Facts:

The case involves MSIL, a joint venture between Suzuki Motor Corporation and MSIL, initially known as SPIL.

SPIL filed its return in 2012, and later, a scheme for amalgamation with MSIL was approved.

Assessment proceedings continued in the name of the non-existent entity, SPIL.

Issues:

The validity of assessment proceedings conducted in the name of SPIL post-amalgamation.

Held:

The court emphasized that the income subjected to tax belonged to the erstwhile entity (SPIL) pre-amalgamation.

The approved scheme of amalgamation resulted in the cessation of SPIL, and it could not be considered a person against whom assessment proceedings could be initiated.

Despite the notice issued under section 143(2) and the communication of amalgamation to the assessing officer, proceedings were pursued in the name of SPIL, rendering them void ab initio.

The court referred to Spice Entertainment, where assessments in the name of amalgamated and dissolved companies were deemed null and void, emphasizing it as a substantive illegality.

The doctrine of merger was highlighted, affirming that the amalgamating entity ceases to exist upon amalgamation.

Consistency and certainty in tax litigation were stressed, adopting the principles established in prior cases for AY 2011-12 to the present appeal for AY 2012-13.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the void ab initio nature of assessment proceedings against the non-existent entity (SPIL) and upholding the principles of consistency and certainty in tax matters.

Facts:

Government of Madhya Pradesh issued a policy in 2012 for wind energy.

Tariff Order issued on March 26, 2013, applicable to projects commissioned till March 31, 2016.

Dispute arose on the commissioning date of a wind project between the appellant and respondent.

A new Tariff Order on March 17, 2016, with a different tariff rate for projects commissioned on or after April 1, 2016.

Dispute on the actual commissioning date of the project - appellant claimed April 1, 2016, while the respondent asserted March 31, 2016.

High Court directed the appellant to enter into a PPA based on the earlier tariff order.

Appellant revoked the commissioning certificate, leading to a second set of writ petitions.

Issues:

Determination of the actual commissioning date of the wind project.

Applicability of the tariff order and the subsequent guidelines.

Held:

The Court held that the project was commissioned on April 1, 2016, based on objective data from the State Load Dispatch Centre (SLDC). The respondent is entitled to the tariff under the Tariff Order dated March 17, 2016. The competitive bidding guidelines issued subsequently on December 8, 2017, do not apply to the project. The first respondent is directed to process the PPA application based on the March 17, 2016, Tariff Order from April 1, 2016.

Facts:

Dispute arose from an agreement for the sale of Iron Ore Pellets between the appellant and respondent.

Agreement contained an arbitration clause in Clause 18, specifying Bhubaneswar as the venue for arbitration.

Respondent invoked the arbitration clause, and the appellant contested, challenging the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court.

Issues:

Whether the Madras High Court could exercise jurisdiction under Section 11(6) despite the agreement specifying Bhubaneswar as the venue.

Interpretation of the agreement regarding the "venue" and its impact on jurisdiction.

Held:

The distinction between "Seat" and "Venue" is crucial, and the agreed "venue" has significance in determining jurisdiction.

The absence of words like "exclusive jurisdiction" does not alter the parties' intention to exclude other courts when a specific place is agreed upon.

When parties agree on the "venue" of arbitration, it becomes the "Seat," and the court at that location has exclusive jurisdiction.

The Madras High Court erred in assuming jurisdiction, as only the Orissa High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 11(6) due to the agreed "venue" being Bhubaneswar.

Facts:

Zorawar Singh owned certain immovable property in New Delhi.

Zorawar Singh executed a Will dated June 16, 1985, and a codicil dated October 21, 1995.

Two suits were filed: one by the respondents claiming declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the Will and codicil, and the other by the appellant claiming natural succession.

Issues:

The applicability of Clause (c) of Section 213(2) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

Whether it is necessary to seek probate or letters of administration in the National Capital Region of Delhi.

Held:

The Act is applicable to Wills and codicils made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains, subject to the jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of the High Courts of Madras or Bombay - {clause (a) of Section 57 of the Act}.

It is also applicable to Wills and codicils made outside those territories and limits in relation to immovable property within those territories - Clause (b) of Section 57.

Clause (c) of Section 57 applies to Wills and codicils made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains on or after January 1, 1927, to which provisions are not applied by clauses (a) and (b).

Sub-section (2) of Section 213 of the Act applies only to Wills made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains falling under clauses (a) or (b) of Section 57, making clause (c) inapplicable.

The judgment cites several cases supporting the view that probate is not necessary for Wills made outside Bengal, Madras, or Bombay concerning properties and parties not located in those territories.

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court's order, which accepted an intra-court appeal against the rejection of the plaint based on Section 213, was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, finding no error in the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court.

FACTS:

The appellant, an ex-Havildar in the Indian Army, completed 24 years of service with a two-year extension granted.

During the extended tenure, the appellant suffered a stroke and was discharged after being re-categorized with an 80% disability.

The appellant sought disability pension and ex-gratia compensation.

ISSUES:

Eligibility for ex-gratia compensation based on the conditions stipulated in the policy circular dated December 26, 2011.

Interpretation of Regulations 173 and 173-A of the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961.

HELD:

The court emphasized the specific conditions for ex-gratia compensation outlined in the policy circular.

