Facts:

The respondent (Heem Singh) was appointed as a constable in the State police service. He was alleged to have overstayed his sanctioned leave by three days and was subsequently arrested for the offence of murder under Section 302 IPC. The prosecution claimed that there was a dispute over land between the respondent and the victim-deceased. Additionally, the respondent's father had died after being treated by the victim using witchcraft, which led the respondent to bear a grudge towards the victim. The victim's death resulted from an accident with an unknown vehicle. During the trial, several prosecution witnesses turned hostile, and the respondent was acquitted of the murder charge.

Issues:

Whether the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings differs from that of a criminal trial.

Whether the connection of the respondent to the incident would affect the reputation of the police force and justify his dismissal from service.

The scope of judicial review over disciplinary matters and when interference is permissible.

Held:

The standard of proof in a disciplinary proceeding is a preponderance of probabilities, while in a criminal case, it is proof beyond all reasonable doubt. The State had sufficient material to conclude that the respondent's connection to the incident would affect the reputation of its police force, justifying his dismissal.

In exercising judicial review over disciplinary matters, two ends of the spectrum are observed. The court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or suffer from perversity. The court must maintain a balance between deference to the disciplinary authority's findings and the authority to interfere when the findings or penalty are disproportionate to the weight of evidence or misconduct.

Decision: The direction of the Division Bench of the High Court for reinstating the respondent in service is set aside. The respondent's dismissal from service is upheld, as there was sufficient material to conclude that his connection to the incident would affect the reputation of the police force.

Facts:

The prosecution's case was based on the testimony of eyewitnesses and forensic evidence. The recovered weapons of assault were not conclusively linked to the crime, and the chemical analyst report supporting the presence of blood on the exhibits was not produced by the prosecution.

Issues:

Whether the recovered weapons of assault were adequately linked to the crime.

Whether the prosecution failed to produce the chemical analyst report supporting the presence of blood on the exhibits.

Whether vital forensic evidence (seized shirt of the co-accused) was withheld by the prosecution.

Whether the Test Identification Parade (TIP) was conducted with proper procedures.

Whether inconsistencies in the statement of PW-3 regarding the lungi found at the crime scene impacted the reliability of evidence.

Whether PW-4 could be considered a reliable eyewitness considering his poor eyesight and hearing capacity.

Whether the unnatural conduct of PW-4 affected the credibility of his testimony.

Held:

The alleged weapons of assault were not adequately linked to the crime as the chemical analyst report supporting the presence of blood on the exhibits was not available in the case records. This lack of evidence weakened the prosecution's case. The prosecution's withholding of vital forensic evidence, i.e., the seized shirt of the co-accused, led to an adverse inference against the prosecution. (Para8.1, 8.2)

The Test Identification Parade (TIP) was flawed due to the presence of police during the exercise, making the identifications unreliable and inadmissible under section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Para 10)

Inconsistencies in the conduct of the TIP, where only one lungi was shown to the related witness despite the pahchan patra mentioning three lungis, rendered the TIP unworthy of acceptance. Inconsistencies in the statement of PW-3 regarding the location of the lungi found at the crime scene and the similarity of lungis worn by many farmers in the village made it unsafe to link the appellant to the exhibit. (Para11, 12)

PW-4's reliability as an eyewitness was doubtful due to his poor eyesight and hearing capacity, and his testimony was further undermined by the fact that another witness, PW-2, who was closer to the crime scene, did not hear anything. (Para 13)

The unnatural conduct of PW-4, who knew the victim and his family but remained quiet about the incident, led to the dismissal of his testimony. (Para 14)

Facts:

The petitioner filed an execution application before the NGT based on its earlier order. However, the District Collector, Thiruvananthapuram, had already passed an order in compliance with the NGT's order. As a result, the execution application filed before the NGT became infructuous.

Issues:

Whether the execution application filed before the NGT is maintainable, given the Collector's order?

