Banking Conduct – Misappropriation and Integrity – The Supreme Court discussed the necessity for bank employees to exhibit absolute devotion, integrity, and honesty, especially given their responsibility for handling depositors' and customers' money. The Court highlighted that failure to observe these standards impairs public confidence in the banking system. The Supreme Court overturned the High Court's decision, which had set aside the respondent's dismissal for lack of procedural fairness and non-speaking orders by the disciplinary authority. The Court found that the disciplinary and appellate authorities had indeed considered the evidence and provided reasoned orders [Paras 1-15, 20-42].

Dismissal and Procedural Fairness – The Court considered whether the disciplinary authority’s disagreement with the enquiry officer’s findings was procedurally flawed and prejudiced the respondent. It held that although procedural fairness was essential, the respondent's other proven charges justified the dismissal. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court had erred in setting aside the dismissal solely based on procedural lapses related to one charge, while the other charges, which were severe, remained unchallenged and supported the dismissal [Paras 16-19, 35-38].

Judicial Review – Scope and Limitations – The Supreme Court reiterated the limits of judicial review in disciplinary matters, stating that it should focus on correcting errors of law, procedural errors, or violations of natural justice, rather than re-evaluating the merits of the decision. The Court found that the High Court overstepped these limits by reassessing the findings of the disciplinary proceedings [Paras 23-25, 39-41].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Held – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and restored the disciplinary authority's order of dismissal. The Court underscored the importance of maintaining integrity in banking and upheld the disciplinary action taken against the respondent [Paras 43-44].

Contract Law – Concluded Contract – The Supreme Court analyzed whether the acceptance of a conditional offer with a further condition results in a concluded contract. The Court held that acceptance must be absolute and unqualified to form a concluded contract. The acceptance of a conditional offer with an additional condition does not constitute a concluded contract unless the original proposer accepts the new condition without qualifications. This aligns with Section 7 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which mandates absolute and unqualified acceptance for the formation of a valid contract [Paras 1-19, 55-59].

Contract Law – Offer and Acceptance – The Court underscored the fundamental principles of offer and acceptance, stating that an acceptance with variations is essentially a counter-offer that must be accepted by the original proposer to result in a contract. It emphasized that mere agreement on some terms does not constitute a binding contract if essential terms are still under negotiation [Paras 20-24, 56-58].

Judicial Review – The Supreme Court criticized the High Court and Trial Court for overlooking the main point regarding the conditional acceptance of the tender offer. The Courts below failed to consider that the counter-proposal by the Respondent was not unconditionally accepted by the Appellant, thus, there was no concluded contract. The Supreme Court set aside the lower courts' decisions and ruled in favor of the Appellant, ordering the refund of the earnest money deposited [Paras 59-62].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Held – The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the High Court and the Trial Court was set aside. The Court declared that there was no concluded contract between the parties, and therefore, no question of breach or damages. The Appellant was entitled to a refund of the earnest money deposited with interest [Paras 61-62].

Motor Accident – Compensation – Future Prospects – The Supreme Court held that future prospects could be granted even in cases pertaining to notional income. Once the victim is proven to be employed, the necessary corollary is that they would be earning an income, and future prospects must be considered to provide just compensation, taking into account inflation and the quest for better circumstances​​.

Motor Accident – Death of Married Couple – Assessment of Income – The Court noted that the claimants were unable to produce documents evidencing the deceased's income or employment. However, this does not justify adopting the lowest tier of minimum wage for computing income. The Court emphasized maintaining the deceased's family standard of living and applied the minimum wage for skilled workers​​.

Motor Accident – Compensation – Notional Income – The Court recognized that notional income determination must consider the effects of inflation and improvements in skills over time. Future prospects should be awarded on notional income, recognizing the homemaker's contributions to the household and society​​.

Compensation for Homemakers – The Court affirmed that compensation for homemakers on a pecuniary basis is a settled proposition. It highlighted the gendered nature of housework and the need to recognize homemakers' work and sacrifices, reflecting changing societal attitudes and international obligations​​.

Decision – Appeals allowed – Held – The total compensation awarded by the High Court was increased. The Court ordered the enhanced compensation amount to be paid within two months with interest from the date of filing the Detailed Accident Report. The Court also laid down general observations regarding notional income calculation for homemakers and future prospects​​.

Motor Vehicles Act – Hypothecation Entry and Fraudulent Documentation – The Supreme Court examined the validity of the High Court's order for the release of a vehicle based on a forged clearance certificate. The High Court failed to consider that the hypothecation entry in the original registration certificate was fraudulently removed by the original owner using a forged Form 35. The Regional Transport Officer (RTO) had cancelled the registration certificate upon discovering the forgery, rendering the subsequent transfer and registration null and void. The Court emphasized that the respondent had no right to claim the vehicle based on fraudulent documentation [Paras 1-23].

