Facts:

The writ petition (Civil) No. 473 of 2005 was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, highlighting the failure of various State Governments to implement provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000. These provisions included the establishment of Child Welfare Committees, Juvenile Justice Boards, Special Juvenile Police Units, and Homes for children in need of care and protection.

Issues:

The petition was the lack of proper implementation of the Juvenile Justice Acts by the State Governments, leading to the deprivation of rights and welfare of children in need of care and protection.

Held:The court, after considering the arguments and concerns raised in the petition, issued various suggestions, recommendations, conclusions, and directions to address the issues at hand.

The court issued suggestions and recommendations regarding the National and State Commissions for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR and SCPCRs). It emphasized the importance of filling up vacancies in these bodies promptly and urged the governments to give due importance to these bodies for the effective implementation of child welfare laws.

Regarding the State Child Protection Society and District Child Protection Unit, the court urged serious consideration for their constitution to involve all stakeholders in child welfare. It also noted the lack of effective functioning of these bodies in many places and the need for remedial steps.

The court emphasized the importance of proper selection and training of social workers and magistrates involved in Juvenile Justice Boards (JJBs) and Child Welfare Committees (CWCs). It stressed the need for adequate staff and facilities for effective functioning and highlighted the importance of quality legal aid for juveniles in conflict with the law.

The court emphasized the need for technology in improving the functioning of JJBs and CWCs. It noted the shortage of computers and peripherals in these institutions and urged the governments to address it. (Para 4)

Regarding the role of police, the court stressed the importance of appointing Child Welfare Police Officers and setting up Special Juvenile Police Units. It urged clear identification of duties and responsibilities of these units and officers.

The court highlighted the need for better infrastructure and management of Child Care Institutions. It recommended regular visits by District Legal Services Authorities to ensure proper functioning.

The court criticized the inadequate funding and lack of seriousness from some State Governments regarding the Juvenile Justice Fund.

The court suggested regular evaluations to monitor the implementation of the Juvenile Justice Act and ensure timely improvements.

The court issued a series of specific directions to various authorities and bodies involved in child welfare. It urged Chief Justices of High Courts to establish child-friendly and vulnerable witness courts in each district.

Facts:

On 03.03.2007, the deceased (Palani), aged around 21 years, was riding a motorcycle when he collided with a bus belonging to the respondent Transport Corporation, which was being driven in a rash and negligent manner. The deceased was unmarried and employed as a contract worker in Hyundai Car Company, Sriperumbudur.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's computation of compensation amount adequately accounted for future prospects, and if not, whether the appellants were entitled to further enhancement based on recent Supreme Court precedent.

Held:

The Court found that the High Court had not accounted for future prospects while computing the compensation amount under the head 'loss of dependency'. Referring to the decision in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and Ors., the Court concluded that future prospects must be considered in determining compensation.

The Court modified the compensation awarded by the High Court, taking into account future prospects at the rate of 40% of the deceased's established income.

The additional compensation was directed to be deposited by the respondent Transport Corporation within a specified period.

Facts:

The appellant and his father-in-law were injured in a motor accident caused by the negligent driving of a bus owned by the respondent corporation.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded compensation to the appellant, which was challenged before the High Court.

The High Court upheld the compensation awarded by the Tribunal but increased the rate of interest on the compensation.

The appellant filed a review petition, which was dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in not considering the appellant's income from other sources while calculating the compensation.

Whether the appellant's claim for compensation towards damage to his car was supported by evidence.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had erred in not considering the appellant's income from other sources, such as commission and interest, while calculating the compensation. The Court relied on precedents to emphasize that loss of taxable earning should be considered for determining just compensation. The Court recalculated the compensation under the heads 'loss of income' and 'loss of future income', resulting in an enhanced compensation amount of Rs. 2,85,966/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum.

The Court rejected the appellant's claim for compensation towards damage to his car as there was no supporting evidence provided.

