Facts:

Dispute over promotions to the post of Junior Management Scale II in Mahakoshal Kshetriya Bank.

Rules formulated under Section 29 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976, governed the promotions.

The Rules prescribed a selection process involving a written test, interview, and performance appraisal reports for the preceding five years.

The eligibility criteria and mode of selection were defined, but no minimum qualifying marks were specified for the interview and performance appraisal reports.

Issues:

Disagreement on the application of the seniority-cum-merit principle.

Challenge to the decision fixing a benchmark of minimum 12 marks in the interview and performance appraisal reports.

Held:

The learned Single Judge set aside the promotion list, directing the preparation of a fresh list with minimum cut-off merit marks, emphasizing seniority-cum-merit.

The Division Bench, without finding any irregularity, dismissed the appeals and ordered a fresh promotion exercise.

Both the Single Judge and Division Bench erred in holding that fixing minimum qualifying marks for interview and performance appraisal violates the seniority-cum-merit principle.

Relying on precedent, it was established that fixing benchmarks based on aggregate performance is permissible and does not contradict seniority-cum-merit.

The Division Bench's decision to set aside the entire selection test was unwarranted, as there was no finding of its vitiation.

The appeals were allowed, and the judgments of the Single Judge and Division Bench were quashed. The respondent-authority was directed to prepare a fresh promotion list, considering those who met the minimum qualifying criteria, following seniority.

Facts:

The respondents filed a suit for the declaration of title and possession. The appellants contested, claiming abandonment of the land by the respondents, issuance of lease to the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants, and possession since then. The trial court dismissed the suit based on the patta-lease (Ex.D-20), stating it was issued to the appellants' predecessor, and the respondents' entries in revenue records were dubious. The first appellate court doubted Ex.D-20, decreeing the suit. The High Court affirmed the first appellate court's findings.

Issues:

Validity of the patta-lease (Ex.D-20).

The authenticity of the respondents' claim to the suit land.

Alleged connivance with the patwari for entries in revenue records.

Admissibility and interpretation of additional evidence.

Held:

In an Article 136 appeal, concurrent findings are generally not interfered with unless shown to be perverse. Interference is warranted when the findings are patently unreasonable (Para 10).

Plaintiffs, in a suit for title and possession, must succeed on the strength of their title. The burden lies on them to establish their title, which they failed to do (Para 13).

The admissions in the written statement about the lease to the plaintiffs' fathers do not absolve the plaintiffs from proving their continued entitlement to the patta-lease (Para 14).

Section 58 of the Evidence Act allows the court discretion to require admitted facts to be proved. Mere allegations of fraud do not rebut the presumption of genuineness under Section 90 (Para 15).

The evidence and records establish that the suit land was abandoned by the respondents' fathers, leading to an auction and lease issuance to the appellants' grandfather. The patta (Ex.D-20) is presumed genuine under Section 90 (Paras 16-19).

Revenue records consistently favor the appellants, strengthening their case. Entries in favor of the respondents for two years are insufficient, and findings of revenue authorities support the appellants' claim (Para 20).

The respondents failed to produce any document proving Ex. D-20 as forged. The Commissioner's order and other evidence establish connivance in entries, discrediting the respondents' case (Paras 22-23).

The findings of misconduct by the patwari, as per Ex.D-1, were ignored by the lower courts. Production of additional evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27, is permissible under specified circumstances (Paras 26-28).

The order of the Tahsildar dated 28.07.1971 is accepted as additional evidence, as it directly relates to the dispute and is referred to in Ex.D-1. Other additional documents are not admitted (Paras 30-31).

The High Court erred in dismissing the appeal without proper consideration of evidence and materials on record. The findings of revenue misconduct were crucial, and the High Court did not weigh the evidence adequately (Para 42).

Facts:

The appellant-assessee, involved in the manufacture of goods falling under Chapter 24 of the Schedule of The Central Excise Act, 1944, charged customers invoices for the price of goods plus Dharmada, a charitable donation.

The Superintendent of Central Excise issued show cause notices and demanded duty on Dharmada, claiming it as part of the price for the sale of manufactured goods.

The Adjudicating Authority initially held that Dharmada was not part of the trading receipts and dropped the demand for excise duty.

