Facts:

In March 2006, the respondent floated a tender for a joint venture related to coal block development. The appellant, Parsa Kente Collieries Limited, was formed as a joint venture between the respondent and Adani Enterprises Limited. Disputes arose regarding various aspects of the agreement, leading to the invocation of arbitration by the appellant.

Issues:

The price adjustment/escalation, fixed costs, and the escrow account. The interpretation of relevant clauses in the Coal Mining and Delivery Agreement (CMDA) was a key point of contention.

Held

Price Adjustment/Escalation: The learned arbitrator interpreted the CMDA clauses, determining the date of commencement for price escalation. The High Court set aside the arbitrator's decision on this claim. The Supreme Court held that the arbitrator's interpretation was plausible, and the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction. The decision was restored.(Para 11.1)

Fixed Costs: The arbitrator awarded Rs. 78 crores to the appellant for fixed costs. The High Court set aside this award, citing lack of evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court, stating that the evidence did not support the claim, and the award was rightly set aside.( Para 11.2)

Escrow Account: The arbitrator's decision regarding the escrow account was also set aside by the High Court. The Supreme Court concurred, emphasizing that the purpose of the escrow account, as per Ministry of Coal guidelines, was to ensure fulfillment of the contract. The High Court's interference was justified.(Para 11.3)

Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, restoring the arbitrator's decision on price adjustment/escalation while upholding the High Court's decision to set aside the awards on fixed costs and the escrow account.

Facts:

The appellants, involved in the import of aluminum waste for manufacturing aluminum alloy, contested the rejection of the declared transactional value by the customs authorities. The dispute arose when the authorities reevaluated the consignment value.

Issues:

The rejection of the declared transactional value and the compliance with Customs Valuation Rules, specifically Rules 3 and 12.

Held:

Transactional Value and Notional Value: The term 'payable' in Section 14(1) refers to the notional value, combining the declared transactional value and the amount added per Rule 10 of the 2007 Rules.

Section 14(2): Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is a non-obstante provision, applicable even when the Board issues notifications fixing tariff values. The second proviso to Section 14(1) deals with specific situations requiring valuation as per rules.

Customs Valuation Rules 2007: Rules 3 and 12 are pivotal. Rule 12 applies when the proper officer has a reasonable doubt about the truth or accuracy of the declared value. The doubt must be based on 'certain reasons,' which are detailed in the Explanation to Rule 12., 14]

Reasonable Doubt: The expression 'reason to doubt' necessitates a reasonable doubt, distinct from 'reason to believe.' This doubt should have a foundation in certain reasons, reflecting suspicion and apprehension.

Procedural Mandate: Rule 12 mandates a two-step verification and examination process. The importer must be given an opportunity to clarify doubts before rejecting the declared value. The doctrine of prospective application is invoked for this procedural mandate.]

Provisional Assessment: Section 18 allows provisional assessment in case of disputes. Compelling importers to forgo this right without reasonable doubt is incorrect.

Flawed Adjudication Order: The findings in the order-in-original were flawed and contrary to law as they didn't provide sufficient reasons for rejecting the declared transaction value.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, emphasizing the necessity of reasonable doubt before rejecting the declared value and invoking the procedural mandates of Rule 12.

Facts:

The case involved the adjudication of citizenship status in the State of Assam, with a specific focus on individuals declared as illegal migrants or foreigners by the Competent Authority.

Issues:

The primary conflict arose between Paragraph 3(2) and Paragraph 8 of the Citizenship Rules, dealing with the inclusion of certain individuals in the National Register of Citizens and their ability to claim citizenship based on residence in Assam.

Held:

Paragraph 3(2) categorically excludes individuals declared as illegal migrants from inclusion in the National Register of Citizens. Such individuals cannot claim Indian citizenship merely based on residence in Assam. On the other hand, Paragraph 8 provides an avenue for appeal when an individual, dissatisfied with the decision under the final list, can approach the designated Tribunal constituted under the 1964 Order. However, Paragraph 8 is applicable only in the absence of a prior adjudication by the Foreigners Tribunal.

