Wakf Act – Sections 6 and 7 – Jurisdiction of Wakf Tribunal – The Supreme Court held that the Wakf Tribunal has the jurisdiction to determine whether a property is a Wakf property when this is disputed in an eviction suit. The Tribunal can adjudicate on such matters, even if the tenant disputes the Wakf nature of the property [Paras 1-24].

Wakf Property – Eviction Suit – The Court ruled that in cases where the tenancy or encroachment is contested on the grounds of the property not being Wakf, the Tribunal must first establish the property's Wakf status before proceeding with eviction orders. This ensures that disputes over property status are resolved under the Wakf Act [Paras 20-23].

Civil Court Jurisdiction – The Supreme Court emphasized that issues falling within the provisions of the Wakf Act must be decided by the Wakf Tribunal, thus barring civil court jurisdiction in such matters. The Tribunal's decisions, when based on evidence and following due process, must be respected and upheld [Paras 16-23].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Held – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision and restored the Wakf Tribunal’s order, thereby confirming the eviction from the disputed properties. The respondent was granted three months to vacate the premises, provided all arrears and dues are cleared [Paras 25].

Penal Code – Section 193 – False Evidence – The Supreme Court held that prosecution for perjury cannot be ordered merely based on inconsistent statements. There must be a definite finding that the statements are irreconcilable and one is deliberately false. The Court must also consider whether initiating an inquiry is expedient in the interest of justice, taking into account the overall factual matrix and probable consequences of such prosecution [Paras 1-17].

Representation of the People Act – Section 100(1)(c) – Improper Rejection of Nomination Papers – The Court noted that the election of the appellant from the 151 K.R. Pura Legislative Assembly constituency was held void due to improper rejection of nomination papers. However, this became infructuous as the appellant completed the term of the Assembly [Paras 3-6].

Criminal Procedure Code – Section 340 – Opportunity to Respond – The Court emphasized that before directing prosecution for perjury, the person accused must be given an opportunity to respond to the allegations. In this case, no such opportunity was provided, and the appellant was examined as a witness by the election petitioner [Paras 10-14].

Decision – Appeals Disposed Of – Held – Civil Appeal No. 4821 of 2012 is disposed of as infructuous. Civil Appeal No. 6171 of 2012 is allowed, setting aside the direction to register a complaint against the appellant for prosecution under Section 193 IPC. The appellant's statements did not constitute deliberate falsehood justifying prosecution. The Registrar General of the High Court is directed not to register a complaint against the appellant [Paras 16-19].

Criminal Procedure Code – Section 433-A – Power of Remission – The Supreme Court held that the power of remission is to be exercised by the State Government if the prisoner has undergone 14 years of actual imprisonment in cases falling within the scope of Section 433-A of the CrPC. For imprisonment less than 14 years, the power of premature release can be exercised by the Governor on the aid and advice of the State Government [Paras 1-4].

Constitution of India – Article 161 – Exercise of Power – The Court emphasized that the power under Article 161 of the Constitution can be exercised by the State Governments, not by the Governor on his own. The advice of the appropriate Government binds the Head of the State. Policies of the State Government encompass both situations under Article 161 and Sections 432, 433, and 433-A of the CrPC [Paras 11-12].

Remission Policies – Statutory and Constitutional Powers – The Court clarified that policies of remission framed by the State Government are composite policies that apply both under Article 161 of the Constitution and the relevant sections of the CrPC. The power of the Governor to commute sentences under Article 161 is independent of the restrictions under Section 433-A of the CrPC [Paras 5-10].

Decision – Appeals Disposed Of – Held – The Supreme Court set aside the directions issued by the High Court, stating that policies must be read considering the period of imprisonment undergone by a prisoner. The power of remission by the State Government applies if the prisoner has completed 14 years of actual imprisonment. For periods less than 14 years, premature release can be considered under Article 161. The State Government is directed to consider the respondent's case for premature release under the applicable policy [Paras 21-24].

Judicial Restraint – Expunction of Remarks – Appeal by a practicing lawyer seeking expunction of adverse remarks made by a High Court Judge – Supreme Court emphasizes judicial restraint and the necessity of comments for adjudication – Offending remarks found to be unnecessary and prejudicial – Remarks ordered to be expunged to prevent future harm to the appellant's professional reputation [Paras 1-18].

