Facts:

The case involves appeals against orders in applications under Section 151 read with Order VII Rule 10 CPC and Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, where parties sought the return of petitions filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The critical issue was the maintainability of such appeals.

Issues:

Whether appeals filed in this case fall within the scope of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.

Determination of the juridical seat of the arbitral proceedings – New Delhi or Faridabad.

Held:

Maintainability of Appeals (Para 15-22): The court emphasized that Section 37(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 explicitly limits the grounds on which appeals can be filed. Appeals are restricted to orders falling under sub-clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Section 37(1). The crucial point highlighted was that the refusal to set aside an arbitral award must be under Section 34, following an adjudication on the grounds specified in that section. In the present case, there was no adjudication under Section 34. The appeals, having arisen from orders related to jurisdiction and return of the petition, did not fall within the purview of Section 37 and were deemed not maintainable.

3.2 Juridical Seat of Arbitral Proceedings (Para 2.5-2.17): The court delved into the concept of the 'juridical seat' of arbitral proceedings, emphasizing its significance in regulating arbitral proceedings. It pointed out that once a seat is designated by agreement, it operates akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. The analysis involved a detailed interpretation of Sections 20, 31(4), and 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, along with a comparison with the UNCITRAL Model Law. The court clarified that the determination of the 'seat' is crucial, as it vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Courts at that location for arbitral proceedings.

Express Designation and Venue (Para 2.13-2.14): The court outlined that an express designation of a 'venue,' coupled with a lack of designation of any alternative place as the 'seat,' indicates that the stated 'venue' is the juridical seat of arbitral proceedings. The use of terms like "arbitration proceedings shall be held" reinforces this interpretation. In an international context, the application of supranational rules governing arbitration further supports the designation of the 'venue' as the 'seat.'

Application to the Present Case (Para 2.15-2.17): The court applied these principles to the arbitration clause in the present case. Notably, Clause 67.3(ii) specified that disputes with a foreign contractor would be resolved under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The court concluded that the clause designates either New Delhi or Faridabad as the 'seat' based on the application of supranational rules. Importantly, even when the proceedings were held in New Delhi, the court determined that both parties had chosen New Delhi as the 'seat,' giving the Courts at New Delhi exclusive jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings.

4. DECISION: The impugned judgment was set aside, affirming that New Delhi was the 'seat' of arbitration, and the Section 34 petition was ordered to be presented in the Courts in New Delhi, as initially determined by the Special Commercial Court at Gurugram.

Facts:

The complainant, engaged in the business of cement sheets, filed a complaint in January 2009, accusing the appellant of hosting a group that published a defamatory article. The complaint pertained to an offense allegedly committed from July 31, 2008, onwards.

Issues:

The applicability of Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, the intermediary status of the appellant, and whether the appellant could be held liable for defamation.

Held:

The Court clarified the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC concerning defamation offenses, distinguishing cases of complaints from police reports. [Paragraph 43]

The judgment discussed the scope of Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, both before and after its substitution, emphasizing the conditions for immunity of intermediaries. [Paragraphs 59, 61, 63-64]

The Court declined to decide the question of whether the appellant was an intermediary or if Google LLC, the parent company, played that role. It emphasized the need for evidence to determine such matters. [Paragraphs 80, 81, 83]

An overview of defamation laws highlighted the essential elements of the offense under Section 499 of the IPC and the significance of exceptions. [Paragraphs 98, 99, 101]

The Court considered the effect of the substitution of Section 79 of the Act, emphasizing that the complaint was filed before the substitution, and hence, the case fell under the previous provisions. [Paragraphs 133-135]

The question of whether the appellant, as a subsidiary, could be considered an independent body immune from liability was deemed inappropriate for determination under Section 482. [Paragraph 136]

The judgment critiqued the High Court's finding that the appellant failed to act on notices to remove objectionable content, pointing out flaws in the reasoning and highlighting the intermediary's limited liability. [Paragraphs 137-139]

The Court emphasized the role of publication in defamation cases, especially in the context of the internet and intermediary responsibility. [Paragraphs 141, 142]

The Court addressed the appellant's response to the complainant's notice, emphasizing the need for evidence and the inappropriateness of addressing such matters in a Section 482 petition. [Paragraphs 146, 147, 149]

Facts:

The appeal challenges the High Court's judgment enhancing compensation from Rs. 3,72,620 to Rs. 5,02,620 in a motor vehicle accident case.

The deceased, a 19-year-old bachelor, died due to injuries from the accident caused by the negligence of a bus driver.

