Facts:

Two candidates, one belonging to the OBC-Female category and another from the SC-Female category, participated in the selection process for constables in Uttar Pradesh Police in 2013. They scored marks above the cut-off for the General Female category. Both claimed selection in the General Female category, but their claim was rejected by the State based on a High Court order that reserved special category candidates within their respective quotas, even if they scored higher marks than the last candidate selected in the open category.

Issues:

Whether the 'seconds view' held by the High Courts of Allahabad and Madhya Pradesh, which supported the reservation of special category candidates to the extent of their respective quotas, is valid?

Whether the 'first view' held by the High Courts of Rajasthan, Bombay, Uttarakhand, and Gujarat, which allowed candidates from backward classes to compete for open category posts based on merit, is correct?

Held:

The 'second view' is not based on any authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court and does not prioritize merit. Selections in public employment must be based purely on merit, subject to any permissible reservations. Any selection resulting in candidates with lower merit getting selected against the open/general category is against principles of equality. The 'second view' is disapproved and rejected. (Para 31-32)

Reservations, both vertical and horizontal, are methods of ensuring representation in public services. The open category should remain open to all candidates based on merit, regardless of their eligibility for reservation benefits. The 'first view' is correct and rational. (Para 33)

Candidates from the OBC Female category who scored higher marks than the last selected candidate in the General Female category must be offered employment as constables in Uttar Pradesh Police. However, the claims of the SC Female category candidates were rejected as none of them had secured more marks than the last selected candidate in the General Female category. (Para 37)

Facts:

The present case revolves around a dispute between the petitioner, Mr. Suresh Shah, and the respondent, Hipad Technology India Private Limited. The petitioner is the landlord, and the respondent is the tenant of a commercial property. The lease agreement between the parties contains an arbitration clause, which provides an alternate mode of dispute resolution. Subsequently, a dispute arose between them regarding the termination of the lease under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In accordance with the arbitration clause, the petitioner nominated a sole arbitrator and issued a notice to the respondent. However, the respondent neither replied to the notice nor objected to the proposed arbitrator.

Issues:

• Whether disputes between a landlord and tenant under the Transfer of Property Act are arbitrable when the lease agreement contains an arbitration clause?
• Whether disputes arising under the Rent Act are arbitrable?

Held:

Disputes under the Transfer of Property Act: After examining the provisions of Sections 111, 114, and 114A of the Transfer of Property Act, the court noted that determination of a lease could occur due to various reasons, including forfeiture arising from the tenant's breach of the lease agreement, which may involve non-payment of rent. In such circumstances, if the lease is determined by forfeiture, the landlord can sue to eject the tenant. However, under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, the court, instead of passing a decree for ejectment, may pass an order relieving the lessee against the forfeiture if the lessee pays or tenders the rent in arrear. Section 114A of the Act further provides a condition for issuing a notice before filing a suit of ejectment, allowing the lessee an opportunity to remedy the breach. The court clarified that while these provisions provide some protection to the tenant before eviction, they do not render the disputes non-arbitrable. Thus, if the lease agreement includes an arbitration clause, the landlord can invoke it to seek resolution before an arbitrator. The arbitrator can consider the relevant circumstances and act in accordance with the law while passing the award. (Para 16)

Disputes under the Rent Act: The court emphasized that in cases where eviction or tenancy is governed by the Rent Act, and the premises fall under the purview of its provisions, the disputes are non-arbitrable. The Rent Act provides statutory protection against eviction and grants exclusive jurisdiction to specific courts to decide on eviction and other related disputes. These courts consider various factors like the landlord's bonafide requirement and the comparative hardship faced by the parties. In such cases, only the courts specified in the Rent Act can adjudicate the disputes, and the arbitration clause, if any, in the lease agreement cannot override this statutory protection. (Para 18)

Decision: The court allowed the petitioner's prayer for the appointment of a nominated sole arbitrator in the instant case, as the dispute between the parties was arbitrable under the lease agreement. (Para 19)

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between ANGLO AMERICAN METALLURGICAL COAL PTY LTD. (Appellant) and MMTC LTD. (Respondent) over the supply of coal. The Majority Award found that the Appellant was able to supply the contracted quantity of coal, but the Respondent was unwilling to lift the coal due to a market slump. The Respondent subsequently attacked the Appellant, alleging non-supply by the Appellant during the Fifth Delivery Period. The Division Bench upheld the Respondent's claim, leading to the present appeal.