Opportunity to Defend – Principles of Natural Justice – Adverse remarks recorded without providing the appellant an opportunity to explain or defend himself – Violation of the principles of audi alteram partem – Remarks deemed inappropriate for not meeting required judicial standards of restraint and sobriety [Paras 16-18].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Offending remarks expunged – Court underscores the importance of restraint and necessity in judicial commentary to protect professional reputations [Paras 17-18].

Income Tax Act – Section 12AA – Registration of Trust – The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) were correct in canceling the registration of the Trust under Section 12AA on the grounds of receiving bogus donations. The Trust misused the benefits conferred by the registration, warranting cancellation [Paras 1-13].

Bogus Donations – Misuse of Trust Status – The Court found that donations received by the Trust were bogus as they were returned to the donors in cash. Such activities clearly indicated misuse of the status granted under Sections 12AA and 80G of the Act. The Trust was not entitled to retain its registration due to these fraudulent activities [Paras 11-13].

High Court's Error – The Supreme Court observed that the High Court erred in entertaining the appeal under Section 260A of the Act without adequately addressing the answers provided by the Managing Trustee. The High Court failed to evaluate whether the conclusions drawn by the CIT and the Tribunal were incorrect or invalid [Paras 12-13].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Held – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the order passed by the CIT and the Tribunal. The Trust's registration under Sections 12AA and 80G was rightfully canceled due to the misuse of its status and involvement in bogus donations. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs [Paras 13].

Judicial Service – Disciplinary Proceedings – Petition challenging the compulsory retirement of Additional District and Sessions Judge due to heavy unexplained bank transactions – Full Court's recommendation and Governor's order of compulsory retirement upheld – Supreme Court finds Full Court's view justified given the substantial transactions and lack of documentary evidence for land purchases – Petition rejected [Paras 1-15].

Disciplinary Committee – Role and Authority – Argument that findings of the Vigilance/Disciplinary Committee should bind the Full Court dismissed – Supreme Court clarifies that in absence of specific rules, Full Court has jurisdiction to take a different view from the Committee – Reference to Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi case to support the principle [Paras 10-12].

Decision: Petition rejected – Compulsory retirement order upheld – Supreme Court emphasizes the gravity of the misconduct and the standard of ethics required of judicial officers [Paras 13-15].

Service Law – Enhancement of Age of Superannuation – The Supreme Court ruled that Ayurvedic doctors covered under AYUSH are entitled to the same benefit of enhanced superannuation age of 65 years as allopathic doctors. The distinction between AYUSH doctors and allopathic doctors, with the former using indigenous systems of medicine like Ayurveda and the latter using allopathy, does not qualify as an intelligible differentia. Therefore, such classification and discrimination are inconsistent with Article 14 of the Constitution [Paras 1-24].

Retrospective Application – The Court held that the order from the AYUSH Ministry dated 24.11.2017, which extended the retirement age to 65 years, should be retrospectively applied from 31.05.2016, aligning with the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare's notification. This ensures no disparity in service conditions between the two categories of doctors [Paras 22-23].

Equitable Relief – No Work No Pay Doctrine – The principle of 'No Work No Pay' cannot be applied to the respondent doctors who have continuously served patients. Denying salary for their service under the interim orders would violate their rights under Articles 14, 21, and 23 of the Constitution. The respondents must be paid their lawful remuneration, including arrears [Paras 15-20].

Financial Implications – The Court rejected the appellants' argument that paying arrears would impose a substantial financial burden on the State. The State's financial considerations cannot justify denying salary to doctors who have legally served their patients [Paras 20].

Decision – Appeals Disposed Of – Held – The Supreme Court directed the appellants to disburse full salary arrears to the respondent doctors within eight weeks. Any delayed payment beyond the stipulated period will attract interest at the rate of 6% from the date of this order until the date of payment. The appeals are disposed of with no order on costs [Paras 24].

