Facts:

Smt. P. Leelavathi filed a suit for partition and recovery of her 1/4th share in certain properties against the legal heirs of V. Shankaranarayan Rao.

The properties were allegedly purchased by the defendants, who were siblings, but the plaintiff claimed that they were benami transactions funded by their late father, G. Venkata Rao.

Issues:

Whether the properties in question were benami transactions.

Whether the plaintiff was entitled to 1/4th share in the properties.

Held:

The source of money is not the sole consideration for determining a benami transaction.

Intention is crucial in deciding the nature of the transaction, and it must be assessed based on surrounding circumstances, relationships, motives, and subsequent conduct.

The plaintiff failed to establish that the properties were benami transactions.

The Court upheld the decision of the trial court and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.

Facts:

Vinay Prakash Jain filed Suit No. 92 of 1966 seeking a declaration of property shares after a partition among family members.

A compromise was reached in 1966, leading to a decree dividing the properties among the plaintiff, parents, and three brothers.

Defendant No.5 (Maya Prakash Jain) later claimed a further family settlement in 2005, exclusive ownership of certain properties, and sought implementation of the earlier decree.

Issues:

Whether daughters, as Class I heirs, are entitled to a share in the property left by parents under the Hindu Succession Act.

Validity and interpretation of Wills left by the father and mother.

Impleadment of daughters as necessary parties in the proceedings.

Held:

The daughters are entitled to a share under the Hindu Succession Act if the parents died intestate.

The Wills, if not proved, would entitle the daughters to a share.

Daughters are necessary and proper parties in proceedings concerning property distribution.

The rejection of Srikanta Jain's impleadment application was erroneous.

The appeal is allowed, and Srikanta Jain's application is accepted.

Facts:

Appellant No. 1 and Appellant No. 2 were convicted for offenses under Sections 302/498A of the IPC based on the death of Sharada Sampat Kale.

Sharada suffered 98% burns, and the prosecution relied on her dying declarations.

The defense contended suicide due to the victim's reluctance to go to the village, while the prosecution alleged murder by pouring kerosene and setting her on fire.

Issues:

Validity of dying declarations as the primary evidence.

Doubt about the victim's mental state given her extensive burns and the administration of painkillers.

Lack of corroborative evidence and examination of crucial neighborhood witnesses.

Discrepancies in the narrative, such as the location of the fire in the kitchen.

Held:

The court emphasized the importance of corroborative evidence in cases of dying declarations, especially when doubts exist about the victim's mental state due to injuries and medication.

The court raised concerns about the victim's ability to provide a reliable statement considering the shock and delusion associated with 98% burns and the administration of painkillers.

Noted discrepancies in the prosecution's case, including the location of the incident in the kitchen, which contradicted the narrative.

Highlighted the non-examination of crucial neighborhood witnesses, leading to a lack of corroboration for the dying declarations.

Concluded that the trial court's acquittal was not perverse and that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment.

Facts:

The case involves a woman (Rupali Devi) who left her matrimonial home due to alleged acts of cruelty by her husband and his relatives. The question before the court is whether the courts at the place where the wife seeks shelter (parental home) after leaving the matrimonial home have jurisdiction to entertain complaints under Section 498A.

Issues:

The determination of the territorial jurisdiction of courts when a woman leaves her matrimonial home due to cruelty and seeks shelter elsewhere. The court must interpret the provisions of Section 498A and relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Held:

The court analyzes the opinions in previous cases and notes a division in views regarding the jurisdiction of courts when cruelty is committed in the matrimonial home, and the wife seeks shelter in the parental home.

The court refers to Sections 177, 178, and 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code, emphasizing the exception to the ordinary rule provided by Section 178, allowing courts in another local area to take cognizance.

The introduction and purpose behind Section 498A are discussed, highlighting its intent to combat cruelty against wives and harassment leading to suicide.

"Cruelty" is defined as both physical and mental, with a focus on the mental distress and trauma that may continue even after the wife leaves the matrimonial home.

The court holds that the consequences of cruelty at the matrimonial home result in repeated offenses at the parental home, falling under Section 179 of the Cr.P.C.

It is concluded that courts at the place where the wife seeks shelter after leaving the matrimonial home due to cruelty have jurisdiction to entertain complaints under Section 498A.

Facts:

The complainant alleged providing a hand loan of Rs.6,00,000/- to the accused, who, in turn, issued a cheque dated 27.02.2012. The cheque was dishonored by the bank on 01.03.2012, citing insufficient funds. The trial court acquitted the accused, emphasizing the complainant's failure to prove financial capacity. However, the High Court overturned this decision, leading to an appeal.

Issues:

The complainant's capacity to lend Rs.6,00,000 to the accused, with the accused challenging the complainant's financial standing based on various transactions.

