Facts:

The appellant, a Manager in Bank of Baroda, was accused of criminal breach of trust, cheating, forgery, and conspiracy. The charges were related to the alleged opening of a fictitious savings bank account and misappropriation of funds.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, being a manager of a nationalized bank, can claim the benefit of Section 197 Cr.P.C.?

Was the sanction for prosecution under Section 197 Cr.P.C. applicable to the appellant?

Held:

The appellant, not being removable from his office with the sanction of the Government, cannot claim the protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C.

The court upheld the rejection of the appellant's application for discharge on the grounds of lack of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. The court also deleted certain observations regarding forgery made by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, emphasizing that such conclusive opinions should be avoided at the pre-trial stage.

Decision: The appeal was partly allowed to the extent of deleting specific observations regarding forgery made by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. The court upheld the order of the High Court and the order of the CMM rejecting the appellant's application under Section 197 Cr.P.C.

Facts:

The case involves the transfer of granted lands in violation of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978. The grant included a condition of non-alienation for a duration of 15 years. The appellants acquired the land from the beneficiaries after the expiration of the 15-year period. The Assistant Commissioner nullified the sale deeds, a decision subsequently upheld by the Deputy Commissioner and the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the granted land's transfer, executed by the beneficiaries without prior permission, is illegal under the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Act, even after the lapse of the 15-year period.

Held:

Full Disclosure: The lower courts based their decisions on the absence of actual permission granted by the competent authority, with documents submitted by the appellants found to be forged. However, criminal proceedings are pending on this matter. The lack of full disclosure does not warrant non-suiting the appellant.

Shifting Plea: The appellant consistently argued for prior permission throughout the proceedings. Shifting to a new plea, asserting that no permission is required, is not permissible at this stage. The court emphasizes that such a plea cannot be entertained, especially without proper pleadings.

Legislative Intent: The Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969, and the Act were enacted to protect the interests of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from exploitation. The objective is to prevent misuse, and therefore, permission for transfer is mandated, irrespective of the time elapsed.

Rule 9 Conditions: Rule 9 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969, outlines more rigorous conditions for transfers within the window of 5 to 15 years. The Deputy Commissioner's satisfaction is a prerequisite, including a credit to the government of 50% of the land's market value.

Post 15 Years Permission: Even after 15 years, the competent authority may consider granting permission, ensuring the interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Section 4(2) of the Act is explicit in requiring permission for any transfer, and the court upholds this interpretation.

Absolute Ban on Transfer: Section 4 of the Act, dealing with the prohibition of transfer, is absolute in its terms. It overrides any agreement, contract, or law. The court highlights the clarity of Section 4(2), mandating permission for transfer even after the lapse of 15 years.

Court's Validation: The lower courts and the competent authority acted within their jurisdiction to nullify transactions contrary to Section 4(2) of the Act. The court acknowledges the validity of their actions, given the statutory provisions and the dubious manner of execution.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal to the Supreme Court arising from a dismissal of an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellants sought to quash the complaint and criminal proceedings related to offenses under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC, and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Issues:

Differentiation between two sets of allegations in the complaint.

Validity of summoning orders for specific offenses against the appellants.

Timing and motive behind the filing of the complaint, especially in relation to divorce proceedings.

Held:

In taking cognizance of an offense, a Magistrate is not required to pass a detailed order. However, when a Magistrate issues process against a person not charged with the offense for which summoned, the summoning order can be challenged.

Two sets of allegations were present: one for offenses under Sections 323, 504, and 506 IPC and another for offenses under Sections 498A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The appellants not implicated in the first set of allegations could not be summoned for those offenses .

Specific allegations supported by evidence justified summoning the appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 595 of 2019 under Sections 323, 504, and 506 IPC. The court refrained from pronouncing on the veracity of the incident at this stage.

Criminal prosecution can proceed only when a prima facie offense is disclosed. The judicial process should not be a tool for oppression or harassment. The High Court has the authority to quash proceedings if they meet the parameters set by the Supreme Court .

Complaint under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act filed by the father of the victim during divorce proceedings indicated a motive to harass the accused. The High Court erred in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings.

The divorce decree does not negate examination of criminal offenses committed within the jurisdiction despite divorce being granted. The complaint under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act was considered retaliatory to the divorce petition.

The High Court's impugned judgment lacked a reference to the allegations, necessitating a detailed factual analysis before applying legal principles. Failure to do so constituted an error.

Facts:

Appellant joined Syndicate Bank in 1979 as a Law Officer.

Went on deputation to Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad, and Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad.

Applied for the post of Presiding Officer at Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow, during the deputation.

Received appointment letter but faced delays and lack of response from Syndicate Bank.

Respondent Bank sought retirement, alleging unauthorized absence due to failure to join immediately after deputation.

Appellant's resignation accepted by the Bank, but pension benefits denied.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's failure to immediately join the bank after deputation constitutes unauthorized absence.

Validity of denying pensionary benefits based on the interpretation of Pension Regulations.

Held:

The court found the Bank's stance unjustified and unsustainable, considering the technicality of the appellant's immediate return after deputation.

Emphasized that there was no interruption in service, and the appellant had obtained a 'No Objection Certificate' for the new position.

Criticized the Bank for an unjustified ego issue and laxity in responding to the appellant's request for permission to take over the new post.

Quashed the impugned orders and allowed the Writ Petition, directing the Bank to remit the appellant's dues with interest within two months.

Imposed costs of Rs.25,000 on the respondent No.1 Bank.

Final Result : Allowed

Facts:

The appellant, Kalabai, threw a burning stove on the deceased during a quarrel between the deceased and her husband.

