Facts:

M/s. Lohiya Agencies, a merchant dealing in 'gypsum board,' was assessed for the years 2006-07 and 2007-08. The Tax Department alleged tax evasion, claiming that 'gypsum board' should be taxed at 12.5% instead of the declared 4%. The dispute arose from the interpretation of Entry 56 of Schedule IV of the RVAT.

Issues:

Whether 'gypsum board' falls within the amended Entry 56, taxed at 4%, or in the residuary Entry 1 of Schedule V, taxed at 12.5%.

Held:

The Additional Commissioner initially held that 'gypsum board' falls under the residuary Entry, subject to 12.5% taxation.

The High Court reversed the decision, relying on the expanded definition of 'gypsum in all its forms' in Entry 56.

The manufacturing process of 'gypsum board' involves dehydration, mixing with additives, and forming a composite material.

The court considered the term 'in all its forms,' interpreting it broadly to include 'gypsum board' within Entry 56.

The court emphasized that the legislature's conscious decision to create a separate Entry for 'gypsum board' in 2014 supported the interpretation that it was distinct from the residuary Entry.

The court dismissed the appeals, allowing each party to bear its own costs.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the parity of pay scales between Head Clerks and Internal Auditors in the Punjab State Power Corporation Limited. The Internal Auditors claimed historical parity, arguing that a revision in the pay scale of Head Clerks disrupted the long-standing equality between the two positions.

Issues:

The entitlement of Internal Auditors to claim pay scale parity with Head Clerks, irrespective of differences in recruitment, qualifications, and job responsibilities.

The Internal Auditors contended that the revised pay scale for Head Clerks disturbed the established parity.

Held:

Equation of Posts and Revision of Pay Scale: The court held that the equation of posts and the revision of pay scales fall within the government's domain. The matter should be left to the discretion and expertise of the Pay Committee and the Government, considering the nature of duties and responsibilities. Judicial review is not applicable to the conclusion reached by expert bodies like the Pay Anomaly Committee.

Burden of Proof for Parity: The burden of proof in establishing parity in pay scales and the nature of duties and responsibilities lies with the person claiming such right. The court emphasized that the claimant must produce material to prove the similarity in the nature of work performed.

Differences in Duties and Responsibilities: The duties and nature of work of Head Clerks and Internal Auditors were deemed entirely different. Head Clerks held more administrative responsibilities, disbursing salaries, and overseeing the entire establishment, while Internal Auditors audited billing in the Revenue Department of the Sub-division Office.

Conscious Exercise of Option: The court highlighted that the exercise of option for promotion as Internal Auditor was a conscious decision by employees, considering the promotional avenues and higher pay scales available in the Internal Auditor position.

Time-Bound Promotional Scales: Internal Auditors were granted time-bound promotional scales on completion of service, which was not available to Head Clerks. This was considered a relevant factor in justifying the differences in pay scales.

Identity for Parity: The court emphasized that a mere difference in service conditions does not constitute discrimination. Complete identity between the two posts is necessary for claiming parity in pay scale.

Facts:

Respondents, Sub Fire Officers in the Punjab State Electricity Board (PSEB), sought parity in pay scales with Head Clerks, Head Clerk-cum-Divisional Accountants, and Internal Auditors within Group XII.

The pay scale for Sub Fire Officers was revised to Rs.1640-2925, but it was not aligned with the revision granted to other positions in the same group.

The respondents claimed discrimination, alleging no difference in qualifications for recruitment between Sub Fire Officers and other positions in Group XII.

Issues:

Whether Sub Fire Officers can claim parity of pay scale within Group XII.

Whether the grant of different scales of pay to Sub Fire Officers amounts to discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution.

Held:

The court emphasized that the equation of pay scales is an executive function, and interference by the court should be avoided. The principle of equal pay for equal work should only be applied when there is complete and wholesale identity between the two groups.( Para 11)

Granting parity in pay scales depends on a comparative evaluation of job and the equation of posts. The person claiming parity must establish that eligibility, mode of selection, nature of work, and other factors are identical.( Para 12)

Examining the case of Sub Fire Officers, the court considered the categorization in Group XII in the PSEB and emphasized that nature of duties, responsibilities, and qualifications for recruitment differ among the posts within the group.( Para 14)

The burden of establishing parity in pay scale and employment rests with the person claiming such right. Mere inclusion in the same group does not automatically grant the right to parity.( Para 20)

The court highlighted the financial implications of granting parity to Sub Fire Officers, stating that such a decision could affect the financial stability of the appellant-Board, a service-oriented institution.( Para 23)

The respondents failed to provide evidence showing similarity/identity between the posts of Sub Fire Officers and other positions in Group XII. The court held that the nature of duties performed by Sub Fire Officers is different, and parity cannot be claimed solely based on categorization.( Para 27)

FACTS:

Appellants sought a permanent injunction against the respondents from using their patented technology and trademark.

A sub-licence agreement was terminated due to disputes over licence fees/trait values.

Defendants claimed protection under the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act, 2001 (PPVFR Act).

The learned Single Judge issued an injunction, but the Division Bench delved into patent validity and excluded certain claims under Section 3(j) of the Patents Act.

ISSUES:

Validity of the patent and the grant of injunction.

Applicability of the PPVFR Act and its relation to the Patents Act.

Summary adjudication on complicated patent issues.

HELD:

Complicated issues cannot be subjected to summary adjudication.

The Division Bench's examination of the counter claim on patent validity was beyond its jurisdiction.

The suit involves complex questions requiring technological and expert evidence, which should be considered at the final hearing.

The injunctive relief granted by the Single Judge was deemed in order and merits no interference during the suit's pendency.

