Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 43B(f) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as inserted by the Finance Act, 2001. The provision pertains to the deduction for liability under the leave encashment scheme.

Issues:

• Whether the newly inserted Clause (f) to Section 43B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is constitutionally valid?
• Whether the absence of objects and reasons behind the enactment of Clause (f) renders it invalid?

Held:

The Court held that Section 43B(f) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is constitutionally valid. The provision is not an embargo upon the autonomy of the assessee in adopting a particular method of accounting, nor does it deprive the assessee of any lawful deduction. It only operates as an additional condition for the availment of deduction concerning specified heads. The insertion of Clause (f) was to regulate deductions by putting them under a special provision. The Court emphasized that the presumption in favor of constitutionality applies while testing the validity of a provision.

The Court rejected the argument that the absence of objects and reasons behind the enactment of Clause (f) renders it invalid. The presence or absence of objects and reasons does not impact the constitutional validity of a provision, as long as the literal features of the provision enable the Court to comprehend its true meaning with sufficient clarity.

Conclusion: The Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 43B(f) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and clarified that the absence of objects and reasons behind the enactment of a provision does not impact its validity, as long as the literal features of the provision enable the Court to comprehend its true meaning with sufficient clarity. 

Facts:

The Kerala State Electricity Board issued a tariff notification that segregated Self-Financing Educational Institutions (SFEIs) from State-run and State-aided private educational institutions, subjecting SFEIs to a higher category of tariff. The validity of this tariff order was challenged.

Issues:

Whether the tariff order gave undue preference to State-run and State-aided institutions?

Whether the tariff notification breached the principles of natural justice due to the absence of reasons?

Whether SFEIs were correctly categorized under the "commercial" heading for tariff purposes?

The meaning of the term "purpose" in the context of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Held:

Issue 1: Undue Preference The court held that the tariff notification did not show undue preference to State-run and State-aided institutions. The differentiation in tariff rates was based on factors like load factor, power factor, voltage, consumption, geographical position, nature of supply, and purpose for which supply is required. (Para 7)

Issue 2: Principles of Natural Justice The court ruled that the absence of reasons in the tariff notification did not breach principles of natural justice. Since SFEIs did not raise objections during the tariff proposal stage, the Commission's role was quasi-legislative. The requirement for disclosing reasons arises only when a dispute is generated, and there was no dispute in this case. (Para 10-11)

Issue 3: Categorization under "Commercial" Heading The court explained that while educational institutions might not perform functions similar to traditional commercial entities, for tariff purposes, entities from diverse fields can be grouped under a common umbrella. The heading "commercial" does not solely depend on the nature of activities. (Para 14)

Issue 4: Meaning of "Purpose" The court interpreted the term "purpose" as the reason for which something is done or exists. SFEIs were included under the "commercial" heading based on the purpose they served, which distinguished them from State-run institutions. The distinction in purpose justifies different tariff rates. (Para 16-18)

The court concluded that the tariff order was valid, and SFEIs being categorized as commercial entities for tariff purposes was not erroneous. The differentiation in tariff rates was justified based on the distinction in purpose and nature of the institutions. The judgment of the Single Judge was restored. (Para 19)

Facts:

The appellant, Motamarri Appanna Veerraju alias Mav Raju, filed a criminal appeal challenging the judgment and orders of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta. The appellant's bail application was filed in August 2018 in connection with multiple offenses, including those under IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act. The High Court granted interim protection to the appellant through successive interim orders.

Issues:

The delay in disposing of the appellant's bail application, the appropriateness of the conditions of interim bail, and the impact of the rejection of bail for a co-accused.

Held:

The court expressed displeasure at the delay in the High Court's handling of the bail application and highlighted the need for expeditious disposal of bail applications. The court decided to dispose of the main bail application filed by the appellant and modify the conditions of the interim bail. The modified conditions included a specified bail bond amount, travel restrictions, limitations on entering a particular district, surrendering the passport, and maintaining regular contact with the Investigating Officer. The court emphasized that the rejection of bail for a co-accused should not necessarily affect the appellant's bail, considering the unique circumstances of the case.

The court referred to a Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed by a co-accused (SLP (Crl.) No. 10310 of 2019) that had been dismissed by the court on 09.12.2019. The court cited this case to clarify that the rejection of the co-accused's bail application wouldn't automatically impact the appellant's situation.

Facts:

The plaintiffs claimed ownership of certain land and alleged that the defendant managed the property as a manager, while the defendant asserted his status as a tenant. The trial court found that the defendant's oral evidence and witnesses had rebutted the presumption of truth attached to revenue records. The first appellate court, however, favored the defendant, stating that the plaintiffs had failed to prove the defendant's role as a manager.

