Facts:

The appellant, N. Ramamurthy, was accused in Special Criminal Case No. 12 of 2002 for multiple offenses, including conspiracy, breach of trust, cheating, forgery, and misappropriation of funds. After the trial, he was convicted, and the Trial Court awarded various sentences. The appellant appealed to the High Court seeking suspension of execution of the sentence, which was denied based on a misconception of the total years of imprisonment.

Issues:

Misconception regarding the total years of imprisonment awarded by the Trial Court.

Applicability of Section 389 of the CrPC for suspension of execution of sentence.

Held:

The High Court's approach was fundamentally incorrect as it assumed the sentences to run consecutively, resulting in an erroneous calculation of 45 years of imprisonment. The Trial Court had explicitly ordered concurrent sentences.( Para 6)

The High Court mistakenly referred to principles related to the suspension of the order of conviction, while the appellant had only sought suspension of execution of sentence. The reference to the decision in Navjot Singh Sidhu was found to be inapt.( Para 7)

Considering the fundamental errors in the High Court's approach, the applications for suspension of execution of sentence were to be reconsidered by the High Court.( Para 8)

The Court refrained from delving into other grounds presented by the appellant, emphasizing that the High Court needed to reexamine the prayer for suspension of execution of sentence with a correct understanding of the applicable legal principles.( Para 9)

No pronouncement on the merits of the applications or the pending appeal was made, leaving the matter open for the High Court's consideration.( Para 10)

Facts:

The Respondent, employed as a Messenger in the State Bank of India, was discharged from service following a criminal conviction related to an assault incident. The assault involved the stabbing of two individuals with a broken soda bottle, leading to a charge under Section 307 IPC. The trial court, while acknowledging simple injuries and lack of intent to commit murder, convicted the Respondent under Section 324 IPC.

Issues:

Whether the assault committed by the Respondent constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, warranting his discharge from service under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act.

Held:

Details the chronology of events leading to the Respondent's discharge, highlighting the rejection of his appeal and subsequent intervention by the Staff Union. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court, in a Writ Appeal, set aside the order of discharge, directing reinstatement based on the contention that the criminal court had released the Respondent on probation to enable him to continue in service.

Addresses the disagreement with the High Court's reasons for setting aside the discharge order. It emphasizes the validity of the show-cause notice, citing Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, and dismisses the High Court's assertion that the bank failed to provide reasons for the discharge.

Delves into the examination of whether Section 10(1)(b)(i) is applicable to the case. It underscores the obligation of the bank to discontinue the services of an employee convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, yet disputes the characterization of the Respondent's assault under Section 324 IPC as such.

Explores the definition of 'Moral Turpitude' and lays down the tests for judging an offense involving moral turpitude. It emphasizes the need to consider factors like the act's impact on moral conscience, the motive behind it, and the character of the perpetrator. The paragraph concludes that, considering the nature of the assault and lack of intent to cause death, the crime committed by the Respondent does not involve moral turpitude.

Summarizes the reasons for affirming the High Court's judgment and dismissing the appeal.

Facts:

The complainant, a partner in a wood processing business, filed a complaint against the appellant, a surveyor, alleging intentional insult and criminal intimidation. The appellant's survey report had recommended repudiating the insurance claim due to misrepresentation by the insured.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's actions amounted to offenses under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC. The Court needed to determine if the complaint presented a prima facie case for trial.

Held:

The Court, in accordance with the principles laid down in earlier judgments, examined the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506. It found that the mere allegation of abuse by the appellant did not satisfy the necessary elements for these offenses. Therefore, the rejection of the discharge application was held to be erroneous.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the judgments of the High Court and Chief Judicial Magistrate, and the appellant was discharged from the offenses under Sections 504 and 506.

Facts:

The appellant filed a civil suit seeking declaration of title over certain properties. The dispute focused on a specific portion of land, referred to as "the suit land," which the appellant claimed was encroached upon by the respondents. The respondents asserted adverse possession as a defense, claiming ownership over the suit land.

