Facts:

The case involves M/S Steel Authority of India Ltd. challenging the demand of interest under Section 11AB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, on the retrospective escalation of excise duty based on an escalation clause.

Issues:

Whether interest is payable under Section 11AB on the retrospective differential excise duty.

When price is revised upward with retrospective effect, and the excise duty is paid immediately on a future date, is interest payable under Section 11AB from the first day of the month succeeding the month in which the duty ought to have been paid.

Held:

The scheme of the Central Excise Act and Rules constitutes a separate code. Section 11A deals with recovery, and Section 11AB is attracted in case of non-levy, non-payment, short-levy, or short-payment under Section 11A. The liability for interest arises when duty, determined or paid under Section 11A, becomes recoverable. The interest clock starts ticking from the date as provided in Rule 8 read with Section 11AB.( Para 35-36)

Section 11A must be read with Section 11AB, and interest under Section 11AB is applicable when duty is not levied or paid, or is short-levied, short-paid, or erroneously refunded. The liability for interest arises from the first day of the month succeeding the month in which duty ought to have been paid.( Para 43, 45-47)

Goods become exigible to duty on removal, and assessment is done by the assessee through self-assessment. Provisional assessment triggers interest liability from the first day of the month succeeding the month for which the amount is determined, as per Rule 7(4).( Para 49-51)

Short-levy can overlap with non-payment, and short-payment may occur despite full levy. Short-levy involves incorrect application of components like rate of duty, valuation, and quantity. In a case of retrospective escalation of price, Section 11A read with Section 11AB applies.( Para 58)

If short-levy is understood as a case where assessment is not full, taking into account correct parameters, it could be classified as a case of short-levy. In a case of retrospective escalation, differential duty becomes payable, triggering Section 11A read with Section 11AB.( Para 59)

Even if the statutory authority labels it as a case of short-levy, Section 11A read with Section 11AB is attracted, and interest calculation starts from the date provided in Rule 8.( Para 60)

The second explanation of Section 11A(2)(b) contemplates voluntary payment by the assessee without a notice under Section 11A. Interest under Section 11A(2)(b) applies to any of the four amounts: non-levy, non-payment, short-levy, or short-payment.( Para 62)

The appeals will stand dismissed.

Facts:

Expulsion of 27 members, including the alleged contemnors, from the Modern Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited.

Challenge to expulsion upheld by the Supreme Court in 2010, directing readmission of the expelled members.

Subsequent litigation regarding unauthorized occupation and allotment of flats by newly inducted members.

Registrar Cooperative Societies' order directing re-admission of expelled members and setting aside the allotment to the alleged contemnors.

Issues:

Violation of Supreme Court orders by alleged contemnors who failed to vacate and hand over possession.

Conflict between the rights of expelled members and newly inducted members.

Possibility of constructing a new tower within the society.

Held:

The Court, considering equities and practicalities, directed:

Alleged contemnors to vacate by 31.08.2019, allotting apartments to re-admitted members.

Alleged contemnors deposit L 10 lakhs each for a new apartment, to be re-admitted upon deposit.

Administrator to seek permission for new building construction; Municipal Corporation to consider within a month.

Administrator to initiate new member admissions and draw lots for 18 apartments in the new building.

Alleged contemnors to find temporary accommodation at their own cost.

Facts:

The original RAE Suit No. 1681 of 2006 was filed by Shantaben Purushottam Kakad, claiming eviction of the appellants under Section 16(i)(c), 16(i)(e), and 16(1)(n) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. Allegations included non-user of the premises, nuisance caused by the business activities, and illegal subletting.

Issues:

Whether the conduct of the tenants amounted to nuisance under Section 16(i)(c).

Whether illegal subletting was established.

Whether there was non-user justifying eviction under Section 16(1)(n).

Held:

On Nuisance (Section 16(i)(c)): The Court found the evidence of nuisance insufficient. Lack of testimony from neighbors, vague details of the alleged nuisance, and absence of the original plaintiff's evidence led to the conclusion that the ground of nuisance was not justified.

On Illegal Subletting: The Court rejected the finding of illegal subletting, emphasizing the lack of details regarding the alleged subletting to Mr. Raja. The Court also noted that the pleaded case of subletting to a third party did not find support in the evidence.

On Non-User (Section 16(1)(n)): The Court upheld the findings of the lower courts, establishing non-user. It considered the registration certificate under the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act and observed the gap in registration during the relevant period, supporting the conclusion of non-user for the purpose for which the premises were let.

