Facts:

The appellant, Vivek Mudgil, challenged the order passed by the U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board regarding his appointment as Principal.

The appellant's appointment was cancelled due to not fulfilling the required qualification of possessing ten years of teaching experience.

The appellant, initially a Lecturer, had his services regularized in 1990. He had a period of study leave from 1992 to 1996, during which he pursued higher studies in Czechoslovakia.

The Board considered this period as not counting towards teaching experience. The appellant fell short of the required teaching experience by nine months when he applied for the Principal position.

Issues:

Whether the appellant met the eligibility criteria for the position of Principal.

Whether the period of study leave should count towards teaching experience.

Whether the exemption granted by the Board affected the appellant's eligibility.

Held:

The Court dismissed the appeals and disposed of the transferred case. The Court held that the possession of ten years of teaching experience was a necessary qualification for the appointment as Principal.

The exemption granted by the Board did not cure the appellant's disqualification as of the last date of application submission and the date of preparing the panel. The Court emphasized that the exemption was not granted retrospectively and did not affect the appellant's eligibility at the time of application.

The Court left open the question of whether the respondent authorities had the power to grant exemptions under Section 16-E(3) of the 1921 Act after the enactment of the 1982 Act, allowing parties to approach the High Court if necessary to decide this issue independently.

Facts:

The appellant, S.C. Singh, challenged a resolution of the High Court of Uttarakhand that terminated the College Development Council (CDC) but allowed its continuation without the appellant as its Director.

The appellant was appointed as Director, CDC, in November 1992, for a tenure of three years, based on an advertisement by the University.

The revised guidelines by the University Grants Commission (UGC) specified a tenure of three years for the Director, extendable for another term of three years.

Issues:

Whether the tenure limitation for the Director of CDC applied only to deputationists or to all appointments.

Whether the appellant could continue as Director, CDC, beyond the prescribed tenure.

Held:

The Supreme Court interpreted the relevant clause of the revised guidelines and rejected the appellant's argument that the tenure limitation applied only to deputationists. It held that the tenure limitation applied to all appointments to the post of Director, CDC.

The Court upheld the judgment of the High Court, stating that the appellant had served the prescribed tenure and could not continue as Director, CDC.

The appeal was dismissed, and consequently, the contempt petition also did not survive. No costs were awarded.

Facts:Squadron Leader (Retd.) Navtej Singh appealed against the invalidation of his service on medical grounds and sought recognition of his marriage to a foreign national, along with benefits for his family. He had married without prior permission as required by Air Force regulations. Despite the lack of permission, no disciplinary action was taken against him.

Issues:

Recognition of marriage with a foreign national by a retired Indian Air Force officer.

Entitlement of family members to benefits.

Held:

The Court held that since the appellant was no longer subject to the Indian Air Force Act, he could validly contract marriage with a foreign national after his release or retirement. The Court directed the respondents to include the names of the appellant's wife and daughter in his Service Certificate from the date of his release or retirement. Additionally, the respondents were ordered to extend all benefits entitled to the spouse and children of a retired officer to the appellant's family.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, we therefore direct the respondents to include the names of the wife and daughter of the appellant in the Service Certificate at least from the date of his release or retirement and direct the respondents to extend to the wife and the daughter of the appellant all such benefits which a spouse and children of a retired officer would be entitled.

Facts:

Indian Oil Corporation issued an advertisement inviting applications for different Kisan Seva Kendra (Retail Outlet) dealerships, including one located on Falka Gerabari Road in Bihar.

Sanjay Kumar Jha (appellant) and Prakash Chandra Chaudhary (respondent) applied for the dealership.

A panel of candidates was prepared, with Jha ranked first and Chaudhary second.

Chaudhary challenged the allotment in the High Court, alleging discrepancies in the evaluation process.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's intervention was justified in this matter.

Whether the decisions of the Single Bench and the Division Bench were erroneous.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's intervention was not justified. It criticized both the Single Bench and the Division Bench for errors in their judgments.

The Court stated that the High Court should not have adjudicated disputed factual issues, as it falls outside the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution. Additionally, the Court emphasized that the High Court erred in making a comparative assessment of the suitability of different candidates for the dealership.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court found fault with the Division Bench for proceeding on a mistaken understanding of the facts, particularly regarding the location of the land in question. It noted that the Division Bench disregarded reports from Revenue Authorities and made errors in its analysis.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgments of both the Single Bench and the Division Bench. The writ petition filed by Prakash Chandra Chaudhary was dismissed, and each party was directed to bear its own costs.

Facts:

The appellant, a contractor, entered into an agreement with the Union of India for the construction of permanent shelters in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Differences arose between the parties regarding the construction work, leading to arbitration.

The arbitrator made an award in favor of the appellant, directing the respondent to pay a certain sum.

The respondent filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to set aside the arbitral award, but faced delays due to jurisdictional issues and administrative difficulties.

Issues:

Whether the delay of 514 days in filing the application under Section 34 can be condoned.

Whether the statutory provisions and precedents support the condonation of such a delay.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the delay of 514 days could not be condoned as it exceeded the strict timeline prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court analyzed the statutory provisions and precedents, emphasizing that the extension beyond the specified timeline of three months could only be granted for a further period of thirty days on showing sufficient cause, but not thereafter.

Despite considering the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which deals with the exclusion of time spent in prosecuting another civil proceeding, the Court found that there remained a delay of 131 days in filing the application. This exceeded the statutory limitation prescribed in Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act.

Therefore, the Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismissed the petition under Section 34, ruling that it was barred by limitation.