Procedural Aspects and Legal Implications – The Court detailed the procedural history, including the original owner's failure to repay the loan and the arbitration award in favor of the appellant. It highlighted the fraudulent actions taken to cancel the hypothecation entry and transfer the vehicle. The Court underscored that legal transfers and registrations must adhere to statutory requirements and cannot be based on fraudulent acts. The RTO's order, which nullified the fraudulent registration, was a crucial factor overlooked by the High Court [Paras 3-16, 20-21].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Held – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the release of the vehicle in favor of the appellant. The Court ordered the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Sitapur to ensure the vehicle's retrieval from the respondent and its release to the appellant on appropriate terms and conditions within four weeks [Para 23].

Service Law – Appointment of Warden – The Supreme Court held that the Governing Body of the College is the authority to appoint the Warden of the College Hostel. The Court emphasized that the Principal, being the Executive head of the College, is in a position to know the members of the staff. Thus, applications for the Warden's post should be invited through the Principal, who will then make recommendations to the Governing Body. The Governing Body, taking into account the Principal's recommendations, will decide the appointment [Paras 1-36].

Governing Body's Authority – The Court noted that the Governing Body has general supervision and control over the affairs of the College and is responsible for administrative appointments, including that of the Warden. The Division Bench's directions requiring the applications to be placed before the Staff Council were deemed unnecessary, as the Staff Council is not statutorily empowered to make recommendations for the Warden's appointment [Paras 20-32, 36-41].

University Grants Commission (UGC) Letter – The Court clarified that the UGC letter dated 19.02.1987 does not confer authority on the Principal to appoint the Warden. It merely suggests that the Warden should be appointed from among the senior teachers in the College, but it does not override the administrative authority of the Governing Body [Paras 20-26].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Held – The Supreme Court set aside the directions in paragraph 41 of the Division Bench's judgment. It affirmed that the Governing Body, with the recommendation of the Principal, should initiate the process for appointing the Warden of the College Hostel. The Court directed the Governing Body to commence the process for the appointment before the Hostel reopens [Paras 36-41].

The Inspector General of Police, Kashmir Zone, issued an invitation for tenders for the supply of commercial vehicles to be used for the transportation of troops and equipment during the Financial Year 2020-2021.

Four parties submitted their bids in response to the tender invitation.

The Tender Opening Committee found that respondent no. 1 (M/S. New J.K. Roadways) did not meet the qualifying requirements of the technical bid.

Consequently, the appellant (M/S. Galaxy Transport Agencies) was deemed eligible and was awarded the contract for the supply of commercial vehicles.

Respondent no. 1 challenged the decision of the Tender Opening Committee by filing a writ petition.

Issues:

The case were whether the appellant satisfied the eligibility criteria and whether the tendering authority's interpretation of the tender conditions should be upheld without interference from the court.

Held:

The court examined Condition No. 31 of the N.I.T. and concluded that it necessitated the submission of a list of "both HMV/LMV" (Heavy Motor Vehicles/Light Motor Vehicles) as part of the bid.

The court emphasized that the interpretation of tender conditions by the tendering authority should not be subjected to second-guessing by the court in judicial review proceedings, as per previous rulings on the matter.

Accordingly, the Division Bench's decision to challenge the tendering authority's interpretation and assert that respondent no. 1 was wrongly disqualified was overturned.

With regard to Condition No. 27 of the N.I.T., which stipulated a minimum work experience of 5 years with a value not less than Rs. 2 crores, the court found that the Tender Opening Committee correctly evaluated the appellant's eligibility.

The court observed that unless arbitrariness or mala fide intentions were alleged against the tendering authority, the court should not interfere with the expert evaluation of a tender, especially in technical aspects, during writ proceedings.

The Division Bench's independent assessment of the appellant's work experience, which substituted the evaluation by the expert Tender Opening Committee, was considered inappropriate.

Facts:

The case involved writ petitions seeking to declare the "Gowari" caste as "Gond Gowari," a Scheduled Tribe, mentioned in Entry 18 of the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950.

Issues:

• Whether the High Court had the authority to entertain the claim of the caste "Gowari" to be declared as "Gond Gowari," a Scheduled Tribe, and consider evidence to adjudicate such claim?
• Whether there is any conflict in the ratio of the judgments in B. Basavalingappa v. D. Munichinnappa and State of Maharashtra v. Milind?
• Whether the High Court had the power to adjudicate whether the Scheduled Tribe "Gond Gowari" is no longer in existence and became extinct before 1911?
• Whether "Gowari" caste is the same as "Gond Gowari" included in Entry 18 of the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950?
• Whether the High Court correctly determined that "Gond Gowari" shown in Entry 18 is not a sub-tribe of "Gond"?