Facts:

The case involves the transition from the Master Circular dated 01.07.13 to the Revised Circular dated 01.07.15 in the identification of wilful defaulters. The revised procedure includes committees, show cause notices, and severe consequences upon classification as a wilful defaulter.

Issues:

The status of in-house committees, the right to legal representation, and the adherence to principles of natural justice in the revised process of identifying wilful defaulters.

Held:

In-house Committees as Tribunals: The court clarified that the in-house committees under the Revised Circular are administrative bodies, not vested with judicial power. The judgment refuted the view that these committees, by Circular force, become tribunals authorized to exercise the State's judicial power.

Right to Legal Representation: It was determined that no right exists under Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, for lawyers to appear before the in-house committees. The committees were deemed not legally authorized to take evidence by statute or subordinate legislation.

Principles of Natural Justice: The court emphasized the flexibility of natural justice, stating that oral hearings are not mandatory in all cases. Written representations, as per the scheme of the Revised Circular, are considered sufficient for arriving at a just result.

Article 19(1)(g) and Public Interest: Considering the significant impact on the fundamental right to carry on business upon being declared a wilful defaulter, the Revised Circular, designed in public interest, must be construed reasonably.

Decision: The impugned judgment was set aside. The court outlined a procedure wherein the First Committee, comprising the Executive Director and senior officials, must promptly issue its order. The borrower can then submit a representation within 15 days to the Review Committee, which must provide a reasoned response. The appeals are allowed.

Facts:

NHAI invited bids for the construction project, and SSANGYONG's bid was accepted.

Price adjustment for components (cement, steel, plant and machinery, and other local materials) was calculated using the WPI.

WPI changed from the Old Series (1993-94= 100) to the New Series (2004-05= 100).

NHAI issued a Policy Circular in 2013 introducing a new formula and linking factor, affecting price adjustments.

Issues:

Applicability of the new Circular and linking factor.

Violation of principles of natural justice.

Challenge under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.34(2)(b)(ii) and 34(2)(a)(iii).

Held:

The judgment addresses the applicability of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, specifically focusing on changes in the grounds for challenging arbitral awards. It notes that the amendments made in Section 34, including Explanations 1 and 2 to s.34(2)(b)(ii), apply prospectively to applications filed on or after October 23, 2015, even if arbitration proceedings commenced earlier.

The judgment clarifies that the amendments sought to bring about substantive changes in the law, emphasizing that the amended provisions are applicable only to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after October 23, 2015. It expounds on the legislative intent behind the amendments, emphasizing the need for a prospective application.

The Court highlights the significant changes made by the Amendment Act in the interpretation of "public policy of India" in arbitral awards. It observes that the shift towards the "fundamental policy of Indian law" as the touchstone for determining public policy is a substantial departure from the earlier jurisprudential approach.

The introduction of the ground of "patent illegality" under s.34(2A) for domestic awards is discussed in detail. The judgment defines "patent illegality" as an error going to the root of the matter, distinct from a mere erroneous application of the law. It underscores the necessity for the error to be so grave that it shocks the conscience or is manifestly arbitrary.

The judgment elaborates on the concept that a perverse decision, while no longer a ground for public policy challenge, can still constitute patent illegality. It clarifies that an award can be set aside if it is found to be shockingly unreasonable or based on considerations that are arbitrary and capricious.

Changes in Section 28(3) are highlighted, aligning with the principles stated in the Associate Builders case. The judgment emphasizes that the role of the arbitrator is paramount in interpreting contract terms unless such interpretation is beyond a fair-minded or reasonable view.

The judgment concludes the discussion on amendments, underscoring the narrowed definition of "public policy of India." It emphasizes that the phrase now excludes errors that merely violate the terms of the contract or a party's subjective understanding of the law.

The ground of challenge under Section 34(2)(a)(iii) is explained in meticulous detail. The judgment discusses the inability of a party to present its case and the significance of materials being considered without affording the parties an opportunity to comment.

Section 34(2)(a)(iv) is analyzed, emphasizing that arbitral awards should not go beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement or the disputes referred to the tribunal. The judgment delineates the boundaries within which the arbitrator's jurisdiction operates.

The expression "most basic notions of … justice" is dissected, highlighting that it refers to fundamental principles breached, and the importance of evidence being disclosed to parties. The judgment emphasizes the core principles that constitute the bedrock of justice.

The majority award's reliance on government guidelines not presented as evidence is noted, leading to the conclusion that Section 34(2)(a)(iii) is attracted. The judgment meticulously examines the evidentiary aspects and their implications on the fairness of the arbitral proceedings.

