Facts:

Sailors were appointed in the Indian Navy before July 3, 1976, with appointment letters stating a term of 10 years of active service and 10 years on fleet service thereafter, if required.

Fleet Reserve Service was discontinued due to a government policy dated July 3, 1976.

Applicants sought the grant of Reservist Pension and Special Pension, which were initially rejected by the tribunal.

Tribunal accepted the claim of appellants for the grant of Reservist Pension in another application.

Issues:

Whether sailors were entitled to Reservist Pension or Special Pension under the Navy (Pension) Regulations, 1964.

The effect of the government policy discontinuing Fleet Reserve Service on the eligibility of sailors for pension benefits.

Held:

The condition in the appointment letter does not automatically entitle sailors to continue in Fleet Reserve Service after completing the initial active service period.

Completion of active service does not imply automatic transfer to Fleet Reserve Service; an express order from the competent authority is necessary for such transfer.

Regulation 269 states that a sailor's service would continue "so long required" or "if required" for a further 10 years in the Indian Fleet Reserve.

Sailors must fulfill the prescribed Naval and Reserve qualifying service of 10 years each to qualify for Reservist Pension under Regulation 92.

Regulation 95 provides for Special Pension to sailors discharged due to government policy or reorganization.

The court directs the competent authority to consider cases of sailors whose active service period expired on or after July 3, 1976, for Special Pension under Regulation 95.

The appeals are disposed of.

Facts:

The petition initially labeled as a contempt petition was treated as a limited review petition concerning the calculation and payment of interest by LIC to the petitioners.

The main contention was to determine from which date the interest should be calculated and paid by LIC, as per the final order dated 10th December 2015.

Issues:

The determine the starting date from which LIC would be liable to pay interest to the petitioners.

The modification of the final order dated 10th December 2015 to specify the date for interest calculation and payment.

Held:

The Court held that LIC would be liable to pay interest at the prevailing bank rate (without penal interest) from 30 days after the date of death or date of maturity relating to the life insurance policy concerned, or from 4th April 2008, whichever is later. The Court modified the final order dated 10th December 2015 accordingly. Despite arguments for a reduction in the rate of interest, the Court maintained the prevailing bank rate without penal interest, considering the delay caused by interim orders. The matter was disposed of with the directive for LIC to discharge its liabilities promptly and without unnecessary delay as per the modified order (Para 13).

This decision aligns with the Court's earlier observations regarding the interpretation of relevant regulations and the equities between the parties, ensuring fairness in the payment of interest by LIC to the petitioners.

Facts:

The case involves the assessment of sales turnover of home appliances by KAIL Ltd. for the year 1999-2000 under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (KGST Act). The dispute arises from whether KAIL Ltd. is the brand name holder of "Sansui" products it sold and whether its sales qualify as the first sale under Section 5(2) of the KGST Act.

Issues:

Whether KAIL Ltd. is the brand name holder of "Sansui" products sold by it and whether its sales are liable to tax under Section 5(2) of the KGST Act.

Held:

The court analyzed evidence, including correspondence, newspaper reports, and affidavits, which indicated KAIL Ltd.'s association with the "Sansui" brand. It was established that KAIL Ltd. was a subsidiary or group company of Videocon International Ltd., which held the brand name rights for "Sansui" in India.

The court concluded that when products are marketed under a brand name, the marketing company can be assumed to be the holder of the brand name or authorized to use it.

While sales between holding and subsidiary companies may not be intended to be covered under Section 5(2) of the KGST Act, if the sale is at a realistic price and usual margins are charged, it should not be ignored. However, evidence showed unusually high margins charged by KAIL Ltd.

The court affirmed that the tax assessment under Section 5(2) was rightly levied on KAIL Ltd. as it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that KAIL Ltd. was the brand name holder of "Sansui" products.

The appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

Navjot Singh Sidhu, the appellant, contested the 2009 election for the 02-Amritsar Parliamentary Constituency.

The election was challenged in E.P. No.3 of 2009 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh.

Sidhu filed an application for the dismissal of the election petition, claiming deficiencies in pleadings.

The High Court partially granted relief to Sidhu but ordered a regular trial for certain allegations, including exceeding the expenditure limit and alleged assistance received from a government official.

Sidhu appealed against this decision.

Issues:

Whether the election petition adequately pleaded the allegations of corrupt practices.

Whether the allegations regarding election expenses and assistance from a government official warranted a regular trial.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the election petition sufficiently pleaded the allegations of corrupt practices regarding election expenses.

The Court ruled that the details provided in the petition regarding the expenses incurred by the candidate were adequate, and thus, the trial on this issue should continue.

Regarding the assistance received from a government official, the Court determined that if the official was rendering service under the State Government when providing assistance, it constituted a corrupt practice. Therefore, this issue should proceed to trial.

The Court found that the third allegation concerning actions taken by the Returning Officer had become academic due to the passage of time.

Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed, and the trial of the election petition on the surviving issues was ordered to recommence.

