Facts:

Partition suit (154/1985) filed by Smt. Saroja Rani in Ranchi, challenged on jurisdiction.

Preliminary decree passed on 13 June 1990; final decree on 5 April 1991.

Respondent raised objections to execution based on lack of territorial jurisdiction.

Issues:

Whether an objection to territorial jurisdiction can be entertained in execution proceedings?

Application of Sections 21A and 47, Order 7 Rule 11, and Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC.

Held:

Jurisdiction objection doesn't go to inherent lack but must be raised at the earliest opportunity.

Conditions for raising jurisdiction objection: earliest opportunity and consequent failure of justice.

Execution court cannot go behind the decree; objections must be raised before the court of first instance.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the High Court's judgment is set aside. The executing court is directed to conclude the execution proceedings expeditiously.

FACTS:

Two workers, Santosh Kumar and Hira Singh, filed claim petitions under the Minimum Wages Act against the appellant, alleging non-payment of wages for the period from 01.01.1991 to 30.10.1992.

The competent authority allowed the claim petitions, directing the appellant to pay determined wages along with a penalty.

The appellate authority affirmed the order, and the appellant approached the High Court through writ petitions, which were subsequently dismissed.

The Division Bench of the High Court, in intra-Court appeals, upheld the dismissal, leading to the present appeals.

ISSUES:

The factual question of whether the workers were employed by the appellant, the validity of the penalty, and procedural matters related to impleadment.

HELD:

The judgment states that the case involves a pure question of fact, which cannot be re-examined in the appeals.

The findings of the competent and appellate authorities, regarding the workers' employment and wages, were considered binding by the High Court.

The writ petitions were dismissed on the ground that the workers, in whose favor orders were passed, were not impleaded, and the Division Bench rightly rejected a belated application for their impleadment.

The workers had passed away, and their legal representatives were not made parties, further justifying the dismissal of the appeals.

The appellant's challenge regarding the adequacy of the opportunity and the quantum of penalty was rejected. The authorities were deemed justified in imposing the penalty considering the nature of breaches committed by the appellant.

The appellant was directed to calculate and pay the awarded sum to the legal representatives of the deceased workers within three months.

Facts:

M/S Paulbro Leathers Private Limited defaulted on a loan from Punjab Financial Corporation.

The matter was settled as per the one-time settlement policy on 01.04.2003, with a Chartered Accountant determining the outstanding balance.

A dispute arose post-settlement regarding the precise liability and the amount paid by the respondent.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the demand raised by Punjab Financial Corporation.

Whether the dismissal of the application for review by the High Court was justified.

Held:

The appeals are allowed, and the case is remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision on the writ petition. (Paragraph 13)

Disagreement with the High Court's reasoning for allowing the writ petition, emphasizing the need to examine the dispute arising from the settlement terms. (Paragraph 14)

Suggestion that if there are disputes or ambiguities in the Chartered Accountant's report, they should be addressed separately. (Paragraph 17)

Emphasis on examining the issue on its merits before quashing the demand, highlighting the necessity for a categorical finding on how the respondent fulfilled the settlement terms.( Paragraph 18)

Facts:

A complaint was lodged in 1983, and the case was put on trial under various sections of IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act.

After the investigation, charges were filed against the appellant and others.

The prosecution filed a petition to examine handwriting expert Mr. H.S. Tuteja in 2004, but his attendance for examination has been a persistent challenge.

Issues:

Whether the summoning of Mr. H.S. Tuteja, as sought by the prosecution, is justified.

The impact of repeated failures to secure the witness's attendance on the trial proceedings.

Held:

The court refers to Section 311 of CrPC, granting discretionary authority to summon witnesses. Emphasizes that such power should be exercised cautiously and only for strong and valid reasons.

Despite multiple opportunities given to the prosecution, they have been unable to ensure the presence of Mr. H.S. Tuteja.

The High Court's orders allowing the summoning of the witness are quashed. The appeal is allowed, and the application for summoning Mr. H.S. Tuteja is dismissed.

Decision: The orders of the High Court dated 04.05.2017, as well as of the Trial Court dated 05.12.2014, are hereby quashed, and the application filed by the Prosecutor for summoning Mr. H.S. Tuteja is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Madhav Hari Joshi, applied for a Jeevan Aastha Plan with LIC in 2009.

An extra premium of Rs. 10,000 was disputed, although the appellant had paid Rs. 1,75,000 against the regular premium of Rs. 1,65,000.

LIC retained the appellant's money for nearly five years without issuing a policy or initiating a refund.

Issues:

Dispute over the extra premium.

Delay in processing the proposal by LIC.

Non-issuance of the policy and failure to refund the appellant's money.

Held:

The appellant had paid the disputed extra premium as part of the total payment.

LIC failed to fulfill the remaining formalities promptly, leading to an unjustified delay.

The appellant's investment was linked to the equity market, and the delay deprived him of the benefits of market escalation.

A deficiency of service was established.

The National Commission's order was modified, and an additional amount of Rs. 2,00,000 was directed to be paid, in addition to the sum ordered by the National Commission.

