the appellants should have approached the Special Court under the Act if they believed that civil courts lacked jurisdiction. The Court dismissed the appeal and imposed costs of Rs. 50,000 on the appellants for engaging in continuous and fruitless litigation.

Facts:

The case involved Gangotri Enterprises Ltd. as the appellant and Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation and another as the respondents. The matter pertained to the interpretation of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 ("1983 Act").

Issues:

The interpretation of the term "dispute" as defined in Section 2(d) of the 1983 Act and the eligibility criteria for arbitrators under Section 4(3)(iii) of the same Act.

Held:

The judgment clarified the definition of "dispute" under Section 2(d) of the 1983 Act, stating that it includes a claim of ascertained money valued at Rupees 50,000 or more arising from the execution or non-execution of a works contract. It further clarified that "ascertained money" encompasses both the amount already determined and the amount that may be determined during proceedings based on the claims or counterclaims of the parties.

Additionally, the judgment referred to Section 4(3)(iii) of the 1983 Act, stating that an employee of a party to the dispute cannot act as an arbitrator. The provision specifies qualifications for appointment as a member of the Tribunal, excluding employees of the concerned department to which the dispute relates.

The appeal was disposed of accordingly. Delay in related special leave petitions was condoned, and they were disposed of in line with the order in another related special leave petition. Pending applications were also disposed of.