The appellant, having been discharged due to a permanent low medical category during the extended service, was entitled to disability pension under Regulation 173-A but did not meet the criteria for ex-gratia compensation.

The deeming fiction under Regulation 173-A was held not to extend to the policy document dated December 26, 2011.

The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the claim for ex-gratia compensation could not be entertained.

Facts:

Lucknow Development Authority (LDA) acquired land for the Sitapur Road City Extension Scheme.

Respondents' land was part of the acquisition but sought release under Section 17.

LDA imposed development charges for the release of the respondents' land.

High Court quashed LDA's order, citing lack of evidence of development in the vicinity of the respondents' land.

Issues:

Whether development charges can be imposed under Section 17.

Interpretation of development activities in the context of land acquisition.

Applicability of the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Act.

Whether the High Court's findings on lack of development in the vicinity are correct.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's interpretation was not correct. It emphasized that development should be examined in respect of the entire acquired land, not just the specific area owned by the respondents. The Court accepted LDA's claims of extensive development activities, including road construction, provision of electricity and water, and sewer line installation. The respondents were deemed liable for development charges, and the High Court's decision was set aside.

Facts:

The Respondent Company, a subsidiary of the Marathwada Development Corporation, engaged women workers for stitching garments at their homes.

The Appellant, the Provident Fund Office, issued notices to the Respondent Company, claiming Provident Fund contributions for the women workers.

The Respondent challenged the order in the Bombay High Court, which ruled in their favor.

Issues:

Whether women workers engaged by the Respondent Company should be considered "employees" under Section 2(f) of the EPF Act.

Whether the women workers, despite working off-site and being paid on a piece-rate basis, fall within the definition of "employee."

Held:

The court held that the women workers were indeed covered by the definition of "employee" under Section 2(f) of the EPF Act. The inclusive definition encompassed both direct and indirect engagement in connection with the work of the establishment. The court emphasized that payment on a per-piece basis and working off-site did not negate the employment status. The Provident Fund Office's order was restored, and the Respondent Company was directed to deposit the assessed Provident Fund dues for the women workers within one month.

The Civil Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. All pending Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

Multiple accused, including Postman Vengaisamy (A-l), Thalaiyaripandi (A-ll), and others, were tried for offenses under Sections 148, 302, and 506 (Part II) IPC.

Incidents occurred on April 8, 2003, and April 26, 2003, involving alleged attacks on the deceased, Chinnaperiaiyah, and others.

Issues:

Credibility of prosecution witnesses, especially Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2).

Allegations of the accused being armed with weapons and forming an unlawful assembly.

Held:

The court hears arguments from both sides and finds no merit in the appeal.( Paragraph 8)

Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2) testified to being surrounded by accused, led by Thalaiyaripandi (A-ll), armed with swords. Accused attacked the deceased and injured Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2). Defense claims these witnesses are introduced, but the court finds no such inference from cross-examination.( Paragraph 9)

Medical evidence supports the oral testimony. Dr. Jayakumar (PW-13) examined Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2) on the same day. Deceased's postmortem report (Ex.P-28) and medical reports (Ex.P-29, Ex.P-30) of the injured witnesses corroborate events.( Paragraph 10)

Statements of Baskaran (PW-4) and Rathi (PW-5) confirm the incident on April 8, 2003, adding to the credibility of the prosecution's case.( Paragraph 11)

Court rejects the applicability of precedents cited by the defense (Ram Laxman, Najabhai Desurbhai Wagh, and Mahendran) as they are distinguishable from the facts of the present case.( Paragraph 13)

Reiterates the principle that "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" has no application in India. Even if part of a witness's statement is unproved, the entire testimony cannot be rejected.( Paragraph 14)

Conclusion: The court dismisses the appeal, affirming the judgment of conviction and sentence by the High Court. Appellants are granted three months to surrender before the competent court.

Facts:

The dispute involved the nomination of Sajjadah Nashin and Mutawalli of a Dargah founded in 1838.

The founder nominated his son Maulana Naseeruddeen Sahib as his successor.

The Zabta, constituting rules for the nomination, was framed by the third Sajjadah Nashin and Mutawalli, Gulam Sarwar Sahib, in 1932.

The appellant, Peer Gulam Jilani, contested the eligibility of the respondent, Peer Gulam Naseer, citing issues related to familial lineage and interpretation of terms in the Zabta.

Issues:

Whether the respondent was eligible to be nominated as Sajjadah Nashin and Mutawalli.

Interpretation of the terms 'Khandan' and 'Sagir Sinn' in the Zabta.

Held:

The Zabta did not specify hereditary succession but emphasized the selection of a qualified person during the lifetime of the incumbent.

The term 'Khandan' was interpreted broadly to include those in the spiritual sect 'Silsila,' not limited to blood relations.

The respondent, being the daughter's son of the 4th Sajjadah Nashin and Mutawalli, was deemed eligible, as he was part of the 'Khandan.'

The interpretation of the term 'Sagir Sinn' as 'minor age' was upheld, and it was not accepted as meaning 'minor son.'

Rule 1 of the Zabta did not establish hereditary succession or lineal descendant requirements for the Sajjadah Nashin and Mutawalli.

The appellant's contentions were dismissed, and the appeals were rejected.