Held:

The High Court lacked authority to entertain the claim of "Gowari" caste to be declared as "Gond Gowari," a Scheduled Tribe.

There is no conflict between the judgments in B. Basavalingappa and State of Maharashtra v. Milind.

The High Court could not have decided that "Gond Gowari" Tribe became extinct before 1911.

"Gowari" caste is distinct from "Gond Gowari" included in Entry 18 of the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950.

The High Court's conclusion that "Gond Gowari" is not a sub-tribe of "Gond" is incorrect.

The admission and employment of "Gowari" community members based on Scheduled Tribe certificates between 14.08.2018 and the date of this judgment shall not be affected.

The High Court's judgment declaring "Gowari" as "Gond Gowari" is set aside, and the writ petitions are dismissed.

Facts:

By the Honorable Supreme Court of India in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The petition aimed to address issues related to the proper treatment of COVID-19 patients and the dignified handling of dead bodies in hospitals during this crisis. Various advocates represented the parties involved, including the Attorney General, Solicitor General, Additional Solicitor General, and several other advocates.

Issues:

The need to address fire safety measures in COVID-19 hospitals.

Provisioning of adequate resources for the treatment of COVID-19 patients.

Enforcement of Guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to prevent violations.

Deployment of additional police personnel at crowded places to ensure compliance with COVID-19 protocols.

Consideration of permissions for gatherings and celebrations during the pandemic.

Mechanism to monitor the number of attendees at functions and gatherings.

Implementing more testing measures to control the spread of COVID-19.

The implementation of weekend curfews and measures to seal containment zones.

Compliance with guidelines issued by the Election Commission of India for political gatherings during the pandemic.

Held:

In its order, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of fire safety in COVID-19 hospitals (para. number needed). The Court directed the State Governments to make more provisions for the treatment of COVID-19 patients (para. number needed) and take strict and stern action against those violating the Guidelines and SOPs (para. number needed). The deployment of more police personnel at crowded places was recommended (para. number needed), and permissions for non-essential gatherings and celebrations were not to be granted (para. number needed). A mechanism to monitor the number of attendees at such functions was to be established (para. number needed). The Court also stressed the need for increased testing, implementation of weekend curfews, and measures to seal containment zones (para. number needed). Additionally, the Court called for compliance with guidelines issued by the Election Commission of India for political gatherings during the pandemic (para. number needed). States and Union Territories were granted four weeks to submit affidavits detailing the measures taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic

Facts:

The appellant and two others filed nominations for the Council of States elections. One elected member of the Assembly cast his vote in favor of one of the winning candidates at 9:15 a.m on 23.03.18, but he was convicted and sentenced in a criminal case later that same day. The appellant secured 2599 value of votes, while the other two candidates secured 2601 and 2600 value of votes. An objection was raised regarding the validity of the vote cast by the convicted elected member, which was rejected. Consequently, the appellant was declared defeated, and the other two candidates were declared duly elected. The appellant filed an election petition seeking a declaration that the vote cast by the convicted member was improperly received.

Issues:

• Whether the vote cast by the convicted elected member at 9:15 a.m on 23.03.18 was valid.
• Interpretation of the phrase "the date" in Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
• Applicability of the de facto doctrine and principles of legality.

Held:

The Court held that a Member of the Legislative Assembly should be treated as innocent until proved guilty, and holding them disqualified before conviction would violate their substantive right. Therefore, the vote cast by the convicted member at 9:15 a.m on 23.03.18 was rightly treated as valid. (Para 11-13)

The interpretation of the phrase "the date" in Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 has to be in sync with the Constitutional scheme of Article 191(1)(e). The conviction should be the cause of disqualification, and the period of disqualification starts from the date of conviction until six years after release. (Para 18-20)

The principles of legality apply in cases of disqualification, and the phrase "the date" in Section 8(3) should be interpreted based on the penal provisions under which the person was convicted. (Para 30, 32, 33)

Cases of insurance law have no relevance to disqualification cases. (Para 41, 42)

The disqualification under Section 8(3) is a consequence of conviction, and a consequence can never precede the cause. (Para 43)

Article 193 deals with penalties for erring members, and disqualification for which a penalty is prescribed under Article 193 also invites civil consequences. However, the act done by the elected member is not necessarily invalidated, except in certain circumstances. (Para 47, 48, 53)

The de facto doctrine applies to acts performed by officers de facto within their assumed official authority, protecting public and private interests. (Para 55)

The Court dismissed Civil Appeal No.611 of 2020, upholding the validity of the vote cast by the convicted elected member, and allowed Civil Appeal No.2159 of 2020, setting aside the findings of the High Court on certain issues. (Para 58-62)