Facts:

JVVL, an electricity distribution licensee in Rajasthan, entered into a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) on January 28, 2010, with APRL, a generating company, based on a tariff-based competitive bid process under Section 63 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

The PPA stipulated that the primary fuel would be domestic coal. However, the New Coal Distribution Policy of 2013 was subsequently notified by the Central Government, bringing about changes in the availability and supply of domestic coal.

APRL claimed increased tariff compensation under the "change in law" provisions in the PPA, stating that the change in domestic coal supply impacted their operations and costs.

Issues:

Whether APRL is entitled to compensation under the "change in law" provisions of the PPA?

Whether the findings of the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC) and the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) can be disturbed in the appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act?

Whether there was a failure on the part of the Government of Rajasthan to provide domestic coal as per the PPA?

Whether APRL's claim for compensation is based on a valid change in law?

Held:

The PPA clearly states that the primary fuel is domestic coal, and the parties agreed on this premise during the bidding process. The claim that the bid and PPA were based on imported coal is not accepted. The change in law, i.e., the revised coal distribution policy, affects the availability of domestic coal, which was the basis of the PPA. The PPA is binding on both parties, and the approval of the tariff by RERC was based on the use of domestic coal. Rajasthan Discoms (including JVVL) agreed to this, as it offered lower tariff escalation than imported coal. The decision of the Bid Evaluation Committee was in their best interest. Rajasthan Discoms admitted in their reply to RERC that the bid was based on domestic coal, and non-availability of domestic coal would entitle APRL to claim compensation under the change in law provisions of the PPA. The concurrent findings of RERC and APTEL are reasonable and binding. The appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act cannot disturb these findings.

APRL's claim is based on the change in law in 2013 when the New Coal Distribution Policy was revised. The PPA was based on the domestic law, and the change in domestic law justifies compensation.

The Government of Rajasthan had committed to provide domestic coal for the project, but due to a shortage of coal supplies, it couldn't fulfill its obligation.

Article 10 of the PPA clearly provides for compensation under the change in law provisions, and it cannot be rendered redundant. The agreement is binding and must prevail. APTEL had clarified that change in law compensation would be limited to the shortfall in domestic linkage coal supply.

The "change in law" provision aims to restore the affected party to the same economic position as if the change had not occurred. Since the monthly tariff was based on domestic coal, compensation should be given on that basis, in line with the principle of restitution.

The late payment surcharge for Rajasthan Discoms is reduced to 9% per annum, and the 2% additional charge is not applicable.

Facts:

The case involved conflicting opinions from different two-Judge Benches of the Supreme Court. In the case of Mohan Lal, it was held that when the informant is also the investigator, the trial is vitiated, and the accused is entitled to acquittal. However, in the subsequent case of Varinder Kumar, it was observed that the law laid down in Mohan Lal should apply prospectively and not affect pending cases. The issue was referred to the present five-Judge Bench to decide the matter on its merits.

Issues:

Whether the informant, who is also the investigator, vitiates the trial and entitles the accused to acquittal under the NDPS Act.

Whether the provisions of the CrPC allow a police officer to receive information, record it, and investigate it, even if the informant is the investigator.

Whether the reverse burden of proof under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act affects the fairness of the investigation by the informant.

Held:

The Court clarified that the observations in previous cases, such as Bhagwan Singh, Megha Singh, and Rajangam, where the informant being the investigator led to acquittal, should be confined to their own facts. Those cases did not establish a general proposition that the informant being the investigator automatically vitiates the trial.

The Court held that there is no bar in the CrPC preventing a police officer from receiving information, recording it, and then investigating it. Sections 154, 156, and 157 of the CrPC allow the officer in charge of a police station to reduce the information in writing and subsequently investigate it.

Under the NDPS Act, there are inbuilt safeguards provided in Sections 50 and 52, which require informing the person being searched or arrested about the grounds for the action. Section 53 also authorizes the Central or State Government to invest any officer of certain departments with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station for investigation. The NDPS Act does not specifically bar the informant from being the investigator.

The Court clarified that the reverse burden of proof under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act does not automatically render the investigation unfair if the informant is also the investigator. Whether the investigation was fair or not will be decided at the time of trial, and the accused must establish actual bias or prejudice, not just the possibility of it.

Decision: The Court held that the informant being the investigator does not automatically vitiate the trial or entitle the accused to acquittal. The matter must be decided on a case-by-case basis, considering the facts and circumstances. Contrary decisions in Mohan Lal and others taking a similar view are not good law and are overruled.