The appeals were allowed to the limited extent of granting enhanced compensation as indicated above, with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The State Transport Authority convened a meeting on 16.10.2014, where the Chairperson and two members were present, to hear an application for modification of time schedules for vehicle movement.

The decision was issued on 15.12.2014, signed by the Chairperson and only one member, as one member had been transferred.

The dispute arose regarding the validity of the decision made by only two members when all three had heard the application.

Issues:

Whether a decision made by the Chairperson and one member of the State Transport Authority, when all three members had heard the application, is valid under the relevant statutory provisions and precedents?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the decision made by the Chairperson and one member of the State Transport Authority was valid. The decision was in accordance with the statutory scheme and the principles established in relevant precedents. The court rejected the findings of both the Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court, declaring the decision as invalid.

The court emphasized that the decision-making process of multi-member bodies typically involves expressing opinions by a majority vote of the members present. There was no provision requiring all members to sign the decision, and the absence of the signature of the third member did not invalidate the decision.

The court referred to the judgment of the Privy Council in Gokal ChandJagan Nath v. Nand Ram Das-Atma Ram, and the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A. Shanta Rao v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad & Ors., which upheld decisions made by majority members, even if not all members signed the order.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of the High Court, affirming the validity of the decision made by the State Transport Authority.

Decided on : 08-02-2018

Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 - Rule 63, Rule 65

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 68

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Arjun Garg, Manish Yadav, Rohit Chandra, Aakash N., Baij Nath Patel, Ms. Sweta, Ms. Romila, Advocates, for the Appellants

Cases Referred

A. Shanta Rao Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad, AIR 1985 A.P. 256

Gokal ChandJagan Nath Vs. Nand Ram Das-Atma Ram, AIR 1938 P.C. 292

Ramaswamy Nadar Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1958 SC 56

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the interpretation of Section 16(5)(a) of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.

There was a pending civil suit between the parties concerning the cancellation of a sale deed related to the premises in question.

Issues:

Whether a review under Section 16(5)(a) of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, regarding an order concerning vacancy, is maintainable.

Held:

The Court clarified that Section 16 of the Act deals with the allotment and release of vacant buildings. It stated that a finding regarding vacancy is a pre-condition for an order under Section 16(1)(a) or (b). Therefore, if there is a wrong order regarding vacancy, it is open to review under Section 16(5)(a) as it is a statutory remedy.

The Court directed the trial court to expedite the disposal of the pending civil suit within six months and to ensure that the suit is tried on its own merits.

The Court ordered that the status quo with regard to possession shall continue until the suit is finally disposed of by the trial court.

Facts:

The incident occurred on 02.06.2014, involving the assault and murder of the deceased, Shaikh Mohsin.

The accused allegedly targeted the victim based on his religious affiliation.

The accused had attended a meeting of a group called Hindu Rashtra Sena shortly before the incident.

The Sessions Court, Pune, rejected the bail applications of the accused.

The accused then applied for bail before the Bombay High Court, which granted bail with a cryptic order seemingly justifying the murder based on the victim's religion.

Issues:

Whether the reasoning provided by the High Court for granting bail is justifiable.

Whether communal hatred can be a valid ground for justifying a murder.

Whether the bail order should be set aside and the matter reconsidered.

Held:

The Supreme Court found the reasoning of the High Court's order problematic, as it appeared to justify the murder on the basis of the victim's religious affiliation, which cannot be justified under any circumstances. The bail order was set aside, and the accused were directed to surrender within one week.

The bail applications were restored to the file of the High Court for fresh consideration, with additional affidavits allowed. The parties were directed to appear before the High Court on 16.02.2018, with a directive to decide on the bail applications within six weeks. The Supreme Court clarified that its observations should not be construed as comments on the merits of the case.

Decision: The appeals were disposed of with the aforementioned observations and directions.

Facts:

The case originated from a suit filed by the respondents against Swami Sheo Dharmanand and others seeking a declaration as trespassers and for an injunction.

Following the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiffs appealed, and during the pendency of the second appeal, Swami Sheo Dharmanand passed away. The appellants, claiming to be the successors of the deceased, filed separate applications seeking to implead themselves as his legal representatives.

