Facts:

The accused was prosecuted for allegedly raping the prosecutrix at knifepoint when she was 14 years old. The prosecution claimed that the accused continued to establish physical relations with her under the pretext of marriage. The lower courts had convicted the accused, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Variation in evidence regarding the age of the prosecutrix.

Casual and perfunctory examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.

Delay of 4 years in lodging the FIR raises doubts about the veracity of the allegations.

Consent given under fear of injury or misconception of fact.

Whether the accused made false promises or intentional misrepresentations.

Held :

The Court noted the variation in evidence regarding the prosecutrix's age and found it difficult to determine her exact age at the time of the incident. The trial court had relied on the prosecutrix's deposition but failed to produce positive evidence of her age. Thus, the benefit of doubt was given to the accused, leading to an acquittal. (Para 7)

The Court observed that the examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was casual and perfunctory, violating principles of natural justice. Circumstances not put to the accused cannot be used against him, and this supported the appellant's case. (Para 8 and 9)

The Court highlighted the delay of four years in filing the FIR and its proximity to the appellant's intended marriage with another girl. This raised doubts about the truthfulness of the allegations. Moreover, the prosecutrix admitted that no incident had occurred on a specific date, further weakening the prosecution's case. (Para 10)

The Court considered Section 90 IPC, which states that consent given under fear of injury or misconception of fact is not valid. However, the misconception should be in proximity to the occurrence, which was not the case here. The Court concluded that the consent of the prosecutrix was a conscious and deliberate choice made over a long period of time, and thus, the accused's conviction could not be sustained. (Paras 13 and 14)

The Court found no evidence to support the claim that the accused made false promises or intentional misrepresentations to establish physical relations with the prosecutrix. Instead, it appeared that the prosecutrix was aware of the societal obstacles in their relationship, and the consent was a result of her deep-seated love for the accused. (Paras 18 and 20)

Considering the acquittal of the accused on other charges and the absence of medical evidence for certain convictions, the Court held that the appellant's conviction was unsustainable and acquitted him. (Para 19 and 21)

Facts:

The prosecution charged the accused with multiple offenses, including murder, robbery, causing disappearance of evidence, and cheating. The trial court acquitted the accused due to contradictions in the prosecution's case. The High Court reversed the acquittal, considering the contradictions minor, and this decision was appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's acquittal order?

Whether non-compliance with certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) could impact the case when recovery of evidence is seriously doubted?

The significance of motive in cases based on circumstantial evidence.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that interference with an acquittal order should occur only in exceptional cases where there are compelling reasons, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse. [Para 5.2.1]

An order would be considered perverse if it is based on no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence that no reasonable person would act upon. [Para 5.2.3]

The findings recorded by the trial court were not perverse and were based on the appreciation of the entire evidence on record. [Para 10]

In cases involving circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must form a complete chain leading to the conclusion that the accused committed the crime and no one else. [Para 5.4]

The contradictions considered by the trial court were not minor and were material to the case. The High Court erred in reversing the trial court's findings solely on this basis. [Para 6.1]

Non-compliance with certain provisions of the CrPC may not be a ground for acquittal, but in cases where recovery of evidence is seriously doubted, non-compliance can play an important role. [Para 7]

The recovery of evidence, including the mobile phone and other items, raised serious doubts due to the lack of proper verification and procedure followed by the investigating officer. [Para 8]

Motive can be a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence, but the absence of motive cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution's case. However, it can weigh in favor of the accused. [Para 9]

In light of the above findings, the trial court was justified in recording the acquittal, and the High Court's decision to reverse it was not justified. [Para 10]

Facts:

The first respondent, a driver, was driving the vehicle belonging to the appellant-owner for nearly three years without renewing his driving license. During this period, the driver got into an accident while driving a truck and suffered 20% permanent disability. He sought compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

Issues:

The primary issue before the Court was whether the appellant-owner should be held liable for the accident and the driver's consequent disability due to the non-validity of the driver's license.

Held:

The Court, in this case, concurred with the views taken by the Delhi High Court in Tata AIG General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Akansha & Ors., the Allahabad High Court in The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Manoj Kumar & Ors., and the Himachal Pradesh High Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hem Raj & Ors., which culminated in the elucidation of the correct legal principle in the Hem Raj judgment.

The Court observed that the vehicle owner must verify the driving license of the employee and ensure that it is renewed within time. The appellant, in this case, permitted the driver to drive the truck with an expired license for almost three years, demonstrating a lack of reasonable care in verifying the license's validity. Thus, the Court held the appellant responsible and liable for the accident and the driver's suffering.

