Facts:

A Tripartite Joint Development Agreement was executed among a society, MHADA, and a corporate debtor for the development of land. The corporate debtor defaulted on a loan, leading to insolvency proceedings under section 7 of the IBC. The application was admitted, an interim resolution professional was appointed, and a moratorium was declared under section 14. During the moratorium, MHADA issued a termination notice of the Joint Development Agreement to the corporate debtor, requiring possession of the land.

Issues:

The interpretation of section 14(1)(d) of the IBC concerning the recovery of property occupied by the corporate debtor.

The rights and implications of the Joint Development Agreement, especially in relation to the possession of the land during the moratorium.

Held:

Interpretation of Section 14(1)(d): The Court emphasized that section 14(1)(d) of the IBC doesn't pertain to assets, legal rights, or beneficial interests of the corporate debtor. The provision concerns "recovery of any property." The expression "occupied by" refers to actual physical possession or use. The Joint Development Agreement granted a license to the developer (corporate debtor) for various activities, effectively constituting "occupation." [Paragraphs 6-7]

Primacy of the Insolvency Code: The Court underscored that in case of a conflict between the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act and the Insolvency Code, the latter must prevail. The moratorium's purpose is to maintain a status quo during the insolvency resolution process, overcoming any obstacles. The statutory freeze lasts until the Adjudicating Authority approves a resolution plan or orders liquidation. [Paragraph 16]

Facts:

The Family Court disposed of a maintenance petition filed by the respondent-wife under Section 125 Cr.P.C., directing the appellant-husband to pay monthly maintenance and for the parties to file a divorce petition by mutual consent. The husband paid maintenance for only four months. The respondent-wife filed an execution petition to enforce the maintenance order. The Family Court rejected the execution petition, deeming the maintenance order conditional and subject to unfulfilled obligations. The respondent-wife filed an application to recall the order in the maintenance petition. The Family Court revived the maintenance application. The husband challenged this by filing a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court rejected the petition under Section 482.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate's jurisdiction under Section 125 Cr.P.C. persists post passing of the initial order?

Whether the revival of the maintenance application by the Family Court is in violation of Section 362 Cr.P.C.?

Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.?

Held:

The legislative scheme under Section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is similar. The prohibition on altering or reviewing judgments by the criminal court is deliberate. The court's jurisdiction is limited to correcting clerical or arithmetic errors. Exceptions to the embargo exist as provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure or other applicable laws.

The expression "save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force" in Section 362 relaxes the rigour of the section under specific conditions.

Section 125 Cr.P.C. shows that the Magistrate's jurisdiction remains after passing the initial order. Express provisions in Section 125(1), Section 125(5), and Section 127 Cr.P.C. allow for cancellation or alteration of orders. The term "from time to time" in Section 125(1) indicates the Magistrate's continued jurisdiction. Section 125(5) empowers the Magistrate to cancel orders under certain conditions. Section 127 provides the Magistrate with the authority to alter or cancel orders.

The wife cannot be left without recourse if the husband does not fulfill the terms of settlement. Section 125 Cr.P.C. must be interpreted to advance justice and protect the rights of women.

The appeal is dismissed. The Family Court's revival of the maintenance application is not prohibited by Section 362 Cr.P.C. The High Court appropriately rejected the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 are exercised to ensure justice.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the right of pre-emption arising from a property transfer. The plaintiff and the second defendant were brothers, each possessing a half share in a common courtyard. The second defendant sold a house along with the courtyard to the first defendant.

Issues:

The determination of the right of pre-emption in the context of the property transfer. The interpretation of Sections 5 and 6 of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act 1966 was central to resolving this issue.

Held:

The right of pre-emption is a preferential right attached to the property being transferred. It allows a person to substitute the original vendee.

Section 5 of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act 1966 outlines cases where the right of pre-emption does not accrue. According to Section 5(1)(c), the right of pre-emption does not accrue if the transferee has an equal or inferior right of pre-emption under Section 6.

Section 6(1) of the Act specifies the persons to whom the right of pre-emption accrues. If a person mentioned in Section 6 acquires the property, the right of pre-emption will accrue only to a claimant with a superior right of pre-emption.

The right of pre-emption is rendered imperfect if the vendor transfers the property to another person who also has a superior right of pre-emption.

In the present case, both the plaintiff and the second defendant had rights in common to the courtyard under Section 6(1)(ii) of the Act. However, the plaintiff's right was superior due to his relationship with the property transferor.

The interpretation of Section 5(1)(c) does not support a disjunctive reading, as suggested. The two segments of the provision pertain to vendees and claimants respectively, and they cannot be reinterpreted.

The concurrent findings of the lower courts correctly interpreted the provisions of the Act, and the plaintiff's superior right of pre-emption prevailed over the second defendant's inferior right.

Decision: The Court upheld the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the appeal. It affirmed the interpretation of Sections 5 and 6 of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act 1966 and held that the plaintiff's superior right of pre-emption prevailed in this case.