The High Court referred the matter to the trial court under Order 22, Rule 5 of the CPC, which determined one of the appellants as the legal representative. However, the High Court allowed both appellants to participate in the appeal without determining the actual legal representative.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to allow both appellants to participate in the appeal without determining the actual legal representative was correct.

Whether the procedural requirements of Order 22, Rule 5 of the CPC were adhered to.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was incorrect and contrary to the procedural requirements of Order 22, Rule 5 of the CPC. The Court emphasized that determining the legal representative must precede the hearing of the appeal on merits. It reiterated that the Court cannot implead all claimants as parties without deciding who will represent the estate of the deceased.

Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and remitted the matter back to the High Court for determination of the legal representative in accordance with the procedural requirements. The High Court was directed to decide the issue on merits based on the reports submitted by the trial court and any objections or materials provided by the parties.

The Supreme Court clarified that its decision did not express any opinion on the merits of the case and instructed the High Court to deal with any observations made in accordance with the provisions of the law.

Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and all pending applications were disposed of accordingly. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

M/S ONGC Mangalore Petrochemicals Ltd. (appellant) awarded a contract to M/S Ans Constructions Ltd. (respondent no. 1).

Respondent no. 1 submitted a No Dues/No Claim Certificate on September 21, 2012, and the final bill was paid by the appellant on October 10, 2012.

On October 24, 2012, respondent no. 1 withdrew the No Dues Certificate alleging coercion.

On January 12, 2013, respondent no. 1 submitted a claim of Rs. 96,88,48,642/- for losses incurred during the contract execution.

Issues:

Whether the No Dues Certificate was voluntarily submitted by respondent no. 1 or under coercion?

Whether the claim for losses made by respondent no. 1 was valid considering the circumstances?

Held:

The court emphasized that a contract discharge by agreement or voucher should be validly and voluntarily executed. If coercion, fraud, or undue influence is proven, the discharge becomes void, rendering any subsequent dispute arbitrable.

The court considered whether there was coercion or undue influence in the issuance of the No Dues Certificate, examining the background of the letters exchanged between the parties.

The court noted the belated submission of the claim for losses by respondent no. 1, highlighting the contractual provisions requiring notice within a specific timeframe.

The court found that the No Dues Certificate was voluntarily submitted, and the claim for losses lacked credibility as it was raised after the final bill settlement.

The court concluded that there was no arbitrable dispute, as the voluntary submission of the No Dues Certificate and acceptance of final payment constituted accord and satisfaction.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, ruling in favor of the appellant.

Facts:

The case revolves around the maintainability of an appeal against the enforcement of a foreign award under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether appeals against the enforcement of foreign awards are maintainable under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

The relationship between Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act and Section 50 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Interpretation of the doctrine of harmonious construction in the context of both statutes.

Objectives of the Acts and the implications of delaying enforcement of foreign awards.

Held:

The Court held that Section 50 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a self-contained provision dealing exhaustively with arbitration matters, including the permissibility of appeals. Hence, appeals not explicitly mentioned in the Act are impermissible. Consequently, Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, being a general provision, does not apply to cases governed by Section 50 of the Arbitration Act.

The inclusion of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act in the proviso to Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act indicates that appeals under the Arbitration Act follow its provisions alone. This ensures that special provisions of the Arbitration Act take precedence over general provisions of the Commercial Courts Act in matters of arbitration.

Section 50 of the Arbitration Act provides the forum for appeals in arbitration cases. If an appeal lies under Section 50, only then does Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act apply to determine the forum for hearing and deciding such an appeal.

The Court emphasized that both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act aim for the speedy resolution of disputes, particularly in commercial matters. Allowing additional appeals under the Commercial Courts Act in cases addressed by Section 50 of the Arbitration Act would undermine the objective of expeditious enforcement of foreign awards.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming that appeals against the enforcement of foreign awards must follow the provisions of the Arbitration Act alone, to ensure efficient and prompt resolution of commercial disputes.