Furthermore, Paragraph 8 does not envision a second round of litigation before the same authority (Foreigners Tribunal) post the preparation of the final list. Orders of the Tribunal and Registering Authority based on the Tribunal's opinion are subject to challenge through writ proceedings and operate as res judicata.

Decision: The Court held that the exercise of power under Article 142 does not extend to creating an appellate forum for citizenship disputes in Assam. Such a direction would encroach upon legislative prerogatives.

Facts:

The appellant, Girish Kumar, challenged the promotion of Respondent No. 3 to the post of Section Officer, contending that the latter did not fulfill the eligibility criteria of three years continuous service in the feeder cadre, as required by the Recruitment Rules, 1967. The dispute arose from the deemed date of promotion granted to Respondent No. 3 under Rule 5 of the Seniority Rules, 1982.

Issues:

Whether the deemed date of promotion under the Seniority Rules, 1982 can be considered for eligibility criteria under the Recruitment Rules, 1967.

Whether Respondent No. 3, granted the deemed date of promotion, fulfilled the three years continuous service requirement for the promotional post.

Held:

The court held that the Seniority Rules, 1982 and the Recruitment Rules, 1967 operate in different fields. While the deemed date of promotion is relevant for seniority, it does not automatically fulfill the eligibility criteria for promotion under the Recruitment Rules. The term "continuous service" in the Recruitment Rules was deemed to mean uninterrupted and unbroken service. Respondent No. 3, having been promoted as Office Superintendent on a deemed date, did not meet the continuous service requirement for eligibility. The High Court's decision was set aside, and the appellant's appeal was allowed. Respondent No. 3 was declared ineligible for promotion to the post of Section Officer.

Facts:

The Gauhati High Court initiated suo moto action following the death of 15 young laborers in mining operations in the State of Meghalaya.

The National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, took over the case (O.A. No.73 of 2014) and issued directions to stop illegal mining and assess the environmental impact.

Orders were passed by the Tribunal, allowing transportation of coal under certain conditions.

Subsequent orders by the Supreme Court permitted transportation of a specified quantity of coal, but an unfortunate incident led to the suspension of transportation.

Various applications were filed seeking permission to transport coal, leading to conflicting orders.

Issues:

Determination of whether to permit the transportation of coal, considering environmental concerns and the ban imposed by the National Green Tribunal.

Held:

The Court permitted the transportation of 75,050 metric tonnes of coal, for which transport challans had already been issued.

Emphasized that the State of Meghalaya must ensure strict compliance and prevent any illegal mining under the guise of permitted transportation.

Directed the State to maintain detailed records of transported coal, including quantity, payments, transporter details, owner details, and verification certificate dates.

The mechanism for verification and transportation was to be finalized and publicized within a week, with transportation allowed from 17th May, 2019, to 31st May, 2019. No transportation was permitted after 31st May, 2019.

Facts:

Appellant sought eviction of respondent due to bona fide need and habitual rent default.

Rent Controller granted permission for eviction, but objection raised under Maharashtra Slum Act.

Suit withdrawn, permission sought from Slum Authority, which was granted after due process.

Civil suit filed for eviction, leading to a final decree by the Appellate Court.

Writ petition filed challenging Slum Authority's permission, resulting in High Court interference.

Issues:

Whether Slum Authority's permission, granted after due process, was legally sound.

High Court's interference under Article 227 based on Slum Authority's alleged oversight.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after due consideration, set aside the High Court's judgment and upheld the Appellate Authority's detailed examination. The High Court's concerns about the Slum Authority's consideration of relevant factors were deemed incorrect. The respondent had multiple opportunities to present his case, and the Appellate Authority had scrutinized the matter sufficiently. The Supreme Court found no reason for the High Court's interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.