Issues:

Whether the presumption of truth attached to revenue records can be rebutted by oral evidence.

Whether the defendant's position as a tenant or manager is proven.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized that the presumption of truth attached to revenue records can be rebutted only if entries were made fraudulently, surreptitiously, or without following the prescribed procedure. The Court also highlighted the importance of documentary evidence over oral evidence when dealing with the presumption of truth in revenue records.

The Court held that the High Court erred in allowing the defendant's appeal based on oral evidence to rebut the statutory presumption. The onus of proving the defendant's relationship as a tenant was on the defendant, who failed to provide reliable documentary evidence. Thus, the judgment and decree of the first appellate court were affirmed in favor of the defendant. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The appellant married her first husband in 1989 and obtained a divorce in 2005. She subsequently filed an appeal against the divorce decree, which was filed after the period of limitation. During the pendency of this appeal, she married the respondent in 2014. The second marriage also ended in discord, leading to a maintenance claim by the appellant against the respondent.

Issues:

Whether a marriage during the pendency of an appeal from a divorce decree is null and void.

The applicability of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, in cases of remarriage during the appeal period.

Whether maintenance can be denied on the ground of nullity of marriage.

The consequences of the appellant's second marriage while the appeal from the divorce decree was pending.

Held and Decision:

The Court analyzes Sections 5, 11, and 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act. It establishes that a marriage can be void under certain conditions mentioned in the statute. Contravention of Section 5(i) (having a spouse living at the time of marriage) renders the marriage void, whereas contravention of Section 5(ii) and 5(iii) renders it voidable. Section 15 allows remarriage after divorce if there's no right of appeal against the decree, or the time for appealing has lapsed without an appeal filed. Contravention of Section 15 applies only if an appeal is filed within the limitation period.( Para 25-26)

The Court emphasizes that while contravention of certain conditions in Section 5 renders a marriage void, not all contraventions have this effect. The Court explains that Section 15's prohibition against remarriage applies if an appeal is filed within the prescribed time, not later with delay condoned.( Para 27-28)

The Court clarifies that the legislative intent is not to nullify a divorce and continue the dissolved marriage due to the prohibition against remarriage for a certain period. It agrees with a previous case that stated that such incapacity for remarriage does not imply the subsistence of the dissolved marriage.( Para 36-37)

The Court concludes that the marriage contracted during the pendency of the appeal was valid, considering that the ex-husband had remarried after the period of limitation, and the appeal was infructuous. Thus, the appellant's second marriage was not void.( Para 39)

The order under appeal and the dismissal of the appellant's maintenance application were set aside. The case was remitted to the appropriate court for maintenance determination. Meanwhile, the respondent was directed to pay maintenance as directed by the Family Court.( Para 40)

REFERRED CASES:

Anurag Mittal vs. Shaily Mishra Mittal, (2018) 9 SCC 691

Lila Gupta vs. Laxmi Narain [Lila Gupta vs. Laxmi Narain, (1978) 3 SCC 258

Facts:

A Tripartite Joint Development Agreement was executed among a society, MHADA, and a corporate debtor for the development of land. The corporate debtor defaulted on a loan, leading to insolvency proceedings under section 7 of the IBC. The application was admitted, an interim resolution professional was appointed, and a moratorium was declared under section 14. During the moratorium, MHADA issued a termination notice of the Joint Development Agreement to the corporate debtor, requiring possession of the land.

Issues:

The interpretation of section 14(1)(d) of the IBC concerning the recovery of property occupied by the corporate debtor.

The rights and implications of the Joint Development Agreement, especially in relation to the possession of the land during the moratorium.

Held:

Interpretation of Section 14(1)(d): The Court emphasized that section 14(1)(d) of the IBC doesn't pertain to assets, legal rights, or beneficial interests of the corporate debtor. The provision concerns "recovery of any property." The expression "occupied by" refers to actual physical possession or use. The Joint Development Agreement granted a license to the developer (corporate debtor) for various activities, effectively constituting "occupation." [Paragraphs 6-7]

Primacy of the Insolvency Code: The Court underscored that in case of a conflict between the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act and the Insolvency Code, the latter must prevail. The moratorium's purpose is to maintain a status quo during the insolvency resolution process, overcoming any obstacles. The statutory freeze lasts until the Adjudicating Authority approves a resolution plan or orders liquidation. [Paragraph 16]

Facts:

The Family Court disposed of a maintenance petition filed by the respondent-wife under Section 125 Cr.P.C., directing the appellant-husband to pay monthly maintenance and for the parties to file a divorce petition by mutual consent. The husband paid maintenance for only four months. The respondent-wife filed an execution petition to enforce the maintenance order. The Family Court rejected the execution petition, deeming the maintenance order conditional and subject to unfulfilled obligations. The respondent-wife filed an application to recall the order in the maintenance petition. The Family Court revived the maintenance application. The husband challenged this by filing a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court rejected the petition under Section 482.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate's jurisdiction under Section 125 Cr.P.C. persists post passing of the initial order?

