Facts:The case involves the creation of a new post of Tax Assistant in the Rajasthan Commercial Taxes Subordinate Services. The proposal was to fill 80% of the posts through direct recruitment and 20% from amongst direct promotees. Separate advertisements were issued for the recruitment of direct recruits and the filling up of the 20% quota for direct promotees. The seniority list published on 04.06.2013 showed those appointed as direct promotees in the 20% quota as senior to the direct recruits. The direct recruits challenged this seniority list.

Issues:

Whether the seniority of the direct promotees, appointed through the 20% quota, being shown senior to the direct recruits, appointed through the direct recruitment process, was justified?

Interpretation of Rule 27 [1] and its provisos in the Rajasthan Commercial Taxes Subordinate Services (General Branch) Rules, 1975.

Held:

The court interpreted Rule 27 of Rajasthan Commercial Taxes Subordinate Services (General Branch) Rules, 1975. It clarified that seniority is determined based on the date of appointment and that candidates selected earlier hold seniority over those selected later. [Para 29]

The court explained that Rule 27 mandates seniority based on the date of appointment. It applies to both direct recruits and promotes. [Para 30]

The court justified the seniority of direct promotes based on their appointment dates due to administrative delays. The impugned judgment was upheld. [Para 32]

Decision:The appeals filed by the direct recruits are dismissed.

FACTS:

The case involved a disciplinary proceeding against the respondent, Rajendra Kumar Dubey, who was a Sub-Inspector in the Railway Police. The charges against him were of gross neglect of duty, leading to theft of railway property, resulting in pecuniary loss to the Railways.

ISSUES:

Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by acting as a court of appeal and re-appreciating the evidence in the disciplinary proceedings.

Whether the High Court's decision to set aside the order of compulsory retirement and direct reinstatement with 50% backwages was justified.

HELD:

The High Court, while exercising its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, is not a court of appeal over the decision of the disciplinary authorities. Its role is not to review the evidence independently or arrive at its own findings based on the evidence. Instead, the High Court may interfere only in specific circumstances, such as when the principles of natural justice are violated, findings are based on no evidence, statutory rules are breached, or the conclusion is arbitrary and capricious.( Para 12.1)

In the present case, there were no allegations of malafides against the disciplinary authority or lack of competence in passing the order of compulsory retirement. Additionally, there was no violation of the principles of natural justice, and the findings were based on materials on record. (Para 12.2)

The High Court was not justified in reevaluating the entire evidence as a court of first appeal and substituting the order of punishment with a lesser one without sufficient reason. ( Para 12.5)

Section 11 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 imposes a duty on every superior officer and member of the force to protect and safeguard railway property and passengers. In this case, the respondent's charges of neglect of duty resulted in pecuniary loss to the Railways, and he held a position of trust and confidence as a Sub-Inspector. Thus, the High Court's decision to set aside the order of compulsory retirement and direct reinstatement with backwages to the extent of 50% was not justified. (Para 12.6)

Cases Referred

B.C.Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749

Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Boards T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108

Coal India Ltd. vs. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC 620

Coimbatore District Central Co-op Bank vs. Employees Association, (2007) 4 SCC 669

Director General RPF vs. Ch. Sai Babu, (2003) 4 SCC 331

Om Kumar vs. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386

State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557

State of Andhra Pradesh vs. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723

Union of India vs. G.Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463

Union of India vs. Manab Kumar Guha, (2011) 11 SCC 535

Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610

FACTS:

The appellant filed an Election Petition challenging the election of the respondent as the Member of Parliament from the Varanasi constituency. The High Court dismissed the petition. The appellant, who was not an elector registered in the Varanasi constituency but enrolled in Bhiwani, Mahendragarh Parliamentary Constituency, Haryana, claimed to be a duly nominated candidate. However, he was an ex-employee of the Border Security Force (BSF) and had been dismissed from service. His nomination papers were not accompanied by the required certificate stating that he had not been dismissed for corruption or disloyalty to the State.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellant can claim to have been a duly nominated candidate at the Varanasi election.

Whether the Election Petition can be maintained by a person who is not an elector or candidate in the election.

Whether the Election Petition is barred under Section 81 read with Section 86(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

HELD AND DECISION:

Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 allows an Election Petition to be presented by any elector or candidate in the election. The appellant, not being an elector in the Varanasi constituency, had to prove himself as a duly nominated candidate to have locus standi in the case. However, he failed to meet the requirements of being a duly nominated candidate as defined in Section 79(b) of the Act. (Para 7, 16, 17, 19, and 20)

The appellant's nomination papers lacked the necessary certificate stating he was not dismissed for corruption or disloyalty to the State. Consequently, he could not claim to be duly nominated. As a result, he had no cause of action to maintain the Election Petition. (Para 22, 25, and 26)

Section 83 of the Act permits only an elector or candidate to maintain an Election Petition, implicitly barring any other person from doing so. Therefore, the appellant, not being an elector or candidate, could not file the Election Petition. (Para 23)

The Election Petition is also barred under Section 81 read with Section 86(1) of the Act, which further supports the dismissal of the appeal. (Para 24)