Facts:

The appellant, Dr. Hira Lal, served as a Touring Veterinary Officer (TVO) in Bihar. During his active service, he was accused in a criminal case related to the Fodder Scam, resulting in his suspension in 2002. He superannuated in 2008. The state withheld 10% of his pension and full gratuity based on Circulars and a Government Resolution due to pending criminal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the State of Bihar had the right to withhold 10% pension and full gratuity of the appellant under Circulars and a Government Resolution due to pending criminal proceedings.

Held:

The court examined the relevant statutory provisions, circulars, and resolutions. Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules permitted withholding or withdrawing pension if the pensioner was found guilty of grave misconduct in departmental or judicial proceedings or caused pecuniary loss to the government. However, the Circulars issued by the state in 1974 and 1980 were deemed to be administrative instructions without the force of law. The court held that the right to receive pension is a property right protected by Article 300A of the Constitution. It emphasized that executive instructions cannot override this constitutional protection.

The court referred to earlier judgments that established pension as a vested right even after the repeal of Article 31(1) of the Constitution. The court ruled that the State of Bihar was unjustified in withholding the pension and gratuity. It directed the state to release 10% of the withheld pension amount from the date of superannuation till a certain point and 90% of the gratuity within a specific period. The remaining 10% of the gratuity was to be released subject to the outcome of the pending criminal proceedings against the appellant.

The judgement referred to "State of Jharkhand and Ors. vs. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava and Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 210" and "D.S. Nakara and Ors. vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305" to establish the legal principles related to pension as a vested right and the protection of pension as property under Article 300A of the Constitution.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the calculation of entertainment duty for an amusement park in Maharashtra. The amusement park charged admission fees for entry and various entertainment activities within its premises.

Issues:

Whether the reduced rate of entertainment duty specified in Section 3(2) of the Act applies to the amusement park's admission charges.

How Section 3(5)(a) of the Act, which outlines different rates of entertainment duty for amusement parks, interacts with other provisions.

Held:

The court interpreted the relevant sections of the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923, and arrived at the following conclusions:

Interpretation of Section 3(2) The court examined Section 3(2) of the Act, which provides for a reduced rate of entertainment duty for specific categories of payments for admission. The court clarified that this provision applies to distinct categories of payments, such as subscriptions to societies, season tickets, or series of entertainments over a period.

Applicability of Section 3(5)(a) The court analyzed Section 3(5)(a) of the Act, which determines different rates of entertainment duty for amusement parks. The court emphasized that this section prevails over Sections 3(1)(b) and 3(2) and dictates the applicable rates of duty for various periods after the amusement park's commencement.

Decision The court concluded that the amusement park did not meet the specific categories mentioned in Section 3(2) for the reduced rate of entertainment duty. Thus, the park was not entitled to a 50% rebate as provided in Section 3(2). The court held that Section 3(5)(a) governs the rates of duty for amusement parks and that only one benefit, either under Section 3(2) or Section 3(5)(a), can be claimed. The court set aside the High Court's interpretation and ruled that the entertainment duty payable followed Section 3(5)(a) of the Act.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1, Dr. Surendra Kumar Singh, a lecturer and head of department, challenged the promotion process for the post of Principal in Polytechnic colleges. The challenge was based on the requirement of a Ph.D. degree as an essential qualification according to the 'Pay Scales, Service conditions and Qualifications for the Teachers and other Academic Staff in Technical Institutions (Diploma) Regulations, 2010' (2010 AICTE Regulations) and the legality of the 'Chhattisgarh Technical Education (Teaching cadre-Polytechnic) (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules, 2014' (2014 Chhattisgarh Rules) that allowed candidates without a Ph.D. to be appointed as Principals.

Issues:

Whether a Ph.D. degree is mandatory for appointment to the post of 'Principal' under the 2010 AICTE Regulations?

Whether the 2016 AICTE Notification retrospectively 'clarifies' eligibility conditions for the appointment of 'Principal'?

Whether retrospective changes in qualificatory requirements can affect the existing appointments?

Whether the alleged conflict of interest involving one of the appellants influences the decision?

Held:

Issue 1 - The Court interpreted the AICTE criteria and emphasized the use of the term "or," which indicated that 'Ph.D. in Engineering' was optional and discretionary. The eligibility criteria allowed adopting institutions/State Governments to specify either of the two criteria. The Court rejected the interpretation that converted "or" into "and."

Issue 2 - The Court concluded that the 2016 AICTE Notification did not change the existing eligibility conditions but was only a clarification. It reiterated the substance of the 2010 AICTE Regulations and did not alter the position of law.

Issue 3 - The Court emphasized that retrospective changes should not affect the appointments made on the basis of a possible understanding of eligibility conditions. Existing appointments should remain undisturbed, and the principle of non-retroactivity should be upheld.

Issue 4 - The Court found that the alleged conflict of interest involving one of the appellants did not imply undue influence over the rule-making process.

