Facts:

The appellant, Ex. Lt. Col. R.K. Rai, had taken voluntary retirement from the Regiment of Artillery due to a disability aggravated by military service.

He applied for disability pension, which was rejected by the Armed Forces Tribunal based on Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961.

The appellant challenged the Tribunal's decision, arguing that he was entitled to disability pension based on subsequent judgments and a government order issued in May 2017.

Issues:

Whether the appellant is entitled to disability pension despite taking voluntary retirement before January 1, 2006.

Whether the claim for "AGI Disability" was properly presented and considered.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellant was entitled to disability pension under the government order dated May 19, 2017, which extended benefits to pre-2006 retirees meeting specific conditions. The Court noted that the appellant's disability, assessed at 30% and aggravated by military service, fulfilled the requirements outlined in the order. Therefore, the authorities were directed to process the appellant's disability pension claim accordingly.

Regarding the claim for "AGI Disability," the Court observed that it was not pressed before the Tribunal or in the review petition. Therefore, the Court did not consider it in the appeals, but the appellant was granted liberty to file a review petition before the Tribunal if the claim had been pressed but not considered.

The civil appeals were allowed, and the Tribunal's orders were set aside, directing the respondents to process the appellant's disability pension claim as per the government order and the Court's observations.

Facts:

The appellants, managers of private aided schools, were permitted by the court to close down their schools.

Subsequently, the State Government decided to take over these schools, a decision that was approved by the State Legislature.

The appellants challenged the notifications issued for the takeover, citing various legal grounds.

Issues:

Whether the State's decision to take over the schools was valid considering the timing of the closure and the takeover.

Whether the takeover process was legally sound and consistent with constitutional provisions.

Whether there was any conflict between the Kerala Education Act, 1958 and other relevant laws, particularly the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

Held:

The Court held that the State's decision to take over the schools was valid, even if the closure occurred before the official notification, as the decision was made when the schools were still operational. The closure of the schools did not invalidate the State's decision.

The Court upheld the State's decision, stating that it was in the public interest and aligned with the objectives of education-related constitutional provisions and laws.

The Court clarified that there was no conflict between the Kerala Education Act, 1958 and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Both Acts operated in different fields, and the State's power to take over schools under Section 15 of the 1958 Act was distinct and separate.

The compensation for the takeover was deemed compliant with Article 300A of the Constitution, as it was based on the market value of the property as per Section 15(2) of the Kerala Education Act, 1958.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the validity of the State's decision to take over the schools under Section 15 of the Kerala Education Act, 1958.

Facts:

Rajendra Shankar Shukla (the respondent) faced allegations related to his conduct as an employee of UCO Bank, particularly regarding the issuance of a cheque.

Shukla was issued a charge sheet after a delay of about 7 years, during which he was promoted to a higher category within the bank.

Despite the ongoing proceedings, Shukla faced financial constraints as he was denied salary, pension, and subsistence allowance.

Issues:

Whether the delay in issuing the charge sheet against Shukla affected the fairness of the inquiry process.

Whether the denial of financial resources to Shukla during the disciplinary inquiry violated his right to access justice.

Whether the imposition of penalties post-superannuation was legal under the relevant regulations.

Held:

The Court held the delay of 7 years in issuing the charge sheet against Shukla was unreasonable and unacceptable, and the charge sheet was liable to be set aside on this ground.

The denial of financial resources to Shukla during the disciplinary inquiry, including salary, pension, and subsistence allowance, violated his right to access justice.

The imposition of dismissal as a penalty post-superannuation was illegal under the relevant regulations. The appeal filed by the Bank was dismissed, and costs of Rs. 1 lakh were imposed on the Bank to be paid to Shukla towards his legal expenses.

Facts:

Sundaram Finance Limited (the appellant) granted a loan to Abdul Samad (the respondent) for the purchase of a Tata Lorry-HCV under a loan agreement.

The respondent defaulted on the loan payments, leading to arbitration proceedings initiated by the appellant.

An ex parte arbitration award was made in favor of the appellant.

The appellant filed for execution of the award in the jurisdiction of the Morena courts, Madhya Pradesh.

The trial court returned the execution application citing lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether an arbitral award should first be filed in the court having jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings for execution and then transferred to another court where the assets are located,

Whether the award can be directly filed and executed in the court where the assets are situated.

Held:

The Court clarified that an award can be directly filed for execution in the court where the assets are situated, without the need for obtaining a transfer of the decree from the court which had jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings.

We are, thus, unhesitatingly of the view that the enforcement of an award through its execution can be filed anywhere in the country where such decree can be executed and there is no requirement for obtaining a transfer of the decree from the Court, which would have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings.

The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside, restoring the execution application filed by the appellant before the Morena courts.

Facts:

The Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. is the appellant, and the Appellate Authority is the respondent.