REFERRED CASES :

Bolin Chetia vs. Jogadish Bhuyan & Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 81

Charan Lal Sahu & Anr. v. K.R. Narayanan & Anr. (1998) 1 SCC 56

Charan Lal Sahu vs. Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam & Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 609

Charan Lal Sahu vs. Giani Zail Singh & Anr, (1984) 1 SCC 390

Charan Lal Sahu vs. Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy, (1978) 2 SCC 500

Kuldeep Singh Pathania vs. Bikram Singh Jaryal, (2017) 5 SCC 345

Mithilesh Kumar Sinha v. Returning Officer for Presidential Election & Ors. (1993) Supp 4 SCC 386

T. Arivandandam v. TV. Satyapal (1977) 4 SCC 467

Facts:

The Gujarat Maritime Board awarded a ship breaking contract to Asiatic Steel Industries Ltd (respondent No. 1). The company deposited earnest money on 08.11.1994 and paid the upset premium on 22.03.1995. Subsequently, respondent No. 1 sought a refund of the contract amount with 10% interest per annum from the date of remittance. The Board agreed to the refund but without interest. The company then filed a writ petition seeking a refund with interest at the rate of 12% per annum.

Issues:

Whether respondent No. 1 is entitled to a refund with interest from the date of remittance?

Whether the conduct of the Gujarat Maritime Board was discriminatory and arbitrary in handling the refund requests?

What is the correct period for which interest should be paid on the refund amount?

Held :

The Court observed that the Board's decision to refund the amount with interest to other entities when they approached the court shows that the Board had the means to decide on the refund but chose not to respond to respondent No. 1's requests.(Para 31)

The Court criticized the Board's callous and indifferent attitude, which led to respondent No. 1 having to approach the court to seek a refund.(Para 35)

The Court held that the Board's conduct was discriminatory and that it acted unfairly by forcing the company to approach the court instead of taking a reasonable decision to refund the amount.( Para 37)

The Court found the Board's behavior unacceptable, as it showed deliberate inaction to force the company to approach the court, rather than making a decision on the refund.(Para 40)

The High Court's judgment directing interest for the entire period (from 08.11.1994 to 19.05.1998) was modified by the Supreme Court, and interest was directed to be paid only from 22.03.1995 to 19.05.1998, as the principal consideration was deposited on 24.03.1995.(Para 41)

Facts:

The case involved the issue of the Union Government's continuation of occupation of certain lands even after the lapse of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952. The Union Government refused to hand back possession of the lands even after the High Court held that the Union's claim had no merit.

Issues:

The legal effect of requisitioning immovable property under the Requisitioning Act.

The status of the right to property as a constitutional right and its protection under the Constitution of India.

The State's obligation to comply with the law and the Constitution.

The Union Government's refusal to release possession of the lands in question.

Held :

Requisitioning of immovable property results in temporary deprivation of possessory rights while leaving the title undisturbed. Expropriation or complete deprivation of title requires a separate process for acquisition. (Para 18)

Although not a fundamental right, the right to property is a valuable constitutional right ensuring guaranteed freedoms and economic liberty. Article 300-A establishes the supremacy of the rule of law. (Para 21)

The Union's occupation of the lands became unlawful upon the Act's lapse in 1987. Despite this, the Union refused to hand back possession, claiming rights over the lands. (Para 24)

The State cannot ignore or comply with the law or Constitution at its convenience. Courts must protect people's liberties and cannot condone lawlessness. (Para 26)

The Union is directed to return possession of the suit lands to appellants within three months. The appellants are allowed to seek compensation through arbitration based on fresh valuation. (Para 27)

Facts:

There were two separate cases registered under the NDPS Act:

The first case involved the recovery of contraband from the car of the appellants-accused in Hyderabad.

The second case involved the recovery of contraband from a factory in the State of Maharashtra, from where the appellant-accused were allegedly transporting the contraband.

The prosecution filed a combined complaint in the Court in the State of Maharashtra, which included both cases. The appellants-accused were granted default bail under Section 167(2) by the court in Hyderabad because the charge-sheet was not filed within 180 days.

However, after the default bail was granted, the custody of the appellants-accused was transferred to the Court in Maharashtra for the second case. The Court in Maharashtra found that the combined complaint was already filed within 180 days, and thus, the default bail should not have been granted.

Issues:

Whether the cancellation of the default bail granted to the appellants-accused was justified?

Whether the combined complaint filed in the Court in the State of Maharashtra was within the stipulated 180 days period under Section 167(2) of the CrPC?