Can the petitioner challenge the Collector's order dated 30.04.2019?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the execution application before the NGT has become infructuous since the District Collector has already passed an order in response to the NGT's order dated 19.12.2018. However, the petitioner is not barred from challenging the Collector's order dated 30.04.2019 in accordance with the law. The court allows the petitioner to file such a challenge within a period of 8 weeks from the date of this judgment, and the challenge will not be dismissed solely on the ground of delay.

Referred Case:

M.K. Balakrishnan vs. Union of India (2017) 7 SCC 810

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the extension of a mining lease for the obstructed period due to judicial interdicts. The appellants sought an extension of the lease term, but the respondents argued that the obstructed period did not entitle the lease-holders to such an extension.

Issues:

Whether an obstructed period caused by judicial interdicts allows for the extension of a mining lease?

Whether Rule 68 of the Uttar Pradesh Mining Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 permits the extension of a lease in such cases?

Whether the New Mining Policy of the State includes provisions for the grant of extension during the obstructed period?

What are the consequences of the disruption of mining operations in a lease area under Rule 40(h)?

Held:

The right to extension of a mining lease flows either from a statutory provision or the terms of the lease agreement. An obstructed period due to judicial interdicts alone does not grant a window for lease extension when the lease agreement does not provide for such consequences. (Para 36)

Rule 68 of the Uttar Pradesh Mining Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 is a relaxation rule in special cases and must be read in conjunction with the Rules governing mineral exploitation. The legislative intent behind Rule 68 is to provide a restricted window for lease extension, and this intent should not be defeated by alternative interpretations. (Para 35)

The New Mining Policy of the State, issued on 12.6.2017, does not include provisions for lease extension during obstructed periods. Any extension granted would violate the policy and cannot relate back to the date of the lease. (Para 39)

Rule 40(h) of the Mining Rules provides for the consequences of disruption of mining operations due to special circumstances. The statute requires the DM, with the prior approval of the State Government, to adjust the amount equivalent to the installments payable during the disrupted period against forthcoming installments. The State is liable to refund any security deposit or advance royalties paid during the obstructed period. (Para 40)

Decision: The appropriate course of action is not to extend the lease for the obstructed period but to refund the security deposit and advance royalties paid by the lease-holders, along with simple interest at 9% per annum. The interest will be calculated from the date of the obstruction until the date of payment. (Para 42-44)

Facts:

Mrs. Ritika Sharan and Mr. Sujoy Ghosh, a married couple, have been living apart since 2016, with divorce proceedings pending before the Family Court, Bengaluru. Their minor child has been residing with Mrs. Ritika Sharan in Bengaluru under the care of maternal grandparents. The Family Court restrained Mrs. Ritika Sharan from taking the child out of Bengaluru and granted visitation rights to Mr. Sujoy Ghosh.

Issues:

Whether the custody of the child should remain with the maternal grandparents or be transferred to the mother, Mrs. Ritika Sharan, who is working in Singapore?

Whether the child's expressed desire to reside with the mother should be considered while determining custody?

Whether the court can use its jurisdiction under Art.142 of the Constitution to modify arrangements in the best interests of the child?

Held:

Ever since the couple started living apart in 2016, the child has been in the care and custody of the mother, Mrs. Ritika Sharan. The fact that the maternal grandparents have moved to Bengaluru to help Mrs. Ritika Sharan does not transfer the child's custody to them.

The paramount consideration is the welfare of the child. Mr. Sujoy Ghosh's insistence on the continued presence of the child under the care of the maternal grandparents, who have moved to Bengaluru, is not fair. There is insufficient material to indicate that Mr. Sujoy Ghosh can look after the child on his own.

During a video conferencing interaction, the child expressed his desire to reside with his mother in Singapore. The child is attached to the father, but his preference is clear.

In matters concerning the welfare of the child, Article 142 of the Constitution is a facilitative constitutional instrument to advance substantive justice. The court has the power to modify arrangements in the child's best interests.