Facts:

The case involves the cancellation of a plot allotment by a Housing Co-operative Society to one of its members (the original allottee), subsequent cancellation of membership, and the transfer of the plot to another party.

A compromise deed was entered into between the Society, the subsequent plot owner, and the original allottee's son (the appellant), resulting in compensation for the appellant.

The appellant challenged the cancellation of the allotment, subsequent transfer of the plot, and the registration of related documents.

Issues:

Whether the cancellation of the allotment and membership by the Housing Co-operative Society was lawful.

The validity of registration of documents related to the cancellation and subsequent transfer of the plot.

The applicability of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in this matter.

Held:

The Co-operative Society was within its rights to unilaterally cancel the allotment and membership of the original allottee due to alleged violations of bye-laws.

The Registrar's role is limited to registration, and there is no provision empowering them to cancel registrations post facto.

Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and should not be used for private or contractual disputes.

The appellant should pursue statutory remedies available under the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, for resolution of the dispute.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision to dismiss the writ petition and directing the appellant to pursue statutory remedies. The court clarified the limited role of Registrars in post-registration matters and emphasized the discretionary nature of writ jurisdiction.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the application of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' to temporary employees (referred to as daily-wage employees, ad-hoc appointees, employees appointed on a casual basis, contractual employees, etc.). These temporary employees were engaged in duties and responsibilities similar to those of regular employees holding the same or corresponding posts within the State of Punjab. The qualifications possessed by these temporary employees were also suitable for appointment on a regular basis.

Issues:

Whether the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is applicable to temporary employees who perform duties equivalent to those of regular employees, holding the same post.

Held:

The Court held that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' applies to all temporary employees engaged in duties similar to those of regular employees. Temporary employees must be paid wages at the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engaged government employees in the same post.

The Court outlined the parameters for applying the principle, including the burden of proof on the claimant to demonstrate parity in duties and responsibilities, irrespective of departmental distinctions, and the necessity for similar qualifications for recruitment.

The Court clarified the misinterpretation of previous judgments by the High Court and affirmed the applicability of the 'equal pay for equal work' principle to temporary employees, emphasizing that it should not be confused with issues of regularization.

The differential treatment of temporary employees based on their length of service was set aside by the Court, affirming the entitlement of temporary employees to wages at the minimum of the pay-scale for their category but not to allowances attached to regular posts.

Facts:

The case involves the validity of amendments made to the Telangana (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966, following the formation of the state of Telangana. These amendments reduced the number of members in the Agricultural Market Committee and shortened their term of office.

Issues:

The constitutionality of the retrospective amendments and their impact on the rights of existing and future members of the Market Committee.

Held:

The Court affirmed the competence of the state legislature to enact laws retrospectively or prospectively within constitutional parameters. [Para 23]

Retroactive amendments made by the legislature do not constitute an encroachment upon judicial power, as long as they rectify defects in the law highlighted by court decisions. [Para 29]

The doctrine of colorable legislation does not question the motives behind legislative actions but rather focuses on the competence of the legislature to enact laws. [Para 30]

The retrospective amendment substituting 'appointed' with 'nominated' effectively removed the distinction between existing and future members of the Market Committee. Thus, the amendment did not violate constitutional provisions or democratic norms. [Para 31]

The Court noted that the characteristics of Market Committee and Special Market Committee are different, and therefore, Article 14 is not attracted. [Para 33]

Facts:

Saroj Agarwalla filed a petition for the grant of probate of a will purportedly executed by Jagdish Prasad Tulshan, claiming to be his only surviving sister.

Two respondents, Yasheel Jain and Malati Tulshan, lodged caveats opposing the grant of probate, asserting their respective interests in the estate of the deceased.

The High Court at Calcutta dismissed the appellant's petition and upheld the caveats filed by the respondents.

Issues:

Whether the respondents had caveatable interest in the probate proceedings.

Whether the caveats filed by the respondents should be discharged.

Held:

The Division Bench held that both respondents had caveatable interest in the probate proceedings and upheld their caveats. The court clarified the limited scope of the probate court's inquiry and emphasized that it is only concerned with the execution of the will and the testator's mental capacity at the time of execution. The court's decision was based on the totality of facts and circumstances presented. The appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the process of promotion from Class IV to Class III posts in the District Court of Muzaffarpur, Bihar.

Initially, a written examination and interview were conducted, but due to discrepancies in marks allocation, a fresh examination was ordered.

The High Court intervened and reinstated the original order of appointment.

The appellants participated in the fresh selection process but later challenged the result.

Issues:

Whether the appellants, having participated in the fresh selection process, could challenge the result.

Interpretation of the rules governing the selection process.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, citing the principle of estoppel. Once candidates participate in a selection process without objection, they cannot later challenge the process merely because they were unsuccessful. The Court also noted some vagueness in the interpretation of the rules but found no glaring illegality. In the interest of justice, the Court directed that the appellant, if still in service, could continue to work provisionally in the Class III post until the next selection process. The appellant could participate in future selections and claim consideration for seniority based on the period spent in the Class III post if successful. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Division Bench and disposed of the appeal accordingly.