Facts:

The claimant sustained injuries in a motor accident and sought compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Initially awarded Rs. 22,85,322/- by the Tribunal, the amount was reduced to Rs. 12,00,000/- by the High Court. The Supreme Court examined the evidence and computations to determine the appropriate compensation.

Issues:

Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal and subsequently reduced by the High Court was appropriate.

Whether the claimant's disability was temporary or permanent, affecting the quantum of compensation.

Held:

The Court found discrepancies in the Tribunal's computation of the claimant's income and identified errors in considering the disability as permanent. Consequently, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal was deemed excessive. The Court recalculated the compensation, awarding Rs. 5 lakhs for loss of income, Rs. 2 lakhs for trauma, pain, and suffering, and retaining Rs. 2,09,622/- for medical expenses, totaling Rs. 9,10,000/-. Interest at 9% per annum was also awarded from the date of filing the petition. The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the appeals were disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The appellant, Dwarike Prasad, acted as a guarantor for a loan granted to another individual, secured by an equitable mortgage on certain immovable property. The appellant failed to repay the loan, leading to the initiation of proceedings under the SARFAESI Act by the bank. These proceedings culminated in the sale of the mortgaged property through auction.

Issues:

Whether the appellant had the right to redeem the mortgaged property after the sale?

Whether the appellant complied with the provisions of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act?

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, which rejected the appellant's plea for redemption rights. The Court emphasized the importance of compliance with Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act. The appellant failed to fulfill the requirements of the provision by not tendering the full amount due along with costs and expenses before the date fixed for sale or transfer. Consequently, the right to redemption stood extinguished upon the execution of the registered sale deed, as per the principles laid down in Mathew Varghese v. M. Amritha Kumar.

However, the Court acknowledged the appellant's entitlement to a refund of the amount deposited by him during the proceedings. It directed the bank to refund the deposited amount with interest at 9% per annum within 8 weeks.

Facts: The appellant, Bharati Reddy, was elected to the post of Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat. A writ petition was filed before the High Court alleging that Reddy played fraud on the government by submitting a false affidavit for the issuance of an Income and Caste Certificate.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in issuing a writ of quo warranto directing Reddy to vacate the office of Adhyaksha.

Whether the Income and Caste Certificate issued to Reddy was valid.

Whether the discrepancies in Reddy's affidavits warranted her disqualification from holding the office.

Held:

The post of Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat is a public office for which a writ of quo warranto can be issued if the incumbent is ineligible or incurs disqualification (Para 13).

The High Court erred in issuing the writ of quo warranto without first determining the validity of the Income and Caste Certificate issued to Reddy. The certificate's validity was to be determined by the Caste Verification Committee (Para 22).

Discrepancies in Reddy's affidavits and the expedited issuance of the certificate did not automatically invalidate it. The Caste Verification Committee was tasked with investigating these matters (Para 20-21).

The High Court's decision to leave the question of the certificate's validity to the Caste Verification Committee was correct. The Committee should expedite its inquiry (Para 37).

Decision: The decisions of the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court were set aside. The Caste Verification Committee was directed to expedite its inquiry into the validity of the Income and Caste Certificate issued to Reddy and conclude the same preferably within a stipulated period (Para 38).

Referred Cases in the Judgment:

Decided on : 06-03-2018

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226

Counsel for Appearing Parties

H. Chandra Sekhar, Advocate, for the Appellants; S-Legal Associates, for the Respondents

Facts:

The case concerned an auction sale of a property which was confirmed in favor of the respondents. The appellants contested this auction sale through a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court. However, the High Court observed that the Deputy Commissioner had the authority to set aside the auction sale suo motu under Section 177 of the Mysore Land Revenue Act. The High Court also noted its inability to direct the Deputy Commissioner to exercise this discretion. Subsequently, a revision petition regarding an application filed by the appellants to invoke the Deputy Commissioner's discretion to set aside the auction sale became the subject of another writ petition.

The High Court rejected the tenability of this application under Section 177, a decision that was upheld in writ appeal. Following these legal proceedings, the appellants filed a suit seeking a declaration of ownership and possession of the property.

This suit was dismissed by both the trial court and the High Court on the grounds of the principles of res judicata.

Issues:

Whether the principle of res judicata applied to the appellants' suit seeking a declaration of ownership and possession of the property, considering the previous adjudication of the matter in the writ petition and subsequent proceedings.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, affirming that the entire issue regarding the confirmation of the auction sale had already been adjudicated upon between the same parties concerning the same land and cause of action.

Therefore, the appellants were rightly non-suited due to the application of the principles of res judicata. The Court emphasized that the principle of res judicata, as enshrined in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is based on the maxim "Nemo Debet Bis Vexari Pro Una Et Eadem Causa" (no one should be vexed twice for the same cause).

The Court concluded that the trial court and the High Court correctly applied this principle, leading to the dismissal of the appellants' suit for declaration of ownership and possession.

Facts:

Anu Bhandari and Pradip Bhandari, who were married in 1997, had been living separately since March 2011 due to marital discord. They had two children. The parties were involved in various civil and criminal litigations, with a total of twenty-three cases pending before different courts.

Efforts for settlement had been made previously, including the intervention of Justice Lisa Gill and the appointment of Meenakshi Arora as a mediator. However, these efforts were not fully successful until the parties appeared before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The court was to resolve the matrimonial disputes between Anu Bhandari and Pradip Bhandari and to facilitate their divorce by mutual consent.

Held:

The court dissolved the marriage between Anu Bhandari and Pradip Bhandari by a decree of divorce by mutual consent. This decision was based on the settlement reached by the parties and their conscious decision, uninfluenced by any extraneous factors. The court also quashed, dismissed, or disposed of various cases according to the terms of the settlement.

