Facts:

The Respondents booked a residential villa with the Appellants.

The agreement stipulated possession by December 31, 2014, upon timely payments.

Respondents deposited Rs. 8.14 crores, but possession was not delivered by the agreed date.

Appellants cited additional work and Stop Work Notices by Pune Municipal Corporation.

Issues:

Whether the Appellants were in deficiency of service for not delivering possession by the agreed-upon date.

Validity of the additional work claim and its impact on possession.

Responsibility for delays due to Stop Work Notices.

Held:

The Court upheld the NCDRC's decision, finding deficiencies in the Appellants' service. The Respondents were justified in seeking a refund with reasonable interest. Even if the villa is now ready, the five-year delay was deemed crucial, and the original bargain could not be imposed on the Respondents. The Court directed the refund and imposed restrictions on the sale of the villa. The appeals stand dismissed.

Facts:

Pursuant to the state government's policy, the appellant was allowed to set up a Hydro Electric Project under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with KSEB.

The MoU specified that the appellant would operate the unit for 30 years from the date of commissioning, and KSEB was responsible for constructing the transmission line.

A delay in the construction of the transmission line led to a writ petition by the appellant, seeking power free of cost and expedited construction.

Issues:

The interpretation of the contract, the delay in the construction of the transmission line, and the entitlement of the appellant to certain tariff concessions.

Held:

The court held that the contract clearly stipulated the date of commissioning as the date when power generated by the appellant was fed into the KSEB grid (Para 35).

While the contract did not specify the exact length of the transmission line, the court emphasized that, according to Clause 9, KSEB had the obligation to complete the transmission line within a reasonable period (Para 36).

The High Court's conclusion that the contract did not specify timelines for the transmission line construction was deemed incorrect (Para 36).

The court recognized the concessions provided to the appellant as matters of policy to encourage industrialization (Para 37).

Contractual obligations were emphasized, and the court noted that the delay in transmission line construction should not leave the private investor in a disadvantaged position (Para 42).

The State Government was directed to reassess the matter within the legal framework and its own policy, considering the delay and contractual obligations (Para 45).

Facts:

Appellant appointed as a temporary Assistant Grade-III in 1983.

Absent for 1968 days between 1987 and 1993, later sanctioned as medical leave.

Promoted to temporary Assistant Grade-II in 1990.

Medical Board in 1992 found excessive leave based on medical certificates.

Termination in 1994 following unsatisfactory reply to show cause notice.

Issues:

Applicability of Regulation 24 of the 1975 Regulations.

Validity of termination without a formal domestic inquiry.

Regularization of absence as leave as a ground for termination.

Held:

The termination under Regulation 24 was not justified as appellant had over eleven years of service.

Formal domestic inquiry is necessary for termination with serious civil consequences.

Regularization of absence as leave was a valid point against termination.

High Court's decision on the termination upheld, but back wages reduced to 10% due to appellant's habitual absenteeism.

Appellant granted reinstatement but not required to work, with salary payment until superannuation in May 2020.

Facts:

The case involves the appellant, Bharatbhai Bhimabhai Bharwad, challenging the grant of bail to respondents No.2 and 3.

The respondents were accused of serious offenses related to causing hurt and attempted murder.

The trial court granted bail to respondents No.2 and 3 based on certain considerations, including the recovery of weapons and the health status of the injured parties.

The appellant challenged the bail order in the High Court, alleging an arbitrary exercise of discretion by the trial court.

Issues:

Whether there was an arbitrary exercise of discretion in granting bail to the respondents.

Whether the High Court properly understood the nature of the challenge raised by the appellant.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized the difference between considerations for cancellation of bail and challenging the grant of bail on the grounds of an arbitrary exercise of discretion. It clarified that the appellant had challenged the very grant of bail on the ground of arbitrary exercise of discretion, not merely seeking cancellation.( Para 10)

As the High Court proceeded as if the appellant had filed the application only for cancellation of bail, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders and remitted the matter to the High Court for reconsideration. The High Court is directed to treat the application as challenging the order of grant of bail and proceed accordingly.( Para 11)

Facts:

The case involves a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where the appellant's cheques were dishonored due to insufficient funds. Section 143A, introduced in 2018, allows the court to order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant. The appellant challenged the order of the Trial Court, which directed the payment of interim compensation.

Issues:

The prospective or retrospective applicability of Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, concerning the payment of interim compensation.

Held:

The court held that Section 143A is prospective and applies only to cases where offenses under Section 138 were committed after its introduction. It emphasized that Section 143A creates a new liability and exposes the accused to coercive recovery methods. The court set aside the orders of the Trial Court and the High Court, directing the return of the money deposited as interim compensation along with interest. The court allowed the appeal.

Facts:

Prestige Estates Project Ltd. applied for planning permission on March 22, 2011. The Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority issued a demand notice for charges, including I & A charges and premium FSI charges, on March 27, 2012. The respondent paid the charges on March 28, 2012. Subsequent amendments by the government on March 26, 2012, and March 28, 2012, revised the charges.

