Facts:

The case involved commissioned officers of the Army, Air Force, and Navy who had retired before January 1, 1996, seeking the grant of a higher pay scale based on a government order dated November 21, 1997.

Issues:

Interpretation of government orders regarding pay scales and allowances for Armed Forces officers.

Determination of entitlement to pensionary benefits for officers who retired before January 1, 1996.

Held:

The government order dated November 21, 1997, sanctioned the improvement of pay scales for officers still in service as of January 1, 1996. It did not provide for benefits to officers who had retired before that date.

Specific provisions of the orders indicated that the benefits were not applicable to officers who retired before January 1, 1996.

Subsequent orders, including one dated June 7, 1999, relating to pensionary benefits for commissioned officers, did not support the interpretation that retired officers before January 1, 1996, were entitled to the benefits provided in the November 21, 1997 order.

There was no discrimination in pensionary benefits between pre-January 1, 1996, and post-January 1, 1996, retirees.

Decision: The court upheld the orders of the Armed Forces Tribunal that retired officers before January 1, 1996, were not entitled to pensionary benefits under the November 21, 1997 order. It set aside any decisions by the Tribunal that extended such benefits to retired officers.

Facts:

Advanta India Ltd. filed a complaint against B.N. Shivanna, accusing him of various acts of misconduct.

The State Bar Council of Karnataka found Shivanna guilty and debarred him from practicing for life.

Shivanna appealed to the BCI, which reduced the punishment to a temporary debarment of 18 months and imposed a fine.

Shivanna filed a review petition under Section 48AA of the Advocates Act, 1961, seeking a review of the BCI's order.

Issues:

Whether the BCI had the authority to review its earlier decision.

Whether Shivanna was denied adequate opportunity to cross-examine a witness during the initial proceedings.

Held:

The Court reinstated the original order of the BCI, which imposed a temporary debarment on Shivanna. The Court found that the BCI's decision to review its earlier order exceeded the scope of its review powers. The Court emphasized that while the review powers of the Disciplinary Committee/BCI are not limited to those of a civil court, they cannot extend to becoming an appellate authority over its own previous orders. Therefore, the BCI's decision to review its previous findings and overturn them without sufficient grounds was deemed unsustainable.

The Court held that revisiting the issue on merits again on the pretext that Shivanna was not granted proper opportunities to cross-examine a witness was beyond review jurisdiction.

The Court also noted that Shivanna's deliberate delays in the proceedings further supported the reinstatement of the original order. Any modification of the punishment would be subject to the outcome of another appeal related to the case (Civil Appeal No. 273 of 2012).

Facts:

Title Suit No. 406/1973 was filed seeking partition of joint family properties. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, but the defendants filed a first appeal against this judgment. During the appeal, the defendants filed applications under Order LXI Rule 27 CPC for acceptance of additional evidence. The High Court allowed these applications and proceeded to hear the appeal, ultimately setting aside the trial court's judgment.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in admitting additional evidence without granting the opposing party an opportunity to rebut it.

Held:

The Court emphasized the importance of procedural fairness, highlighting the necessity of granting the opposing party an opportunity to rebut new evidence admitted in appellate courts. Referring to previous judgments, the Court held that the High Court erred in not granting the plaintiffs an opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal or explain alleged admissions contained in the additional evidence.

The Court directed the High Court to reconsider the appeal afresh, ensuring procedural fairness and expeditious resolution of the matter. It urged the High Court to conclude the proceedings within six months from the date of the judgment.

Facts:

The respondents, unsuccessful candidates in the Civil Services (Preliminary) Examination, 2010, sought disclosure of marks awarded to them, including raw and scaled marks, cut-off marks, scaling methodology, model answers, and complete results of all candidates. The High Court directed the UPSC to provide the requested information within fifteen days. UPSC appealed against the High Court's decision, arguing that the court didn't correctly interpret the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) and the binding decisions of the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court correctly interpreted the RTI Act and Supreme Court decisions regarding the disclosure of marks in the Civil Services Examination.

Whether the information sought by the respondents can be mechanically furnished or if there are inherent limitations based on public interest and the integrity of the examination system.

Held:

The Court acknowledged the need to balance the right to information with other public interests, particularly in sensitive matters such as the disclosure of examination marks. It emphasized that while the RTI Act confers the right to information, exemptions under Sections 8, 9, and 11 should be interpreted purposively to harmonize conflicting interests.

The Court recognized UPSC's concerns regarding the potential negative implications of disclosing evaluated answer sheets, including challenges to evaluation and erosion of faith in the system. Therefore, it held that the information sought could not be mechanically furnished but left open the possibility for the respondents to establish a case for disclosure based on public interest and other relevant parameters.

The Court set aside the High Court's orders and dismissed the writ petitions, affirming that the discretion of the courts to determine disclosure based on the specific circumstances of each case. This decision aligns with the principles laid down in earlier cases such as Central Board of Secondary Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay and Ors., (2011) 8 SCC 497, and Prashant Ramesh Chakkarwar v. UPSC, (2013) 12 SCC 489, where the Court emphasized the balance between the right to information and other public interests.

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) against an order passed in a Writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The appeal stemmed from an order of the Appellate Officer (District Judge) under the Public Premises Act, which was initially challenged through a Writ petition.

Issues:

The maintainability of the LPA against the order passed in the Writ petition under Articles 226/227, especially concerning orders under the Public Premises Act.