Additionally, the court issued directions for the transfer of property and the payment of a specified amount. It emphasized the importance of courts actively intervening to assist parties in reaching settlements, as mandated by Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

The judgment appreciated the efforts of Justice Lisa Gill, Meenakshi Arora, and the legal counsels involved. The Civil Appeals were disposed of with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The appellant, Pankaj Jain, had applied for release on bond under Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, arguing that since he was not arrested during the investigation, the trial court was obligated to release him on bond. However, the trial court rejected his application. The appellant then sought bail before the Special Judge, C.B.I., but the request was not accepted as the appellant had not previously filed any bail application before the trial court. The matter was brought before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the trial court was obligated to release the appellant on bond under Section 88 of the Cr.P.C.

Whether the appellant was entitled to bail.

Held:

The Court held that Section 88 of the Cr.P.C. does not confer an automatic right upon any person present in court. The discretionary power vested in the court by Section 88 is aimed at ensuring the appearance of individuals before the court. The use of the word "may" in Section 88 indicates discretionary power, and the term "any person" encompasses a wide range of individuals, including witnesses.

The court further stated that the discretion conferred upon the court under Section 88 extends to accepting a bond from an accused or any person present in court. The decision of the Special Judge, C.B.I., and the High Court to reject the appellant's request for release on bond under Section 88 was upheld as there was no infirmity in their decision.

Regarding the appellant's request for bail, the Court noted that the appellant had previously been granted liberty to file a bail application before the trial court but had failed to do so. Therefore, the trial court was directed to first consider the appellant's bail application. Once the appellant files a bail application, it should be promptly considered, taking into account his claim of disability and other relevant grounds.

Decision: The Court disposed of the appeal, affirming the trial court's decision to reject the appellant's application for release on bond under Section 88. Additionally, the trial court was directed to consider any bail application filed by the appellant.

Facts:

The dispute arose between NHAI and M/S. Progressivemvr (JV) regarding the interpretation of a price adjustment formula in a contract for road construction. The contract included a clause for price adjustment to accommodate fluctuations in material costs during project execution.

Issues:

Whether the base rate or the prevailing rate should be used in the price adjustment formula.

Held:

The Court analyzed the relevant clauses of the contract and interpreted that the intention of the formula was to consider the base cost while calculating the price adjustment.

The purpose of the price adjustment clause was to account for fluctuations in material costs from the time of bidding, supporting the use of the base rate in the calculation.

The Court addressed the issue of conflicting interpretations by different Arbitration Tribunals in similar cases. It held that while Arbitration Tribunals may have taken different views, the interpretation favoring NHAI was plausible and consistent with contractual terms.

The Court ruled in favor of NHAI, stating that the base rate should be used in the price adjustment formula.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeals and held that the base rate should be applied in the price adjustment formula. It also addressed the issue of conflicting interpretations by Arbitration Tribunals and established its interpretation as governing pending cases.

Facts:

The appellant, M/S. Universal Cylinders Limited, manufactured cylinders for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) storage. The appellant supplied cylinders to government-owned companies based on provisional prices determined by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MoP & NG). Subsequently, the prices were revised downwards, leading to an excess amount being charged by the appellant. The government companies deducted this excess amount from the payments due to the appellant, leading the appellant to seek a refund of the sales tax paid on the excess amount.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was entitled to a refund of the sales tax paid on the excess amount charged for cylinders supplied to government-owned companies.

Held:

The court held that the appellant was under a legal obligation to receive only the price finally fixed by MoP & NG, and therefore, the excess amount charged could not be retained. The court further held that the appellant was entitled to a refund of the sales tax paid on the excess amount.

The court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and directed the refund of the sales tax paid on the excess amount charged by the appellant. The court reinstated the order of the Deputy Commissioner and granted the appellant interest on the refund amount at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the Deputy Commissioner's order until payment.

Facts:

A loan was granted by a non-financial company (not covered under the SARFAESI Act) to the respondent borrower.

Subsequently, the non-financial company merged with the appellant-company, a financial company covered by the SARFAESI Act.

The appellant initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act for the recovery of the loan.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of the SARFAESI Act could be invoked in this case where the company granting the loan was not covered by the Act at the time of granting the loan.

Whether proceedings under the SARFAESI Act were barred if a case was filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, invoking an arbitration clause.

Held:

The loan, debts, and financial assets stood vested in the appellant pursuant to the amalgamation scheme filed under Sections 391 and 394 of the Companies Act, 1956. Upon sanctioning of the scheme, all assets including loans, recoveries, security, interest, financial documents, etc., got transferred to and vested in the appellant. The respondent borrowers became borrowers of the appellant as if the financial assistance was granted by the appellant to them.

The debt with underlying securities was considered the asset of the predecessor company, which had the right to transfer/assign its assets to any person without seeking consent of the borrower.

The court rejected the argument that the merger was devised solely to bring the provisions of the SARFAESI Act into effect for the recovery of dues from the borrowers.

Proceedings under the SARFAESI Act are to be placed on a higher pedestal, given that the Act provides a speedy remedy to banks and financial institutions without recourse to the court of law. Merely because steps were taken under the Arbitration Act did not foreclose the remedy under the SARFAESI Act.

The respondent was treated as a 'borrower', the arrangement was classified as a 'security arrangement', the agreements created 'security interest', and the appellant became a 'secured creditor' under the SARFAESI Act.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, affirming the application of the SARFAESI Act and prioritizing its provisions over general laws.