Facts:

Appellant and seven members submitted a No Confidence Motion against the President of Masughat Gaon Panchayat.

Delays occurred in convening the special meeting required by law.

Meeting eventually took place, where nine members voted in favor of the No Confidence Motion, resulting in the removal of the President.

President challenged the legality of the resolution through a writ petition in the Gauhati High Court.

Issues:

Validity of the resolution passed against the President in the special meeting.

Procedural irregularities in convening the meeting.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after analyzing Section 15 of the Assam Panchayat Act, noted the requirement of strict compliance with the law. However, it recognized exceptions when no public interest is affected. As the respondent, who benefited from attending the meeting, had effectively waived the procedural irregularities by participating in the meeting, the Court upheld the validity of the resolution passed against the President.

Therefore, the appeal was allowed, setting aside the judgments of the High Court. The competent authority was directed to implement the consequences of the resolution. Costs were not awarded in this case.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the interpretation of provisions within the Indian Medicines Central Council Act, 1970 (the Act of 1970).

A Member of the Central Council of Indian Medicine (CCIM), who was also the President of CCIM representing the State of Uttarakhand, had his term expire on 27.8.2016.

An election was held on 14.3.2017 for the post of President, in which Dr. Vanitha R. was elected.

There was a dispute regarding the tenure for which the election was held, with one party arguing for a five-year term and the other contending it was only for the remainder of the term of the previous officeholder.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 7 of the Act of 1970, specifically in relation to the tenure of the President of the CCIM.

The dispute revolved around whether the election held on 14.3.2017 was for a full five-year term or only for the remainder of the term of the previous officeholder.

Held:

The tenure for which the election was held was only for the remainder of the term of the previous officeholder, not a full five-year term.

Section 7(3) of the Act of 1970 deals with casual vacancies in the Central Council, and the term of the person elected to fill such a vacancy is only for the remainder of the term of the outgoing member.

Interpretation of Sections 7(1) and 7(3) must be harmonious, and in this case, the election was held to fill a casual vacancy, thus the term was limited.

The court dismissed arguments related to regulations governing the term of the President, emphasizing that regulations cannot supersede the provisions of the Act.

The court set aside the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court and declared the election for the President held on 23rd March 2018 as legal and valid.

The court ordered the declaration of the election results within ten days.

Facts:

A dispute arose between Ferani Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and respondent no.3 regarding a development agreement for a property. Respondent no.3 sought information about development plans submitted by Ferani Hotels Pvt. Ltd. The Public Information Officer (PIO) declined the information, leading to appeals and ultimately to the Court.

Issues:

Whether the information sought under the Right to Information Act, 2005, regarding development plans submitted by a developer, should be disclosed.

Whether the provisions of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, mandate the disclosure of such development plans.

Held:

The Court held that there was no 'personal information' sought for disclosure. The information requested had a clear relation to public activity and interest.

Provisions of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, specifically required developers to make available sanctioned plans and layout plans to the public. This was aimed at enhancing transparency in the real estate sector.

Disclosure of development plans did not infringe copyright laws as per the Copyright Act, 1957. Reproduction of works for certified copies is permitted under the Act.

The Court emphasized the importance of public interest and transparency in matters concerning land development and investments. Full disclosure of information regarding development plans was deemed necessary.

The Court recommended that sanctioned plans and layout plans should be displayed at project sites, in addition to any other specified manner by the Authority's regulations, to ensure transparency and accountability.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals and directed Ferani Hotels Pvt. Ltd. to disclose the information regarding development plans. Costs of Rs.2.50 lakhs were imposed on the appellant.

Facts:

The State of Kerala acquired land in Ernakulam District for the Infopark project, invoking the urgency clause under section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Subsequently, a notification was issued under section 4(1) of the Act for the acquisition of the aforementioned land.

The appellants, who owned separate land, contested that the Special Tahsildar exceeded his authority by attempting to act as Collector for land acquisitions beyond those explicitly mentioned in the notification.

Issues:

Whether the Special Tahsildar was empowered to perform the functions of a Collector for land acquisitions beyond those explicitly mentioned in the notification.

Whether adherence to legal procedures, even in cases involving public interest, is mandatory.

Held:

On perusal of the notification dated August 21, 1989, it is evident that the Special Tahsildar was appointed to perform the functions of a Collector only within Ernakulam District, specifically for lands for which notifications under section 4(1) had been published.

The Special Tahsildar was not authorized to issue fresh notifications for other land acquisitions beyond the scope outlined in the notification. The explanatory note accompanying the notification clarified this limitation.

Adherence to legal procedures is crucial, and any violation of these procedures could render the act voidable, if not void. The Court rejected the notion that technicalities should be overlooked in cases involving public interest.

Decision: The Court ruled in favor of the appellants, holding that the Special Tahsildar exceeded his authority by attempting to act as Collector for acquisitions beyond those explicitly mentioned in the notification.

Facts:

The petitioner, Aseer Jamal, raised concerns regarding the accessibility of information under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) for illiterate and visually impaired citizens. He argued that certain provisions of the RTI Act, particularly Section 6, were discriminatory and violated Article 14 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of the RTI Act adequately cater to the needs of illiterate and visually impaired individuals.

Whether Section 6 of the RTI Act violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court declined to address the constitutional validity of Section 6 of the RTI Act. Instead, it focused on addressing the practical concerns raised by the petitioner.

The Court observed that Section 6(1) of the RTI Act mandates public authorities to provide reasonable assistance to individuals unable to make a written request, ensuring accessibility for illiterate persons. It also noted the provision in Section 6(3) allowing for the transfer of RTI applications to the appropriate competent public authority.

Regarding visually impaired persons, the Court highlighted measures implemented by several states to provide information in accessible formats such as Braille and audio files. It also noted the existence of hotline numbers and help desks for RTI-related queries.