Facts:

The Contempt Petition arose from OA No. 766 of 2013 filed by the banks seeking recovery of Rs. 6203,35,03,879.32. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 gave an oral undertaking on 26.07.2013 before DRT, Bengaluru, not to alienate or dispose of their properties. The High Court of Karnataka passed orders on 03.09.2013 and 13.11.2013 restraining Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 from transferring, alienating, disposing, or creating third-party rights in their movable and immovable properties.

Respondent No. 3 received US$ 40 million in their account on 25.02.2016, and within a few days, on 26.02.2016 and 29.02.2016, the same amount was transferred out of that account.

Issues:

whether Dr. Vijay Mallya was guilty of contempt of court for not disclosing full particulars of his assets and for violating the orders passed by the High Court of Karnataka.

Held:

The Court found Dr. Vijay Mallya guilty of contempt on two counts: first, for disobeying the Court's orders by not disclosing full particulars of his assets, and second, for violating the express orders of restraint passed by the High Court. The Court dismissed the Review Petitions, as they did not raise any "error apparent on record" justifying interference in review jurisdiction.

The Court directed Dr. Vijay Mallya to appear before the Court on 05.10.2020 at 02:00 p.m., and the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, was instructed to ensure his presence on that day.

Facts:

In the present case, a Contemnor, who is an advocate, made reckless and scandalous allegations against the Supreme Court in tweets and a press statement. The Court initiated suo motu proceedings against him. The Contemnor was granted time to submit an unconditional apology, but instead, he reiterated his statements in a supplementary statement, claiming that his tweets were in the public interest and made in good faith.

Issues:

Whether the Contemnor's defense of truth is valid as per Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Whether the Contemnor's statements amounted to criminal contempt and violated the right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Whether the Contemnor's actions interfered with the judicial process and administration of justice.

Held:

The twin requirement for considering the truth as a valid defense, as per Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is that it must be in public interest and bona fide. In this case, the defense taken by the Contemnor cannot be considered either in public interest or bona fide. His statements further aggravated the contempt and undermined the institution of justice. Therefore, the defense of truth is not applicable here.

While freedom of speech is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, it does not permit malicious attacks on institutions such as the judiciary. Fair criticism of judgments is permissible, but attributing motives to Judges harms the administration of justice and is not protected under free speech.

Lawyers are part of the judicial system and must respect the institution while fearlessly advocating their cases. Making scandalous allegations against the judiciary damages the profession's dignity and cannot be tolerated. [Para 44, 50]

The Court's power to punish for contempt does not violate the right to free speech. It must balance free speech rights with the need to maintain the dignity of the judiciary.

The Court cannot be influenced by media or public opinions while deciding cases. Advocates must remember their ethical duty and not denigrate the system they are part of.

The Contemnor's claim that the Court is coercing him to apologize is unfounded. The Court has granted him the option to submit an apology voluntarily. The lack of remorse and the persistence in the defense justify a more substantial punishment than a mere warning.

The Court convicts the Contemnor of criminal contempt and sentences him to pay a nominal fine of Rs. 1/-. If the Contemnor defaults on the fine, he will undergo simple imprisonment for three months. He is further debarred from participating in the Supreme Court for three years. The Court concludes that the defense of truth is not valid and imposes the sentence after duly balancing the relevant factors.

Accordingly, the present proceedings including all pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

Facts:

The case involves the supply of pipes and measurement equipment (SKID equipment) by the respondent (M/S. Adani Gas Ltd.) to its industrial, commercial, and domestic consumers under the head of 'gas connection charges'. The respondent considered this supply as a service related to 'tangible goods' for the consumers' use without transferring the right of possession and effective control over the goods.

Issues:

• whether the SKID equipment provided by the respondent to its consumers fell within the ambit of Section 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994, which deals with the taxability of supply of tangible goods for use without transferring possession or effective control of such goods.

Held:

Section 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994, levies tax on the supply of tangible goods for use without transferring possession and effective control. This provision was introduced to tax activities where the customer uses the service provider's goods without acquiring possession or effective control, making it a taxable service rather than a 'deemed sale' under Article 366(29-A)(d) of the Constitution of India.

The definition of taxable service under Section 65(105)(zzzzj) requires certain elements to be fulfilled, such as the provision of a service in relation to the supply of tangible goods, with no transfer of possession, and the goods being supplied for use by the recipient.

