Facts:

The appellants, who were Direct Entry Artificers of the Navy, claimed entitlement to pension benefits. They asserted that after serving an initial engagement period of 10 years as Artificers, they were placed in Fleet Reserve for a further 10 years. They argued that, according to regulations, 50% of the period in Fleet Reserve (5 years) should be counted for pension purposes, thereby totaling 15 years of service. However, the respondents contested this claim, stating that the appellants were not placed in Fleet Reserve for the alleged period of 10 years.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were entitled to count their time in Fleet Reserve towards their pension benefits. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the Principle of Promissory Estoppel applied in this case, considering the absence of any explicit promise or assurance regarding enrollment in Fleet Reserve.

Held:

The court held that enrollment in Fleet Reserve is contingent upon a positive act of enrollment, and completion of 10 years' service as an Artificer does not automatically imply enrollment into Fleet Reserve. Therefore, the appellants were not entitled to count their time in Fleet Reserve towards pension benefits.

The court clarified that for the purpose of calculating pension and gratuity, entire service from the date of enrollment or advancement to the rank of ordinary seaman till the date of discharge must be counted. However, Fleet Reserve service can only be counted if a Sailor is drafted into it.

The court outlined the regulations pertaining to drafting into Fleet Reserve, emphasizing that it is not a right but contingent upon fulfillment of certain criteria and specific recommendations by the Commanding Officer.

Liability to serve in Fleet Reserve arises only upon positive enrollment, and automatic enrollment cannot be presumed. The appellants were not enrolled in Fleet Reserve, and therefore, cannot count the period towards pension benefits.

The court rejected the invocation of Promissory Estoppel, stating that there was no promise or assurance made at the time of initial recruitment regarding enrollment into Fleet Reserve. The decision to enroll individuals into Fleet Reserve rested with the authorities and was not guaranteed.

Absence of assurance regarding enrollment into Fleet Reserve at the time of recruitment precludes the application of Promissory Estoppel. Mere recruitment for active and reserve service does not imply enrollment into Fleet Reserve.

The court concluded that the appellants were not entitled to count Fleet Reserve for pension purposes. However, their cases would be considered for grant of special pension.

The court addressed the argument regarding treating all Artificers alike for pension purposes. It clarified that while all Artificers should be treated equally, the training period of Apprentice Entry Artificers is considered towards pension eligibility, unlike Direct Entry Artificers.

The court rejected the challenge to the precedent set by Anuj Kumar Dey v. Union of India regarding the inclusion of training period for pension calculation. It upheld the precedent and concluded that Apprentice Entry Artificers are eligible for pension after completing their training period.

Facts:

Dr. B.C. Singh and Dr. Stella Lillian Singh jointly purchased a property. Upon Dr. S.L. Singh's demise, Dr. B.C. Singh initiated legal action against J.M. Utarid and his children, asserting their status as licensees of the property and seeking eviction. The defendants claimed a share in the property as kindred of Dr. S.L. Singh, raising issues of succession.

Issues:

• Whether J.M. Utarid and his children were co-owners or mere licensees of the property.

• Determining the entitlement to the share of the property left by Dr. S.L. Singh.

• Interpretation of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 concerning the succession rights of Indian Christians and the applicability of the Act to foreign nationals.

Held:

The Court interpreted Sections 24, 25, and 26 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, establishing the distinction between lineal and collateral consanguinity. It further analyzed Sections 32, 33, 35, 47, and 48 to determine the devolution of property in cases of intestacy. The Court found that Dr. B.C. Singh, as the surviving spouse, was entitled to half of Dr. S.L. Singh's share in the property.

Regarding the remaining share, the Court ruled that when an intestate leaves no lineal descendants, parents, brothers, or sisters, the property shall be divided among the nearest kindred. In this case, Ida Utarid, the sister of Dr. S.L. Singh, was identified as the preferential heir, excluding more distant kindred such as J.M. Utarid.

Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the judgment of the First Appellate Court. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

The dispute involved possession of agricultural land in a village. Plaintiffs claimed a share of the land, contested by the defendants who argued that the widow of a previous owner had acquired absolute ownership rights under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, specifically determining whether the widow's rights constituted pre-existing rights or were conferred by a compromise decree.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the compromise decree and concluded that the widow's rights were indeed limited as stated in the decree. It emphasized that these rights did not stem from any pre-existing right but were conferred by the compromise decree.

The Court clarified that Section 14(1) of the Act does not recognize pre-existing rights of a Hindu male, and the property did not become the self-acquired property of the widow. It reiterated principles from the V. Tulasamma case regarding the right to maintenance, emphasizing that maintenance is a pre-existing right, but in this case, there was no indication that the property was acquired in lieu of maintenance.

The Court concluded that the widow's right was not a result of maintenance or any pre-existing right but arose from the compromise decree, thus falling under Section 14(2) of the Act, which deals with properties acquired by a widow for the first time.

Facts:

Several writ petitions were filed challenging the rejection of applications by Private Tour Operators (PTOs) for registration and allocation of quota for the Hajj pilgrimage in 2016.

The rejection was based on alleged non-compliance with certain clauses of the policy for PTOs as laid down by the Supreme Court.

The petitioners contended that the reasons cited for disqualification contradicted the exemptions granted to them.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of PTOs' applications for Hajj 2016 was arbitrary and illegal.

If so, whether the petitioners are entitled to compensation for the loss incurred due to the illegal rejection of their applications.

Held:

The rejection of the petitioners' applications was found to be arbitrary and illegal, as the reasons provided contradicted the exemptions granted to them.

The court invoked the principles of damages in public law and awarded compensation of Rs. 5 lakh per petitioner for the loss suffered.

The respondents were directed to remit the compensation within two months, failing which interest would accrue at 15% per annum.

The respondents were empowered to recover the damages and costs from the officers responsible for the unsustainable orders.

The writ petitions were allowed, and the petitioners were granted compensation along with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000 per petition.

Facts:

The case pertains to the restructuring of the tribunal system in India, with a focus on ensuring speedy and inexpensive justice while upholding the principles of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary. Various concerns regarding the functioning of tribunals have been highlighted, including the need for personnel with legal expertise and judicial experience, the importance of independence of the judiciary, and the effectiveness of alternative mechanisms for judicial review.

Issues:

The need for restructuring the tribunal system in accordance with the constitutional scheme and previous court decisions.

Ensuring the competence and independence of tribunal members.

Improving the standards of adjudication and access to justice.

Held:

The court broadly approves the concept of having an effective and autonomous oversight body for all tribunals, responsible for recruitments and overseeing the functioning of members.

It suggests the creation of a regular cadre for tribunal members and the setting up of an autonomous oversight body.

The court calls for amending the scheme of direct appeals to the Supreme Court, ensuring that tribunal orders are subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts.

It recommends making tribunal benches accessible at convenient locations and proposes conferring jurisdiction on existing courts as special courts or tribunals.

The court emphasizes the need for urgent action on these issues, suggesting the formation of a committee to interact with stakeholders and propose a mechanism consistent with constitutional principles and expert recommendations.

Facts:The petitioner had earlier approached the Supreme Court challenging the validity of the U.P Ex-Chief Ministers Residence Allotment Rules, 1997. Subsequently, the 1997 Rules were struck down. The present challenge pertains to the insertion of Section 4(3) by the 2016 Amendment, allowing former Chief Ministers to retain government accommodation for their lifetime.

Issues:

Whether Section 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Ministers (Salaries, Allowances and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1981, as inserted by the 2016 Amendment, is constitutional.

Held:

The preamble to the Constitution embodies the principles of equality and fraternity. The allocation of government bungalows to former constitutional functionaries is subject to judicial review under Article 14.

Public bungalows are public property, and questions regarding their allocation are matters of public concern. The doctrine of equality requires that former Chief Ministers, once they demit office, should be treated on par with common citizens.

Section 4(3) of the 1981 Act creates a separate class of citizens based on their previous public office, which violates the equality clause. It is considered arbitrary and discriminatory.

