Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 6 of the Bihar Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1994, regarding the tax liability of manufacturers or dealers of motor vehicles.

Issues:

Whether the Bihar Act, enacted under Entry 57 of List II of the Constitution, is within the legislative competence.

Whether manufacturers or dealers are liable to pay tax under Section 6 of the Bihar Act.

Whether the imposition of penalties for non-payment of tax is valid under Section 23 of the Act.

Held:

The High Court determined that the Bihar Act falls under the legislative competence granted by Entry 57 of List II of the Constitution, empowering the State Legislature to impose tax on vehicles based on possession.

Section 6 of the Bihar Act imposes tax liability on manufacturers or dealers when they possess motor vehicles during their business activities.

The constitutional validity of Section 6 was upheld previously, confirming that the tax liability under this section is tied to the possession of vehicles by manufacturers or dealers during their business operations.

Sections 5 and 6 of the Act operate in different contexts. While Section 5 deals with tax payable upon registration by the owner, Section 6 addresses tax liability before possession by the manufacturer or dealer. The intent of Section 6 is to specify the tax payable in place of that specified in Section 5.

Section 23 of the Act imposes penalties for non-payment of tax within the prescribed period. The court upheld the imposition of penalties, noting that the vires of Section 6 and the relevant rules have been challenged previously and repelled.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the rulings of the High Court regarding the liability of manufacturers or dealers to pay tax under Section 6 of the Bihar Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1994, as well as the imposition of penalties for non-payment of tax.

Facts:

The petition sought registration of FIR, court-monitored investigation into corruption allegations in the Rafale deal, and quashing of the Inter-Governmental Agreement of 2016 for the purchase of Rafale Jets.

Issues:

Whether interference on the sensitive issue of purchase of defence aircrafts by the Indian Government is warranted?

To what extent is judicial review permissible in matters of defence procurement?

Whether the decision-making process and pricing details are subject to scrutiny?

What is the role of the Indian Offset Partner (IOP) in the procurement process?

Whether the Court should intervene in the procurement of 36 defence aircrafts by the Indian Government?

Held:

The Court outlined the parameters of judicial scrutiny in matters of defence procurement, emphasizing the need for a different degree of scrutiny due to the sensitive nature of defence contracts. The scrutiny should consider national security concerns and the crucial nature of the procurement to the nation’s sovereignty.

The Court found no reason to doubt the decision-making process and pricing details, emphasizing that minor deviations would not warrant setting aside the contract. It affirmed that contracts of defence procurement should be subject to a different degree and depth of judicial review.

Pricing details were not disclosed to Parliament due to national security concerns and agreements between the governments of India and France. The Court emphasized that it was not its role to carry out a comparison of pricing details. The role of the Indian Government in the engagement of the Indian Offset Partner (IOP) starts only when the vendor submits a formal proposal.

The Court stated that there was no substantial material to suggest commercial favoritism by the Indian Government in the engagement of the Indian Offset Partner (IOP). It refrained from intervening in matters of technical feasibility, leaving them to the discretion of the concerned parties.

The Court dismissed the writ petitions, emphasizing that there was no reason for intervention on the sensitive issue of defence procurement. It stated that the perception of individuals could not be the basis for a fishing and roving enquiry by the court, especially in such matters.

Facts:

The case pertains to challenges arising from urban development and slum rehabilitation schemes in Mumbai, focusing on the utilization of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) and Floor Space Index (FSI). The Maharashtra government implemented schemes such as the slum rehabilitation scheme and utilized TDR as an incentive for developers.

Issues:

The legality and application of TDR and FSI in specific areas, challenges to the discretionary powers of the Municipal Commissioner, and concerns regarding infrastructure and open spaces.

Held:

The Court, after considering the arguments and examining the details of the case, upheld the decision of the High Court. The Court emphasized the role of elected governments in policymaking and the limitations of judicial interference in matters of policy formulation unless they violate constitutional principles.

The Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the High Court had adequately addressed the issues raised and issued appropriate directions. Each party was directed to bear its own costs.

