Facts:

Mohammad Badruddin faced disciplinary proceedings, resulting in a punishment of compulsory retirement, later altered to reversion.

Five charges were leveled against Badruddin, with the Inquiry Officer finding charge No. 4 proved, while charges 1, 2, 3, and 5 were not proved.

The Disciplinary Authority disagreed with findings on charges 1 and 5.

Based on charges 1, 4, and 5, along with a previous punishment of reversion, Badruddin was removed from service.

The High Court set aside the removal punishment, citing reasons for disagreement not being supplied and non-disclosure of the previous punishment.

Issues:

Violation of natural justice due to non-furnishing of the Inquiry Report.

Validity of removal from service based on multiple charges, including a previous punishment.

Held:

Non-furnishing of Inquiry Report: The Division Bench set aside the punishment, citing a violation of natural justice. The Supreme Court clarified that the Ramzan Khan judgment had prospective effect and couldn't affect inquiries conducted before November 20, 1990. As the punishment order was before this date, the Court restored the punishment of reversion.( Paragraphs 4, 5, and 7)

Removal from Service - Multiple Charges: The Supreme Court clarified that, post the 42nd Constitutional amendment, there's no mandatory requirement to communicate the proposed punishment. Non-communication of previous punishments in the show cause notice does not invalidate the punishment. However, the Court couldn't maintain the removal punishment due to findings on charge No. 4. The matter was remanded to the Disciplinary Authority for reconsideration based on charge No. 4.( Paragraphs 23 and 24)

Conclusion: The order of reversion was restored, as the non-furnishing of the Inquiry Report did not affect the pre-November 20, 1990, punishment. The removal punishment was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Disciplinary Authority for reconsideration based on charge No. 4.

Facts:

The High Court dismissed appeals by the State of Madhya Pradesh and another on merits.

Despite the dismissal of the appeals, the landowners filed a cross objection seeking enhancement of compensation.

The High Court, without proper examination and reasons, rejected the cross objection.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was obligated to independently examine the issues raised by the landowners in the cross objection.

Whether there was a case for enhancement of compensation based on the evidence presented by the parties.

Held:

The Court observed that Order 41 Rule 22(4) of the CPC allows the cross objection to be heard and determined even if the original appeal is withdrawn or dismissed for default.

The High Court was obligated to independently examine the issues raised by the landowners in the cross objection and determine if there was a case for further enhancement in compensation.

The failure of the High Court to examine the question of whether there was a case for enhancement of compensation and the rejection of the cross objection without discussion and reasons were deemed legally unsustainable.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and restoring the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, confirming the dismissal of the landowners' suit.

Facts:

The appellant, Sulekha Rani, appealed against the judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) dismissing her Original Application for the grant of pension in respect of her deceased spouse's service in the Indian Army. The appellant's spouse was enrolled in the Army in 1994, posted at the Siachen Glacier, and discharged in 2001. The appellant contended that no Invalidation Medical Board was held prior to the discharge, and the absence of such a board was a violation of rules.

Issues:

Whether the absence of an Invalidation Medical Board prior to the discharge of the appellant's spouse is a violation of rules.

Whether the appellant is entitled to family pension.

Held:

The Court held that the discharge of the appellant's spouse without convening an Invalidation Medical Board was illegal. Rule 13(3)(III)(v) is a residuary provision and does not apply to cases of medical unfitness. The absence of an Invalidation Medical Board is a violation of the prescribed procedure for discharge in cases of medical unfitness. Consequently, the appellant is entitled to family pension, and the service of the deceased spouse is deemed to have continued until the date of death (30 September 2007). No arrears of wages are payable between the date of discharge and the date of death. The arrears of family pension are to be paid to the appellant within three months from the date of the order.

Facts:

The plaintiff and the defendant were acquainted, and the plaintiff had taken financial assistance from the defendant.

A sum of Rs.5,000/- was construed as consideration for the land, and a sale deed dated 10th December 1968 was executed.

Contemporaneously, an agreement dated 10th December 1968 and another agreement on 29th August 1969 were entered into, indicating reconveyance conditions.

The plaintiff filed a suit in 1980 seeking redemption of the mortgage.

Issues:

Whether the transaction is a mortgage by conditional sale or a sale.

The relevance of mutation proceedings in determining the character of the transaction.

The plaintiff's right of redemption based on the agreements and subsequent actions.

Held:

The court interprets Section 58(c) and the proviso, emphasizing that the sale deed must embody the condition to be deemed a mortgage. Contemporaneous agreements are considered but held insufficient to alter the nature indicated in the sale deed.( Paragraphs 5-7)

The court refers to a precedent emphasizing that a sale with a condition of retransfer is not a mortgage. The real character of the transaction is determined by the provisions of the deed viewed in light of surrounding circumstances and parties' intention.( Paragraph 8)

The court examines the documents (Exhibits 23, 24, and 14/1) and concludes that the sale deed does not indicate a mortgage. The defendant's acquisition of absolute right is supported by non-repayment and initiation of mutation proceedings.( Paragraphs 9-10)

The court dismisses the relevance of a cited case (Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar) regarding mutation's presumptive value on title. It asserts the importance of mutation in the present context, emphasizing its relevance in construing the nature of the transaction.( Paragraph 11)

The court finds the suit seeking redemption not sustainable and suggests that if the agreement of reconveyance is to be enforced, a suit for specific performance should have been filed. The suit is dismissed based on a misconception.( Paragraph 12)

Facts:

The respondent filed a summary suit for the recovery of a specified amount under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellant challenged the grant of conditional leave to defend, highlighting the absence of admissible dues and the withdrawal of a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Issues:

Whether the court properly exercised its discretion in granting conditional leave to defend?