Another show cause notice was issued by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Aurangabad, calling for penalty and interest.

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that Dharmada was liable to be included as part of the assessable value.

The Central Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) partly allowed the appeal, but upheld the inclusion of Dharmada in the assessable value.

Issues: Whether Dharmada collected by the appellant, being an optional payment made by the buyer, can be regarded as part of the transaction value for the sale of goods.

Held and Decision:

The nature of the transaction involves the sale of goods, and the consideration is the price paid for the goods.

Excise duty is charged on the transaction value, which includes the amount paid as price for the goods.

The term "transaction value" is defined to mean the price actually paid or payable for the goods when sold, excluding amounts like excise duty and other taxes.

Dharmada, being a voluntary donation earmarked for charity and credited as such, does not constitute consideration for the transfer of goods.

The Court relied on precedent (Bijli Cotton Mills) stating that amounts received for Dharmada and earmarked for charitable purposes are not regarded as income of the assessee but are held under an obligation to spend the same for charitable purposes.

The Court distinguished the case from Tata Iron & Steel, where a surcharge was added as an element of price, unlike Dharmada, which is meant for charity.

The Dharmada collected, being an optional payment made by the buyer, cannot be regarded as part of the transaction value for the sale of goods.

Facts:

FCI advertised for the post of Assistant Grade-II (Hindi) with specific eligibility criteria.

The original writ petitioner applied, was shortlisted, and ranked sixth in the merit list.

Despite being ranked, the petitioner did not receive a final letter of appointment and was not on the selected list.

The denial was based on the petitioner's failure to produce an experience certificate for one year's translation work from English to Hindi and vice-versa.

Issues:

Whether the non-production of the experience certificate along with the application is fatal to the petitioner's case?

Whether subsequent production of certificates during verification should be considered?

Held:

The Division Bench, considering the distinction between essential requirements and the mode of proof, ruled that non-production of the certificate along with the application is not fatal.

The court emphasized that the essential is possession of the required qualification/experience before the given date, and the mode of proof is secondary.

The FCI's failure to call for additional evidence during document verification was noted, and the certificates subsequently produced were considered valid.

The Division Bench set aside the FCI's rejection and directed consideration of the petitioner for appointment on merit if other conditions are met.

Facts:

The appellant was enrolled in the Corps of Signals of the Indian Army as a Radio Mechanic on 18 February 1971.

On 18 August 1981, he was discharged from military service under Army Rule 13(3) on account of being placed in a low medical category.

The appellant claimed to suffer from a Chronic Duodenal Ulcer due to his participation in Operation Cactus Lilly in 1971.

The appellant moved the Armed Forces Tribunal for the grant of war injury pension, which was declined based on the view that the disability was not attributable to participation in action.

The appellant sought disability pension for the period between 1996 and 2014.

Issues:

Whether the appellant should be granted disability pension between 1996 and 2014?

Held:

On 26 November 2018, the Court allowed the appeal for consideration of disability pension between 1996 and 2014.

The chart submitted by the respondents indicated varying assessments of disability over the years, leading to the denial of disability pension from 24 March 1995.

With effect from 30 January 2014, the appellant's disability was assessed at 20% on a permanent basis for life by the Military Hospital, Danapur Cantt.

The Court found the denial of disability pension for the period between 24 March 1995 and 30 January 2014 misconceived, considering the previous order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal rounding off the disability element.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant directed to be granted arrears on account of disability pension between 24 March 1995 and 30 January 2014 in accordance with applicable rates.

Facts:

The first respondent was married to Vijay Kumar Jindal in 2010, and they have two children.

The first respondent filed a petition under Section 12 of the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005, seeking maintenance.

The complaint alleges that the house where the couple resided belonged to a joint family, and the appellant and his deceased brother carried on a joint business.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, as the brother of the deceased spouse, can be held liable for maintenance under the Act.

Held:

The appellant contested the basis of liability, arguing that the joint business with the deceased brother does not justify directing him to pay maintenance.

The court found sufficient averments in the complaint, especially in paragraph 10, indicating a joint family setup, joint business, and shared household.

