Facts:

The appellant, an unmarried Hindu daughter, sought maintenance from her father under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, after attaining majority. The Revisional Court found that the appellant had no physical or mental abnormality or injury that would render her unable to maintain herself. The appellant contended that, based on Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, she was entitled to claim maintenance until she is married, even without any physical or mental disability.

Issues:

Whether an unmarried Hindu daughter can claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. only until she attains majority or until she remains unmarried?

Can the right to claim maintenance by an unmarried daughter be pursued under both Section 125 Cr.P.C. and Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956?

Held:

Section 125 Cr.P.C. limits the claim of maintenance of a child until he or she attains majority. However, an unmarried daughter can claim maintenance under Section 125(1)(c) if she is unable to maintain herself due to any physical or mental abnormality or injury. In this case, the appellant was found not to suffer from any such abnormality or injury.

Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, imposes a statutory obligation on a Hindu to maintain his or her unmarried daughter who is unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or property. This right of an unmarried daughter to claim maintenance is absolute and can be enforced against her father.

The purpose and object of Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to provide immediate relief in summary proceedings, while the right under Section 20 of the Act, 1956, is a larger concept that needs determination by a Civil Court. The Magistrate's jurisdiction under Section 125 Cr.P.C. does not extend to determining claims contemplated by the Act, 1956.

An unmarried Hindu daughter can claim maintenance from her father until she is married, relying on Section 20(3) of the Act, 1956, provided she proves her inability to maintain herself. To enforce this right, the application or suit must be under Section 20 of the Act, 1956.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, and the appellant is given the liberty to pursue her claim for maintenance under Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, if she so desires.

Facts:

The appellant-Corporation was established under the NCDC Act and functions as an intermediary providing loans or grants to cooperative societies. The source of funds is through grants and loans received from the Central Government. The interest income earned on these funds has been treated as taxable business income. The issue is whether the interest income on grants disbursed to cooperative societies is eligible for deduction for determining the taxable income of the appellant-Corporation.

Issues:

Whether the interest income on grants disbursed can be considered business income under Section 14 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act).

Whether the disbursement of grants is an allowable deduction under Section 37(1) of the IT Act.

Whether the principle of diversion by overriding title is applicable.

Whether the expenses incurred for the business purpose can be deducted.

Held:

The interest income on grants disbursed is considered business income and falls under Section 14 of the IT Act as "Profits and gains of business or profession." It is not treated as income from other sources under Section 56 of the IT Act.

The disbursement of grants is an integral part of the appellant-Corporation's business and is, therefore, an allowable deduction under Section 37(1) of the IT Act. The source of funds used for the expenditure is not relevant for this purpose.

The principle of diversion by overriding title is not applicable as the grants are disbursed as part of the appellant-Corporation's core business activity, and the funds are not diverted by any superior title.

The scheme of the IT Act requires determination of 'real income' based on commercial accountancy principles. Expenses incurred in the course of business are deductible, and the income tax is imposed on real income.

Facts:

The appellant, a paramilitary officer posted at a local unit of BPCL, was dismissed by the disciplinary authority on charges of corruption. An FIR was registered with the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and the appellant's appeal against the dismissal order was also dismissed by the appellate authority. The appellant filed a writ petition challenging the dismissal, which was also dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the principles of natural justice were violated during the disciplinary proceedings?

Whether the disciplinary proceedings should be exonerated due to the absence of a criminal chargesheet filed by the CBI after the enquiry?

Whether the punishment of dismissal from service was proportionate to the charges of corruption, fabrication, and intimidation proved against the appellant?

Held:

The power of judicial review exercised by Constitutional Courts is distinct from the appellate power of a departmental appellate authority. Judicial review is limited to correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to manifest injustice, or violations of principles of natural justice.( Para 25)

Phe High Court's conclusion was based on evidence and was well-reasoned. The scope of judicial review was not restricted, and the appellate authority addressed all pleas raised by the appellant.( Para 28-30)

The appellant's plea regarding violation of the "nemo judex in sua causa" principle due to the enquiry officer's questioning was rejected. Such questioning is allowed under Section 165 of the Evidence Act, and no specific malice or bias was alleged against the enquiry officer.( Para 31-32)

The distinction between standards of proof in disciplinary and criminal proceedings was discussed, and the appellant's plea for exoneration based on the absence of a criminal chargesheet was discarded.( Para 34-35)

The Disciplinary Authority has discretion in imposing punishment, subject to principles of proportionality and fair play. The punishment of dismissal was not disproportionate to the proven charges of corruption, fabrication, and intimidation, which could have caused substantial harm.( Para 36-38)

Facts:

The appellant, Rizwan Khan, and others were found in possession of contraband articles during a vehicle search. He was charged and convicted under Sections 20(b)(ii)(B) of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Issues:

Whether the evidence provided by the police officials was reliable and trustworthy,

Whether there was compliance with the prescribed procedures under Sections 42 and 55 of the NDPS Act,

Whether ownership of the vehicle was essential to establish guilt under the NDPS Act.