The General Service Agreement (GSA) between the respondent and its purchasers stipulated that there was no transfer of ownership or possession of the pipelines and measurement equipment (SKID equipment) to the consumers. The equipment was installed for measuring and recording the volume and pressure of the gas delivered, ensuring safe operations at the buyer's facilities. Therefore, the condition of not transferring ownership or possession, as per Section 65(105)(zzzzj), was satisfied.

The term "use" does not have a fixed meaning and must be contextually interpreted. In the present case, "use" of the SKID equipment encompasses its application for fulfilling the purpose of the contract, ensuring the correct quantity of gas supply, and enabling the safe and regulated delivery of gas, which is beneficial to both the seller and the buyer.

The refund of gas connection charges collected from consumers was not a refundable security deposit, as evidenced by the varying percentage of funds refunded to consumers based on their usage.

The Court upheld the decision of the Adjudicating Authority that the SKID equipment provided by the respondent to its consumers constitutes a taxable service under Section 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994. The Tribunal was erroneous in interfering with the findings and order of the Adjudicating Authority.

Facts:

The University Grants Commission (UGC) issued guidelines dated 06.07.2020 directing universities and colleges to complete terminal semester/final year examinations by 30.09.2020. The Ministry of Human Resource Development also issued an Office Memorandum (OM) on the same date, and the Ministry of Home Affairs permitted the conduct of examinations. However, the State of Maharashtra and the Maharashtra State Disaster Management Authority decided not to hold examinations for final year courses and to promote students based on previous performance and internal assessment. A writ petition was filed challenging the UGC Guidelines, the orders of ministries, and the decisions of the State authorities as ultra vires Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Issues:

• Are the UGC Guidelines, issued under Section 12 of the UGC Act, beyond the domain of UGC and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution?
• Can the State Disaster Management Authority's decision to promote students without holding examinations override the UGC Guidelines?
• Can the UGC Guidelines, being statutory, prevail over any inconsistent decision taken by the State authorities under the Disaster Management Act, 2005?
• Is it mandatory for the UGC to consult all universities before issuing guidelines under Section 12 of the UGC Act?

Held:

The UGC Guidelines, being issued under Section 12 of the UGC Act, are statutory and not beyond the domain of UGC. They are in compliance with Section 12 and are not violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The Guidelines show concern for the health of stakeholders and are reasonable.

The State Disaster Management Authority's decision to promote students without examinations cannot override the UGC Guidelines. The decision falls outside the jurisdiction of the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

The UGC Guidelines, being referable to Entry 66 of List I, shall prevail over any contrary decision taken by the State authorities under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, regarding the conduct of examinations.

Section 12 of the UGC Act does not mandate consultation with all universities in every case. The expression "in consultation with the Universities or other bodies concerned" should be read to mean where consultation is necessary.

The writ petition challenging the UGC Guidelines and the State authorities' decisions to promote students is dismissed. The UGC Guidelines prevail over any contrary decision taken under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, and the State is at liberty to seek an extension of the deadline for conducting examinations.

All writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. The Special Leave Petition No.10042 of 2020 is dismissed.

Facts:

The respondents filed a petition on 25.04.2018 under Section 7 of the IBC, claiming to be 'Financial creditors' and seeking the recovery of a principal amount of Rs.2.10 crores along with interest. The appellant company disputed this claim, stating that Rs.80,40,000/- was repaid to the respondents between 2003 and 2004. Moreover, the respondents requested the conversion of Rs.90,00,000/- from the outstanding loan as share application money, which was later treated as a loan from respondent no. 2. The appellant company also contended that it had paid Rs.43,25,000/- to the respondents between 2004 and 2006, fully liquidating the loan liability.

Issues:

• Whether the debt claimed by the respondents is barred by limitation under the Limitation Act, 1963.
• Whether the respondents can be considered 'Financial creditors' under the IBC based on the evidence presented.
• Whether the debt arising from payment received for shares, issued to a third party at the request of the payee, qualifies as a financial debt.

Held:

The applicant invoking the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process must prima facie show the existence of a legally recoverable debt, and the respondents failed to demonstrate that the debt was not barred by limitation (Para 36).

Under Clauses (19) to (21) of Part II of the Schedule of the Limitation Act 1963, the limitation period for a suit for the recovery of money lent is three years from the date of loan payment. In this case, the debt was likely barred by limitation as early as 2012 when winding up proceedings were initiated in the Madras High Court (Para 37).