Held:

The Court ruled that the Writ petition against the order of the Appellate Officer (District Judge) under the Public Premises Act is essentially a petition against the order of a civil judge. Such orders are subject to scrutiny by the High Court only under Article 227 and not under Article 226.

The power exercised by the Appellate Officer under Section 9 of the Public Premises Act is judicial and not executive. The Appellate Officer, being the District Judge or designated judicial officer, acts as a pre-existing judicial authority in the district and not as a persona designata.

An order passed by a Civil Court is subject to scrutiny by the High Court only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, not under Article 226. Therefore, no writ can be issued against an order passed by the Civil Court, and hence, no Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable.

The Division Bench of the High Court should have dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal as not maintainable. Without proper analysis, it could not assume jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. However, the respondents were given liberty to challenge the decision of the Single Judge through appropriate remedy.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over land between Murti Devi and Siri Bhagwan.

The trial court dismissed the suit filed by Murti Devi and her daughter.

The first appellate court reversed this decision and decreed in favor of Murti Devi and her daughter.

Siri Bhagwan filed a second appeal in the High Court, where Surat Singh, a subsequent purchaser of the land, had become a party to the proceedings.

The High Court allowed the second appeal without hearing Surat Singh.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in allowing the second appeal without hearing all parties involved.

Whether the High Court violated the procedure laid down in Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code by framing a substantial question of law for the first time in its final judgment.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed procedural irregularities in allowing the second appeal and framing a substantial question of law in its final judgment without hearing all parties involved.

The Court emphasized the mandatory nature of the requirements under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, which includes framing substantial questions of law at the time of admission of the appeal.

Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case back to the High Court for fresh consideration.

The High Court was directed to hear the appeal afresh, framing proper substantial questions of law after hearing the appellant, and decide the appeal on those questions.

The Court urged the High Court to expedite the proceedings, ideally completing them within six months from the date of receipt of the Supreme Court's judgment.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of provisions related to the valuation of taxable service provided by construction service providers under the Finance Act, 1994.

Initially, service tax was calculated on the value equivalent to 33% of the 'gross amount charged' from any person by such commercial concern for providing taxable service. This included only the service charge.

Amendments were made to include the value of goods and materials supplied by the service provider for providing such service.

The Revenue contended that the value of materials supplied by the service recipient (free of charge) should also be included while calculating the 'gross value' for the purpose of levying service tax.

Issues:

Whether the value of materials provided by the service recipient free of charge should be included in the calculation of the 'gross amount charged' for service tax purposes.

Held:

The court held that the value of goods/materials provided by the service recipient free of charge should not be included in the calculation of the 'gross amount charged' for service tax.

Explanation 3 to sub-section (1) of Section 67 clarifies that the gross amount charged for the taxable service shall include the amount received towards the taxable service. Since no amount is charged for materials supplied by the service recipient, it should not be included.

The court emphasized that the value of goods/materials supplied free of charge has no bearing on the value of services provided by the service provider and should not be added to the contract value.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming that the value of goods/materials supplied free of charge by the service recipient should not be included in the calculation of service tax.

Facts:

The appellant, a State Government Undertaking, applied for registration under Section 12A of the Income Tax Act, claiming exemption for charitable purposes.

The Commissioner of Income Tax (CIT) granted the registration certificate but later issued a show cause notice for cancellation.

The CIT subsequently canceled the certificate, leading to legal proceedings including a rectification application and appeals.

Issues:

Whether the CIT had the express power to cancel a registration certificate under Section 12A.

Whether the grant of the certificate was quasi-judicial in nature.

Whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act applied to the cancellation of the certificate.

The impact of an amendment to Section 12AA conferring explicit power on the CIT to cancel certificates.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that until the amendment to Section 12AA came into effect, the CIT did not have express power to cancel a registration certificate under Section 12A. The grant of the certificate was deemed quasi-judicial, and the CIT could only cancel it if expressly empowered to do so. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act did not apply as it pertained to executive or legislative orders, whereas the CIT's order under Section 12A was quasi-judicial. The amendment to Section 12AA, effective from October 1, 2004, gave the CIT explicit power to cancel registration certificates, but this was not retrospective.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and restoring the ITAT's decision. It affirmed that the CIT had no authority to cancel the registration certificate until the explicit power was conferred by the amendment to Section 12AA.

Facts:

The appellant, Ex. Lt. Col. R.K. Rai, had taken voluntary retirement from the Regiment of Artillery due to a disability aggravated by military service.

He applied for disability pension, which was rejected by the Armed Forces Tribunal based on Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961.

The appellant challenged the Tribunal's decision, arguing that he was entitled to disability pension based on subsequent judgments and a government order issued in May 2017.

Issues:

Whether the appellant is entitled to disability pension despite taking voluntary retirement before January 1, 2006.

Whether the claim for "AGI Disability" was properly presented and considered.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellant was entitled to disability pension under the government order dated May 19, 2017, which extended benefits to pre-2006 retirees meeting specific conditions. The Court noted that the appellant's disability, assessed at 30% and aggravated by military service, fulfilled the requirements outlined in the order. Therefore, the authorities were directed to process the appellant's disability pension claim accordingly.

Regarding the claim for "AGI Disability," the Court observed that it was not pressed before the Tribunal or in the review petition. Therefore, the Court did not consider it in the appeals, but the appellant was granted liberty to file a review petition before the Tribunal if the claim had been pressed but not considered.

The civil appeals were allowed, and the Tribunal's orders were set aside, directing the respondents to process the appellant's disability pension claim as per the government order and the Court's observations.