Facts:

The respondent applied for the allotment of an LIG tenement in 1990.

The respondent deposited Rs 4,000 on 21 February 1991.

On 30 April 1992, a letter of allotment was issued, specifying a balance of Rs 47,674 payable at the time of possession.

The appellant claimed the allotment was canceled in 1994 due to the respondent's failure to deposit the balance.

The respondent contested, stating she did not receive a letter of possession.

Issues:

Whether the letter offering possession was made available to the respondent.

Whether the balance payment was required only at the time of possession.

Held:

The Court set aside the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission's judgment, emphasizing the real dispute about the availability of the letter offering possession. The respondent's letters in 1996 and 2008 admitted financial inability to deposit the balance. The Court found the complaint filed in 2008 was time-barred. The appellant was directed to refund Rs 25,000, and the respondent was awarded a total of Rs 1 lakh, including litigation expenses. This decision was made under the Court's jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

Facts:

The appellant, M/S PRRSAAR, appealed against the order dated 20.02.2017 by the Securities Appellate Tribunal, which upheld the Disciplinary Action Committee's decision of the National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. The disciplinary action involved a fine and suspension imposed on the appellant for financial irregularities and misconduct in business conduct.

Issues:

The appellant argued that the penalty/fine could only be imposed in accordance with the Circular dated 27.06.2013, while the respondent relied on bye-laws, particularly Chapter IV Rule 1.

The appropriateness of suspending the trading membership and the quantum of penalty imposed by the relevant authority.

Held:

The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and directed the appellant to reapproach the Securities Appellate Tribunal for reconsideration. The reconsideration is limited to the issue of the quantum of punishment awarded to the appellant. The Court noted that the Appellate Tribunal failed to address the appellant's contentions about the appropriateness of the order and the specific provisions in the Circular. The Tribunal is instructed not to delve into technicalities related to the withdrawal of a specific appeal but to decide the restored appeal expeditiously, focusing solely on the quantum of punishment. The Appeal is allowed.

Facts:

CCL Products (India) Limited, engaged in instant coffee manufacturing, faced complaints of environmental pollution.

Pollution Control Board issued directions, including the submission of bank guarantees, to ensure compliance with environmental standards.

Three bank guarantees were provided by the respondent, each covering specific compliance requirements.

Issues:

Whether the Pollution Control Board's invocation of bank guarantees was justified.

Whether principles of natural justice were followed in the invocation process.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that bank guarantees constitute independent contracts between the issuing bank and the beneficiary. Unless there is fraud, irretrievable injustice, or special equities, the court should not interfere with the invocation as long as it aligns with the terms of the bank guarantee. The Tribunal erred in requiring principles of natural justice to be followed in the context of bank guarantees. The invocation was justified based on non-compliance with environmental norms, and the court set aside the Tribunal's judgment. The appeal was allowed.

Facts:

The appellant initiated a public interest litigation.

High Court directed the State to make an administrative decision on Tripura Medical College.

State reconstituted the Society managing the college.

Issues:

Appellant challenged admission procedure and fees, seeking parity with other government medical colleges.

The writ petition was dismissed, leading to the present appeal.

Held:

Court's Jurisdiction and Policy Decision: The court highlighted that the appellant raised a policy issue, and it was inappropriate for the High Court to direct the government to run the college as a government institution. The chosen hybrid model with a society was upheld. (Para 8)

Grievance on Fees The appellant's grievance about student fees was advised to be considered by the regulatory committee in the state. (Para 9):

Appropriateness of Judicial Review: The court found it inappropriate to determine the correctness of a policy decision made by the State government. (Para 10)

Final Decision: The court found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it. No costs were imposed. (Para 11)

Facts:

The respondent initially filed a writ petition challenging the 2016 Rules, which was disposed of with the liberty to make a representation. The subsequent representation was rejected. A second writ petition was filed by the respondent, challenging only the 2016 Rules. An amendment application sought the quashing of advertisements and the list of selected candidates, which was allowed by the court.

Issues:

The appeal included the High Court's interference with the select list despite the respondent being disallowed from challenging the advertisements, the absence of selected candidates in the writ petition, and the questionable categorization of the writ petition as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) given its nature related to service jurisprudence.

Held:

The High Court erred in modifying the select list when the respondent was not allowed to challenge the advertisements. (Para 29-32)

The direction to modify the select list without impleading selected candidates was against the appellants' interests. (Para 33)

The High Court, in treating the writ petition as a PIL, erred, especially since the respondent was not allowed to challenge the advertisements. (Para 38)

The Court emphasized that the respondent, not participating in the selection process, should not have been allowed to challenge the validity of the Rules indirectly. (Para 40)

Decision: The appeals were allowed, the High Court's directions were set aside, and the writ petition was dismissed.