The NCLT rightly refused to admit the application under Section 7 of the IBC, holding it to be barred by limitation. The Appellate Tribunal erred in reversing the earlier decision and admitting the application (Para 38).

Evidence, including forensic evidence, is required to adjudicate disputes about forged signatures or fabricated records, and such matters should be addressed in a regular suit rather than in IBC proceedings (Para 40).

The application under Section 7 of the IBC was not maintainable, as there was no financial debt in existence. The payment received for shares issued to a third party at the payee's request cannot be considered a debt, let alone a financial debt (Para 42).

The judgment and order of the Appellate Tribunal are set aside, and the Adjudicating Authority's order dismissing the application is restored (Para 43).

Facts:

Rule 115(7) of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, requires all motor vehicles to carry a valid PUC Certificate issued by an authorized agency after one year of initial registration. Rule 116 empowers officers to direct vehicle owners to submit their vehicles for emission testing, and non-compliance results in penalties as per Rule 116(4) to (9).

Issues:

• Whether the NGT had the authority to pass orders directing the State Government to issue instructions to dealers and petrol pumps not to supply fuel to vehicles without PUC Certificates.
• Whether the NGT had the power to direct the State to deposit Rs. 25 crores to secure compliance with its order.

Held:

The NGT had the power to direct the State to implement compliance with Rules 115 and 116 of the 1989 Rules. The enforcement of statutory environmental obligations under these rules, which are related to emission standards, arises from the implementation of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, and the Environment Protection Act, 1986. Therefore, the NGT had jurisdiction to pass such orders.

However, the NGT lacked the authority to order the stoppage of fuel supply to vehicles without valid PUC Certificates. Such a penalty was not specified in the 1989 Rules or the NGT Act. The suspension of registration certificates and other prescribed penalties are the only consequences for non-compliance with PUC Certificate requirements.

The NGT had no power to direct the State to deposit Rs. 25 crores as security to secure compliance with its order, especially when the initial order did not contain any such direction. The penalty for non-compliance with an NGT order is governed by the NGT Act and does not include a monetary deposit.

Decision: The impugned orders of the NGT were set aside to the extent that they directed the State to deposit Rs. 25 crores and stop fuel supply to non-compliant vehicles. However, the State was required to strictly implement compliance with Rules 115 and 116 and penalize violators according to the provisions of the 1989 Rules.

Facts:

The case involves the supply of pipes and measurement equipment (SKID equipment) by the respondent (M/S. Adani Gas Ltd.) to its industrial, commercial, and domestic consumers under the head of 'gas connection charges'. The respondent considered this supply as a service related to 'tangible goods' for the consumers' use without transferring the right of possession and effective control over the goods.

Issues:

whether the SKID equipment provided by the respondent to its consumers fell within the ambit of Section 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994, which deals with the taxability of supply of tangible goods for use without transferring possession or effective control of such goods.

Held:

Section 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994, levies tax on the supply of tangible goods for use without transferring possession and effective control. This provision was introduced to tax activities where the customer uses the service provider's goods without acquiring possession or effective control, making it a taxable service rather than a 'deemed sale' under Article 366(29-A)(d) of the Constitution of India.

The definition of taxable service under Section 65(105)(zzzzj) requires certain elements to be fulfilled, such as the provision of a service in relation to the supply of tangible goods, with no transfer of possession, and the goods being supplied for use by the recipient.

The General Service Agreement (GSA) between the respondent and its purchasers stipulated that there was no transfer of ownership or possession of the pipelines and measurement equipment (SKID equipment) to the consumers. The equipment was installed for measuring and recording the volume and pressure of the gas delivered, ensuring safe operations at the buyer's facilities. Therefore, the condition of not transferring ownership or possession, as per Section 65(105)(zzzzj), was satisfied.

The term "use" does not have a fixed meaning and must be contextually interpreted. In the present case, "use" of the SKID equipment encompasses its application for fulfilling the purpose of the contract, ensuring the correct quantity of gas supply, and enabling the safe and regulated delivery of gas, which is beneficial to both the seller and the buyer.

The refund of gas connection charges collected from consumers was not a refundable security deposit, as evidenced by the varying percentage of funds refunded to consumers based on their usage.

The Court upheld the decision of the Adjudicating Authority that the SKID equipment provided by the respondent to its consumers constitutes a taxable service under Section 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994. The Tribunal was erroneous in interfering with the findings and order of the Adjudicating Authority.