The Court further emphasized that the owner cannot wash his hands off the responsibility of not checking whether the driver has renewed the license. The lack of care by the driver in not renewing the license was also present, but the appellant-owner's lack of care would also arise. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the judgment of the Delhi High Court, holding the appellant-owner liable for the accident and the driver's disability due to the driver's non-valid driving license.

Facts:

The appellant and the second respondent got married in India in 2012 and later moved to the US in April 2015. They had a son who was born in December 2016. In March 2019, the second respondent came to India with the child and decided to stay back. The appellant was granted legal and temporary custody of the minor child by the Superior Court of New Jersey in May 2019. Subsequently, the appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus before the High Court of Karnataka in August 2019, seeking the child's return to the US.

Issues:

Whether the arrangement envisaged by the High Court, allowing the child to return to the US, was in the interest of the welfare of the child.

Whether the conditions imposed by the High Court for the child's return were appropriate.

Held:

The Court considered the sequence of events and found that the appellant acted promptly to secure custody of the child. Given that the child was born in the US, was a US citizen by birth, and the appellant had shown commitment to shared parenting, the court determined that the child's welfare would be best served by accompanying the appellant to the US. (Para 9, 13)

The court exercised parens patriae jurisdiction to determine the child's welfare and concluded that allowing the child to return to the US with the appellant was in the child's best interest. (Para 16)

The conditions imposed by the High Court for the child's return, namely obtaining certificates certifying India's Covid-19 safety and congeniality for the child's residence in New Jersey, were set aside. The appellant's undertaking to comply with prevailing regulations for international travel was recorded. (Para 17, 19, 20)

Facts:

On 16 February 2019, the Union Government issued Notification 5/2019 under Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act, imposing enhanced customs duty on goods imported from Pakistan. The notification was published through e-gazette at 20:46:58 hours. Importers had already presented their bills of entry and completed the self-assessment process before the notification was uploaded. The question was whether the notification was applicable retrospectively and if the importers were liable to pay duty based on the enhanced rate.

Issues:

Whether Notification 5/2019 could be enforced with retrospective effect.

Whether importers were liable to pay duty based on the enhanced rate under the notification.

Held:

The court interprets the statute based on its provisions, purpose, and scheme. In this case, the court is interpreting a fiscal levy under the Customs Act and its relationship with the Customs Tariff Act. (PARA 34)

The court acknowledges the shift from analog to digital gazette publication and the importance of the precise time of e-gazette publication. The notification under Section 8A cannot operate retrospectively unless authorized by statute. The revised rate of import duty under Notification 5/2019 applies to bills of entry presented after its publication on the e-Gazette at 20:46:58 hours on 16 February 2019. (PARA 35)

A notification under Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act is akin to delegated legislative power. It must come into operation with reference to the point of time when it was published on the e-gazette. (PARA 39)

Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act does not provide power for increasing duty with retrospective effect, and the notification must be treated as having come into force at the time of e-gazette publication. (PARA 58)

The power under Section 8A does not have retrospective effect as it is not accompanied by statutory entrustment of authority to exercise it retrospectively. (PARA 62)

Section 5(3) of the General Clauses Act, which makes a Central Act effective from the day preceding its commencement, does not apply to notifications, which are forms of delegated legislation. (PARA 68)

Once the notification is found to take effect from its publication, bills of entry presented before the publication will be subject to the rate of duty that prevailed at the time of deemed presentation. (PARA 78)

The power under Section 17(4) of the Customs Act cannot be used to alter the rate of duty at the time of self-assessment following deemed presentation of bills of entry. Para 80

Facts:

The respondent no. 1 had constructed a flyover on a National Highway. After a year of use, it was found to be in a distressed condition with several cracks. The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways appointed the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) as an expert agency, which opined that the bridge could be repaired using a carbon fibre composite treatment. On the other hand, Dr. E. Sreedharan recommended the strengthening and replacement of RCC girders with PSC girders, necessitating demolition and reconstruction, with a guaranteed service life of 100 years. In light of this divergent opinion, the State government constituted a High Level Committee to consider the matter. The Committee accepted Dr. Sreedharan's proposal due to the assured 100-year guarantee. The State Government accepted the Committee's report.

Issues:

Whether the High Court correctly conducted a judicial review of the State Government's decision and whether the decision was arbitrary or violative of Article 14.

Held:

The High Court, instead of applying established parameters of judicial review and ascertaining whether the State Government's decision would vitiate Article 14, delved into the matter itself and directed a load test to be conducted. The Court held that the State Government's acceptance of the Expert Committee's report could not be deemed arbitrary. As a result, the order of the High Court was set aside.

Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, affirming the validity of the State Government's decision to accept the Expert Committee's report.

Facts:

The Supreme Court, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, directed each State/Union Territory to form a High Powered Committee (HPC) to decide which class of prisoners could be released on parole or interim bail to reduce overcrowding in prisons. The HPC in Maharashtra categorized prisoners into three groups based on the nature of their offenses and the length of their sentences.

Issues:

The petitioners alleged discrimination in the categorization made by the HPC.

Held:

The HPC's categorization based on the nature of the crime and length of punishment is reasonable and not arbitrary (para 11).

The grant of interim bail is an additional benefit provided to prisoners due to the pandemic, and it does not create new legal rights for them (para 12).

The exclusion of certain categories from receiving interim bail is justified as the intention is to prevent the release of those charged with serious offenses affecting society (para 12).

If any modifications to the categories are necessary to achieve prison decongestion, the HPC has the authority to consider and apply such changes (para 14).

Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the categorization made by the HPC and the High Court's decision to support it.

Facts:

The National Law School of India University, Bengaluru (NLSIU) was required to obtain a recommendation from the Academic Council before conducting the National Law Aptitude Test (NLAT) for admission to its five-year integrated B.A.LL.B (Hons.) Programme for the academic year 2020-21. However, NLSIU issued an admission notification for NLAT on September 3, 2020, without such a recommendation. This resulted in a delay in the conduct of the Common Law Admission Test (CLAT), which was eventually scheduled for September 28, 2020. The petitioners challenged the validity of the NLAT notification.

Issues:

Whether the petitioners have the locus to file the writ petition?

Whether NLSIU was required to obtain a recommendation from the Academic Council before issuing the NLAT notification?

Whether NLSIU, as a member of the Consortium of National Law Universities, was bound by its Bye-Laws and should have conducted admission through CLAT 2020?

Whether the online home-proctored examination proposed by NLSIU lacked transparency and violated the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution?

Whether the NLAT conducted on 12.09.2020 with a re-test on 14.09.2020 was marred by malpractices and should be set aside?

Held :

The petitioners have the locus to file the writ petition as they represent students aggrieved by the NLAT notification.

NLSIU was required to obtain a recommendation from the Academic Council before conducting NLAT. The admission notification dated 03.09.2020 issued without such recommendation is not in accordance with the National Law School of India Act, 1986.

NLSIU, as a member of the Consortium, was bound by its Bye-Laws, which required admissions to be conducted through CLAT. The obligation under the Bye-Laws is binding on the members, and NLSIU should not have proceeded with a separate admission test (NLAT).

The online home-proctored examination proposed by NLSIU lacked transparency and violated the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. A large number of students were denied the opportunity to appear in the test due to short notice and technical requirements.

The court did not express any opinion on the issue of malpractices in the NLAT conducted on 12.09.2020 and 14.09.2020, as it is a matter of scrutiny of facts and evidence.

Facts:

The appellants in this case filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal against the NCLT's order after a delay of more than 45 days. The Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal along with the application for condonation of delay. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court seeking to revive the appeal.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the appeal could be condoned by the Appellate Tribunal beyond the prescribed 45-day period under Section 421(3) Proviso of the Companies Act, 1956?

Whether the order of the Supreme Court extending the limitation due to Covid-19 pandemic can be applied to condone the delay beyond the prescribed 45-day period?

Held:

Section 421(3) of the Companies Act prescribes a limitation period of 45 days for filing an appeal from the date of the NCLT's order. The starting date for limitation can be fixed based on the availability of a certified copy of the order. However, if the appellants chose to apply for the certified copy after a delay, they cannot rely on Section 421(3) to fix the starting date. (Para 13-14)

The appellants had 45 days from the date of receiving the certified copy to file the appeal, which expired on 02.02.2020. The Appellate Tribunal can condone the delay only up to this period, which expired even according to the appellants on 18.03.2020. The subsequent lockdown, imposed on 24.03.2020, does not alter this calculation. (Para 15-17)

The order of the Supreme Court dated 23.03.2020, which extended the limitation period due to the Covid-19 pandemic, only applies to the "period of limitation" and not the period for condonation of delay. The appellants cannot claim the benefit of this order to further condone the delay beyond the prescribed 45-day period. (Para 18-19, 25)

The expression "prescribed period" appearing in Section 4 of the Limitation Act refers to the period of limitation and not the period during which the Court or Tribunal can exercise discretion to allow proceedings. Any period beyond the prescribed limitation cannot be considered as part of the "prescribed period." (Para 20-23)

Cases Referred

Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Subash Projects and Marketing Limited, (2012) 2 SCC 624