Issues:

• Whether the Majority Award, which considered the entirety of the correspondence and oral evidence, was a possible view based on the facts.
• Whether the provisions of patent ambiguity and latent ambiguity under the Evidence Act, 1872, apply to the facts of the case.
• Whether the Majority Award is sustainable under the law as it stood before the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015.

Held:

The Majority Award, after examining the correspondence and oral evidence, arrived at a possible view on the Respondent's breach and the quantum of damages. The Division Bench's approach of solely relying on three emails without considering the entire context of correspondence and the LTA was flawed.

The Evidence Act's provisions on patent ambiguity are not applicable, as the three critical emails were part of the overall correspondence and needed to be read in the context of the entire LTA. However, the provisions on latent ambiguity could apply, and the Majority Award's reliance on Mr. Wilcox's evidence was valid.

The Majority Award is sustainable under the law as it stood before the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015.

Decsion: The court upheld the Majority Award's findings, stating that it was a possible view based on the evidence presented. The Division Bench's approach of relying solely on three emails without considering the context of the Long-Term Agreement (LTA) and other correspondence was deemed flawed. The appeal was dismissed, and the decision clarified the application of the Evidence Act to the documents exchanged in a contract.

Facts:

The promotion of an incumbent teacher to the post of Professor under the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS).

The teacher joined the constituent college of Karnataka University on October 28, 2013, as an Associate Professor. Before that, he served as an Associate Professor in an affiliated college of the University from January 1, 2006, to January 1, 2009.

The promotion to the post of Professor under CAS was granted to him from October 28, 2013.

The incumbent teacher filed a writ petition seeking promotion from January 1, 2009, claiming that he had completed the eligibility criteria on that date.

The Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court allowed his case and directed the University to grant him promotion from January 1, 2009.

Issues:

• The interpretation of the term "College" for the purpose of CAS promotions.
• The question arose whether the promotion should be granted from the date of entry into the University's service (October 28, 2013) or from January 1, 2009, when the incumbent teacher was working in an affiliated college.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the term "College" in the context of CAS promotions should be interpreted in accordance with the preamble of the relevant statute governing promotions, not the definition of "College" under section 2(2) of the Act.

It was clarified that "College" referred to in the statute pertains only to "Constituent College" and not "Affiliated College."

The Court upheld the University's decision to grant promotion to the incumbent teacher from the date of entry into the University's service (October 28, 2013) and not from January 1, 2009.

The High Court had erred in ordering promotion from January 1, 2009, as the teacher was not in effective service of the University during that period.

Facts:

Respondents had booked flats with the appellant-builder, but the flats were not delivered on time. They filed a consumer complaint before the National Commission, seeking a refund of their money. The appellant received the notices in June 2020 and filed a written statement/reply on 31 August 2020, which was beyond the 45-day period prescribed under Section 38 of the Consumer Protection Act.

Issues:

• Whether the National Commission can allow the filing of a written statement beyond the prescribed 45-day period?
• Whether the order dated 23 March 2020, passed by the Supreme Court for the extension of the limitation period due to the Covid-19 pandemic, applies to the present case?

Held:

The court observed that while it is true that a written statement cannot be allowed to be filed beyond the period of 45 days as per Section 38 of the Consumer Protection Act, the Supreme Court's order dated 23 March 2020 extended the limitation period in all proceedings, irrespective of whether it was prescribed under general or special laws and whether it was condonable or not. This extension was effective from 15 March 2020 until further orders.

The court further noted that the original 30-day limitation period for filing the written statement had expired on 12 August 2020, and the extended period of 15 days expired on 27 August 2020, while the order dated 23 March 2020 was still in effect. Thus, the limitation for filing the written statement in the present proceedings before the National Commission would be deemed to have been extended by the Supreme Court's order.

Facts:

 The appellant's daughter died an unnatural death, and the respondent-accused claimed it to be a suicide. However, the appellant lodged an FIR alleging that his deceased daughter was pressurized to bring money, and he had paid money on several occasions to the in-laws of the deceased. The Session Judge noted an incident where the deceased was allegedly assaulted by her in-laws, leading to a complaint at the police station. The FIR also mentioned that the father-in-law of the deceased had telephonically threatened the appellant and demanded money. On the same day, the deceased informed the appellant of a threat to her life. Unfortunately, before the appellant could reach his daughter's matrimonial house, he was informed of her hospitalization, and she later passed away.