Whether there was a prima facie fair and reasonable defense disclosed by the appellant?

The relevance of the withdrawal of the prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Held:

The court emphasized the discretion vested in the court to grant conditional leave to defend in appropriate cases. It noted that in a summary suit, if the defendant discloses a prima facie fair and reasonable defense, unconditional leave to defend may be granted. The court, in this case, found that the appellant had raised substantial defenses and genuine triable issues. The lower courts misdirected themselves in applying the principles laid down in IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited vs. Hubtown Limited, resulting in the grant of conditional leave. Therefore, the impugned orders granting conditional leave were set aside, and unconditional leave to defend was granted to the appellant.

Facts:

The appeal arises from a dispute between a landlord (appellant) and a tenant (respondent) over eviction from a property under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

The tenant, after compromising in a civil suit, failed to vacate the property as per the agreed terms, leading to an execution petition by the landlord.

The High Court set aside the Executing Court's order, stating that the execution petition was not maintainable without a formal decree.

Issues:

Whether the execution petition filed by the appellant is maintainable without a formal decree.

Whether the order dated 01.06.2012, passed under Order 23 Rule 3, can be treated as a decree for execution purposes.

The propriety of directing the appellant to apply under Section 152 of the Code.

Held:

The High Court was not right in holding that the execution petition is not maintainable without a formal decree. The order had the effect of a decree during the interim period.

The appellant is granted two weeks to apply under Section 151 read with Order 20 Rule 6(A) of the Code to the concerned Court for drawing up a formal decree.

The High Court was not right in directing the appellant to apply under Section 152 of the Code.

The Executing Court's order is modified to impose a compensatory cost of Rs. 50,000 on the respondent.

The respondent is granted one month to vacate the property after completing procedural formalities and making payment of all arrears of rent.

Facts:

Issac T.M., the appellant, served Idukki District Co-operative Bank in Kerala.

Kerala introduced a self-financing pension scheme for co-operative bank employees in 2005.

The appellant, eligible for pension, faced delays due to disciplinary proceedings.

A communication in 2006 initiated the pension scheme, but a show cause notice in 2007 led to a liability on the appellant.

Pension disbursal was hindered due to disciplinary proceedings, leading to a writ petition.

Issues:

Interpretation of para 5(2) of the Pension Scheme.

Delay in forwarding pension records by the bank.

Appellant's entitlement to pension from 1 February 2007.

Held:

The Court held that para 5(2) of the Pension Scheme was ultra vires based on a previous Kerala High Court judgment. The entitlement to pension from 1 February 2007 was affirmed. The Court directed the second respondent to pay arrears of pension between 1 February 2007 and 1 November 2013 within four weeks. Calculation and intimation of any interest due on delayed contributions were also ordered within four weeks. The first respondent was then required to remit the amount, and the arrears due to the appellant were to be paid within two months. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The State of West Bengal invited tenders for a special repair program on National Highway-II. PAM Developments Private Ltd. (the appellant) won the bid, and an agreement was executed. After completing the work, the appellant raised claims, which went unpaid by the State. The appellant initiated arbitration under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act, resulting in the arbitrator allowing the claims. Subsequently, the State filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, and the appellant filed an execution application.

Issues:

Validity of the unconditional stay granted based on Order XXVII, Rule 8A of CPC.

Application of Section 36 of the Arbitration Act concerning the grant of stay of the arbitration award.

Equality of treatment between the government and other parties in arbitration proceedings.

Interpretation of the relationship between the provisions of CPC and the Arbitration Act.

Held:

The court, considering Sub-Section (3) of Section 36 of the Arbitration Act, emphasized that the grant of stay must be subject to conditions as deemed fit. The reference to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in Section 36 is for general guidance, and the phrase "having due regard to" implies a discretionary rather than a mandatory application. [Para 17]

The phrase "having regard to" in Section 36 implies a general guideline, and the provisions of CPC are to be followed as guidance, with the primary application of the Arbitration Act. The court clarified that the CPC should not make the main provisions of the Arbitration Act inapplicable. [Para 18]

Arbitration proceedings aim for quick dispute resolution, and automatic stays on money decrees against the government would defeat the purpose. The Arbitration Act treats all parties equally under Section 18, and there is no special treatment or differential application for the government in Section 36. [Para 24]

The court rejected the argument that Order XXVII, Rule 8A of CPC provides for special treatment for the government. Even if applied, it only exempts the government from furnishing security, and the court retains the power to direct deposit of the awarded amount. [Para 27]

Decision: The court allowed the appeals, declaring that the unconditional stay of the arbitration award was not sustainable. It restored the order of the Executing Court, enabling the appellant-award holder to pray for the release of the attached amount.

Facts:

Respondent carried out exports from 1988 to 1993.

Applied for an REP license, entitled to a premium, which was not paid due to the discontinuation of the scheme.

Appeals and unsuccessful attempts for premium release.

District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum allowed the claim.

Appellants challenged the jurisdiction of consumer fora, arguing that benefits under the Exim policy do not constitute a service.

Issues:

Whether a person claiming under an REP license is a consumer under the Consumer Protection Act.

Whether providing benefits under the Exim policy qualifies as a 'service' under the Act.

Held:

The court, after considering relevant sections of the Consumer Protection Act and the Exim policy for the period in question, held that the government, in formulating the Exim policy and providing incentives, does not perform a service. The person availing of incentives is not considered a consumer under the Act. The court referred to previous decisions, including Vikram Sales Corporation vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Bihar School Examination Board vs. Suresh Prasad Sinha, to support this interpretation.