Facts:

U.P. Jal Nigam Construction Division (Jal Nigam) retrenched workmen engaged in various categories.

The Writ Petition challenging the retrenchment was decided in 2009, directing preference to the petitioners in future selections.

Subsequent disputes arose leading to a series of contempt petitions.

Issues:

Whether the circular dated 07.04.2015 complied with the court's directions?

Did the order of the court mandate reinstatement or grant of regular pay scale?

Can the petitioners claim reinstatement without a specific court order to that effect?

Held:

The circular dated 07.04.2015 complied with the court's directions under Section 6Q of the Act.

Contempt cannot be invoked without a specific direction for reinstatement or regular pay scale.

The court's order did not mandate reinstatement; hence, petitioners cannot claim such relief.

The Group D posts available were subject to regular recruitment rules, not for direct appointment of retrenched workers.

Contempt petitions dismissed; the services of already engaged workmen remain unaffected.

FACTS:

The Appellant-State issued a Letter of Acceptance on 12.12.2008 for a works contract to M/s. G. F. Toll Road Pvt. Ltd.

Disputes arose, and arbitration was invoked as per the Concession Agreement.

Respondent No. 1 appointed a retired Engineer-in-Chief as their nominee arbitrator, and the Appellant-State nominated a retired Engineer-in-Chief as well.

The Indian Council of Arbitration (ICA) raised objections to the Appellant's nominee, claiming potential bias due to his past employment with the State.

ISSUES:

Whether the objection to the arbitrator's nomination based on his past employment is justified.

Applicability of the pre-amended 1996 Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Procedure for appointing a substitute arbitrator as per Section 15(2).

HELD:

The objection to the nominee arbitrator being a former employee over 10 years ago was deemed unjustified. Mere allegations of bias are insufficient grounds for removal.

The pre-amended 1996 Act is applicable, and the objection based on the 2015 Amendment Act was deemed untenable.

The court emphasized Section 15(2), stating that a substitute arbitrator must be appointed according to the rules applicable to the original arbitrator. The ICA's appointment of an arbitrator on behalf of the Appellant was unjustified.

REFERRED CASES:

ACC Ltd. v. Global Cements Ltd, (2012) 7 SCC 713

Locabail Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties, 2000(1) All ER 65

Re Medicaments and related Classes of Goods (No.2), 2002(1) All ER 465

Facts:

Late Smt. Shyal Devi purchased land in 1958.

Title Suit filed in 1992 due to alleged interference by Bihar State Road Transport Corporation.

Previous litigation established possession but not title.

Electricity Sub-station construction initiated in 2015 on disputed land.

Smt. Shyal Devi passed away in 2014, and her sons (Respondent Nos. 1 to 3) filed Title Suit No. 45/2015 seeking an injunction.

Issues:

Validity of Writ Petition challenging orders of Civil Courts.

Prima facie case for granting interim injunction.

Ownership and possession of disputed suit property.

Public interest vs. Private interest in constructing Electricity Sub-station.

Held:

The court does not unsettle the judgement of the High Court on the ground of maintainability of the Writ Petition under Article 227 due to procedural reasons.

Respondents failed to establish a prima facie case justifying the grant of an interim injunction. The previous finding of possession did not confer title, and the Plaintiffs did not specify the area under dispute.

The court emphasized that the findings of previous litigation were against the Plaintiffs, and the refusal to grant a Temporary Injunction was justified. The Electricity Sub-station construction was on land registered in the name of the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation.

The balance of convenience favored the Electricity Board due to the completion of the Sub-station, ready to benefit around 1 lakh people. Respondents could be compensated if entitled under Section 67 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

The judgement of the High Court directing status quo was set aside. The court stated that these findings were prima facie in nature and would not influence the trial of the case.

Facts:

The appellant, Satishchandra Ratanlal Shah, a retired bank employee, sought a loan from the respondent's money lending company.

The loan was granted, but the appellant failed to repay within the agreed timeframe.

The respondent filed a complaint, leading to the framing of charges under various sections of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's inability to repay the loan automatically gives rise to criminal prosecution for cheating.

Whether there was fraudulent or dishonest intent by the appellant at the beginning of the transaction.

Validity of charges under Section 406 and Section 415 of the IPC.

Held:

The court emphasizes that at the stage of framing charges, the court must ensure a prima facie case against the accused. A cautious approach is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to the accused's liberty.( Para 10)

Analyzing charges under Section 405 read with 406 of the IPC, the court notes that there was no clear case of entrustment, and the magistrate erred in issuing process for criminal breach of trust. The High Court failed to correct this error.( Para 12)

Regarding charges under Section 415 punishable under Section 420 of the IPC, the court stresses that the mere inability to repay a loan does not warrant criminal prosecution unless fraudulent or dishonest intent is proven from the beginning of the transaction.( Para 14)

The High Court's unnecessary moral observations are criticized, and the court expunges certain remarks that could be seen as casting aspersions on the appellant, maintaining that such suggestions need to be restricted.( Para 16)

The court sets aside the High Court's order, allowing the appellant's application under Section 482 of the CrPC and quashing the proceedings initiated based on the FIR.( Para 18)