Held :

The combined complaint included details of both the offences and demonstrated that the transportation of the narcotic substance commenced from Omerga, Maharashtra, and was intercepted at Hyderabad. Therefore, the Court in Maharashtra had the jurisdiction to inquire and try the offences. (Para 12)

Although there was a miscommunication about the filing of the combined complaint on 06.07.2018, the High Court, considering all relevant facts in the application filed under Section 439(2) CrPC, rightfully cancelled the default bail granted to the appellants on 12.07.2018. (Paras 11 and 12)

The appellants are at liberty to file a regular bail application before the Omerga Court under Section 439 CrPC, which shall be considered on its merits. (Para 13)

Facts:

The second respondent filed a winding-up petition against the first respondent, M/S Kaledonia Jute and Fibres Pvt. Ltd., on the ground of its inability to pay debts. A winding-up order was passed based on the petition. Subsequently, the first respondent sought to recall the winding-up order and paid the entire amount due to the second respondent (petitioning creditor). The second respondent had no objection to recalling the order, but the Official Liquidator opposed it, stating that the first respondent owed money to various other creditors totaling Rs. 27 Crores. The Company Court kept the winding-up in abeyance but directed the Official Liquidator to continue custody of the company's assets.

Meanwhile, the appellant (M/S Kaledonia Jute and Fibres Pvt. Ltd.), claiming to be a creditor of the first respondent, moved an application before the NCLT under Section 7 of the IBC, 2016, seeking payment of Rs. 32 lakhs. The appellant also sought the transfer of the winding-up petition to the NCLT, but the Company Court refused, stating that the requirements of the relevant rules had been complied with, and a winding-up order was already passed.

Issues:

Under what circumstances can a winding-up proceeding pending before a High Court be transferred to the NCLT?

At whose instance can such a transfer be ordered?

Held:

The Court held that if the winding-up petition has already been served on the respondent (company) as per Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, then the proceedings are not liable to be transferred. However, if the service of the winding-up petition on the respondent has not been completed, such proceedings, whether under Clause (c) of Section 433 or under Clauses (a) and (f) of Section 433, must be transferred to the NCLT. [Para 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32]

The Court held that the proceedings for winding-up of a company are proceedings in rem, where the entire body of creditors is a party. Although the proceeding may be initiated by one or more creditors, the petition is treated as a joint petition, and the official liquidator acts on behalf of all creditors. Therefore, any creditor of the company in liquidation comes within the definition of "party" in the fifth proviso to Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013. As a result, the appellant (creditor) is entitled to seek the transfer of the pending winding-up proceedings to the NCLT. [Para 41, 42, 43, 44]

The Court emphasized that parallel proceedings in different forums would defeat the purpose of the IBC. Therefore, the transfer of proceedings to the NCLT is necessary. [Para 45, 46]

Referred Case:

Forech India Ltd. vs. Edelweiss Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd., (2019) 2 SCALE 142

FACTS:

The appellant was accused of strangulating his wife in their matrimonial house. The chargesheet included the appellant's father-in-law and mother-in-law. The Trial Court relied on the evidence of PW-1 and medical evidence to convict all the accused. During the appeal in the High Court, the prosecution against the father-in-law abated due to his death, and the mother-in-law was acquitted, while the appellant (husband) was convicted.

ISSUES:

Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant.

Whether the appellant's failure to provide a plausible explanation for the cause of death raised a strong suspicion of his involvement in the crime.

HELD :

The Court acknowledged the common occurrence of witnesses turning hostile during lengthy trials. However, it emphasized the need to examine the available evidence to determine its sufficiency for conviction. [Para 20]

The court correctly appreciated the rationale behind some witnesses turning hostile to preserve close family ties. In the Indian context, relationships between two families continue after marriage, which may affect witness testimony. [Para 21]

The prosecution's case was primarily built on the testimony of PW-1 and medical evidence. While there were some inconsistencies in PW-1's statement, the court found it to be consistent and cogent, making it a credible piece of evidence. [Para 22]

The doctor opined that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation. The location of the crime and the absence of outsiders supported the prosecution's case. [Para 23-24]

As the husband, the appellant was under an obligation to provide a plausible explanation for the cause of death during his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. His failure to do so raised strong suspicion of his involvement in the crime. [Para 25]

DECISION: The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant (husband) for the murder of his wife. However, it directed the State to consider his release on completion of 14 years of actual sentence. [Para 27]

REFERRED CASES :

Amarsingh Munnasingh Suryawanshi vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 15 SCC 455

Gulam Sarbar vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand), (2014) 3 SCC 401

Namdeo vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150

Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar vs. State of Bihar & Anr., (2007) 10 SCC 433

Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681

Yanob Sheikh Alias Gagu vs. State of West Bengal, (2013) 6 SCC 428

Facts:The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) conducted an investigation into the respondent's alleged insider trading activities related to the sale of 51,000 company shares based on confidential financial information. The investigation was initiated in 2017, and the respondent was requested for information on November 28, 2019. The Whole Time Member passed an ex-parte order on June 15, 2020.

Issues:whether the SEBI's ex-parte interim order, passed by the Whole Time Member without considering the balance of convenience or irreparable injury, was justified under the given circumstances.

Held:The Tribunal was correct in its conclusion that there was no extreme urgency to pass an ex-parte interim order in this case, considering the investigation had been pending since 2017 and the required information was supplied on November 28, 2019. While the power of SEBI to pass such orders in urgent matters was affirmed, it should be exercised "only in extreme urgent matters." However, the interpretation of SEBI's powers by the Tribunal in this specific case should not be cited as a precedent in other cases.

Decision: The appeals were disposed of in accordance with the above observations.