Facts:

The case of Mahender Chawla & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 156 of 2016) involved petitioners alleging threats from the accused if they testified against them. The petitioners contended that numerous witnesses had been attacked, and some had even been killed. The matter concerned the abysmal state of witness protection in India and its impact on the administration of criminal justice.

Issues:

The court was the inadequacy of witness protection measures in India, leading to witnesses facing intimidation and reluctance to testify truthfully.

The court needed to address the constitutional implications of failing to protect witnesses and the consequent denial of a fair trial.

Held:

The court recognized the indispensable role of witnesses in the judicial system, particularly in criminal cases where testimonies often determine factual findings.

Despite their significance, witnesses in India face dire circumstances, including threats and trauma, due to the lack of a comprehensive witness protection program.

The failure to provide adequate protection to witnesses results in many turning hostile, especially in cases involving influential or violent accused individuals.

Witness protection is crucial for ensuring fair trials and upholding the rule of law, as failure to hear material witnesses amounts to a denial of justice.

The Witness Protection Scheme, 2018, prepared by the Union of India, was recognized as a temporary measure until suitable legislation is enacted. The scheme aims to identify threats to witnesses and ensure their safety during legal proceedings.

The court directed the States of Uttar Pradesh and Haryana to provide adequate security to the petitioners.

It mandated the establishment of vulnerable witness deposition complexes in district courts across India within a year to facilitate secure testimony.

Facts:

The case involved a complaint filed by Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited (RJIL) alleging anti-competitive practices by three major telecom operators (IDOs) and the Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI). RJIL asserted that the IDOs intentionally ignored requests for Point of Interconnection (POI) augmentation, causing network congestion and call failures. Allegations were also made regarding the denial of Mobile Number Portability (MNP) requests by IDOs and COAI's alleged bias towards IDOs.

Issues:

The primary issues revolved around the jurisdiction of the CCI to handle the matter, considering the specialized regulatory framework governing the telecom sector under the TRAI Act.

Additionally, the maintainability of writ petitions challenging CCI's jurisdictional authority was in question.

Held:

The court held that TRAI, as a specialized regulator for the telecom sector, should initially address disputes related to telecom regulations, including interconnection agreements and compliance with license conditions. These issues fall within TRAI's expertise and statutory mandate. Therefore, CCI's jurisdiction is limited until TRAI determines jurisdictional aspects. [

While TRAI deals with regulatory aspects, the CCI retains authority to investigate and address anti-competitive practices in the telecom sector. The CCI's role is crucial in ensuring fair competition and preventing practices that adversely affect competition.

The court affirmed the maintainability of writ petitions challenging CCI's jurisdictional authority, emphasizing the importance of judicial review in such matters.

CCI's order directing an investigation based on prima facie evidence was administrative in nature. The High Court couldn't adjudicate on the merits of the case but could review jurisdictional issues.

Decision: The court upheld the High Court's decision to quash CCI's order, as it was premature for CCI to proceed before TRAI resolved jurisdictional aspects. However, the court emphasized that CCI's role in addressing anti-competitive practices remains significant, complementing TRAI's regulatory functions.

Facts:

Three individuals, namely Rameshwar Singh (A-1), Surendra Singh (A-2), and Ram Singh (A-3), were prosecuted for the murder of Rajendra Prasad.

The prosecution's case relied on circumstantial evidence due to the absence of eyewitnesses.

The trial court found all three accused guilty, and their appeals to the High Court were unsuccessful.

Surendra Singh (A-2) and Ram Singh (A-3) appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging their convictions.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution provided sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts were legally sustainable.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after a thorough examination of the evidence and legal arguments, upheld the convictions of Surendra Singh (A-2) and Ram Singh (A-3) for the murder of Rajendra Prasad. The Court found no reason to overturn the concurrent findings of the lower courts, as the prosecution's evidence was deemed sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court concluded that the appellants were involved in the commission of the crime based on various circumstantial evidence, including motive, presence near the crime scene, recovery of stolen articles, and identification of the perpetrators.

Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the convictions of Surendra Singh (A-2) and Ram Singh (A-3) for murder.

Facts:

Dispute arose between Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (Appellant) and Pratibha Industries Ltd. (Respondent) regarding a tender contract.

Respondent filed an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking an interim injunction.

An arbitrator was appointed based on an oral agreement between the parties during the Section 9 petition hearing.

Appellant filed a notice to recall the order appointing the arbitrator, arguing that the clauses cited by the Respondent did not constitute arbitration clauses but were in-house procedures.

Single Judge of the High Court recalled the order appointing the arbitrator, but the Division Bench overturned this decision.

Issues:

Whether the clauses cited by the parties constituted arbitration clauses or in-house procedures.

Whether the High Court had the inherent power to recall its own orders in this context.

Whether the Arbitration Act's self-contained nature precluded a review or recall application in the absence of a valid arbitration agreement.

Held:

The clauses cited by the parties did not constitute arbitration clauses but were related to in-house procedures. The oral agreement during the Section 9 petition hearing could not supersede the absence of arbitration clauses in the contract (Para. 10).

High Courts, as courts of record, have the inherent power to recall their own orders to prevent miscarriage of justice or correct errors. This power has been recognized in previous judgments (Para. 11).

The Arbitration Act's self-contained nature did not preclude a review or recall application in this case, as there was no valid arbitration agreement (Para. 15).

The Division Bench's decision was set aside, and the original order appointing the arbitrator was continued for four weeks, allowing the parties time to approach the appropriate forum (Para. 16).