The judgment rejects the argument that a new contract was formed without the appellant's consent but upholds the minority award. It invokes Article 142 of the Constitution to ensure complete justice, taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case.

The relief granted by the minority award is specified in comprehensive terms, including the principal sum and interest. The judgment provides clarity on the quantum of relief and its basis in the arbitration proceedings. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

FACTS:

On 23.11.1997, a dispute over a road led to a confrontation between the accused and the complainant's family. The prosecution claimed that accused No.1 and No.2 fired gunshots resulting in the death of Somiben and injuries to others. The trial court convicted the appellant-accused No.1, and the High Court affirmed the decision.

ISSUES:

Identification of assailants in the dark agricultural field.

Contradictions in witness testimonies regarding who fired the fatal shots.

Recovery of weapons and corroboration of evidence.

Motive and its role in establishing guilt.

HELD:

The court considered the lack of evidence on lighting conditions during the incident, casting doubt on the identification of assailants in the dark. Contradictions in witness testimonies regarding the shooter and the recovery of weapons raised concerns. The motive was acknowledged but deemed a double-edged sword.

In the absence of conclusive evidence and doubts on crucial aspects, the court gave the benefit of doubt to the accused. The conviction of appellant-accused No.1 was set aside under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, Section 307 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, and Section 25(c) of the Arms Act.

REFERRED CASES:

Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 11 SCC 141

FACTS:

The plaintiffs, including the appellant and his late brother, filed a suit against the second defendant, the wife of 'B', seeking a declaration that she had no right in the suit property. The plaintiffs contended that the document of adoption dated 27.04.91, adopting the first defendant, was false. The trial court dismissed the suit, upholding the adoption. The plaintiffs appealed to the High Court.

ISSUES:

During the pendency of the appeal, the second plaintiff (second appellant) passed away. However, his legal representatives were not brought on record.

The High Court held that the appeal abated not only with respect to the second appellant but as a whole.

HELD:

The court observed that Order XXII, Rule 3 is applicable to appeals filed under Order 41 as well. It applies when a suit or an appeal is filed by more than one plaintiff/appellant, and on the death of one, the right to sue does not survive to the remaining plaintiff/appellants alone. In such cases, the legal representatives of the deceased party should be substituted; failure to do so results in abatement. In the present case, there were legal representatives available for the deceased brother of the appellant, but no steps were taken for their substitution. Therefore, the appeal abated with respect to the deceased brother, and the trial court's decree, upholding the adoption, became final with respect to him.

The court emphasized that allowing the appellant to proceed further and succeed in the appeal would lead to an inconsistent decree. The High Court would pass a decree declaring the adoption invalid, contradicting the trial court's decree that had become final. The court held that both inconsistent decrees cannot stand together, creating irreconcilable conflict. The situation would be the same even if the late brother had filed a separate suit.

The argument that an interlocutory order granting permission to prosecute the appeal despite the death of the late brother creates an estoppel against holding that the appeal abated as a whole was rejected. The court emphasized that the impact of the death of the late brother on the proceeding arises from the incompatibility of decrees, and the interlocutory order is not sufficient to overcome this legal obstacle.

REFERRED CASES:

Harihar Prasad Singh and Others vs. Balmiki Prasad Singh and Others 1975 (1) SCC 212

Ram Sarup vs. Munshl & Ors. 1963 (3) SCR 858

Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) by LRS. & Ors. vs. Pramod Gupta (Smt.) (Dead) by LRS. & Ors. 2003 (3) SCC 272

State of Punjab vs. Nathu Ram AIR 1962 SC 89

Facts:

Respondents filed a partition suit in 2007.

Decreed ex-parte in 2008.

Appellant and others filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, dismissed in 2010.

Appeal withdrawn in 2013, followed by a fresh appeal in the same year.

Issues:

Whether time spent in proceedings to set aside the ex-parte decree constitutes "sufficient cause" to condone the delay in filing an appeal?

When an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is dismissed on merits, is a regular appeal under Section 96(2) CPC barred?

Held:

The court held that the time spent in pursuing the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is a "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay in filing the first appeal. Emphasized that the right to appeal under Section 96(2) CPC is a statutory right and should not be denied merely because the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was dismissed.

In the interest of justice, the court allowed the appeal, condoned the delay, and restored the appeal challenging the ex-parte decree. Noted that the appellant and others were not grossly negligent in pursuing their case. The court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the matter.