Facts:

Respondents filed a partition suit in 2007.

Decreed ex-parte in 2008.

Appellant and others filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, dismissed in 2010.

Appeal withdrawn in 2013, followed by a fresh appeal in the same year.

Issues:

Whether time spent in proceedings to set aside the ex-parte decree constitutes "sufficient cause" to condone the delay in filing an appeal?

When an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is dismissed on merits, is a regular appeal under Section 96(2) CPC barred?

Held:

The court held that the time spent in pursuing the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is a "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay in filing the first appeal. Emphasized that the right to appeal under Section 96(2) CPC is a statutory right and should not be denied merely because the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was dismissed.

In the interest of justice, the court allowed the appeal, condoned the delay, and restored the appeal challenging the ex-parte decree. Noted that the appellant and others were not grossly negligent in pursuing their case. The court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the matter.

Facts: In a sexual harassment case, the appellants filed anticipatory bail applications along with a Vakalatnama before the Madurai High Court. The date on the Vakalatnama became a point of contention, leading to allegations of forgery.

Issues: The primary issue revolved around the date mentioned in the Vakalatnama, with the State contending that it was forged. The appellants claimed it was an inadvertent mistake.

Held:

The court emphasized that forgery, even if committed outside the court, affects the administration of justice.

However, in this case, the Vakalatnama could not be conclusively termed as forged. The appellants admitted their signatures but argued that the date was mistakenly recorded.

The court found the appellants' explanation plausible, stating that there was no evidence of intentional deception or fraudulent intent.

The court highlighted that fraud requires mens rea, and the accused must intend wrongful gain or loss to another.

The direction to lodge a criminal complaint against the appellants was deemed unjustified, as there was no prima facie evidence of an intention to cause harm.

The court concluded that the mistaken date in the Vakalatnama did not warrant criminal proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C.

Decision:

The court set aside the direction to lodge a criminal complaint against the appellants, stating that the Vakalatnama's incorrect date did not amount to fraud. The court emphasized the absence of evidence supporting the allegations and the inadvertent nature of the mistake.

Facts:

FIR registered against the respondent under the Prevention of Corruption Act in 2002.

Charge-sheet filed in 2005 without including the authorization for investigation.

The prosecution's application to bring the authorization on record dismissed in 2008 due to a delay in filing.

Subsequent attempts to bring the authorization on record, invoking different provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Issues:

Whether the dismissal of the first application on procedural grounds operates as res judicata for subsequent attempts.

The nature of the lapse in not filing the authorization along with the charge-sheet.

Held:

The Court held that the failure to file the authorization order was a procedural lapse and not a substantive violation of the law. The rejection of the first application was based on the failure to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay and not on merits. The court emphasized that substantive justice must prevail over procedural or technical justice. Therefore, the prosecution was permitted to bring the authorization for investigation on record.( Paragraphs 6, 7, 9, 11)

Facts:

The appellant challenged his conviction and sentence under Section 21(C) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

The trial court sentenced the appellant to 18 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2 lakh.

The High Court partially allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence to 16 years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 2 lakh.

Issues:

Whether the trial court could impose a sentence higher than the minimum prescribed under Section 21(c) without considering factors enumerated in Section 32B.

Whether factors other than those mentioned in Section 32B could be considered while imposing a punishment higher than the minimum term of imprisonment.

Held:

The court clarified that the discretion of the court to impose a punishment higher than the minimum term is not limited to factors mentioned in Section 32B(a to f).

The quantity of the substance with which an accused is charged is a relevant factor that can be considered while determining the quantum of punishment.

The Court can examine a punishment higher than the minimum if it relies on an irrelevant factor not enumerated in Section 32B(a to f).

In the present case, where the appellant was found in possession of a quantity much higher than the commercial quantity, the punishment higher than the minimum was upheld.

The High Court's decision to reduce the sentence from 18 years to 16 years was affirmed, but considering the appellant's role as a carrier, the sentence was further reduced to 12 years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 2 lakh.

Facts:

Appellant charged with strangulating his wife, leading to her death.

Incident occurred on the rooftop of the premises on the night of 31.08.2010 and 01.09.2010.

Prosecution's case supported by the evidence of a child witness (PW-7), who is the son of the accused and deceased.

Issues:

Reliability of the child witness (PW-7) questioned by the appellant.

Presence of the appellant at the crime scene disputed.

Challenge to the preservation of the deceased's body before postmortem.

Assertion of false implication and lack of inquiry into the child witness's background.

Held:

The High Court affirmed the conviction under Section 302 IPC, rejecting the appellant's plea under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. The Supreme Court, on reevaluation, found that the act occurred in a sudden fight without premeditation. The strangulation, while severe, did not meet the criteria of extreme cruelty. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Section 302 conviction, modifying it to Section 304 Part II, IPC, and imposing a sentence of 10 years' simple imprisonment. The appeal is partly allowed.( Para 13,14,15)

FACTS:

Uttar Pradesh created the Minority Welfare Department in 1995.