Issues:

Whether the respondents had perfected their title over the suit land through adverse possession.

Held:

The court emphasized the classical requirement for adverse possession, stating that mere possession, no matter how long, does not necessarily imply adverseness to the true owner's title.( Paragraph 18)

Quoting precedents, the court outlined the elements of adverse possession, emphasizing the need for hostile, open, and exclusive possession for a sustained period. The burden of proving adverse possession lies with the party making such a claim.( Paragraph 20)

The court found that the lower courts were unjustified in holding that the respondents had perfected their title through adverse possession. It highlighted several reasons, including the absence of adversity or hostility between co-owners, failure of the respondents to prove their continuous and open assertion of ownership rights, and the lack of knowledge by the appellant about the extent of encroachment until 1983.( Paragraph 22)

The court noted that the appellant filed the suit within 12 years of discovering the encroachment in 1983, making the plea of adverse possession unavailable to the respondents.( Paragraph 24)

Consequently, the court set aside the impugned judgment, decreeing the appellant's suit in its entirety against the respondents. The respondents were granted three months to vacate the encroached portion and hand over possession to the appellant.( Paragraph 26)

Facts: The petitioner was sentenced to 7 years RI for an offense under Section 395 IPC, 5 years for offenses under Section 3/25(1A) of the Arms Act, and life imprisonment for offenses under Sections 307 and 302 IPC and Section 27(3) of the Arms Act. The petitioner's representation for premature release in 2010 was rejected, and a fresh representation in 2018 yielded no response, leading to the filing of the present writ petition.

Issues:

Validity of the petitioner's representation for premature release.

Consideration of convictions and sentences under different sections of the IPC and Arms Act.

Relevance of the declaration of Section 27(3) of the Arms Act as ultra vires and unconstitutional.

Held and Decision:

The court held that the conviction and sentence under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act were not valid due to its declaration as ultra vires. However, sentences under Section 395 IPC and Section 3/25(1A) of the Arms Act, though completed concurrently, cannot be considered for premature release.

Remission or commutation for one offense does not automatically release the petitioner for other offenses. The court emphasized that the Competent Authority must consider each offense separately.

Given the invalidity of Section 27(3) of the Arms Act and completion of the sentence for Section 3/25(1A), these offenses are not considered in the premature release representation. The court directed that the representation be considered only in reference to the sentence of life imprisonment concerning offenses under Sections 302 and 307 IPC.

The petitioner, convicted on multiple counts under Sections 302 and 307 IPC, may be released prematurely if the competent authority grants remission for all seven life sentences. However, this decision rests with the competent authority.

Grant or non-grant of remission is the prerogative of the Competent Authority, and the court should not interfere with this process. The decision on premature release must consider all relevant factors, including the nature of the crime and its societal impact.

The court did not direct the immediate release of the petitioner but instructed the Competent Authority to consider the representation expeditiously, focusing on the sentence of life imprisonment for offenses under Sections 302 and 307 IPC.

The court clarified that the earlier rejection of the petitioner's request for premature release should not hinder the consideration of the fresh representation dated February 5, 2018.

The Competent Authority is directed to process the representation within four months, without the need for consultation with the Central Government.

Facts:

The appellants booked a residential apartment with the respondent developer in the "Adarsh Palm Retreat" project. The dispute arises from the booking amount, payment issues, and the subsequent cancellation of the allotment by the respondent.

Issues:

The dispute over the booking amount, the alleged reduction from 25% to 15%, the failure to execute necessary agreements, and the subsequent cancellation of the allotment by the respondent.

Held:

The court, after considering the correspondence between the parties, concludes that there was an agreement to reduce the booking amount from 25% to 15%. The court emphasizes the developer's obligation to enter into a written agreement for sale under Section 4 of the Karnataka Ownership Flats Act. It finds that the appellants' insistence on the execution of necessary documentation for loan disbursement was reasonable and consistent with statutory obligations.