The Court referred to Rule 5 of the Right to Information Rules, 2012, which exempts persons below the poverty line from paying application fees, provided they submit proof of their status.

In conclusion, the Court disposed of the writ petition, granting the petitioner liberty to submit a representation to the competent authority suggesting additional methods for accessing information under the RTI Act. The Court emphasized the importance of ensuring that differently abled persons, including visually impaired individuals, have functional access to information and encouraged authorities to explore advanced technologies to facilitate this access.

Facts:

Lok Prahari, through its General Secretary, filed a Public Interest Litigation invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.

The petitioner sought a declaration that a stay of conviction by an appellate court does not wipe out disqualification and revive membership retrospectively.

The petitioner argued that disqualification under certain sections of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, arises upon conviction and that the seat of a member of Parliament or State legislature becomes vacant from the date of conviction.

The matter arose from a case where a member of the Legislative Assembly in the State of Uttar Pradesh was convicted of offenses under Sections 353, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to imprisonment. The District Court stayed the execution of the sentence and of the conviction.

Issues:

Whether a stay of conviction by an appellate court affects the disqualification of a member of Parliament or State legislature under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

The interpretation of relevant constitutional provisions, statutory provisions, and judicial precedents regarding disqualification upon conviction.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that a stay of conviction by an appellate court suspends the disqualification, and the seat of the member does not become vacant from the date of conviction.

The Court examined Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which empowers the appellate court to suspend the execution of a sentence or order appealed against, for reasons to be recorded in writing. It cited previous judgments such as Rama Narang v Ramesh Narang and Lily Thomas v Union of India to establish the legal precedent regarding the effect of a stay of conviction on disqualification.

The Court concluded that once a conviction is stayed during the appeal process, the disqualification under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, does not operate. Therefore, the seat of the member does not become vacant from the date of conviction. The power conferred on the appellate court under Section 389 includes the power to stay a conviction, which suspends the operation of the disqualification.

Additionally, the Court dismissed the petitioner's request for certain directions to be issued to the Union Government regarding the dissemination of judgments related to disqualifications of sitting members.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of various provisions of the Constitution of India regarding reservation in promotions and the application of the creamy layer principle to SCs and STs.

Issues:

The judgment include the validity of the M. Nagaraj case judgment, the application of the creamy layer principle, the interpretation of relevant constitutional provisions, the object of reservation, and the reservation in promotions for SCs and STs.

Held:

The court held that the judgment in M. Nagaraj case did not need to be referred to a seven-judge bench. However, the requirement for the State to collect quantifiable data showing backwardness of SCs and STs, as mandated by the M. Nagaraj case, was deemed invalid to this extent .

The application of the creamy layer principle to SCs and STs was upheld. Only individuals within SCs and STs who have come out of untouchability or backwardness due to belonging to the creamy layer would be excluded from reservation benefits. This application was seen as consistent with Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution .

The court emphasized a harmonious interpretation of Articles 14, 16, 341, and 342 of the Constitution, clarifying that Parliament has the freedom to include or exclude persons from the Presidential Lists based on relevant factors. Similarly, Constitutional Courts have the authority to exclude the creamy layer from these lists when applying the principles of equality under Articles 14 and 16 .

The court reiterated that the purpose of reservation is to ensure the progress of backward classes of citizens and their attainment of equality with other citizens of India .

The determination of adequate representation in promotional posts for SCs and STs under Article 16(4-A) is left to the discretion of the States, considering the efficiency of administration and the need for reservation at different levels of promotion .

The court clarified that while a proportionality test to the population as a whole may be considered for representation in promotional posts, the language of Article 16(4-A) allows States to determine adequate representation based on the specific context of the promotional post in question.

Facts:

The appellant's wife died along with her child by drowning in a river within seven years of her marriage. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 304-B IPC, which was affirmed by the High Court with a reduced sentence. The appellant contended that there was neither cruelty nor any demand for dowry.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented in the case warrants interference by the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India?

Held:

The Supreme Court will not reassess the evidence at large in an appeal under Article 136, particularly when it has been concurrently accepted by the High Court and the Courts below.

Interference by the Supreme Court is justified only if something more is shown, such as a violation of principles of natural justice, error of law or procedure, misreading of evidence, or manifestly perverse conclusions by the High Court.

Material in the form of testimony from witnesses PW-1 and PW-3 regarding dowry harassment was present. This included complaints made by the deceased to her father and elder sister about harassment by the appellant.

The presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act for dowry death was applicable considering the circumstances presented in the case.

The trial court's conclusion was based on evidence, including testimony from various witnesses, and was not manifestly perverse. The view taken by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court was warranted by the materials on record.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction under Section 304-B IPC was upheld.

Facts:

The respondent filed a suit against the appellants for eviction from the suit premises.

A compromise was reached during the suit, resulting in a consent decree.

The defendants failed to comply with the terms of the decree, leading to execution proceedings.

The Executing Court ordered possession in favor of the plaintiff, but the defendants filed a revision, leading to remand by the revisionary court.

The High Court set aside the revisionary court's order and upheld the Executing Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the remand by the revisionary court was justified.

Whether additional documents filed by the defendants were relevant in the revisionary jurisdiction.

Held:

The Court found that the revisionary court erred in remanding the case to the Executing Court instead of deciding the revision on its merits.

The court emphasized that remand is warranted only for material issues not decided or procedural lacunae.

The allowance of additional documents was deemed unnecessary as the legality and correctness of the order could be decided based on existing records.

The High Court should have remanded the case to the revisionary court instead of deciding the issue on merits itself.

The revisionary court is directed to decide the revision afresh on its merits, considering relevant legal precedents, within six months. The appeals thus succeed and are accordingly allowed in part.