Technicalities regarding the challenge to the Family Court's order cannot overshadow the core issue – the welfare of the child. Delaying the decision could lead to the child staying in Bengaluru with the grandparents while the mother is in Singapore, causing the child to lose a year of education.

The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. Mrs. Ritika Sharan is permitted to take the child with her to Singapore, where she is employed and resides. Directions are issued to facilitate visitation rights for Mr. Sujoy Ghosh, which will supersede all previous orders.

Facts:

The petitioners sought fair investigation in a case of gangrape and murder in Uttar Pradesh. They raised concerns about the legality of the victim's cremation. The State Government entrusted the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on 10.10.2020, and the CBI began its investigation on 11.10.2020.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court should monitor the investigation or leave it to the High Court's jurisdiction.

Protection of the victim's family and witnesses.

Appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor.

Whether the trial of the case should be transferred to Delhi from Uttar Pradesh.

Violation of Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code.

Held:

The investigation was entrusted to the CBI by the State, thereby addressing the petitioners' apprehensions about proper investigation by the Uttar Pradesh Police. The grievance stands redressed. The High Court of Allahabad has adequately delved into the aspects of the case related to fair investigation, securing the presence of the victim's family members, and other appropriate orders. The Supreme Court will not monitor the proceedings but leaves it to the High Court's jurisdiction. The petitioners may seek to intervene in the High Court's proceedings if necessary. (Para 10)

All aspects of the matter, including the CBI investigation and alleged illegal cremation, are left open to be considered by the High Court in PIL(C) No.16150/2020. The CBI shall report to the High Court as directed by it. (Paras 13 and 14)

The security provided by the State Government to the victim's family and witnesses is deemed sufficient. However, to allay apprehensions, the Supreme Court directs that the security shall be provided by the CRPF. (Paras 11 and 12)

The issue of appointing a Special Public Prosecutor shall be considered by the High Court in light of the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. (Para 13)

The transfer of the case to Delhi is not necessary at this stage since the CBI is conducting the investigation. However, the question of transferring the trial remains open for consideration if needed in the future. (Para 15)

The High Court is requested to delete the names and relationship of the victim's family members from the order and digital records to comply with the law. (Para 16)

Facts:

The appellant had applied for default bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC after the completion of 180 days from the remand date. The trial court granted bail to the accused. However, the High Court set aside the bail order, stating that since an additional complaint was filed before the disposal of the bail application, bail could not have been granted.

Issues:

Whether an accused has the right to default bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC upon the expiry of 180 days from the remand date.

Whether the subsequent filing of an additional complaint can defeat the enforcement of the accused's right to default bail.

Held:

The Court held that Section 167(2) of the CrPC was enacted with the objectives of ensuring fair trial, expedited investigation and trial, and reasonable procedure before depriving any person of his personal liberty, which is intrinsically linked to Article 21 of the Constitution. The accused, upon applying for bail under Section 167(2) r/w Section 36A (4) of the NDPS Act, after the expiry of 180 days or the extended period, is entitled to be released on bail forthwith.

The prosecution cannot defeat the enforcement of the accused's right to bail by subsequently filing a final report, additional complaint, or report seeking an extension of time. The accused's right to be released on bail arises the moment he files the bail application and offers to abide by the bail order's terms and conditions.

In cases where there is any ambiguity in the interpretation of a penal statute, the Court must favor an interpretation that protects the rights of the accused, given the power disparity between the individual accused and the State machinery.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal and granted bail to the accused, considering that he had applied for default bail within the stipulated period.

Facts:

The appellant was acquitted under Section 20, NDPS Act based on the finding that the case was not one of 'chance recovery.'

Trial Court relied on certain averments made in a written reply submitted by the prosecution in opposition to the appellant's bail application.

The prosecution was not given an opportunity to controvert the reply document, and no confrontation was made with Prosecution Witness 5 (PW5).

The statement of PW1, the sole independent witness (declared hostile by the prosecution), corroborates the seizure of contraband substance (charas) from the appellant's possession.