Held:

The prosecution successfully proved the case against the accused by examining police witnesses (PW3, PW4, PW5, PW7, and PW8). Though the two independent witnesses turned hostile, the police witnesses' testimonies were found reliable and trustworthy. The court rejected the notion that evidence of police officials requires independent corroboration and upheld the lower courts' conviction.( Para 8.2)

The court established and proved compliance with the prescribed procedures under Sections 42 and 55 of the NDPS Act.( Para 9 and 9.1)

The court clarified that ownership of the vehicle is not essential to establish guilt under the NDPS Act. It is sufficient to establish and prove that contraband articles were found with the accused in a vehicle purchased by them. The ownership of the vehicle is immaterial, and the crucial aspect is the recovery of the contraband articles and the commission of the offense under the NDPS Act.( Para 11)

In the circumstances, the present appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved an accused named Stalin and a victim who were at a beer party. The accused became angry when the victim served extra beer to two persons from outside the locality. A scuffle ensued, during which the accused took out a knife and stabbed the victim from behind, causing a single injury.

Issues:

Determine the appropriate section of the IPC applicable to the case - whether Section 302 (murder) or Section 304 Part I (culpable homicide not amounting to murder).

Held:

The court clarified that there is no hard and fast rule that a single injury automatically excludes the application of Section 302 IPC. The nature of the injury, its location on the body, and the weapon used are indicators of whether the accused intended to cause death. The court stressed that each case's specific facts and circumstances must be considered to decide the nature of the offense.( Para 7.2)

The court relied on the deposition of PW-3, an eye-witness, who described the events leading to the incident during the beer party. This testimony was crucial in determining the sequence of events that led to the scuffle and the single injury.( Para 9)

The court considered Exception IV to Section 300 IPC, which provides that culpable homicide is not murder if it occurs in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without premeditation and without undue advantage or cruel and unusual conduct. Based on the facts of the case, the court concluded that Section 302 IPC would not be applicable.( Para 10)

The court, however, noted that the accused used a knife and inflicted the injury on a vital part of the victim's body, making it likely to cause death. Therefore, the offense would fall under Section 304 Part I of the IPC, as it amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.( Para 11)

Facts:

The Rajasthan State Agro Industries Corporation Limited was closed by the State Government, and all its surplus employees were absorbed into different corporations. The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (appellant) absorbed the respondent no. 1, offering him the option to choose between the CPF scheme and the GPF and pension scheme. Respondent no. 1 opted for the pension scheme under the Regulations, 1989. The appellant-Corporation directed the transfer of the employee and employer contributions from the Provident Fund Commissioner to the respective funds. However, the Rajasthan Agro Industries Corporation Limited informed that the pension scheme was not applicable in their corporation, and no capital value amount was due to the appellant-Corporation.

Issues:

Whether there was any obligation to transfer a capital amount for the employees to be eligible for the pension scheme?

Whether the appellant-Corporation properly fulfilled the statutory requirements for the respondent's pension entitlement?

Held:

The Court referred to Regulation 43 of the Regulations, 1989 and the Circular dated 02.07.1991, which make it clear that the employer's share should be transferred to the appellant-Corporation Pension Fund, and the employee's share with interest should be transferred to the GPF Fund. The certificate issued by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner confirmed the transfer of both employee and employer contributions to the appellant-Corporation, satisfying the requirement for the pension scheme.

The Court observed that neither the Regulations, 1989 nor the Circular dated 02.07.1991 referred to any capital amount, and there was no obligation on the erstwhile employer to transfer any such amount. The appellant-Corporation had the obligation to credit the transferred amounts to the Pension Fund and GPF Fund, and there was no valid reason for denying the respondent's pension claim after retirement.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed by the Court, upholding the High Court's decision to allow the respondent's claim for pension entitlement.