The order of the Division Bench was set aside, restoring the Single Judge's order, and the suit was remanded for disposal in accordance with the law.

REFERRED CASES:

Alka Gupta vs. Narender Kumar Gupta, (2010) 10 SCC 141

Facts:

The appellant, Ex. LAC Yogesh Pathania, challenged the findings and sentence awarded by the District Court Martial (DCM) under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007. The charges include using insubordinate language, using criminal force, and acts prejudicial to good order and Air Force discipline.

Issues:

The appellant's alleged violations of Air Force discipline, specifically charges 3, 5, and 7, relating to insubordination, criminal force, and prejudicial acts during an incident on the night of May 22-23, 2009.

Held:

The Tribunal found direct evidence supporting charge no. 3, with witnesses confirming the appellant's misconduct regarding insubordinate language towards a superior officer. The Tribunal also noted the appellant's admission of consuming alcohol on the day in question.( Para 7)

The claim that the appellant was slapped by WO Agar Singh was not substantiated by the evidence on record. The Tribunal reexamined the statements of witnesses and upheld the charges of insubordination, criminal force, and acts prejudicial to discipline.( Para 11)

The Supreme Court, in reviewing the evidence and Tribunal's findings, concluded that the view taken by the Tribunal was plausible. The Court, under Sections 30 and 31 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, found no ground for interference in the appeal.( Para 12)

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the application for permission to file the appeal was also rejected, as the Court did not find any point of law of general public importance warranting leave.

Facts:

The appellants, Babu Lal and Devi Lal, were convicted under Section 302 and 120B IPC for murder and conspiracy.

The case was based on circumstantial evidence, with an extra-judicial confession by co-accused Babu Lal.

The circumstances included a missing person report, suspicious activities of the accused, and alleged conflicts over money transactions.

Issues:

Reliability of circumstantial evidence.

Admissibility and evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession.

Whether the circumstances collectively lead to a conclusive hypothesis of guilt.

Held:

The Court emphasized the need for circumstantial evidence to be conclusive, consistent only with the guilt of the accused.

Extra-judicial confession, being weak evidence, requires corroboration and caution in reliance.

If two views are possible based on circumstantial evidence, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the one favorable to them.

The circumstances in this case, though raising suspicion, did not form a complete and coherent chain to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The prosecution failed to elevate the case from "may be true" to "must be true."

The appellants were entitled to the benefit of doubt, and their convictions were set aside.

FACTS:

The appellant filed a Criminal Writ Petition in 2002, seeking registration of a criminal complaint regarding the wrongful killing of his son by the police.

Delhi High Court directed CBI to register a complaint and investigate.

CBI filed a Closure Report in 2008, which was not accepted by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.

Cognizance was taken against thirteen police officers, and the matter was committed to the Court of Sessions.

Accused filed Revision Petition, leading to petitions before the Delhi High Court.

High Court directed the Magistrate to reconsider cognizance, leading to multiple rounds of petitions and orders.

The High Court eventually dismissed the Appellant's petition in 2014, with the liberty to approach the Sessions Judge.

ISSUES:

The appropriate forum for revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 of Cr.P.C.

The delay in the legal proceedings.

HELD:

The Court acknowledged the prolonged nature of the case, emphasizing the need for speedy justice.

The Court refrained from deciding on the question of law regarding concurrent revisionary jurisdiction.

The order of the High Court was set aside, and the case was restored before the High Court with a request for expeditious consideration.

The Court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the case.

Liberty was granted to approach the Supreme Court again if any party was aggrieved by the High Court's order.

Facts:

The case involved the divestment of the Director, CBI, Alok Kumar Verma, of his powers, functions, duties, and supervisory role by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) and the Government of India.

Issues:

The authority of the CVC and the Government to take such actions without obtaining prior consent from the Committee under s.4A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act.

Held:

The legislative intent behind the CVC Act, 2003, and the amendments to the DSPE Act was to ensure the independence of the Director, CBI. Parliament followed the directions of the court in Vineet Narain and further amended the DSPE Act through the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, emphasizing the need for a High Power Selection Committee for the Director's appointment.( Para 32)

Sections 4A and 4B of the DSPE Act aim to completely insulate the Director, CBI, from extraneous influences, upholding the integrity of the CBI. The requirement of "previous consent of the Committee" in Section 4B(2) is crucial to prevent arbitrary interference with the Director's functioning.( Para 34)

Orders divesting powers from the Director, CBI, were set aside. The Committee under Section 4A(1) of the DSPE Act will reconsider the matter. Until then, the Director is directed to refrain from major policy decisions, limiting activities to routine functions.( Para 39-41)

Facts:

Birla Institute of Technology (BIT) is the appellant, and the State of Jharkhand and Others are the respondents.

Respondent No.4, a teacher, claimed gratuity from BIT under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

The controlling authority ordered BIT to pay gratuity to respondent No.4.

BIT appealed, but both the appellate authority and the High Court upheld the order.

Issues:

Whether the appellant (BIT) is liable to pay gratuity to a teacher under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

Held:

The Supreme Court relied on the precedent set in Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association (2004) 1 SCC 755, which held that teachers are not employees under Section 2(e) of the Act.

The High Court erred in distinguishing the precedent on the grounds of applicability to primary teachers only. The Supreme Court clarified that the distinction is not valid, emphasizing that teachers, in general, are not intended to be covered by the Act.

The Court reiterated that the definition of "employee" under the Act does not include teachers, irrespective of the type of educational institution they work in.

The High Court's decision was set aside, and the appeal by BIT was allowed.

The application made by respondent No.4 before the controlling authority under the Act was dismissed as not maintainable.