Facts:

The appellant sought reservation in the sports and game category for admission into the MBBS course. Despite submitting the necessary material, the appellant was denied due priority in admission. The appellant promptly approached the High Court.

Issues:

Whether a meritorious candidate, who diligently pursued their legal right without delay, could be denied admission due to the cut-off date of 30th September being passed.

Held:

Under exceptional circumstances, if the court finds no fault on the candidate's part and the fault lies with the authorities, the court can, in rare cases, direct admission in the same year by increasing seats. However, this should not exceed one or two seats and must occur within one month from the cut-off date. No admission should be ordered beyond 30th October. The court may cancel the admission of a candidate at the bottom of the merit list after giving an opportunity for a hearing. If no admission relief can be granted in the same year, the court can direct admission in the next academic year, possibly by increasing the number of seats.

Decision: The right to equal and fair treatment, a component of Article 14, is crucial. Denial of admission to a meritorious candidate, even without fault on their part, violates fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21. The court rejected the view that compensation is the only remedy and affirmed the possibility of admission relief in exceptional circumstances. The court emphasized the importance of prioritizing and expeditiously disposing of such cases.

Facts:

The Respondent, a Grade II Police Constable, tendered her resignation on 1 June 2017, accepted on 12 June 2017.

The Respondent attempted to withdraw the resignation on 13 July 2017.

The Director General of Police rejected the withdrawal, relying on Rule 35A of the Special Rules of Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services.

High Court allowed a writ appeal, setting aside the dismissal of the writ petition, directing the State to reinstate the Respondent with continuity.

Issues:

Validity of the acceptance of resignation.

Interpretation of Rule 35A regarding the withdrawal of resignation after acceptance.

Applicability of the provisions of Section 50 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016.

Held:

Rule 35A clearly outlines that resignation can be withdrawn before acceptance. Once accepted, withdrawal is not permitted. The appointing authority can accept the resignation from a date before the expiry of the notice period.( Para 8)

The acceptance of the resignation on 12 June 2017 was valid. The withdrawal attempt on 13 July 2017, a month later, was legally inconsequential.( Para 9)

The High Court's conclusion allowing withdrawal within the notice period was contrary to Rule 35A.( Para 10)

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment. No costs were awarded.( Para 11)

The Respondent was allowed to apply afresh for appointment in the future, subject to selection and in accordance with the law.( Para 12)

Facts:

The case involves a matrimonial dispute where the husband, a U.S. citizen practicing as a Dentist, filed for custody of the children after the wife, also a U.S. citizen and a Dentist, refused to return to the U.S. with the children from India.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of Indian courts in guardianship matters, the habitual residence of the children, and the best interests of the children.

Held:

The Family Court held that the Indian Courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Guardianship Petition due to the parties being U.S. citizens, and the children residing in India in breach of immigration laws.( Paragraph 4.7)

The High Court, in Habeas Corpus proceedings, directed the wife to return to the U.S. with the children, emphasizing the children's right to be brought up by both parents in the U.S.( Paragraph 5.1)

The parties agreed to the following directions, including joint application for U.S. passports, the wife's return to the U.S., shared parenting, and financial support by the husband.( Paragraph 7)

FACTS:

Written and oral tests conducted for the post of Junior Lecturer in Mathematics.

Results published by the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission (Appellant).

Last selected candidate (Mr. G.V. Ramakrishna Sagar) chose not to join the post.

Respondent No. 1 filed a claim for appointment after a delay of four years.

Original Application dismissed on grounds of delay by A.P. Administrative Tribunal.

Writ Petition filed by Respondent No. 1 before the High Court.

ISSUES:

Interpretation of Rule 6 (amended) and Rule 7 of Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission Rules.

Validity of the claim for appointment by Respondent No. 1 after the delay.

HELD:

The amended Rule 6 specifies that the list of candidates approved/selected shall be equal to the number of vacancies.

Fallout vacancies due to relinquishment and non-joining shall be notified in the next recruitment.

The waiting list provision for one year has been eliminated after the amendment.

Rule 7 emphasizes that selection must adhere to the existing Rules.

Respondent No. 1, being a non-selected candidate, cannot claim selection based on the unamended Rule 6.

The High Court was not justified in granting relief to Respondent No. 1, ignoring the amended Rule 6.

The appeal is allowed, and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.

Facts:

The case involved the calculation of Premium FSI charges for a construction project in Chennai. The initial planning permission was granted on 01.07.2009. The government introduced the "Premium FSI Scheme," and the developer submitted a revised plan seeking additional FSI under this scheme on 04.05.2011. The application was returned for defects on 10.02.2012, and after rectification, the government granted approval on 29.05.2012. The dispute arose regarding the calculation of Premium FSI charges based on the guideline value.

Issues:

Whether the Premium FSI charges should be calculated based on the guideline value as of the application date (04.05.2011) or the approval date (29.05.2012).

Held:

The court held that no right accrued to the builder until approval was granted. Regulation 36 mandated approval from the government for Premium FSI, and the crucial date for determining charges was the approval date. The court set aside the Division Bench's decision and allowed the appeal, stating that the charges should be based on the revised guideline value in force from 01.04.2012.

Conclusion: The judgment clarified the importance of the approval date in determining Premium FSI charges, emphasizing that no legal right accrues until the government sanctions the revised plan. The court upheld the authority's right to calculate charges based on the guideline value in force at the time of approval.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that six heavily armed individuals (A-1 to A-6) killed the victim in broad daylight. The incident occurred between 12 and 12:30 p.m. Eyewitnesses PW-1 and PW-2 were present at the scene, and a written complaint was prepared by PW-1 and scribed by PW-4, leading to the registration of an FIR.