Issues:

• Whether the FIR was engineered to falsely implicate the accused?
• Whether there was a lack of correlation between the allegations in the FIR?
• Whether the allegations were general without assigning a specific role to the accused?
• Whether the grant of anticipatory bail would obstruct the investigation?

Held:

The Single Judge of the High Court erred in arriving at the findings that the FIR was engineered to implicate the accused and lacked correlation between allegations. The FIR contained specific allegations related to dowry demands, assault incidents, and monetary transactions, making the Single Judge's conclusions unreasonable (Para 14).

The grant of anticipatory bail in such a serious offense would obstruct the investigation. The Court found deficiencies in the investigation, and the status of the accused as influential persons diminished the Court's faith in further investigation by the same authorities (Para 19).

In light of the flawed investigation, the Court decided to entrust further investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) under Article 142 of the Constitution (Para 23).

Facts:

The case involved an appeal challenging the denial of anticipatory bail to the appellant, who was the mother-in-law of a Muslim woman to whom triple talaq was pronounced by her husband. The appellant was accused under the provisions of Section.498A of the Indian Penal Code based on vague and general allegations in the FIR.

Issues:

• Whether the provisions of Section.7(c) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, would bar the grant of anticipatory bail to the mother-in-law of a Muslim woman upon whom triple talaq was pronounced by her husband.
• Whether Section.7(c) of the Act, 2019, restricts the court's power to grant anticipatory bail under s.438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

Held:

 The offense created by Section.3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, applies to the Muslim husband for pronouncing triple talaq on his wife. The mother-in-law, being a female, cannot be accused of pronouncing triple talaq under the Act, as the offense can only be committed by a Muslim man. Therefore, the mother-in-law cannot be denied anticipatory bail under Section.7(c) of the Act. (Para 8, 9)

The court's power to grant anticipatory bail is not barred by Section.7(c) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. While entertaining an application for anticipatory bail for an offense under the Act, the court must hear the married Muslim woman who made the complaint, as prescribed under Section.7(c) of the Act. Only after giving the married Muslim woman a hearing can the court grant bail to the accused. The provisions of Section.438 CrPC are not expressly overridden by the Act. (Para 10, 18)

Facts:

An advocate, not connected to the criminal proceeding in any capacity, filed an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., urging the court to expedite the trial of an accused facing charges under the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The advocate identified themselves as a social activist while submitting the said application.

Issues:

• Whether a third party, devoid of any involvement in the criminal proceeding, possesses the locus standi to file an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. seeking the expedition of the trial.
• Whether the High Court has the authority to direct the trial court in expediting criminal trials for offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Held :

The judgment holds that the High Court does possess the power to direct the trial court in expediting criminal trials, particularly in cases involving offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act. [Para 11]

However, the application filed by the third-party advocate was deemed to lack bona fide intentions, and subsequently, the advocate had no locus standi to file such an application. [Para 14]

The court clarified that applications of this nature, brought forward by third parties in the guise of Public Interest Litigation, cannot ordinarily be entertained by the High Court. [Para 15]

The responsibility of ensuring the expeditious conduct of criminal trials lies with the State and the prosecution. Thus, the application filed by the third-party advocate under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. was dismissed by the Supreme Court. [Para 16]

Nonetheless, the judgment states that the trial court retains the discretion to expedite the criminal trial, taking into account the gravity of offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act, subject to any orders passed by the High Court in pending proceedings. [ Para 16]

FACTS:

The charge against the petitioner was framed under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, which includes Section 376(2). The petitioner pleaded that the charge was under Section 376(1) and not Section 376(2). The victim, a six-year-old, was allegedly raped by the petitioner, and evidence from the victim and her mother, who was an eyewitness, was present on record.

ISSUES:

• Whether the charge framed against the petitioner was under Section 376(1) or Section 376(2) of the IPC.
• Whether the evidence on record supports the allegation of the rape of a six-year-old victim by the petitioner.

HELD:

The Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 4206 of 2020 was dismissed by the court. The concurrent finding of fact supported the charge framed under Section 376 of the IPC, which includes Section 376(2). The evidence provided by the victim and her mother, who was an eyewitness, was crucial in establishing the commission of the offense.