Held:

The Court summarily states principles established by the Supreme Court regarding Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Notably, the execution of a cheque implies a presumption under Section 139 that it was for debt discharge, which is a rebuttable presumption.

The complainant admitted receiving Rs.8,00,000 as retirement benefits and making a payment of Rs.4,50,000 in 2010. The accused argued that within two years, the complainant disbursed Rs.18,00,000 to various individuals, questioning the complainant's financial capacity.

The burden to prove financial capacity shifted to the complainant due to a probable defense raised by the accused. The complainant's unsatisfactory responses during cross-examination and failure to explain financial capacity were noted.

The Court emphasized that the trial court's findings were based on evidence presented by the defense. The High Court's criticism of the trial court's decision as perverse was deemed unsustainable, and the original judgment was restored.

Facts:

The Respondent manufactured goods falling under Chapter 72 of The Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, specifically Pig Iron and HR Coil Sheets.

Invoices included 'Dharmada,' a charitable donation from customers, credited to charity by the Respondent.

Issues:

Whether 'Dharmada' should be added to the assessable value for the payment of central excise duty.

Held:

The Deputy Commissioner, in a show cause notice, held that 'Dharmada' should be added to the assessable value.

The Commissioner (Appeals) affirmed this decision.

The CESTAT, in an appeal by the Respondent, overturned the decision, citing the precedent of Mohan and Co., Madras vs. CCE Madras.

The Supreme Court, in Civil Appeal No. 531 of 2008, considered the Collector vs. Panchmukhi Engineering Works case, asserting that 'Dharmada' should be a part of the assessable value.

The present case, linked to M/s D.J. Malpani vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik, held that 'Dharmada' cannot be included in the transaction value for assessments.

In view of the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 5282 of 2005, M/s D.J. Malpani vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik, the present appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The respondent floated an e-public tender for call center services. The appellant, facing a show cause notice for blacklisting in another tender, participated and won the bid. The show cause notice alleged providing false information.

Issues:

Interpretation of clause 20(i) and 20(ii) regarding blacklisting in the tender.

Validity of the Business Continuity Certificate submitted by the appellant.

Held:

The Court held that clause 20(i) did not require disclosure of a show cause notice; initiation of blacklisting is a different stage. The format provided specific conditions for disclosure, and the appellant complied. The undertaking given by the appellant did not necessitate disclosure of a show cause notice. The Court emphasized the seriousness of blacklisting and the need for clarity in the tender format.(Para 13-28)

The Court rejected doubts raised by respondent No.3 on the Business Continuity Certificate, stating that disputes on such technicalities are better suited for suits, not writ proceedings. It cautioned against courts substituting their interpretation for that of the tendering authority. Respondent No.1's reluctance to accept the doubts also played a role in the decision.(Para 29-35)

The Court cautioned against routine challenges to tenders, emphasizing the need for efficiency in public sector contracts. It referred to precedents that highlight the Court's limited role in interpreting commercial contracts. The impugned order was set aside, and the writ petition dismissed.(Para 36-43)

Facts:

The case involves cross appeals in the nature of Civil Appeal No. 6600 of 2015 and C.A. No. 1954 of 2019.

The appellant is the insurance company, and the central issue is whether the age of the deceased or the age of the dependents should be the basis for calculating the multiplier in the case of a bachelor's death.

Issues:

The determination of the multiplier in the case of a motor accident resulting in the death of a bachelor.

The question is whether the age of the deceased or the age of the dependents should be considered for calculating the multiplier.

Held:

The court affirms that in the case of a bachelor's death, it is the age of the deceased that should be the basis for calculating the multiplier.

The focus for determining the claim is on the deceased and what contribution he would have made to the dependents if alive.

The judgment emphasizes the importance of applying a uniform settled principle to avoid confusion and litigation.

The court dismisses the appeal filed by the insurance company, finding it without merit.

Regarding the claimants, no interference is called for as they have already been granted more than a reasonable amount for future prospects.

Both appeals are dismissed, and the parties are left to bear their own costs.

Facts:

15 persons were tried for the murder of Babusingh on the night of 13/14th September 1992.

Trial court acquitted 8 persons and convicted 7, including Gajrajsingh, Bhagwansingh, and Peer Singh.

The main issue is the presence of the three appellants at the crime scene.

Issues:

Lack of evidence against the three appellants.

Discrepancies in witness statements, especially by PW-5.

Held:

The "Dehati Nalishi" recorded at the spot did not name the three appellants, creating doubt about their presence.

PW-5, a crucial witness, did not name the appellants in the initial statement under Section 161 CrPC.

Discrepancies in statements and doubts raised about the presence of the accused.

Benefit of doubt given to the accused-appellants.

Appeals allowed, and the conviction of the appellants set aside.