Facts:

The Gauhati High Court initiated suo moto action following the death of 15 young laborers in mining operations in the State of Meghalaya.

The National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, took over the case (O.A. No.73 of 2014) and issued directions to stop illegal mining and assess the environmental impact.

Orders were passed by the Tribunal, allowing transportation of coal under certain conditions.

Subsequent orders by the Supreme Court permitted transportation of a specified quantity of coal, but an unfortunate incident led to the suspension of transportation.

Various applications were filed seeking permission to transport coal, leading to conflicting orders.

Issues:

Determination of whether to permit the transportation of coal, considering environmental concerns and the ban imposed by the National Green Tribunal.

Held:

The Court permitted the transportation of 75,050 metric tonnes of coal, for which transport challans had already been issued.

Emphasized that the State of Meghalaya must ensure strict compliance and prevent any illegal mining under the guise of permitted transportation.

Directed the State to maintain detailed records of transported coal, including quantity, payments, transporter details, owner details, and verification certificate dates.

The mechanism for verification and transportation was to be finalized and publicized within a week, with transportation allowed from 17th May, 2019, to 31st May, 2019. No transportation was permitted after 31st May, 2019.

Facts:

The case involves two separate alienations of distinct portions of ancestral property by the late predecessor-in-interest. The first suit challenging the initial alienation was dismissed, and subsequently, a second suit was filed for the second alienation. The trial court and appellate court dismissed the second suit, citing Order II, Rule 2 and constructive res judicata. The High Court set aside this decision.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff should have included both claims in one suit under Order II, Rule 2?

Whether the different periods of limitation provided by Article 109 of the Limitation Act affect the application of Order II, Rule 2?

Held:

The Court held that Order II, Rule 2 requires a plaintiff to include the whole claim arising from a cause of action in one suit. If a plaintiff omits or relinquishes any portion intentionally, they are barred from suing on that part unless leave is obtained from the Court. The Court emphasized that even if different reliefs could be sought for in one suit arising from a cause of action, a second suit for a different relief can be filed with leave.

In this case, the Court found that the second alienation stemmed from the same cause of action as the first, and the mere fact of a different period of limitation does not override the bar under Order II, Rule 2. The late predecessor-in-interest executed both sale deeds, and the suits contained virtually identical averments. The plaintiff had the opportunity to seek relief for the second sale deed in the first suit but omitted to do so.

Therefore, the Court set aside the judgment of the High Court, affirming the dismissal of the second suit under Order II, Rule 2.

FACTS:

Appellants filed a complaint before NCDRC citing deficiency of service by the respondents related to a residential flat booking.

NCDRC issued a conditional order on 16 November 2018, requiring the appellants to file a rejoinder and evidence within four weeks.

NCDRC, on 15 February 2019, dismissed the complaint, citing the appellants' failure to file the rejoinder and evidence.

ISSUES:

Was the dismissal of the complaint justified based on a technicality?

Did the NCDRC's observation regarding the appellants lacking merit in the case influence the decision unfairly?

HELD:

The judgement clarifies that the ground for rejecting the complaint was technical and disregarded the principles of substantial justice. The court emphasized that such dismissals on technicalities go against the purpose of establishing the NCDRC and burden the litigants, defeating the objective of ensuring justice in consumer fora.( Paragraph 2 )

Highlights the court's concern about marginal delays not being condoned by the NCDRC due to stipulated timeframes in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The court acknowledges the challenges in disposing of complaints promptly due to resource constraints and urges consumer fora to consider this reality.( Paragraph 4 )

Sets aside the impugned order of the NCDRC and restores the consumer complaint to its file, emphasizing that the dismissal was based on a mere technicality. No notice was issued to the respondent in this case.( Paragraph 5 )

Notes the readiness of the appellants with the rejoinder and affidavit of evidence, instructing the NCDRC to take them on record.( Paragraph 6 )

The Appeal is accordingly disposed of..( Paragraph 7 )

Facts:

Respondents engaged as Store Watchmen on daily wages under NMR basis temporarily.

Engagement order explicitly stated the temporary nature of employment with no claim to further appointment.

Board decision led to closure of Sectional stores, resulting in termination of respondents' services in 1990.

Industrial dispute raised, referred to Labour Court, which ordered reinstatement and back wages at 50%.

Single Judge affirmed reinstatement, granted 50% back wages due to pendency since 1991.

Division Bench affirmed Single Judge's decision.

Issues:

Validity of termination of temporary workers.

Burden of proof regarding continuous work for 240 days.

Quantum of back wages and reinstatement.

Held:

The initial burden is on respondents to show continuous work for 240 days, but both Single Judge and Division Bench erred in placing the burden on the appellant-Board.

Considering the age of most respondents, reinstatement not applicable. Focus on 50% back wages and compensation.

Appellant-Board provided a chart calculating 50% back wages, and the amount already paid was considered in full quit of all claims, including compensation in lieu of reinstatement.

Facts:

The cadre of Government Teachers, for which parity is sought by Niyojit Teachers, is a dying or vanishing cadre. The State consciously refrained from appointing in this cadre post-2006, with exceptions. Currently, there are around 66,000 Government teachers compared to nearly 4 lakh Niyojit Teachers. The mode of recruitment for Niyojit Teachers significantly differs from that of Government Teachers.