FACTS:

The appellant, Shreyas Sinha, sought admission to the five-year law course at the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences for the academic session 2019-2020. He contended that the benefit of reservation was not extended to him in that academic session.

ISSUES:

whether the University's decision to provide reservation from the next academic year was contradictory to the provisions of the National University of Juridical Sciences (Amendment) Act, 2018.

HELD:

The Court noted that the Amending Act came into force on May 21, 2019, but it did not have any provision stating that it would apply to the ongoing admission process.( Para 15)

The Academic Council of the University, in its 36th meeting held on July 27, 2019, resolved to implement a 30% reservation for West Bengal domiciles from the next academic year. The Executive Council of the University approved this decision on August 10, 2019.( Para 16)

The Court held that since the reservation policy was not available when the admission process was initiated in January 2019, the University's decision to provide reservation from the next academic year was not contradictory to the provisions of the Amending Act.( Para 20)

The Court found no error in the findings recorded by the High Court, which led to the dismissal of the writ petition challenging the University's reservation policy for the academic session in question.( Para 15, 16, 20)

REFERRED CASES:

Anupal Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. Through Principal Secretary, Personnel Department & Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 173

P. Bhima Reddy vs. State of Mysore & Ors., (1969) 1 SCC 68

S. Krishna Sradha vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1609

Facts:

The case pertains to the liability of Bangalore Club to pay wealth tax under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. The Assessing Officer found the club liable to be taxed under the Act, and the CIT (Appeals) dismissed the appeal. However, the Appellate Tribunal set aside the orders of the Assessing Officer and CIT (Appeals). The High Court decided in favor of the revenue, but the Review Petition was also dismissed.

Issues:

The primary issue was whether Bangalore Club fell under Section 21AA of the Wealth Tax Act as an association of persons and was liable to pay wealth tax.

Held:

Section 3 of the Wealth Tax Act is the charging section that applies to individuals, Hindu undivided families, and companies. Bangalore Club does not fall under these categories and cannot be brought into the wealth tax net under this provision.( Para 9-13)

Section 21AA was introduced to prevent tax evasion by certain assesses creating associations of persons without defining members' shares to evade tax. The section aims to rope in associations of persons with a business or commercial object to make income or profits.( Para 19, 24 & 26)

Bangalore Club is an association of persons, but it is not created to evade tax, and its members' shares are determinate on the date of liquidation. Thus, Section 21AA does not apply to the club.( Para 28, 30-32)

The Income Tax Act's definition of "person" includes both "association of persons" and "body of individuals." For income tax purposes, Bangalore Club might be treated as a "body of individuals," but Section 21AA does not expand the field of taxpayers; it only targets associations of persons with indeterminate shares.( Para 33)

The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned judgment, and held that Bangalore Club is not liable to pay wealth tax under Section 21AA of the Wealth Tax Act.

Facts:

The appeals were filed by insurance companies challenging the judgments of the High Courts that upheld the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) in favor of the claimants. The compensation was awarded under two categories - 'loss of consortium' and 'loss of love and affection.'

Issues:

The main issue before the Court was to determine the scope of consortium compensation and whether 'loss of love and affection' could be awarded as a separate head of compensation.

Held:

The Constitution Bench in the case of "National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and Ors." had referred to an amount of Rs. 40,000/- for 'loss of consortium,' but it did not specifically address whether this consortium amount is payable only as spousal consortium. The judgment did not limit consortium compensation to only the spouse.

A Three-Judge Bench in the case of "United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur alias Satvinder Kaur and others" categorically stated that, apart from spousal consortium, parental and filial consortium are also payable.

The concept of 'loss of love and affection' was found to be comprehended within the broader term 'loss of consortium,' and thus, there was no justification to award separate compensation for 'loss of love and affection.'

Decision: The Court partially allowed the appeals. It upheld the judgments of the High Courts awarding consortium compensation to each claimant, as it was in accordance with the law laid down in the referred cases. However, the Court accepted the submission of the appellants that there is no justification for awarding compensation under the separate head of 'loss of love and affection.'

REFERRED CASES:

General Manager Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum vs. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and others, (1994) 2 SCC 176.

Magma General Insurance Company Limited vs. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130

National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 680

Sangita Arya and others vs. Oriental Insurance Company ltd. and others, (2020) SCC Online 513

Sarla Verma (Smt) and Others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121

United India Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Satinder Kaur alias Satvinder Kaur and others, (2020) SCC Online 410