Facts:

The case involves a winding up petition filed by ACTION ISPAT AND POWER PVT. LTD. against SHYAM METALICS AND ENERGY LTD. The issue revolves around whether the winding up proceedings can be transferred from the Company Court to the NCLT and the applicability of the Companies Act, 2013, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and relevant rules.

Issues:

• Permissibility of transferring winding up proceedings to NCLT after admission of the winding up petition.
• Interpretation of Section 434(1)(c), fifth proviso, and Section 290 of the Companies Act, 2013.
• The applicability of the Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016, and the Company (Court) Rules, 1959.

Held:

The Code (Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016) provides a beneficial result in winding up proceedings, making them compulsorily transferable to the NCLT if the petition has not been served in the pre-admission stage.

Even post-admission of a winding up petition and after the assets of the company sought to be wound up become in custodia legis and are taken over by the Company Liquidator, the Company Liquidator may continue the business for the beneficial winding up of the company.

Unless irreversible steps towards winding up have been taken, the Company Court has discretion to transfer the proceedings to the NCLT under the fifth proviso to Section 434(1)(c).

In this specific case, the Court found that no irreversible steps towards winding up have taken place, justifying the transfer of the winding up petition to the NCLT.

Facts:

 An advocate filed a writ petition before the High Court, seeking directions to the Department of AYUSH to allow homeopathic practitioners to perform in accordance with the advisory issued on 06.03.2020. The advisory suggested the use of AYUSH systems in responding to COVID-19, but the State of Kerala and the Department of AYUSH, Trivandrum, did not implement it. The High Court disposed of the writ petition, stating that the advisory was being followed by the government, and AYUSH practitioners were only allowed to prescribe immunity boosters. Any claim of curing COVID-19 by homeopathic practitioners, except those mentioned in the advisory, could lead to action under the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

Issues:

• Whether homeopathic practitioners can advertise their ability to cure COVID-19 when statutory regulations prohibit such advertisements.
• Whether the High Court's observations and directions in paragraph 14 of the judgment were appropriate.

Held :

The Homeopathic Practitioners (Professional Conduct, Etiquette, and Code of Ethics) Regulations, 1982, clearly prohibit advertisement by homeopathic practitioners. Since regulations already bar advertising, there is no basis for homeopathic medical practitioners to claim that they can cure COVID-19. The observations in paragraph 14 of the High Court's judgment were unwarranted in this context. (Para 18-19)

The writ petition before the High Court sought only limited relief, i.e., a direction to implement the advisory dated 06.03.2020 issued by the Ministry of AYUSH, and there was no occasion for the High Court to make additional observations and issue directions as it did in paragraph 14. The guidelines issued by the Ministry of AYUSH after 04.04.2020 provide specific guidance on homeopathy's approach to COVID-19, and qualified practitioners can prescribe medicines accordingly. While the High Court was correct in stating that no medical practitioner can claim to cure COVID-19, it failed to fully comprehend the advisory and guidelines issued by the Ministry of AYUSH. The Homeopathy is contemplated to be used in preventing and mitigating COVID-19, as reflected by the advisory and guidelines. (Para 20-23)

Facts:

The informant, Samir Agrawal, filed a complaint before the Competition Commission of India (CCI) alleging a violation of Section 3 of the Competition Act. The CCI dismissed the case, holding that no contravention of Section 3 was made out. The informant appealed to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), which upheld the CCI's decision. Subsequently, the informant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

• Whether the informant had the locus standi to move the CCI with the information.
• Whether the actions of Ola and Uber constituted cartelization or anti-competitive practices between drivers.

Held:

The Court held that "any person" may provide information to the CCI, and the definition of "person" under Section 2(l) of the Competition Act is inclusive and wide, encompassing individuals and artificial juridical persons. Therefore, the informant (Samir Agrawal) was competent to approach the CCI with the information. (Para 13, 14, 16, 20, 22)

The Court upheld the concurrent findings of fact by the CCI and NCLAT, stating that Ola and Uber's actions did not facilitate cartelization or anti-competitive practices between drivers. As a result, no contravention of Section 3 of the Act was established. (Para 23)

Facts:

The appellant, Smt. S. Vanitha, claimed the house owned by respondent Nos. 2 and 3, her in-laws, as her matrimonial residence after her husband (respondent No. 4) deserted her and their daughter. The authorities directed her to vacate the house, and the High Court upheld the decision, stating her right to claim shelter was only against her husband.

Issues:

• Whether the premises in question constituted a 'shared household' under Section 2(s) of the PWDV Act.
• Whether the remedies sought under the Senior Citizens Act can preclude the woman's right to a shared household under the PWDV Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the premises in question constituted a 'shared household' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the PWDV Act. The remedies sought under the Senior Citizens Act should not defeat the woman's right to a shared household under the PWDV Act. The woman is duty-bound to inform the Magistrate under the PWDV Act after obtaining relief from the Senior Citizens Act's Tribunal. The court ruled that the Senior Citizens Act's summary powers should not be used to circumvent a woman's claim of entitlement under the PWDV Act. [Para 23]

Facts:

The case involved an appeal against a decision of the High Court of Kerala in WA No. 1073 of 2020. The main issue was whether the resolutions passed by the Syndicate prescribing norms and standards for granting affiliation for additional courses were ultra vires the APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University Act, 2015.