Facts:

The first respondent was appointed as an Ayurvedic Medical Officer in the State of Bihar in 1989.

Bihar was reorganized in 2000, resulting in the creation of the State of Jharkhand.

The first respondent opted for Bihar but was later allocated to Jharkhand in 2007.

In 2010, the first respondent sought re-allocation to Bihar, which was granted.

The respondent continued to work in Jharkhand until retirement in 2017.

The first respondent filed a Writ Petition claiming non-relief from Jharkhand to join Bihar.

Issues:

Whether the non-relief by Jharkhand was a valid ground for seeking relief from the court.

Whether the first respondent, having retired, could be absorbed by the State of Bihar.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the first respondent did not pursue legal remedies when aggrieved by Jharkhand's decision not to relieve him. It deemed inappropriate to direct his absorption by Bihar after retirement. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The judgment further stated that there shall be no order as to costs.

Facts:

The dispute arose from a construction project where M/S Treaty Construction & another (appellants) undertook to build a structure with flats and shops. The purchasers formed a co-operative housing society (M/S Ruby Tower Co-op. HSG. Society Ltd.). The society alleged that the appellants failed to complete interior works, obtain necessary certificates, and borrowed money on false pretenses.

Issues:

The completion of construction, allegations of illegal alterations, and financial transactions between the parties.

Held:

The National Commission's direction to pay Rs.25,00,000/- by the appellants to the respondent was upheld. The appellants had agreed to this amount in meetings, and the National Commission rightly enforced this commitment.( Para 10)

The part of the order requiring the appellants to pay compensation of Rs.3,00,000/- was set aside. The court found no evidence on record to establish the appellants' liability for compensation, and there was a lack of material proving loss suffered by the respondent-society.( Para 11)

The direction for the appellants to pay Rs.1,000/- per day after 60 days until obtaining full Occupancy Certificate was also set aside. The court considered the Municipal Corporation's objections and the ongoing dispute over alleged illegal constructions by the respondent-society.( Para 12)

In summary, the court partly allowed the appeal, directing the appellants to pay Rs.25,00,000/- to the respondent. The compensation and daily penalties were set aside. Both parties were instructed to fulfill their respective obligations within specified time frames. The court left open the option for the parties to seek appropriate remedies for future grievances.( Para 14)

Facts:

The Union of India contended that the respondents were involved in smuggling a large volume of gold from the UAE to India, weighing over 3300 kgs. The respondents were arrested under Section 135 of the Customs Act, and detention orders were issued under Section 3 of COFEPOSA on May 17, 2019. The detention orders were served on the respondents on May 18, 2019, while the compilation of documents was served on May 21, 2019, and May 22, 2019.

Issues:

The High Court quashed the detention orders, citing a procedural violation concerning the non-simultaneous service of relied-upon documents with the detention orders. Additionally, the detaining authority's satisfaction regarding the respondents' likelihood of release on bail was questioned.

Held:

Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA allows a leeway of five days for the grounds of detention and documents to be served. The High Court erred in quashing the orders based on the timing of document service, as the statutory requirement was met within the stipulated timeframe.( Paragraph 19)

The relied-upon documents were served within the statutory period, and the time-consuming nature of compiling voluminous documents justified the delay in serving the compilation.( Paragraph 21)

The term "pari passu" must be read in conjunction with Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA, meaning that the grounds and documents must be served within five days. The High Court's decision to quash the orders on this ground was deemed incorrect.( Paragraph 24)

The "Hand Book on Compilation of Instructions on COFEPOSA matters" guidelines were fully complied with, but executive instructions cannot override statutory provisions.( Paragraph 26)

Detention orders can be validly passed against a person in custody, provided the grounds show awareness and the likelihood of release on bail leading to further prejudicial activities.( Paragraph 30)

The detaining authority's awareness of the respondents' custody was evident, even though it was not explicitly stated in the orders.( Paragraph 35)

The satisfaction of the detaining authority regarding the likelihood of release on bail was based on materials, and the High Court erred in quashing the orders solely on this ground.( Paragraph 37)

Decision: The appeals of the Union of India were allowed, and the appeals of the detenues were dismissed. The High Court's decision to quash the detention orders was set aside.

Facts:

The respondents sought compassionate appointment after the death of their parents who were teachers.

Appointments were made under Rule 10 of the Bihar Municipal Body Elementary Teachers (Employment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006.

An instruction dated 17 October 2008 by the Government of Bihar affected the jurisdiction of the District Compassionate Committee.

Issues:

Validity of appointments under Rule 10.

Impact of the Government instruction dated 17 October 2008 on the appointments.

Held:

The High Court's direction to appoint the respondents in the regular service of the Government was deemed erroneous. The respondents were appointed in accordance with Rule 10 of the 2006 Rules. No executive instruction could supersede the rules. The respondents were granted the liberty to approach the State Government for suitable relief.