The court clarified that the fulfillment of Section 2(f), Section 2(q), and Section 2(s) requirements would be a matter of evidence at trial.

An order for interim maintenance was justified based on the material available at this stage.

The court disposed of the appeal, emphasizing that the order does not preclude a final adjudication on the merits of the complaint.

Facts:

The Competent Authority under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (MISA) directed the detention of 'R' on 5.11.1974, prior to the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA), coming into force on 13.12.1974. On 19.12.1974, the Competent Authority under COFEPOSA directed further detention. The detenu's son filed a writ of habeas corpus on 29.4.1975. Proclamation of Emergency on 25.6.1975, subsequent amendments to COFEPOSA, and the enforcement of SAFEMA on 25.1.1976 were critical developments. Emergency was lifted on 21.3.1977, leading to the revocation of detention orders on 22.3.1977.

Issues:

The applicability of SAFEMA to the case of 'R' concerning the detention orders under COFEPOSA during the Emergency period.

Held:

The order of detention under Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA could be made to prevent activities prejudicial to foreign exchange. The maximum period of detention varied based on declarations under Section 9 and Section 12A of COFEPOSA.

Section 2 of SAFEMA applied to persons with orders of detention under COFEPOSA, subject to the proviso in Section 2(2)(b). The substantive provision would not apply if the order was revoked during specified periods outlined in the proviso.

Part (i) of the proviso to Section 2(2)(b) dealt with cases where Section 9 or Section 12A of COFEPOSA did not apply. In this case, neither Section 9 nor Section 12A applied, making SAFEMA applicable.

The order of detention was not revoked under any proviso conditions nor set aside by a competent court. SAFEMA provisions applied, as per Part (i) of the proviso.

The High Court rightly observed that the detention "had run right through the duration or continuance of the emergency." The failure to agitate the matter on merits during the pendency of the writ petition was noted.

The representation dated 17.01.1975, rejection communicated on 11.02.1975, and the absence of grievances regarding communication of grounds or identical grounds weakened challenges to the detention order under COFEPOSA.

The Competent Authority and the Appellate Tribunal under SAFEMA found the properties mentioned in the schedules illegally acquired and forfeited. The Writ Petition deserved to be rejected.

FACTS:

The appellant applied for an electricity connection in December 1996 and submitted a required test report in March 2005.

The respondent argued that the delay in granting the connection was due to the appellant's failure to submit the test report promptly.

A criminal complaint was lodged by the appellant, leading to a High Court order on 14 August 2015, directing the grant of the electricity connection on 4 September 2015.

ISSUES:

Whether the delay in granting the electricity connection was solely attributable to the appellant's failure to submit the test report promptly.

Whether the compensation awarded by the NCDRC was adequate.

HELD:

The court acknowledged the initial delay caused by the appellant in submitting the test report.

The court found no cogent explanation for the decade-long delay by the respondent after the test report submission.

A criminal writ petition was instituted, leading to a High Court order directing the grant of the electricity connection.

The court enhanced the compensation awarded by the NCDRC to Rs. 5,00,000, considering the appellant's hardship and inconvenience.

The enhanced compensation was ordered to be paid within four weeks, and in default, it would carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum.

The civil appeal was allowed in these terms with no costs.

Facts:

The appellant, PR. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-6, filed an appeal under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, challenging the dismissal of the Revenue's appeal by the High Court. The appeal pertained to the notice issued by the Assessing Officer under Section 148 and the subsequent assessment order. The respondent, NOKIA INDIA PVT. LTD., raised objections, contending that the notice was based on a mere change of opinion and, therefore, was bad in law. The ITAT upheld the respondent's appeal, and the High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal on the grounds of not involving any substantial question of law.

Issues:

The appeal include the legality of the notice issued under Section 148, whether it was based on a change of opinion, and if the High Court was justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground of not involving any substantial question of law.

Held:

The High Court erred in dismissing the appeal in limine, as there are substantial questions of law involved.

The questions for consideration include the justification of the notice issued under Section 148 and whether it was legally sustainable, considering the requirements of Section 148.

The ITAT's findings on the legality of the notice and the merits of the case need to be reconsidered.

The appeal is allowed, and the impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits, addressing the substantial questions of law raised.