Issues:

• Whether the power of the Syndicate to prescribe norms and standards for affiliation is derived from Section 30(2) of the APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University Act, 2015?
• Whether the absence of Statutes (till 07.08.2020) meant the power under Section 30(2) could not be exercised?
• Whether the Vice Chancellor had the power to regulate matters in the absence of Statutes, as per Section 14(6) of the Act?
• Whether the norms prescribed by the Syndicate for granting affiliation were within the scope of their authority?
• Whether the Universities could enhance norms and standards prescribed by AICTE?

Held:

The source of power for the Syndicate to prescribe norms and standards for affiliation lies in Section 30(2) of the APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University Act, 2015. The absence of University Statutes until 07.08.2020 does not render the Syndicate's power under Section 30(2) inoperative. The Syndicate can exercise its power freely when the Statutes do not prescribe conditions for affiliation. The High Court's ruling on the ultra vires nature of the Syndicate's resolutions was erroneous. (Para 28, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40)

Universities cannot dilute AICTE norms and standards, but they have the authority to prescribe enhanced norms. The AICTE's processing of applications based on self-disclosure raises concerns about infrastructural discrepancies and student compensation in case of false information provided by colleges. (Para 47, 56, 57, 58)

Facts:

Seven accused persons, one of whom died during the trial, attacked the victim-complainant. Six accused, including the three appellants, were convicted for the offense under sections 307 read with 149 and section 148 of the IPC. The High Court upheld the appellants' conviction under section 307 and reduced the sentence from seven to five years, while the other three co-accused persons were acquitted.

Issues:

• Permissibility of alteration of charges under ss.211-224 and 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
• Difference between ss.34 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
• Examination of independent witnesses and its impact on the prosecution's case.
• Sentencing and leniency in cases of violent crimes.

Held:

The Court held that the framing of charges can be altered, and Courts have the flexibility to rectify charges under Sections 211 to 224 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The controlling objective is to ensure justice is not defeated by technicalities, and Courts can weigh evidence to determine individual convictions even when group prosecution under Section 149 fails. The appellants did not suffer any adverse effect when individually held guilty for attempted murder without the aid of Section 149.

The Court discussed the difference between Sections 34 and 149 of the IPC, emphasizing that Section 34 requires active participation and a prior meeting of minds, while Section 149 assigns liability merely by membership of an unlawful assembly.

Regarding the non-examination of independent witnesses, the Court stated that adverse inference needs to be assessed based on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is unfair to expect the presence of third parties in every case, especially in violent crimes that are seldom anticipated.

The Court found no justification to show leniency and reduce the sentence. The appellants were armed with deadly weapons, brutally attacked the complainant causing severe injuries, and have not served even half of their sentence.

Facts:

The writ petitioners challenged the validity of chapter-VI of guidelines issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, restricting the number of tax audit assignments a practicing member could accept in a financial year.

Issues:

• The court was the constitutionality of the said guidelines under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Held:

The Supreme Court, recognizing the issue's public importance affecting both Chartered Accountants and citizens requiring tax audits, allowed the transfer of the writ petitions to the Supreme Court. The Court aimed to settle the law and provide clarity on the matter, and thus, the interim orders in the transferred writ petitions were allowed to continue until the Supreme Court renders a final decision.

 Facts:

A writ petition (Civil) No. 1213 of 2020 was filed, seeking the quashing of the decision to affix posters outside the residences of COVID-19 positive individuals under home isolation.

Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare on 02.07.2020 were presented in the case, but they did not contain any provisions regarding the pasting of posters outside the residences of COVID-19 positive individuals.

The Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, issued a D.O. (Demiofficial) letter dated 19.11.2020, which was relevant to the matter.

Issues:

• Whether the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare empower the authorities to paste posters outside the houses of COVID-19 patients under home isolation.

Held:

The guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare are related to the exercise of power under the Disaster Management Act, 2005. These guidelines do not include any requirement of pasting posters outside the houses of COVID-19 patients.

The Union of India has already issued a D.O. letter dated 19.11.2020 to guide the States and Union Territories, which clearly states that no State or Union Territory is required to paste posters outside the residence of COVID-19 positive persons, as of now.

The State Governments and Union Territories can resort to the exercise of affixing posters outside the residences of COVID-19 positive individuals only when any direction is issued by the competent authority under the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

Decision: The writ petition was disposed of, and the court held that the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare do not authorize the pasting of posters outside the residences of COVID-19 positive persons under home isolation, unless specifically directed by the competent authority under the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

Facts:

The appellant was initially appointed on a temporary basis as an Assistant Teacher in a school in 1985, with graduation and B.Ed degrees, falling under Category 'C' of Schedule 'F' of the Rules. Respondent no.1 was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the same school in 1985, but he possessed only a Senior Secondary Certificate and Diploma in Education at the time.

Issues:

• whether respondent no.1 could claim seniority and promotion as Head Master over the appellant, considering their qualifications and the relevant Rules.

Held:

 The Court held that the judgment in Bhawna v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. applied directly to the present case, establishing that the appellant, with B.A. and B.Ed. degrees at the time of her initial appointment, was qualified for her appointment. However, respondent no.1 was not qualified for appointment as an Assistant Teacher when initially appointed. His seniority cannot be claimed from the date of his initial appointment as he lacked the required qualifications.[ Para 20 to Para 25]

Decision: The judgment of the High Court in review was set aside, affirming the appellant's appointment as Head Master.