The incident resulted in serious burn injuries to the deceased, leading to her death.

Issues:

The offense committed by the appellant—whether it constituted murder under Section 302 IPC or a lesser offense under Section 304 Part II IPC.

Held:

The appellant argued for a reduction in the offense based on a precedent, Hari Shanker vs. State of Rajasthan (1998) 8 SCC 355, where a similar act was downgraded from murder to Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Court considered the dying declaration of the deceased, stating that the appellant threw a burning stove on her during a quarrel.

The Court noted the absence of evidence indicating any intention or motive to kill on the part of the appellant.

Relying on the precedent, the Court concluded that the facts and circumstances warranted reducing the offense from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Court partially allowed the appeal, altering the appellant's conviction and reducing the sentence from life imprisonment to rigorous imprisonment for five years.

Facts:

The case involves a jute mill, its closure, and subsequent proceedings under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The appellant, a trade union, issued a demand notice under Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code on behalf of approximately 3000 workers for outstanding dues. The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) dismissed the petition, stating that a trade union does not qualify as an operational creditor.

Issues:

Whether a trade union falls within the definition of "person" under Section 3(23) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Whether a trade union can be considered an operational creditor for claims related to employment.

Held:

The Court interprets Section 5(20) and 5(21) of the Code, defining operational creditor and operational debt. Rule 6 and Form 5 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016, recognize the possibility of joint applications by workmen. The Court concludes that a trade union, established under the Trade Unions Act, qualifies as a "person" under Section 3(23) and can be an operational creditor for employment-related claims.( Para 4)

Examining the Trade Unions Act, the Court notes that a trade union is established under a statute and can sue and be sued as a body corporate. The general funds of a registered trade union can be spent on the conduct of trade disputes, including claims for wages and other dues.( Para 6)

Citing the Bombay High Court's judgment in Sanjay Sadanand Varrier, the Court emphasizes that a registered trade union can prosecute or defend legal proceedings for the rights of its members. This principle is applicable to petitions filed under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.( Para 8)

The Court, emphasizing the importance of justice and procedural flexibility, rejects the argument that individual petitions by workmen would be less burdensome. It asserts that a registered trade union can represent its members collectively and files a joint petition under Rule 6 and Form 5.( Para 10)

The NCLAT's refusal to consider whether a trade union falls under the definition of "person" is deemed incorrect. The NCLAT's assertion that a trade union is not an operational creditor due to no direct services to the corporate debtor is also rejected. The Court allows the appeal, setting aside the NCLAT's judgment, and remands the matter for expedited consideration on merits.( Para 11)

Facts:

The appellants contested the probate case, arguing that the application under Section 228 was barred by the law of limitation. The deceased executed a will in 1990, and after her demise in 2001, the respondent obtained a probate from a court in England. The appellants claimed that the respondent's application for letters of administration in India, filed in 2001, exceeded the three-year limitation period stipulated in Article 137 of the Limitation Act.

Issues:

Whether the application for letters of administration, made under Section 228, was subject to the limitation period under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Additionally, the court needed to determine if the right to apply accrued at the time of probate or if it remained a continuous right.

Held:

The court observed that the application for letters of administration is not an action in law but in rem, allowing the right to be exercised continuously as long as the purpose of the trust exists. Referring to the precedent set in Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur, the court rejected the argument that the application was time-barred. The judgment emphasized that the right to apply accrues when necessary, and delay, while arousing suspicion, cannot be equated with an absolute bar of limitation.

Decision: The court affirmed that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to applications for probate or letters of administration. It clarified that the right to apply for letters of administration is a continuous right, not confined by a strict limitation period, and can be exercised as long as the purpose of the trust remains.

Facts:

The incident occurred on 23-05-2007 at 07:30 PM. The appellant threw a burning chimney lamp at his daughter during a sudden quarrel about the placement of a bulb. The daughter sustained severe burn injuries and succumbed to them after seven days.

Issues:

Whether the act of the accused fell under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC, considering the sudden nature of the quarrel and the absence of premeditation.

Held:

The court observed that the occurrence was sudden, with no premeditation. Considering the circumstances, the act was brought under Exception 4 to Section 300. The conviction under Section 302 IPC was modified to Section 304 Part-II, and the life imprisonment sentence was reduced to the period already undergone by the appellant.

Decision: The appeal was partly allowed, modifying the conviction and reducing the sentence based on the circumstances surrounding the incident.

Facts:

The appellant filed a Writ Petition challenging the Notifications dated 27.06.2007 and 21.10.2015 issued under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The classification of employees, segregation of wages, inclusion of certain categories in the scheduled employment, and the validity of certain provisions in the notifications.

The appellant contested that the categorization interferes with their promotion policy and that the government lacks jurisdiction to alter the conditions of service.

Held:

The deemed categorization of employees based on experience is beyond the jurisdiction of the government as it interferes with the terms of the employment contract.

Inclusion of Security inspector/ Security officer/ Supervisor in the scheduled employment is ultra vires the provisions of the Act.

Trainees who are not paid any wages cannot be included in the notification, and fixing the training period for one year exceeds the jurisdiction of the government.

Categorization of unskilled employees as semi-skilled and semi-skilled as skilled based on experience is ultra vires.

The prohibition of segregation of wages into components in the form of allowances is impermissible.

Decision: The appeals are allowed, and certain parts of the notifications are declared invalid. However, other parts of the notifications remain in force. Employers are not entitled to recover any amounts paid under the notifications, and workmen can pursue other remedies for their grievances.