Penal Code – Sections 425, 427, 447 – Prevention of Damage of Public Property Act, 1984 – Section 3(1) – Criminal Procedure Code – Section 321 – Kerala assembly ruckus case – Withdrawal of Prosecution – Destruction of property not freedom of speech – Committing acts of destruction of public property cannot be equated with either the freedom of speech in the legislature or with forms of protest legitimately available to the members of the opposition – To allow the prosecution to be withdrawn in the face of these allegations in respect of which upon investigation a final report has been submitted under Section 173 of the CrPC and cognizance has been taken would amount to an interference with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons – Such an action is clearly extraneous to the vindication of the law to which all organs of the executive are bound – Hence the mere finding of the High Court that there is no absence of good faith would not result in allowing the application as a necessary consequence by ignoring the cause of public justice and the need to observe probity in public life – Members of the State Legislature have in their character as elected representatives a public trust impressed upon the discharge of their duties – Allowing the prosecution to be withdrawn would only result in a singular result which is that the elected representatives are exempt from the mandate of criminal law. This cannot be countenanced as being in aid of the broad ends of public justice – CJM was justified in declining consent for the withdrawal of the prosecution under Section 321 – Appeals dismissed [Paras 1-33].

Constitution of India – Article 194(2) – Acts of vandalism cannot be said to be manifestations of the freedom of speech and be termed as "proceedings" of the Assembly – Article 194(2) is divided into two limbs: First limb of Article 194(2) which provides the members absolute immunity with respect to anything said or any vote given in the House is a manifestation of the freedom of speech provided under Article 194(1) – Second limb of Article 194(2) gives the members immunity in respect of the publication of 'any report paper votes or proceedings' by or under the authority of the house – Legal immunity to 'anything said or any vote given' in the first limb and the 'publication of a report paper votes or proceedings' in the second limb of Article 194(2) flow from the freedom of speech that is provided under Article 194(1) – Exercise of these manifestations of the freedom of speech – as provided in Article 194(2) – has been provided with express immunity. However the only difference between the two limbs of Article 194(2) is that the first limb protects the exercise of the freedom and the second limb protects the member against the publication of the said exercise of the freedom – Legal proceedings against the exercise of the freedom can only be initiated by those aware of the exercise of freedom which would mean either those who are present in the House or those who become aware of it when the speech vote or the like is published – While the freedoms protected by both the limbs are substantively the same the second limb is clarificatory in the sense that it prevents 'any person' from initiating proceedings against the exercise of freedom of speech inside the House when they obtain knowledge of the exercise of the said freedom through a publication – Immunity provided for the exercise of the manifestations of the freedom of speech in the second limb of under Article 194(2) cannot exceed the freedom of speech provided in the first limb of Article 194(2) – Acts of destruction of public property are not privileged under the first limb of Article 194(2) – Consequently acts of vandalism cannot be said to be manifestations of the freedom of speech and be termed as “proceedings” of the Assembly – It was not the intention of the drafters of the Constitution to extend the interpretation of ‘freedom of speech’ to include criminal acts by placing them under a veil of protest – Hence the Constitution only grants the members the freedom of speech that is necessary for their active participation in meaningful deliberation without any fear of prosecution – Moreover the word ‘proceedings’ in Article 194(2) follows the words ‘any report paper votes’ – Reports papers and votes are actions that are undertaken by the members of the Assembly in their official capacity for participation and deliberation in the House – These are essential functions that a member has to perform in order to discharge her duty to the public as their elected representative – On application of the interpretative principle of noscitur a sociis the phrase ‘proceedings’ takes colour from the words surrounding it – Since the words associated with the phrase ‘proceedings’ refer to actions that are exercised by the members in their official capacity in furtherance of their official functions the meaning of the word ‘proceedings’ must also be restricted to only include such actions [Paras 34-47].

Decision – Appeals dismissed – Held – Orders of High Court and CJM affirmed – Application for withdrawal of prosecution under Section 321 CrPC rejected – Immunities under Article 194(2) do not extend to acts of vandalism or destruction of public property [Paras 48-50].

Arbitration – Arbitral Award – Patent Illegality – Judicial Intervention – Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Scope of interference limited to grounds under Section 34 – Judicial intervention on merits of award not permissible – Award can be set aside if it violates “public policy of India” or principles of natural justice – “Public policy” limited to fundamental policy of Indian law, not expanding into mere erroneous application of law – Findings based on no evidence or ignoring vital evidence can be set aside – High Court's interference with arbitral award set aside – Appeal dismissed [Paras 42-46].

Change in Law – Relief under Contract – License Agreement between PSA SICAL and Port Trust – Change in law adversely affecting rights under contract – Article 14.3 providing relief without compensation – Arbitral Tribunal’s finding on change in law justified – High Court's interference beyond permissible limits [Paras 56-58].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Held – Arbitral Tribunal's award reinstated – High Court’s order set aside – Principles of limited judicial intervention reaffirmed [Paras 60-66].