The Tribunal and the High Court used a multiplier of '15' based on the age of the deceased's mother.

Issues:

Calculation of compensation considering the age of the deceased, future prospects, and multiplier.

Applicability of the multiplier to a bachelor's age.

Held:

The Constitution Bench's decision in National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi and Ors. (2017) 16 SCC 680 is referred, emphasizing the consideration of future prospects.

The age of the deceased, not the dependents, is crucial in determining the multiplier.

The Court recalculates the compensation, adding 40% of the deceased's established income for future prospects and deducting 50% for personal expenses.

The final compensation is determined as Rs. 6,62,448, from which the High Court's awarded amount of Rs. 5,02,620 is deducted.

The balance compensation payable is Rs. 1,59,868, rounded off to Rs. 1,60,000.

The third Respondent/insurance company is directed to deposit this amount with 7% simple interest from the claim petition date within two months.

The appeal is partly allowed, and the insurance company is directed to deposit Rs. 1,60,000 as compensation with interest. No costs are awarded.

Facts:

The prosecution case revolves around the appellant receiving a phone call from the second respondent, her daughter's husband, reporting the alleged suicide of the victim-deceased. Upon reaching the scene, the appellant discovered the deceased's body, which had been bathed and buried by the second respondent and his relatives. Subsequently, injury marks were observed on the body. A chargesheet was filed against a friend of the second respondent, and during the trial, the appellant moved an application under Section 319 to summon the second respondent based on her substantive evidence.

Issues:

The summoning order for the second respondent. The trial court had allowed the application under Section 319, but the High Court set aside this order.

Held:

During the appellant's cross-examination, she provided details about the harassment her daughter faced from the second respondent. The trial court, after a careful evaluation of evidentiary material, summoned the second respondent, considering the incident's occurrence within the matrimonial home. The High Court's interference was deemed unjustified, as the evidence met the threshold required for summoning under Section 319.

The trial court's order was based on the principles outlined in the Constitution Bench's decision in Hardeep Singh, and reasons were provided, including the reliance on Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The High Court's dismissal of the order on the pretext of exploring the cause of death was criticized. Section 319 empowers the court to proceed against a person appearing guilty based on emerging evidence during the trial.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial court's order for summoning the second respondent was valid, while the High Court's interference was unsustainable.

Facts:

Appellant, a tanker driver, met with a severe accident resulting in the loss of one leg and permanent disability.

Filed a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act against the Truck Owner and the Insurance Company.

Dispute over the assessment of functional disability and compensation.

Issues:

Assessment of the appellant's functional disability.

Determination of compensation amount under Section 4 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Reimbursement of medical expenses.

Held:

The Court affirmed the High Court's decision to assess the appellant's income at Rs. 4,000/- p.m.

The functional disability of the appellant was assessed at 100%, considering the permanent incapacity to work as a driver.

Relevant factor used was 201.66 as per Schedule IV to the Act.

Compensation payable to the appellant determined as Rs. 4,83,984/- under Section 4 of the Act.

Awarded a lump sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- towards hospitalization and medical expenses.

Directed the Insurance Company to pay the enhanced compensation with interest at 6% p.a., calculated from one month after the accident until the date of payment, within 4 weeks.

The Civil Appeal stands allowed.

Facts:

The respondent, a Lecturer in Anesthesia, joined Chhattisgarh Institute of Medical Sciences (CIMS) without obtaining approval/NOC from the appellant-State.

The appellant rejected the respondent's request for retiral benefits, citing her acceptance of a position at CIMS without proper authorization.

Issues:

Whether the respondent is entitled to retiral benefits from the appellant-State after joining CIMS.

Validity of the orders passed by the appellants rejecting the respondent's claims.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in directing the personal appearance of the Principal Secretary and summoning officers to explain the rejection of the respondent's claims. The practice of summoning officers to court was deemed improper, impinging on public duties. The court emphasized that if an order is not legal, the appropriate course is for the courts to set it aside and issue necessary directions, without summoning officers.

The impugned orders were set aside, emphasizing the impropriety of summoning officers to court and reiterating that the courts have the jurisdiction to set aside illegal orders and issue appropriate directions without requiring personal appearances. The High Court was directed to reconsider the case without being influenced by previous findings.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 13(2) of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011.

The appellant contested an order of the Rent Control Tribunal and appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The primary issue revolved around the legislative competence of the Chhattisgarh State Legislature in enacting Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act.

Whether Section 13(2) providing for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from orders passed by the Rent Control Tribunal is within the legislative powers of the State.