Whether the revival of the maintenance application by the Family Court is in violation of Section 362 Cr.P.C.?

Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.?

Held:

The legislative scheme under Section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is similar. The prohibition on altering or reviewing judgments by the criminal court is deliberate. The court's jurisdiction is limited to correcting clerical or arithmetic errors. Exceptions to the embargo exist as provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure or other applicable laws.

The expression "save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force" in Section 362 relaxes the rigour of the section under specific conditions.

Section 125 Cr.P.C. shows that the Magistrate's jurisdiction remains after passing the initial order. Express provisions in Section 125(1), Section 125(5), and Section 127 Cr.P.C. allow for cancellation or alteration of orders. The term "from time to time" in Section 125(1) indicates the Magistrate's continued jurisdiction. Section 125(5) empowers the Magistrate to cancel orders under certain conditions. Section 127 provides the Magistrate with the authority to alter or cancel orders.

The wife cannot be left without recourse if the husband does not fulfill the terms of settlement. Section 125 Cr.P.C. must be interpreted to advance justice and protect the rights of women.

The appeal is dismissed. The Family Court's revival of the maintenance application is not prohibited by Section 362 Cr.P.C. The High Court appropriately rejected the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 are exercised to ensure justice.

Facts:

The plaintiff-appellant filed suits for the cancellation of a sale deed. The defendants contested the suits, arguing that the appellant undervalued them and paid insufficient court fees. The trial court ruled against the appellant, stating that the suits were undervalued and the fees paid were inadequate. The appellant filed a writ petition, contending that they were not a party to the sale deed, and thus the trial court erred in directing them to pay ad valorem fees based on market value. The appellant claimed that they should pay fees based on the revenue fixed by the State Government as per section 7(iv-A) of the Act.

Issues:

Whether the trial court's valuation and fee determination were correct.

Whether the concept of "market value" under section 7(iv-A) aligns with the determination of fees based on revenue payable.

Held:

The valuation for court fees is crucial as the plaintiff sought not only a declaration but also decrees of cancellation. The term "market value" is defined in the context of this litigation by section 7(iv-A). This section specifies that if the plaintiff is not a party to the decree or instrument, the value is one-fifth of the subject matter's value. This value is deemed to be the value of the property involved in the suit. The explanation to section 7(iv-A) further clarifies that the value of immovable property is as computed under sub-sections (v), (v-A), or (v-B) of the Act.

The appellant's contention is that the value determination follows section 7(v) due to section 7(iv-A). Section 7(v) (i) has two clauses for revenue-paying lands. The plaintiff valued the suits based on revenue payable, which led to a value of Rs. 3000 each. There was no obligation for the plaintiff to prove revenue payment during the suit filing. The concept of "market value" in this context refers to the modes defined in sub-clauses (v), (v-A), or (v-B) of section 7(iv-A). The High Court's reasoning ignored this aspect, rendering its conclusions unsustainable. Thus, the question of market value based on revenue payable becomes an issue to be tried in the suit.

FACTS:The appellant, M/S. Ananda Social and Educational Trust, appealed against the High Court of Karnataka's decision. The case involved the interpretation of Section 12AA of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The appellant's registration was rejected by the Commissioner of Income Tax due to a lack of undertaken activities. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal) reversed this decision based on the Delhi High Court's judgment. The Revenue Department appealed against this decision.

ISSUES:

Whether a newly registered trust with no undertaken activities can be registered under Section 12AA.

The scope of the term "activities" in Section 12AA and its relation to proposed charitable activities.

HELD :

The purpose of Section 12AA is to ensure the registration of trusts or institutions with genuine charitable objectives and activities.

The term "activities" in Section 12AA includes both actual and proposed activities. The Commissioner's assessment for registration includes evaluating the trust's proposed charitable activities and ensuring alignment with its objectives.

The situation differs when the Commissioner intends to cancel registration under sub-section (3) of Section 12AA, where the focus is on assessing whether actual activities align with the trust's objectives.

The Delhi High Court's view, which supported the registration of a newly formed trust without undertaken activities, was upheld. The Commissioner should evaluate proposed activities for genuineness.

The Commissioner's power to cancel registration remains if actual activities deviate from the trust's objectives.

REFERRED CASES :

Self Employers Service Society vs. Commissioner of Income Tax - (2001) 247 ITR 18