Issues:

Whether Niyojit Teachers are entitled to pay parity with Government Teachers despite the dying nature of the latter cadre and distinct recruitment processes.

Held:

The cadre seeking parity is dying, and the mode of recruitment for Niyojit Teachers differs significantly from that of Government Teachers. Thus, the applicability of the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' is limited by factors such as the method of recruitment.( Para 58)

The Court acknowledges limitations to the applicability of the 'equal pay for equal work' doctrine, including the consideration of various dimensions of a job. Pay scales are considered an executive function, and expert bodies should evaluate such matters.( Para 68)

The State's decision to have two distinct cadres (Government Teachers and Niyojit Teachers) is justified, considering the differences in recruitment and the number of teachers in each cadre.( Para 76)

The State's rational use of resources to spread education, including the dying cadre of Government Teachers, is part of an integrated policy. Judicial intervention could create an imbalance and strain budgetary resources.( Para 77)

While the Right to Education is crucial, paying Niyojit Teachers at the same level as State Teachers is not necessary for quality education. The modalities for improving teacher quality should be decided by the Executive.( Para 78)

No violation of Niyojit Teachers' rights or discrimination against them. The State's efforts align with policy goals, and any directions to equalize salaries could disrupt the positive strides made.( Para 79)

While the State can devise a pay structure, a suggestion is made to consider raising Niyojit Teachers' scales to the level suggested by a Committee, without insisting on additional tests.( Para 80)

These appeals are allowed( Para 83)

Facts:

The appellant, Advocate Rakesh Tiwari, was convicted for contempt of court for his undesirable conduct towards the Chief Judicial Magistrate (C.J.M.) Alok Pandey. The incident involved the advocate entering the chamber of the C.J.M., hurling abuses, attempting to assault him, and making threats. The advocate had alleged bias and interference in a case he was involved in.

Issues:

Whether the advocate's actions constituted criminal contempt of court?

What would be an appropriate sentence for the advocate's misconduct?

Held:

The High Court found the advocate guilty of criminal contempt, noting his lack of apology and the scandalization of the subordinate court. The original sentence included imprisonment for six months, a fine of Rs. 2000, and a restriction from entering the judgeship of Allahabad. The Supreme Court modified the sentence as follows:

The six-month imprisonment is suspended for three years, subject to good conduct and a condition not to enter the District Judgeship, Allahabad, for an additional three years.

The imprisonment may be activated if the advocate breaches any condition within the three-year period.

The advocate must deposit the Rs. 2000 fine, and failure to do so will result in a three-month restriction from the District Judgeship.

Facts:

Sanjay Kumar, a 15-year-old patient, complained of abdominal pain, fever, and hemorrhage in both eyes. The surgeon operated on the patient despite a low platelet count. The patient was discharged but later died in another hospital.

Issues:

Was the surgery necessary given the patient's critical condition and low platelet count?

Is the surgeon liable for medical negligence leading to the patient's death?

Held:

The court emphasizes the need for reasonable medical decisions and states that unreasonableness in professional conduct can't escape liability.( Paragraph 12 )

The court concludes that it's a case of an unreasonable decision by the Operating Surgeon, not a minor negligence.( Paragraph 14 )

The court decides that the entire compensation of Rs. 6,00,000/- is payable by the hospital, considering the surgeon's liability as vicarious.( Paragraph 18 )

Facts:

The appellants, belonging to the Scheduled Caste category, challenged the selection process for the limited departmental examination for the promotion to the post of Sub-Inspector (Civil Police) in the Police Department of Uttar Pradesh. The examination was conducted by the UP Police Recruitment and Promotion Board, and the appellants alleged that the selection process was undertaken without applying the Reservation Policy.

Issues:

Whether the selection process was conducted in accordance with the Reservation Policy.

Whether the criteria for securing 50% marks should be reckoned subject-wise or paper-wise.

Held:

The Court emphasized the importance of maintaining the merit-based selection process and upheld the requirement of a minimum of 50% marks in each subject.( Para 13)

The Court rejected the reliance on a previous order, stating that it did not decide the current controversy and could not serve as a precedent.( Para 14)

The Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the appellants did not fulfill the criteria of obtaining 50% marks in each subject.( Para 15)

Facts:

The appellant is a society running educational institutions, including a non-Governmental Educational Institution.

The employees were engaged on a temporary basis and were terminated due to the abolition of posts in light of financial losses faced by the institution.

Issues:

Whether the removal of employees due to the abolition of posts falls under the purview of Section 18 of the Act?

Whether the decision of the Managing Committee to abolish posts was arbitrary or mala fide?

Held:

The Court examines the applicability of Section 18 of the Act and Rule 39 of the 1993 Rules in cases of removal due to the abolition of posts.( Paragraph 9)

Reference to the decision in Shri Maheshwari Senior Higher Secondary School vs. Bhikha Ram Sharma (1996) 8 SCC 22, emphasizing that in cases of termination due to the abolition of posts, no enquiry under the Rules is required.( Paragraph 11)

The Court discusses the State's communication, stating no approval is needed for removal if the posts were not aided and appointments were not approved by the Education Department.( Paragraph 13)

Critique of the Division Bench's observation that the issue was raised for the first time, highlighting the consistent stand of the Management on the applicability of Section 18. The present appeals are allowed. ( Paragraph 14)