Held:

The State Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact Section 13(2) of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011. Therefore, Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act is declared ultra vires the Constitution of India, null and void, and of no effect. (Para 89) [1127-E]

The analysis of legislative powers under Article 246 highlighted that while the State Legislature can enact laws related to land tenures, including the relation of landlord and tenant, it cannot legislate to confer appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court. Entry 64 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List expressly debar the State Legislature from legislating with respect to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. (Para 54) [1121-B-C]

The Supreme Court, established under Article 124, does not have a provision for direct appeal from an order of a Tribunal constituted under state law. Articles 262(2) and 348 further demonstrate that matters pertaining to the Supreme Court fall exclusively within the legislative domain of the Union Parliament. (Para 41) [1118-F-G]

Article 323B(3)(d) does not empower a State Legislature to expand the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by enacting a provision for further statutory appeal to the Supreme Court from an order of an Appellate Tribunal. (Para 55) [1121-D]

Section 13(2) providing for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court is not ancillary or incidental to the power of the Chhattisgarh State Legislature to enact a Rent Control Act. It overtly transgresses the limits of its legislative power. (Para 49) [1120-C]

While Article 136 of the Constitution grants discretionary power to the Supreme Court to interfere in appropriate cases, Section 13(2) mandates the Supreme Court to consider an appeal, which goes beyond the legislative competence of the State. (Para 57) [1121-E]

The second proviso to Article 200, which requires the Governor to reserve a bill for Presidential consideration if it derogates from the powers of the High Court, is not attracted in the case of Section 13(2) since it does not derogate from any power of the High Court. (Para 68) [1123-B-F]

The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is supervisory and not appellate. The High Court's interference is restricted to cases of patent error of law, perversity, arbitrariness, lack of jurisdiction, and usurpation of powers. The writ jurisdiction cannot be converted into an alternative appellate forum. (Para 86) [1126-G-H; 1127-A-C]

Facts:

The appellant, a judicial officer of the rank of Additional District and Sessions Judge, challenged his compulsory retirement order dated 03.05.2016 under Rule 56(C) of the U. P. Fundamental Rules. The order was based on charges related to his acquittal of an accused in a criminal case and subsequent vigilance inquiries. The appellant's service records, including Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs), were scrutinized at various levels.

Issues:

Whether the order of compulsory retirement was justified based on the judicial officer's acquittal in a criminal case.

Whether the judicial officer's service records and punishment of censure warranted compulsory retirement.

Held:

The Court held that the vigilance inquiries and scrutiny of service records, including the punishment of censure, were conducted properly. The adverse remarks and the appellant's disposal of work were considered, and the Full Court's decision to recommend compulsory retirement was deemed justifiable.( Paragraphs 8 and 9)

The Court emphasized the limited scope of judicial review in cases of compulsory retirement, restricting interference to instances of arbitrariness, capriciousness, malafides, or overlooking relevant materials. It underscored that principles of natural justice have no application in such cases.( Paragraph 11)

The judgment stressed the high standards of integrity expected from judicial officers, highlighting their role as pillars of the justice system. It asserted the necessity for strict judgment standards in assessing judicial conduct.( Paragraph 13)

In conclusion, the Court found no grounds for interference with the order of compulsory retirement, thereby dismissing the appeal.( Paragraph 14)

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over property rights based on a merger agreement signed by the sovereign Ruler of the State of Maihar with the Dominion of India. The property in question, initially held as perpetual lease rights, was bequeathed by the ruler to his sons from different wives.

Issues:

Whether the property is part of an impartible estate governed by the rule of primogeniture, and if the succession is subject to Mitakshara law or the rule of primogeniture.

Held:

Under Mitakshara Hindu Law, inherited property is ancestral. The concept of coparcenary and the right to survivorship are explained. The Hindu Succession Act of 1956 impacts the nature of inherited property.

Introduction to the term 'impartible estate' and its characteristics, primarily governed by the rule of primogeniture, where the eldest son inherits to the exclusion of others.

Impartible estate is treated as self-acquired and separate property. Sons or coparceners do not have the right to partition or restrain alienation. Succession is under the rule of primogeniture.

Section 5(ii) exception protects custom and covenants for primogeniture. The rule persisted even after the loss of sovereignty through a merger agreement.

The property in question, though ancestral, is part of the estate of the sovereign ruler, not coparcenary property. The right to transfer or bequeath is affirmed.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed. The High Court's findings affirm that the property is part of the impartible estate, subject to the rule of primogeniture.