Decision: The court allows the appeal and directs the appellants to pay the balance of the sale consideration, along with other charges. The developer is instructed to execute necessary agreements for title transfer. The court maintains the interim order until the completion of registration formalities.

Facts:

The High Court of Delhi disposed of writ petition No. 5734 of 2016, challenging an order dated 30.06.2016 issued by the Union of India, based on a statement made by the counsel for the Union of India. The High Court did not delve into the merits of the case but set aside the order solely on the basis of the counsel's statement.

Issues:

The disposal of the writ petition without considering its merits. The appellant challenges this disposal, claiming it was based on incorrect briefing to the counsel for the Union of India.

Held:

The Court, after considering the application made by the Union of India, allows the appeal, sets aside the impugned order, and restores Writ Petition No. 5734 of 2016 to its original number before the High Court for fresh disposal on merits. The decision is based on the grounds that the High Court did not decide the writ petition on its merits but disposed of it based on an incorrect statement made by the counsel for the Union of India.

Decision: The application by the Union of India (IA No. 163521 of 2018) is allowed, and as a consequence, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside, and the writ petition is restored for fresh disposal on merits before the High Court.

Facts:

The dispute involves a building named "Moti Building" in the city of Jalna, consisting of four houses.

Defendant No.3 sold the property to Bansilal Shivlal in 1965.

A previous civil suit in 1971 resulted in a decree in favor of defendant Nos.1 and 2, declaring them as owners of the property.

The current suit challenges the previous decree and the sale deed, alleging it was ancestral property.

Issues:

Whether the current suit was barred by limitation.

Whether the suit was a collusive attempt to avoid execution of the previous valid decree.

The validity of the sale deed and the plaintiffs' claim to the ancestral property.

The binding nature of the previous decree on the current plaintiffs.

Held:

The findings of all three courts, including the Trial Court, first Appellate Court, and the High Court, were concurrent and deemed binding.

The suit was considered collusive, filed at the behest of defendant No.3 to avoid execution of the valid 1975 decree.

The sale of the property by defendant No.3 was found to be for legal necessity and the benefit of the family, binding on all family members, including the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs failed to prove their claim or that the sale was not for the benefit of the family.

The suit was dismissed as it was not filed for a bona fide cause but as a collusive attempt.

Facts:

The respondent, a public limited company, was allotted a commercial plot by the appellant, Delhi Development Authority (DDA). A perpetual lease deed was executed, and subsequently, a demerger scheme was approved by the Company Judge, transferring assets to another company (respondent no.2). DDA demanded payment for UEI and misuse charges, leading to a legal challenge.

Issues:

Validity of DDA's demand for UEI and misuse charges.

Whether the transfer falls under the stipulations of the Lease Deed.

Applicability of DDA's policy and instructions in the case of a demerger.

Held:

The Company Judge's order clearly stated the transfer of property, assets, rights, and powers to respondent no.2. Compliance with clause 6(a) of the Lease Deed, including obtaining prior written consent and paying UEI, is mandatory for such transfers. The High Court misinterpreted clause 2(d) of DDA's policy in declaring it inapplicable to a demerger case.

The central clause is 6(a) of the Lease Deed, emphasizing the necessity of complying with the lessor's terms. Commonality of directors/shareholders does not exempt the transferor from UEI obligations. Clause 2(d) of the policy reinforces the charge of UEI irrespective of commonality in directorship and the name continuity of the parent company.

The order of demerger establishes a case of transfer, and respondents, not falling under specified categories, are liable to pay UEI as per clause 6(a) of the Lease Deed. The High Court erred in setting aside the demand, which was valid as per the Lease Deed.

The transfer of the subject plot from respondent no.1 to respondent no.2 is evident. The involvement of the same set of directors/shareholders in both companies does not absolve respondent no.1 from the obligations outlined in clause 6(a) of the Lease Deed. The Single Judge's decision is reinstated.