The appellant detected unauthorized use of electricity by a consumer (respondent No. 2) running an oil mill in Maharashtra.

Legal proceedings were initiated under Sections 126 and 127 of the Electricity Act, 2003, resulting in the issuance of provisional and final bills to the consumer.

The consumer challenged the legality of the bills through a writ petition, which was partly allowed by the High Court, remanding the case to the Assessing Authority.

Issues:

Whether the Electricity Act, 2003, applies to the case.

Whether the consumer has the right to appeal under Section 127 of the Act against orders/demands raised under Section 126.

Held:

The Supreme Court held the Electricity Act, 2003, applies to the case as the meter inspection occurred after the Act came into force.

The consumer has the right to appeal under Section 127 against orders/demands raised under Section 126.

Sections 126 and 135 of the Act provide for different liabilities: monetary liability under Section 126 and criminal liability under Section 135.

Compliance with the High Court's directions for passing consequential orders under Section 126 within three months was directed.

Facts:

The appellant, Kurukshetra University, terminated the services of the respondent, Prithvi Singh, a security guard, on grounds of misconduct.

A departmental inquiry was conducted, and Singh's services were terminated, leading to an industrial reference to the Labour Court, Ambala.

The Labour Court ruled in favor of Singh, stating that his termination was illegal due to procedural irregularities in the inquiry.

The High Court upheld the Labour Court's decision, prompting the appellant to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the Labour Court and High Court correctly applied legal principles in assessing the termination of employment and the conduct of the domestic inquiry.

Whether the termination of the respondent's employment constituted retrenchment or punishment under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Whether the appellant should be afforded an opportunity to present evidence regarding the alleged misconduct.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court and High Court failed to properly apply legal principles in assessing the termination and domestic inquiry.

The termination of the respondent's employment constituted punishment, not retrenchment, under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The Labour Court erred in not allowing the appellant to present evidence regarding the alleged misconduct and in treating the termination as retrenchment.

The case was remanded back to the Labour Court, affording the appellant an opportunity to present evidence on the alleged misconduct, and directing the Labour Court to issue a fresh notice to the respondent for appearance.

Facts:

The State of U.P. issued notifications between 1976 and 2010 to acquire land for planned industrial development in Noida and Greater Noida.

Some landowners challenged the acquisition in the High Court of Allahabad, arguing that it was illegal, lacked urgency, and deprived them of the opportunity to object.

The High Court disposed of several writ petitions, upholding the acquisition in most cases but directing the State to pay enhanced compensation and allot developed abadi plots to certain landowners, based on the extent of development on the acquired land.

The appellants, who were also landowners in the acquisition proceedings, appealed to the Supreme Court seeking similar relief as granted by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the appellants are entitled to claim the same relief as granted by the High Court to certain landowners in the acquisition proceedings.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellants lacked both legal right and factual foundation to claim the relief of allotment of additional developed abadi plot.

The Land Acquisition Act does not provide for such reliefs to landowners.

The State had already paid statutory and additional compensation to all landowners, including the appellants.

Granting the relief sought by the appellants would contradict the Court's previous directions and set a precedent against its decision in a similar case.

The appeals were dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision to deny the appellants the relief of allotment of additional developed abadi plot.

Facts:

The appellants (plaintiffs) filed a civil suit against the respondents (defendants) for specific performance of an agreement.

The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the appellants.

The respondents appealed to the Single Judge of the High Court, who allowed their appeal and dismissed the appellants' suit.

The appellants then filed a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) before the Division Bench of the High Court, which was summarily dismissed.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in dismissing the appellants' LPA.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the Division Bench's dismissal of the LPA lacked proper reasoning and did not comply with the requirements of the Civil Procedure Code. The lack of a reasoned order deprived the parties of understanding the basis for the decision, causing prejudice. Thus, the Supreme Court decided to set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the Division Bench of the High Court for fresh consideration on merits.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the case to the Division Bench of the High Court for fresh consideration on merits, emphasizing the importance of reasoned orders and expeditious disposal of the appeal.

Facts:

The case involved workers seeking regularization of their services in Chennai Port Trust, governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The High Court had given directions regarding cargo distribution between Chennai and Ennore Ports. Chennai Port Trust terminated the MOU after certain activities were shifted to Ennore Port Trust. Workers filed a writ petition, initially dismissed by a Single Judge but partially allowed by a Division Bench.

Issues:

The employment status of the workers, their association membership, and entitlement to relief.

Held:

The Supreme Court directed that the case should have been referred to arbitration instead of being entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution. Various questions regarding employment status and entitlement to relief need to be decided by an Arbitral Tribunal.

The Court set aside the impugned judgments and dismissed the writ petition, granting liberty to the parties to approach the court for the appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal as per the MOU.

The Tribunal is instructed to consider all issues raised, ensure a fair resolution within six months, and may frame additional questions if necessary.