Issues:

The legality of the demand for revised I & A charges and premium FSI charges. The court examined whether the Rules, 2008, were formally amended and if the demand for revised charges was enforceable against Prestige Estates Project Ltd.

Held:

The court addressed the provisions of G.O.Ms No.86 and the contemplated amendment to the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning (Levy of Infrastructure and Amenities Charges) Rules, 2008. It was clarified that the Rules, 2008, were not formally amended, and the demand for revised I & A charges could not be enforced without such amendment.( Para 20)

The court considered an Internal Office Circular/Order dated April 16, 2012, specifying that revised I & A charges were leviable from March 28, 2012. The court agreed with the High Court's view that the revised charges were not lawfully demanded from Prestige Estates Project Ltd. for applications made prior to March 28, 2012.( Para 21)

The judgment scrutinized the levy of Premium FSI charges under Regulation 36. It emphasized that the demand for Premium FSI charges is incident to the grant of Premium FSI. The court affirmed that the demand for revised Premium FSI charges was lawful.( Para 22)

The court highlighted that planning permission was not yet granted, and the steps were outlined for the fulfillment of conditions before considering the application for planning permission.( Para 23)

Emphasizing that the grant of planning permission would only follow a meticulous scrutiny of the application, the court held that Prestige Estates Project Ltd. was bound to pay the revised charges once they came into force on April 1, 2012. The demand for revised Premium FSI charges on August 22, 2012, was deemed lawful.( Para 24)

Facts:

The respondents (Subhash, Kartar, Sohit, Amarjeet, Soran Bhati, Lilu@Mahendra, and Ashu @ Ashish) were facing trial for various offenses, including murder, in connection with Crime No. 608/2018.

The respondents applied for bail before the Sessions Court, but their applications were rejected.

The respondents appealed to the High Court, which granted bail without providing sufficient reasons for its decision.

The father of the deceased (appellant) challenged the High Court's decision in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in granting bail to the respondents without assigning proper reasons.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's orders and dismissing the bail applications of the respondents.

The High Court committed a jurisdictional error by not providing reasons for granting bail and not considering relevant factors, such as the antecedents of the accused and the nature of the offense.

Emphasized the need for assigning reasons while granting bail and referred to previous cases highlighting the same.

While not requiring categorical findings at the bail stage due to insufficient evidence, the court stressed that it must appear that the court applied its mind to the relevant facts.

Directed the respondents to surrender in the Sessions Court for custody as under trial.

Instructed the Sessions Judge to decide the trial strictly in accordance with the law and on its merits expeditiously, without being influenced by any observations made in the Supreme Court's order.

Facts:

The All India Chess Federation (second Respondent) disaffiliated the Maharashtra Chess Association (Appellant) on December 25, 2016.

The Appellant filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court under Article 226 challenging the disaffiliation.

The second Respondent raised a preliminary objection, citing Clause 21 of its Constitution and Bye Laws, contending that the Bombay High Court lacked jurisdiction.

Issues:

Whether a private agreement (Clause 21) can oust the writ jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court under Article 226.

Whether the existence of an alternate remedy, as provided in the agreement, creates a legal bar on the Bombay High Court's writ jurisdiction.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that while parties can agree to submit disputes to a specific court, the existence of an alternate remedy does not create an absolute legal bar on the High Court's exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The judgment emphasized the discretionary nature of the writ jurisdiction and criticized the Bombay High Court's reliance solely on Clause 21 without examining the case holistically. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the writ petition was restored to the Bombay High Court for fresh consideration.

Facts:

The appellants, prospective buyers, entered into an agreement to purchase land for Rs. 99,84,500. The appropriate authority issued a show cause notice under section 269UD(1A), challenging the disclosed sale consideration. After inquiries, the authority ordered the vesting of the suit land in the Central Government.

Issues:

Whether the appropriate authority's decision for pre-emptive purchase under Section 269UD(1) was valid.

The appellants challenged the apparent consideration and sought a refund.

The Division Bench also considered the disbursement of the amount, involving Section 269UG(4) of the Act.

Held:

The appropriate authority meticulously examined the location, area, and proximity of the suit land. After considering the condition and use of existing structures, the authority determined the market value at Rs. 1,79,21,532, surpassing the declared consideration. The authority rejected the appellants' objections regarding deduction percentages.( Paragraphs 26-29)

The writ court rightly limited its jurisdiction, acknowledging it couldn't act as an appellate court. The findings were consistently upheld by the writ court, appellate court, and review court, based on evidence and in conformity with Section 269UD of the Act.( Paragraphs 36-37)

The Division Bench dismissed the appellants' appeal but partially allowed the vendor's appeal. However, the Division Bench failed to consider Section 269UG(4) of the Act, which dictates the appropriate authority's role in determining the consideration.( Paragraphs 3, 12-13)

The court, in allowing the vendor's appeal, emphasized that the High Court should have left the disbursement matter to be decided by the appropriate authority under Section 269UG(4) of the Act.( Paragraph 6)