Appellants applied for the post of District Minority Welfare Officer in 1996 through deputation/transfer.

Appellants were selected and appointed in 1997 for a temporary period of two years.

UP Minority Welfare Department Gazetted Officers Service Rules 2001 came into force in 2001.

Appellants sought absorption in the Minority Welfare Department, but the State rejected the request based on the 2001 Rules.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellants, appointed before the 2001 Rules, can claim absorption under the said rules?

The applicability of the judgments in Saeed Ahmad Khan & Ors. v. State of U.P. and Chandrabhan Srivastava and Another vs. State of U.P. in the present case.

HELD:

The court observed that the appellants' appointment was not on deputation but by transfer of service, indicating selection and appointment in the Department of Minority Welfare.( Para 12)

The court cited Managing Director, UP Rajkiya Nirman Nigam v. P.K. Bhatnagar and others, emphasizing that the mere fact of spending several years on deputation does not alter the position from that of a deputationist to a regular employee.( Para 14)

The court noted that Rule 3(h) of UP Minority Welfare Department Gazetted Officers Service Rules 2001 defines 'Member of the Service' as a person substantively appointed under these rules or the rules in force prior to their commencement.( Para 15)

The court concluded that the appellants, having been appointed before the 2001 Rules, cannot be deprived of their rights of absorption in the Minority Welfare Department.( Para 16)

The court directed the absorption of the appellants as District Minority Welfare Officers in the Department of Minority Welfare and Waqf from the date of their appointment. For retired employees, the court directed compliance with pension-related matters.( Para 17)

REFERRED CASES:

Managing Director, UP Rajkiya Nirman Nigam v. P.K. Bhatnagar and others (2007) 14 SCC 498

FACTS:

Nirval Singh, the respondent, sought compassionate appointment after the death of his father who was working with the appellants.

The policy for compassionate appointment dated 21.11.2002 was in force when the application was submitted.

The respondent did not receive compassionate appointment as the implementation of the policy was kept in abeyance for the consideration of a new policy.

ISSUES:

The delay in approaching the courts for redressal after a period of 7 years.

The change in policy from the earlier one to the new one.

The options offered to the respondent under the new policy, which he declined.

HELD:

Addresses the delay in approaching the courts and the change in policy. The Court held that the delay of 7 years extinguished the objective of providing immediate amelioration to the family. The abolishment of the earlier policy and the introduction of the new one meant that the application had to be considered under the new policy. The respondent failed to avail the options offered under the new policy.( Paragraph 7 )

Concludes the decision by stating that the offer of solatium could be the only remedy available at this stage. The Court directed the payment of Rs. 5 lakhs to the respondent within two months, considering the revised policy.( Paragraph 9 )

Facts:

The Respondent applied for the allotment of a flat under the Self-Financing Housing Scheme.

The Board allotted a flat, and after various proceedings, the matter reached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court passed an order on 19.09.2012, conclusively determining the rights and obligations of the parties.

Subsequently, the Respondent initiated execution proceedings to enforce the Supreme Court's order.

Issues:

Whether a Revision Petition under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is maintainable before the National Commission against an Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings?

Held:

The nature of execution proceedings is independent and different from the nature of proceedings for adjudication of a consumer complaint.

Execution proceedings cannot be considered a continuation of the original consumer dispute.

Revision Petition is not maintainable under Section 21(b) against an Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings.

The National Commission erroneously entertained the Revision Petition, which was not maintainable.

The Delhi High Court rightly set aside the Order passed by the National Commission on the ground that a Revision Petition was not maintainable against the Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings.

Facts:

The Appellants sought permission under Order XLI Rule 27, CPC to introduce additional evidence before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The evidence, comprising two documents, came into existence after the filing of the appeal before the State Commission. The State Commission rejected the application, deeming the documents "not necessary." The matter reached the National Commission, which affirmed the State Commission's decision.

Issues:

Whether the Appellants should be allowed to introduce additional evidence at the appellate stage.

Whether the rejection by the State Commission was justified.

Held:

The court observed that under Order XLI Rule 27, CPC, a party can produce additional evidence at the appellate stage if it establishes the evidence's unavailability despite due diligence when the decree was passed. The two documents were crucial to the Appellants' case, showing their inability to obtain the Occupancy Certificate due to unauthorized structures.

The State Commission's rejection was deemed an error as it merely stated the documents were "not necessary" without a reasoned explanation. The National Commission's affirmation of this decision was set aside. The Civil Appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the State Commission to consider the additional documents and decide the appeal on its merits expeditiously.