Facts:

The plaintiff sought a declaration that the mortgage and sale deeds regarding a house were void, alternatively seeking redemption of the mortgage. The plaintiff claimed the property was orally gifted to him by his father, with mention in a will executed in favor of the plaintiff's stepmother. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court decreed it. The High Court affirmed the decree for redemption, leading to the appeal.

Issues:

The validity of the mortgage and sale deeds, the alleged undue influence, the validity of the oral gift under Mohammedan Law, the statute of limitations, and procedural irregularities in the redemption of mortgage proceedings.

Held:

The defendants proved the execution of the mortgage and sale deeds in accordance with the law. The burden of proof lay on the plaintiff to challenge their validity, which they failed to discharge.

The plaintiff failed to establish that the documents were executed under undue influence or fraud.

The plaintiff failed to prove the essential conditions required for a valid oral gift under Mohammedan Law. The court found no evidence of possession or fulfillment of necessary conditions.

The suit challenging the documents was filed beyond the limitation period, rendering it barred by limitation under Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The High Court erred in treating the suit as a simple redemption of mortgage case and failing to follow the procedure laid down in Order 34 Rules 7 and 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment due to its procedural irregularities and errors in legal interpretation.

Facts:

H.K. Singla, the appellant, was the Secretary of the Chandigarh State Bank of Patiala Employees Co-operative USE Thrift & Credit Society.

Avtar Singh Saini & Ors, the respondents, filed a complaint alleging non-payment of maturity amount along with interest by the society.

The District Forum directed the society to pay the amount along with additional compensation, but the society failed to comply.

Singla was sentenced to imprisonment and fined by the District Forum under Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Issues:

Whether Singla, as Secretary of the society, could be held personally liable for the society's default.

Interpretation of Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 regarding penalties.

Held:

The Court suspended the order of imprisonment against Singla during the pendency of the appeal before the State Commission. The Court expressed doubt about the legality of imprisoning Singla for the default committed by the society, especially in the absence of any order directly implicating him.

Therefore, it was deemed appropriate to suspend the imprisonment order until the State Commission determines whether Singla could be imprisoned without any personal liability imposed by the District Forum. The Court urged the State Commission to expedite the appeal process.

Additionally, the first respondent was allowed to take necessary legal steps to recover the amount owed by the society, considering it was in liquidation.

Facts:

The appellant, Hukum Chandra, was a tenant in a shop located in Madhya Pradesh.

The respondent, Nemi Chand Jain, filed a suit for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, claiming a bona fide requirement of the shop for his son, Rajendra Kumar Jain, to start or continue his business.

The trial court initially dismissed the suit for eviction, but the first appellate court overturned this decision, finding that the requirement of the shop for Rajendra Kumar's business was genuine.

Issues:

Whether the requirement for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act was bona fide and genuine.

Whether subsequent events, such as the landlord obtaining possession of an adjacent shop, affected the bona fide requirement for eviction.

Held:

Outlines the requirements for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act, emphasizing the need for a bona fide requirement by the landlord or his family member and the absence of other reasonably suitable accommodation.

Discusses the evidence presented regarding the tenant's son, Rajendra Kumar's, involvement in a utensils business at the time of filing the eviction petition. The trial court had initially found that Rajendra Kumar was already engaged in business, questioning the bona fide requirement for eviction.

Address the contention regarding subsequent events, particularly the landlord obtaining possession of an adjacent shop. The Court found that this adjacent shop was meant for another son of the landlord, not Rajendra Kumar, thus not affecting the bona fide requirement for eviction.

Confirms the decision of the High Court to uphold the eviction, noting that the landlord's other son, Rajesh Kumar Jain, occupied the adjacent shop. Therefore, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the judgment of the lower courts.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was granted three months to vacate the premises.

Facts:

The case involved an incident where the deceased, Raghumani, was found lying in a pool of blood after being attacked on November 15, 1995.