Decision: The appeals were allowed. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and Dr. Surendra Kumar Singh's writ petition challenging the promotion of the appellants was dismissed. The appellants' appointments as Principals were upheld.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute between the Appellant, Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (a licensee company), and the Respondent, Rahamatullah Khan (consumer), regarding electricity supply, billing, and recovery of dues. The Appellant had issued an additional demand to the Respondent for the period from July 2009 to September 2011 due to a mistake in billing under the wrong Tariff Code. The question was whether the Appellant could disconnect electricity supply after the limitation period of two years following the issuance of the initial bill.

Issues:

Interpretation of the term "first due" in Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Determination of when an additional demand becomes "first due" in cases of billing mistakes.

Whether the licensee company can disconnect electricity supply after the two-year limitation period in case of a mistake.

Held:

The court clarified that while the liability to pay for electricity arises upon consumption, the charges become "first due" only upon issuance of the bill by the licensee company. Therefore, the two-year limitation period under Section 56(2) starts from the date the charges became "first due" according to this interpretation.

The court examined whether the two-year limitation period applies to supplementary demands. It was established that Section 56(2) doesn't prevent the licensee from raising a supplementary demand after the limitation period, but it bars the licensee from disconnecting electricity supply to recover such demands.

The court referred to Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which states that in the case of a mistake, the limitation period starts when the mistake is discovered. In the present case, the period of limitation began from the date of discovery of the billing mistake in 2014. The licensee company could pursue other legal remedies for recovering the additional demand, except disconnection of electricity supply under Section 56(2).

Conclusion: The judgment clarifies the interpretation of provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 and the Limitation Act, 1963 in the context of disconnection of electricity supply, billing, and recovery of dues. It emphasizes that the limitation period for disconnection starts from the date when the charges became "first due" as per the initial bill, and that the licensee company can raise supplementary demands but is barred from disconnection after the two-year limitation period.

Facts:

The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board introduced bidding parameters, including a criterion for the number of households based on census data. However, this criterion was not formally incorporated into the regulations and was not communicated to the bidders. Bidders with the highest composite scores were initially disqualified for exceeding the 100% limit. Adani Gas Limited challenged the grant of authorization in various geographical areas.

Issues:

The legality of the bidding criteria introduced through the Board Note and the fairness of the disqualification of bidders exceeding the 100% limit based on criteria that were not formally part of the regulations.

Held:

The introduced bidding criteria were not part of the official regulations and were not properly notified to bidders.

The introduced criteria cannot be treated as absolute norms to disqualify bids.

Disqualifying bidders based on a criterion that was not formally incorporated would be arbitrary and unconstitutional (Article 14).

The Board Note was a guideline, and the Board had the right to evaluate the reasonableness of bids exceeding the 100% limit.

Disqualifying bidders solely on exceeding the 100% limit without proper evaluation would be inconsistent with the regulations.

The procedure of calling the highest bidders to justify their bids' reasonableness was justified and fair.

Principles of natural justice were not breached by calling only the highest bidders for justification.

The Board's decision to disqualify or accept bids was based on a proper assessment of reasonableness.

The Chairperson's view regarding the binding nature of the Board Note and the need for hearing other bidders was disagreed with.

The Member Technical's perspective was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The case revolves around the matter of granting Permanent Commissions (PCs) to women SSC officers in the Indian Army. The initial process under the Women Special Entry Scheme (Officers) [WSES] was replaced by Short Service Commission (SSC) with an outer period of fourteen years. A writ petition was filed seeking directions for the grant of PC to women SSC officers. The High Court ruled that SSC women officers who had opted for PC were entitled to it on par with male SSC officers. The Union Government, during the appeal, issued a communication granting PC to SSC women officers in ten arms of Army services.

Issues:

Whether the policy decision of the Union Government dated February 25, 2019, granting PCs to SSC women officers in the Indian Army, enforces the fundamental rights of women officers.

Whether the distinction drawn between women officers with different years of service is valid.

Whether the absolute bar on women seeking criteria or command appointments is sustainable.

Whether the application of Article 33 in limiting fundamental rights for Armed Forces is valid.

Held:

Issue 1: The policy decision of the Union Government dated February 25, 2019, is interpreted as enforcing the fundamental right of women officers to seek access to public appointments and equality of opportunity, as per Articles 15(1) and 16(1) of the Constitution. (Para 50, 52)

Issue 2: The distinction drawn between women officers with different years of service (less than fourteen years, between fourteen and twenty years, and above twenty years) is deemed fallacious. Women SSC officers, regardless of years of service, should be entitled to consideration for grant of PCs. (Para 52, 59, 60)

Issue 3: The absolute bar on women seeking criteria or command appointments is not sustainable and goes against the principle of equality under Article 14. Blanket exclusion of women from such appointments lacks justification. (Para 67, 68)

Issue 4: Article 33 empowers Parliament to limit or abrogate fundamental rights for the Armed Forces to ensure proper discharge of duties and discipline. Such restriction must be through a law enacted for the purpose. (Para 44)