Issues:

The trial court acquitted all accused, but during the appeal in the High Court, three accused (A-1, A-3, and A-6) passed away, and the appeal abated concerning them.

The High Court set aside the trial court's judgment, finding A-2, A-4, and A-5 guilty of offenses under various sections of the IPC.

Held:

The primary question was the reliability of eyewitness statements (PW-1 and PW-2). Both witnesses provided nearly identical accounts with no major contradictions. The complaint was immediately dictated by PW-1 to PW-4, who confirmed its authenticity. The medical evidence corroborated the prosecution's narrative.

Medical evidence supported the eyewitness accounts, with corresponding firearm entry wounds and a time of death aligning with the incident. The injuries mentioned by the doctor were consistent with the weapons carried by the accused. The medical evidence fully supported the eyewitnesses' version.

The court addressed minor variations and contradictions in the statements of PW-1 and PW-2. However, these did not significantly impact the core of their evidence. The strained relationship between the parties was acknowledged, but the immediate recording of the complaint minimized the possibility of false implication.

Facts:

The appeal revolves around the entitlement to disability pension for an Air Force Officer who retired in the natural course, with a disability of less than 20%.

Issues:

Whether disability pension is payable when an Air Force Officer superannuates with less than 20% disability.

The applicability of rounding off principles as per Circular dated 31.1.2001 and the Order dated 10.12.2014 in "Union of India and Ors. Versus Ram Avtar."

Held:

The Court examined Defence Service Regulations Pension Regulations for the Air Force, 1961, specifically Regulations 37(a) and (b). It clarified that disability pension is admissible only if the disability is assessed at 20% or above and is attributable or aggravated by Air Force service.

Referring to Circular dated 31.1.2001, the Court noted Para 8.2, which stipulates that no disability element shall be payable for disabilities less than 20%. Rounding off principles were found applicable only when the disability is more than 20% but less than 80%.

The Court set aside the Armed Forces Tribunal's order, emphasizing that the petitioner was not entitled to disability pension due to the disability being less than 20%. The principles of rounding off did not apply in this case.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Two FIRs filed - one by the petitioner against Respondent No.7, an IPS Officer, for alleged sexual assault and another by Respondent No.7's mother alleging pressure for money by the petitioner's family.

Petitioner sought the transfer of investigation to an independent agency, suspension of Respondent No.7, and protection for herself and her family.

Issues:

Fairness of investigation by Delhi Police due to Respondent No.7's police background.

Alleged attempts to deceive the court and suppression of material facts.

Held:

The investigation into the petitioner's FIR was conducted fairly by a Special Investigation Team.

No need to transfer the investigation to a Central Agency.

Observation of discrepancies in the petitioner's statements regarding an alleged car incident, leading to the issuance of a suo motu contempt notice.

The matter to be considered on its merits, and the charge-sheet to be evaluated by the court.

Facts:

The case involves appeals against orders in applications under Section 151 read with Order VII Rule 10 CPC and Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, where parties sought the return of petitions filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The critical issue was the maintainability of such appeals.

Issues:

Whether appeals filed in this case fall within the scope of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.

Determination of the juridical seat of the arbitral proceedings – New Delhi or Faridabad.

Held:

Maintainability of Appeals (Para 15-22): The court emphasized that Section 37(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 explicitly limits the grounds on which appeals can be filed. Appeals are restricted to orders falling under sub-clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Section 37(1). The crucial point highlighted was that the refusal to set aside an arbitral award must be under Section 34, following an adjudication on the grounds specified in that section. In the present case, there was no adjudication under Section 34. The appeals, having arisen from orders related to jurisdiction and return of the petition, did not fall within the purview of Section 37 and were deemed not maintainable.

3.2 Juridical Seat of Arbitral Proceedings (Para 2.5-2.17): The court delved into the concept of the 'juridical seat' of arbitral proceedings, emphasizing its significance in regulating arbitral proceedings. It pointed out that once a seat is designated by agreement, it operates akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. The analysis involved a detailed interpretation of Sections 20, 31(4), and 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, along with a comparison with the UNCITRAL Model Law. The court clarified that the determination of the 'seat' is crucial, as it vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Courts at that location for arbitral proceedings.

Express Designation and Venue (Para 2.13-2.14): The court outlined that an express designation of a 'venue,' coupled with a lack of designation of any alternative place as the 'seat,' indicates that the stated 'venue' is the juridical seat of arbitral proceedings. The use of terms like "arbitration proceedings shall be held" reinforces this interpretation. In an international context, the application of supranational rules governing arbitration further supports the designation of the 'venue' as the 'seat.'

Application to the Present Case (Para 2.15-2.17): The court applied these principles to the arbitration clause in the present case. Notably, Clause 67.3(ii) specified that disputes with a foreign contractor would be resolved under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The court concluded that the clause designates either New Delhi or Faridabad as the 'seat' based on the application of supranational rules. Importantly, even when the proceedings were held in New Delhi, the court determined that both parties had chosen New Delhi as the 'seat,' giving the Courts at New Delhi exclusive jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings.

4. DECISION: The impugned judgment was set aside, affirming that New Delhi was the 'seat' of arbitration, and the Section 34 petition was ordered to be presented in the Courts in New Delhi, as initially determined by the Special Commercial Court at Gurugram.