"In the circumstances, the view that weighed with the High Court was not correct." Para No. 11: "We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order dated 19.06.2014 passed by the High Court...and restore the order dated 31.10.2002 passed by the Appellate Authority." Para No. 12: "This appeal stands allowed. No order as to costs."( Para No. 10)

Facts:

The case involved a second appeal where the appellant contended that the regular second appeal had been decided without framing a question of law. The appellant relied on judgments from the Punjab and Haryana High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court to support this contention.

Issues:

Whether a second appeal required the formulation of a substantial question of law, especially in light of the conflicting judgments from different High Courts.

Held:

Sole contention that the regular second appeal was decided without framing a question of law.( Para 3)

Different legal position in Punjab and Haryana High Court due to Constitution Bench Judgment in Pankaiakshi (Dead) through L.Rs. and Ors. vs. Chandrika and Ors.( Para 4)

Section 97 of the Amendment Act and Section 100 of the Code amended to require a substantial question of law in second appeals.( Para 7)

Constitution Bench's opinion on the applicability of Section 97 to state amendments and the saving clause in the Amendment Act.( Para 9)

Effect of the Constitution Bench's judgment on the State of Punjab, stating that a second appeal does not require a substantial question of law.( Para 10)

Discussion of the Constitution Bench's judgment in Pankajakshi case and its impact on the interpretation of Section 97.( Para 11)

Dismissal of the appeal based on the legal position clarified by the Constitution Bench.( Para 12)

Facts:

The Government of India, on July 5, 2002, decided to disinvest its shares in ITDC, transferring one of its hotel properties, Indraprastha Hotel, to HQRL. Appellant No.3, Moral Trading & Investment Ltd., successfully bid for the shares. Legal disputes ensued, including a civil suit filed by HQRL seeking an injunction and another suit by Hillcrest Realty for a declaration of voting rights.

Issues:

The violation of various sections of the Companies Act, alleging oppression and mismanagement by the RPM Group, the absence of notice to Director 'AM' during crucial resolutions, and the overall validity of share transfers.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that the determination of whether HQRL lost its private character and became a public limited company depended on the pending suits. Prima facie, HQRL altered its status, but the Court refrained from a final decision.( Para 62)

The order in Ram Parshottam Mittal is not final; it represents a prima facie view for the purpose of injunction. The interim observations are not considered binding.( Para 65)

Section 286, requiring notice to the Director, is crucial. The absence of notice to 'AM' during resolutions makes them unfair and invalid.( Paras 74-76)

The Directors' improper allotment of shares to themselves, excluding 'AM,' without proper notice, is deemed improper.( Para 81)

Pending suits will conclusively determine if HQRL is a private or public limited company. This impacts the applicability of sections 85 to 89 and the rights of preference shareholders.( Paras 83, 84)

Section 108 operates independently, and its violation, along with the failure to file share certificates, was noted. The High Court's order under Section 340 Cr.P.C. against 'RPM' was upheld.( Para 87)

Considering the overall scenario, the impugned order was not interfered with. However, the direction to prosecute 'RPM' was set aside.( Para 89)

Facts:

DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd. and certain individuals were involved in disputes over possession and refund related to flats in the DLF Valley project.

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) and the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (SCDRC) had awarded compensation under various heads, leading to legal challenges.

Issues:

Arbitrariness in compensation awards

Principles governing interest as compensation

Multiple heads of compensation for the same default

Held:

The Court held that the grant of compensation under various heads by the NCDRC was not sustainable, emphasizing the need for a foundation based on judicially recognized principles rather than a rule of thumb.

The judgment referred to the principle laid down in Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa & Others v. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1 SCC 508, stating that interest is compensation for the beneficiary deprived of the use of the investment made.

The Court modified the compensation awards, directing the appellant to send an occupation certificate, offer possession, and pay interest at a reasonable rate. The costs were capped at Rs. 50,000, and the judgment also addressed cases seeking refunds, modifying the interest rate to 9% per annum.