Issues:

Whether the acquittal based on the reply document without giving an opportunity to the prosecution and without confronting PW5 was valid?

Whether the lack of independent witnesses affects the prosecution case?

Whether the sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 50,000 awarded by the High Court is appropriate?

Held:

The appellate court has the power to re-consider questions of both law and fact and re-appreciate the evidence on record in appeals against judgments of conviction or acquittal. However, self-restraint is exercised to consider the presumption of innocence and the interests of justice. [Para 11]

2.1 The appellant's acquittal was primarily based on the finding that it was not a 'chance recovery.' The trial court relied on a written reply submitted by the prosecution in opposition to the appellant's bail application. Court records cannot be presumed to be veracious, and the prosecution must be confronted with such documents during cross-examination. [Paras 15, 16]

2.2 Since the prosecution was not given an opportunity to controvert the reply document, and irrelevant material was impermissibly relied upon by the trial court, the High Court was justified in reversing the findings and interfering with the acquittal. [Paras 17, 18]

Lack of independent witnesses does not necessarily weaken the prosecution case, but it demands a greater degree of care in scrutinizing police officers' testimonies. The observations of the trial court that the testimonies of PW2 and PW5 (police witnesses) were contradictory and lacked independent witness support were unsubstantiated by the evidence. PW1's statement corroborated the seizure of contraband substance from the appellant. [Paras 19-21]

Considering the appellant's age, circumstances, and the delay in trial and appeal, the High Court's sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 50,000 is upheld. However, the law mandates a minimum mandatory sentence of ten years for possession of 'commercial quantity' of cannabis. As clarified in Hira Singh v. Union of India, the total quantity of the mixture, including the neutral substance, is relevant for sentencing. In this case, the total quantity exceeded the 'commercial quantity,' making the sentence too charitable. [Paras 23-25]

Decision: The appeals are dismissed, and the sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 50,000 awarded by the High Court is upheld.

Facts:

The U.P. State Warehousing Corporation issued an e-tender for handling and transport of foodgrains and fertilizers. The tender was canceled multiple times due to complaints of financial irregularities.

Respondent No.1, Sudhir Kumar Singh, was declared the successful bidder for one of the centers, and an agreement was entered into between him and the Corporation.

Sudhir Kumar Singh filed a writ petition challenging the tender's cancellation, and the High Court allowed his petition, setting aside the cancellation and certain disciplinary actions recommended against the Corporation's officers.

The State of U.P. appealed against this judgment.

Issues:

Whether the principles of natural justice, particularly audi alteram partem, were violated during the cancellation of the tender.

Whether the breach of natural justice can lead to a conclusion of arbitrary state action under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The prayer in the writ petition was confined to the cancellation of the tender, but the High Court went beyond that and set aside the Managing Director's report and the Special Secretary's order, which recommended disciplinary action and recovery of financial loss from the responsible parties. The impugned judgment is set aside to that extent. (Para 18)

Whenever a plea of breach of natural justice is made against the State, the said plea, if found sustainable, sounds in constitutional law as arbitrary State action, which attracts the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (Para 23)

Non-observance of natural justice was earlier considered to be prejudice in itself, but the Court clarified that the existence of prejudice must be determined by the Court or Tribunal and not the authority that denies natural justice. (Para 28)

Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to remedy injustice. Breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot lead to a conclusion of prejudice by itself. Prejudice must be a matter of fact or a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice. (Para 39)

In the present case, respondent No.1 was completely in the dark regarding the cancellation of the tender, and prejudice was caused to him. The impugned judgment is upheld on this ground. (Para 40)

The appeals arising out of SLP (C) 5136 of 2020 and SLP (C) 7351 of 2020 are partially allowed. The earnest money deposit and security deposit made by respondent No.1 are ordered to be returned within eight weeks. (Para 42)

The State Corporation may also pay any amount that remained unpaid for work actually done by respondent No.1, subject to a hearing and reasons to be stated. (Para 43)