Facts:

The dispute involved the nomination of Sajjadah Nashin and Mutawalli of a Dargah founded in 1838.

The founder nominated his son Maulana Naseeruddeen Sahib as his successor.

The Zabta, constituting rules for the nomination, was framed by the third Sajjadah Nashin and Mutawalli, Gulam Sarwar Sahib, in 1932.

The appellant, Peer Gulam Jilani, contested the eligibility of the respondent, Peer Gulam Naseer, citing issues related to familial lineage and interpretation of terms in the Zabta.

Issues:

Whether the respondent was eligible to be nominated as Sajjadah Nashin and Mutawalli.

Interpretation of the terms 'Khandan' and 'Sagir Sinn' in the Zabta.

Held:

The Zabta did not specify hereditary succession but emphasized the selection of a qualified person during the lifetime of the incumbent.

The term 'Khandan' was interpreted broadly to include those in the spiritual sect 'Silsila,' not limited to blood relations.

The respondent, being the daughter's son of the 4th Sajjadah Nashin and Mutawalli, was deemed eligible, as he was part of the 'Khandan.'

The interpretation of the term 'Sagir Sinn' as 'minor age' was upheld, and it was not accepted as meaning 'minor son.'

Rule 1 of the Zabta did not establish hereditary succession or lineal descendant requirements for the Sajjadah Nashin and Mutawalli.

The appellant's contentions were dismissed, and the appeals were rejected.

Facts:

Multiple accused, including Postman Vengaisamy (A-l), Thalaiyaripandi (A-ll), and others, were tried for offenses under Sections 148, 302, and 506 (Part II) IPC.

Incidents occurred on April 8, 2003, and April 26, 2003, involving alleged attacks on the deceased, Chinnaperiaiyah, and others.

Issues:

Credibility of prosecution witnesses, especially Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2).

Allegations of the accused being armed with weapons and forming an unlawful assembly.

Held:

The court hears arguments from both sides and finds no merit in the appeal.( Paragraph 8)

Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2) testified to being surrounded by accused, led by Thalaiyaripandi (A-ll), armed with swords. Accused attacked the deceased and injured Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2). Defense claims these witnesses are introduced, but the court finds no such inference from cross-examination.( Paragraph 9)

Medical evidence supports the oral testimony. Dr. Jayakumar (PW-13) examined Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2) on the same day. Deceased's postmortem report (Ex.P-28) and medical reports (Ex.P-29, Ex.P-30) of the injured witnesses corroborate events.( Paragraph 10)

Statements of Baskaran (PW-4) and Rathi (PW-5) confirm the incident on April 8, 2003, adding to the credibility of the prosecution's case.( Paragraph 11)

Court rejects the applicability of precedents cited by the defense (Ram Laxman, Najabhai Desurbhai Wagh, and Mahendran) as they are distinguishable from the facts of the present case.( Paragraph 13)

Reiterates the principle that "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" has no application in India. Even if part of a witness's statement is unproved, the entire testimony cannot be rejected.( Paragraph 14)

Conclusion: The court dismisses the appeal, affirming the judgment of conviction and sentence by the High Court. Appellants are granted three months to surrender before the competent court.

Facts:

The appellant sought specific performance of an agreement to sell land.

The trial court decreed the suit, but the decree for specific performance was declined in the second appeal.

The High Court granted a decree for recovery of the earnest money with interest.

Issues:

The scope of second appeal as per Section 100 of the CPC and Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act.

The validity of the power of attorney to purchase land.

The plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform the contract.

Held:

The court emphasized the limited scope of second appeals, clarifying that interference is only allowed in case of an error in law or procedure, not on findings of fact.

The High Court's interference based on the absence of a specific power of attorney was found unjustified.

The judgment highlighted the findings of the first appellate court that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform the agreement.

Financial capacity, evidenced by the execution of sale deeds, was considered.

The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the decree for specific performance was restored.

The appellant was granted two months to pay the balance sale consideration, and if not received, the plaintiff could deposit the amount with the executing court.

The appeal was allowed, and no costs were imposed. The court reinstated the decree for specific performance, emphasizing the limitations on the High Court's jurisdiction in second appeals.

Facts:

The appellants, father and son, were accused of dowry death concerning the suicide of the wife of accused no.1. Allegations included cruelty due to dowry demands. The trial court acquitted both appellants, finding the prosecution failed to prove the case. The High Court overturned this decision, relying on witness depositions and misplaced letters.

Issues:

The reliability of witness testimonies.

Misplacement of crucial letters.

Applicability of Sections 304B and 306 r/w Section 34 of the IPC.

Held:

Section 304B and Presumption: Section 304B applies if a woman's death within 7 years of marriage results from cruelty or harassment for dowry. The presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act is rebuttable, allowing the accused to show the absence of elements of Section 304B. (Paras 33, 34)

Contradictions in Evidence: The testimony of the sister of the deceased, PW-1, and contradictions in the evidence of the deceased's father, PW4, were highlighted. The prosecution's case, as presented through PW4, was deemed unacceptable, and contradictions went to the root of the matter. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39)

Missing Letters: The two letters allegedly written by the deceased were not produced. Even if misplaced, the absence of harassment allegations in letters sent by PW4 was crucial. The High Court's reliance on the allegedly missing letters in an appeal against acquittal was deemed unacceptable. (Paras 42, 43, 46)

Scope of Trial and Relevant Evidence: The High Court's consideration of evidence related to harassment by the second accused (son) was found irrelevant and foreign to the trial for the offense under Section 304B. The Court emphasized that the evidence must be directly related to the demand for dowry. (Paras 51-53)

Appellate Court's Role: The Appellate Court has the power and duty to reappraise evidence. The Court stressed that truth in a criminal trial is discovered by analyzing chief examination, cross-examination, and re-examination. (Para 50)

Decision: The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the conviction under Section 304B.