Section 4(3) cannot pass the test of Article 14 and is liable to be struck down as it transgresses the equality clause under Article 14.

Decision: The Court held that Section 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Ministers (Salaries, Allowances and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1981, as inserted by the 2016 Amendment, is ultra vires the Constitution of India. Consequently, the Court struck down Section 4(3) of the Act.

Facts:

The State Public Service Commission advertised posts of School Lecturers for various subjects under the Secondary Education Department. After conducting the examination, the Commission published answer keys and invited objections from candidates. Certain candidates, including the appellants, raised objections regarding the correctness of certain questions. The Supreme Court directed a re-examination of specific questions by experts. An Expert Committee was constituted for this purpose.

Issues:

Whether the objections raised by the appellants regarding certain questions were satisfactorily addressed by the Expert Committee?

Whether the Commission should revise the entire result of all candidates or only of those who approached the Court?

Held:

The Expert Committee satisfactorily addressed all objections raised by the appellants regarding certain questions. The Commission accepted the report of the Expert Committee and revised the result of 311 appellants accordingly. Therefore, the Expert Committee's report, which has been accepted by the Commission, needs to be implemented.

The Commission should revise the entire result of all candidates (except those already selected) based on the corrected key answers. Candidates who appeared in the examination and whose key answers were correct are entitled to have their results revised. It would be inequitable not to extend this benefit to candidates who did not approach the Court but relied on the actions taken by the Commission and its Expert Committee.

Decision: The Court directed the Commission to revise the results of all candidates (except those selected) based on the corrected key answers and publish the revised results for all candidates.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over a piece of land between M/S Eureka Builders (the appellants) and the legal representatives of Gulabchand s/o Veljee Dand (the respondents). The land, originally belonging to three individuals (referred to as three PATIL), was sold through Court Auction proceedings in 1942 and through direct purchase in 1943 to Shah Veljee Kanjee. Legal battles ensued regarding the ownership of the land, with Shah Veljee Kanjee's legal representatives ultimately being recognized as the rightful owners. Appellants, claiming through three PATIL, contested the suit filed by Shah Veljee Kanjee's legal representatives for partition and possession of the land.

Issues:

Whether the respondents proved their subsisting title over the land at the time of filing the suit.

Whether the appellants, claiming through original holders (three PATIL), established their right to the land.

The effect of re-grant orders made by the State in favor of original holders (three PATIL) in 1973.

Held:

The Court held that the respondents had established their subsisting title over the land, while the appellants failed to prove their claim through original holders (three PATIL).

The Court emphasized the principle that a person can only transfer rights in property which they themselves possess. It was found that the rights of original holders (three PATIL) were extinguished due to their failure to file suit within the limitation period, as per the Limitation Act.

Additionally, the Court rejected the appellants' argument regarding re-grant orders, stating that the rights of original holders were extinguished by efflux of time. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed, affirming the decision of the High Court.

Facts:

The case involved four agreements related to the commissioning of a Photovoltaic Solar Plant. Two agreements were with M/s. 'JI' dated 01.02.2012, one with appellant no.2 dated 05.03.2012, and another with appellant no.3 dated 14.03.2012. All agreements contained arbitration clauses except the one dated 05.03.2012. Disputes arose regarding default in rent payment by appellant no.3 and fraud allegations against appellant no.2.

Issues:

Whether the agreements are interconnected and subject to arbitration?

Can arbitration be refused based on the seriousness of fraud allegations?

Are directives needed for lease rental payments?

Held:

The court held that all four agreements were interconnected, forming a single commercial project. The main agreement dated 14.03.2012 was identified as the principal agreement, while the others were ancillary.

Arbitration cannot be refused solely based on the seriousness of fraud allegations unless they are significant. In this case, the allegations were not deemed serious enough to reject arbitration.

Directives were issued for appellant no.3 to pay lease rentals as per the terms of the Equipment Lease Agreement and for future lease rentals.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, referring all four agreements and involved parties to arbitration. Appellants were directed to pay lease rentals and future lease rentals for the equipment as per the terms of the Equipment Lease Agreement.