The prosecution alleged involvement of six accused, including the appellant, Gupteswar Behera, who were charged with offenses under Sections 148, 149, and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Various witnesses, including PW1 Pradeep and PW15, the Investigating Officer, provided testimony, along with medical evidence presented through PW13 and PW14 regarding the injuries sustained by the deceased.

Issues:

The credibility of the eye-witness accounts and the reliance on dying declarations made by the deceased were the main issues in question.

Whether the deceased survived long enough for the witnesses to hear his statements was a crucial point of contention.

Held:

The Court found doubt regarding whether the deceased survived long enough for the witnesses to hear his statements. Considering the time it would take for witnesses to reach the scene and the severity of the injuries, the Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments and orders of both the Sessions Court and the High Court. Gupteswar Behera was acquitted of all charges and ordered to be set at liberty unless required in connection with any other case.

Facts:

The appellants entered into agreements to sell with the respondent, which were found to be insufficiently stamped. The trial court directed the payment of deficit duty and penalty. The High Court directed the trial court to levy the penalty at 10 times the deficit duty, relying on a previous judgment.

Issues:

Whether the trial court had discretion in imposing the penalty for deficit stamp duty, and whether the High Court's reliance on the previous judgment was correct.

Held:

The court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957, particularly Sections 33, 34, 38, and 39. It found that while Section 34 mandates a penalty of 10 times the deficit duty, Section 39 provides discretion to the Deputy Commissioner to impose a penalty not exceeding 10 times the duty. The court upheld the High Court's interpretation but noted that Section 38 empowers the Deputy Commissioner to refund any portion of the penalty in excess of five rupees, indicating legislative intent for discretion in penalty imposition.

The court considered the circumstances of the case and the time it would take to seek a refund of penalty from the Deputy Commissioner. It decided to uphold the trial court's direction of payment of deficit duty with double the penalty, aiming to serve the ends of justice efficiently without prolonging the legal proceedings.

Therefore, the appeal was disposed of by approving the trial court's direction for payment of deficit duty with double the penalty instead of requiring the appellant to deposit 10 times the penalty and then seek a refund under Section 38.

Facts:

The appellant, Trust, acquired a parcel of land measuring 9797 sq. meters, including Plot No. CTS No. 97/A-5/2, with the intent of providing housing for weaker sections of society. Subsequently, the Trust constructed building A-1 on a sub-plot carved out of this land. The respondents, purchasers, took possession of flats within this building.

Issues:

Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in clarifying an order through a "Note for speaking to the Minutes" beyond the scope of correcting typographical or clerical errors.

Whether the High Court's order directing conveyance of 2700 sq. meters of land was sustainable.

Whether the respondents were entitled to the conveyance of land beyond the area specifically decreed by the Trial Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's clarification through a "Note for speaking to the Minutes" exceeded its jurisdiction as it essentially modified the original order beyond the scope of correcting typographical or clerical errors. Such notes are not meant for modifying or clarifying orders beyond their original scope. Therefore, the impugned order passed below the "Note for speaking to the Minutes" is set aside.

Furthermore, the High Court's orders directing the conveyance of 2700 sq. meters of land were deemed unsustainable. The Trial Court's decree did not direct the appellants to execute a deed of Conveyance for such an extent of land. Therefore, the High Court could not have passed any further order beyond the judgment and decree of the Trial Court without any cross-appeal or cross-objection by the respondents.

The Supreme Court also noted that the High Court's determination of 2700 sq. meters as the area for conveyance was unsupported by the evidence presented during the case. Even considering the map sanctioned by the Corporation and the Corporation's reply, the total plot area was 2593.70 sq. meters, out of which the building occupied only 1009.70 sq. meters. Thus, the High Court's order directing the appellants to execute the deed of Conveyance for 2700 sq. meters of land was not sustainable.

Consequently, the impugned orders passed by the High Court dated 23.12.14 below the "Note for speaking to the Minutes" were quashed and set aside. The order passed by the Divisional Registrar of Deemed Conveyance was modified to grant conveyance of only 1009.70 sq. meters of land, which was the built-up area of building A-1.