Facts:

The complainant, Shiv Prakash Mishra, filed a complaint against several accused, including Subhash Chandra Shukla.

Subsequent investigations led to the exclusion of Subhash Chandra Shukla from the charge sheet, as evidence indicated his absence at the place of the incident.

During the trial, the appellant sought to summon Subhash Chandra Shukla under Section 319 CrPC.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented justifies summoning Subhash Chandra Shukla as an additional accused under Section 319 CrPC.

Held:

The court emphasized the discretionary nature of the power under Section 319 CrPC, to be exercised sparingly and based on strong and cogent evidence. The court found contradictions in witness statements and highlighted the absence of Subhash Chandra Shukla at the place of the incident during the investigation. The trial court's decision to dismiss the application under Section 319 CrPC was upheld. The appellant failed to file a protest petition during the investigation, and the court concluded that the power under Section 319 CrPC should not be exercised in a casual or cavalier manner.

Facts:

Respondent No.1 was found tampering with the meter, leading to a loss assessed at Rs. 6,28,383.

The appellant argued that this was respondent No.1's second offense, with a prior case compounded in 2009.

The complaint was filed under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Issues:

Delay in filing the complaint within 24 hours as required under Section 135(1A) of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Jurisdiction of the Special Court under Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Held:

The Special Court is empowered by the proviso to Section 151 of the Electricity Act, 2003, to take cognizance directly, negating the need for an order of committal under Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Dismissing the claim of delay, the Supreme Court accepts the appellant's submission that the disconnection occurred within the specified time.

The government notification (G.O.Ms. No.118) designates the 1st Additional District Judge's Court as a Special Court, establishing jurisdiction.

The High Court's order quashing proceedings is set aside. The Supreme Court does not delve into the merits, leaving it to the trial court.

Facts:

The appellant filed a suit for specific performance in 2006.

The trial court decreed the suit, and both parties appealed the decision.

The appellate court confirmed the trial court's judgment, resulting in the merger of the two decrees.

The main issue revolved around the time frame for the deposit of the balance sale consideration.

The executing court rejected the objections of the respondents and allowed the appellant's execution petition.

The High Court set aside the executing court's order, citing a failure on the appellant's part to deposit the balance within the specified time.

Issues:

Applicability of the doctrine of merger.

Interpretation of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act.

Validity of the High Court's decision regarding the time frame for depositing the balance sale consideration.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized the doctrine of merger, stating that once the appellate court confirms the trial court's judgment, there is a merger of the decrees. The court discussed the applicability of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, which allows the court to rescind the contract or extend the time for compliance with the decree.

The court held that the appellant acted bona fide, and the executing court was justified in rejecting the objections of the respondents. The High Court's modification of the decree was deemed impermissible. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment.

Facts:

The appellant, M/S PRRSAAR, appealed against the order dated 20.02.2017 by the Securities Appellate Tribunal, which upheld the Disciplinary Action Committee's decision of the National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. The disciplinary action involved a fine and suspension imposed on the appellant for financial irregularities and misconduct in business conduct.

Issues:

The appellant argued that the penalty/fine could only be imposed in accordance with the Circular dated 27.06.2013, while the respondent relied on bye-laws, particularly Chapter IV Rule 1.

The appropriateness of suspending the trading membership and the quantum of penalty imposed by the relevant authority.

Held:

The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and directed the appellant to reapproach the Securities Appellate Tribunal for reconsideration. The reconsideration is limited to the issue of the quantum of punishment awarded to the appellant. The Court noted that the Appellate Tribunal failed to address the appellant's contentions about the appropriateness of the order and the specific provisions in the Circular. The Tribunal is instructed not to delve into technicalities related to the withdrawal of a specific appeal but to decide the restored appeal expeditiously, focusing solely on the quantum of punishment. The Appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The respondent applied for the allotment of an LIG tenement in 1990.

The respondent deposited Rs 4,000 on 21 February 1991.

On 30 April 1992, a letter of allotment was issued, specifying a balance of Rs 47,674 payable at the time of possession.

The appellant claimed the allotment was canceled in 1994 due to the respondent's failure to deposit the balance.

The respondent contested, stating she did not receive a letter of possession.

Issues:

Whether the letter offering possession was made available to the respondent.

Whether the balance payment was required only at the time of possession.

Held:

The Court set aside the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission's judgment, emphasizing the real dispute about the availability of the letter offering possession. The respondent's letters in 1996 and 2008 admitted financial inability to deposit the balance. The Court found the complaint filed in 2008 was time-barred. The appellant was directed to refund Rs 25,000, and the respondent was awarded a total of Rs 1 lakh, including litigation expenses. This decision was made under the Court's jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.