Contempt of Court – Loan Repayment Defaults – The appellants, who guaranteed the repayment of a loan and offered immovable properties as security, failed to comply with court orders to deposit certain amounts, leading to their properties being classified as NPAs. The High Court found the appellants guilty of contempt for issuing post-dated cheques that were dishonored, not appearing in court, and providing false explanations. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings but reduced the sentence of imprisonment already served [Paras 1-34].

SARFAESI Act – Section 17 – Jurisdiction and Procedure – The case involved the appellants challenging actions under the SARFAESI Act, including the issuance of notices under Sections 13(2) and 13(4) for the recovery of dues. The appellants' appeal was dismissed due to non-deposit of the required amount [Paras 3-4].

Contempt of Courts Act – Sections 10 and 12 – Legal Standards and Sanctions – The Court evaluated the appellants' conduct against the legal standards for contempt, emphasizing the wilful nature of disobedience and the impact on judicial proceedings. The appellants' behavior was found to be deceitful and aimed at hoodwinking the court [Paras 10-27].

Decision – Special Leave Petition Disposed of – Held – The Supreme Court confirmed the appellants' guilt for contempt but reduced the imprisonment term to the period already served. The fine imposed by the High Court was also upheld [Paras 32-34].

Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupant) Act – Government Accommodation – Retired Employees – The Supreme Court held that retired government employees, including those displaced due to terrorism, do not have an indefeasible right to occupy government accommodation on a nominal license fee. Such accommodation is meant for serving government employees to facilitate their duties and not for retirees. The Court emphasized that the humanitarian consideration for displaced persons cannot extend to indefinite retention of government housing meant for active duty personnel [Paras 1-22].

Right to Shelter – Constitutional Perspective – The right to shelter is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. However, this right does not equate to a right to government accommodation, especially for retired employees who have received pensionary benefits and other compensations. The Court highlighted the importance of balancing the right to shelter with the necessity of providing government accommodation to serving officers [Paras 15-19].

Judicial Review – High Court Orders – The Supreme Court found that the orders passed by the Delhi and Punjab & Haryana High Courts, which allowed retired employees to retain government accommodation, were without any legal basis or policy support. The Court deemed these orders arbitrary and irrational, thus overturning them [Paras 13-20].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Held – The appeal by Union of India was allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court orders, restoring the eviction order under the Public Premises Act. The respondent, Onkar Nath Dhar, was granted time until 31st October 2021 to vacate the premises, acknowledging his extended occupation post-retirement. The appellants were directed to submit a report on action taken against similarly situated retired officials by 15th November 2021 [Paras 21-22].

Civil Procedure Code – Order 41 Rule 22 – Cross-objections – Court held that it is not necessary for a respondent to file cross-objections to challenge adverse findings if the decree is wholly in their favor – Objections can be raised against adverse findings of the lower court before the appellate court without a cross-objection – Amendments to Order XLI Rule 22 in 1976 expanded the scope of cross-objections to include adverse findings, and provided different forms for raising them [Paras 1-25].

Constitution of India – Articles 136 and 142 – Application of Order 41 Rule 22 CPC principles to petitions under Article 136 – Supreme Court can permit objections to findings even without cross-objections under its wide powers to do justice under Article 142 – The court can draw principles from Order XLI Rule 22 CPC to allow such objections [Paras 26-27].

Civil Jurisdiction – Exclusion by Statute – Jurisdiction of civil courts can be excluded by specific statutes – Principles for determining exclusion include examining the adequacy of statutory remedies and whether the statute provides for finality of orders by special tribunals – Bar on civil court jurisdiction in matters under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 confirmed [Paras 35-37].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Held – The suit by the first respondent is dismissed as the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 – The sale deed in favor of the first respondent was void under Section 5(3) of ULCRA – Costs imposed on the first respondent [Paras 39-40].

Indian Penal Code – Section 302 read with 34 – Murder – Circumstantial Evidence – The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Surajdeo Mahto (Appellant No.1) based on circumstantial evidence, including the last seen theory, recovery of incriminating materials, and motive. Appellant No.1 was the last person seen with the deceased, provided false information about the deceased's whereabouts, and subsequently absconded. The evidence established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 1-45].

Indian Penal Code – Section 302 read with 34 – Acquittal of Co-Accused – The Court acquitted Prakash Mahto (Appellant No.2) due to insufficient evidence linking him to the murder. The only substantial evidence against him was that he was last seen with the deceased and Appellant No.1. There was no direct evidence or sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 42-45].

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act – Section 7A – Plea of Juvenility – The Court rejected the plea of juvenility raised by Appellant No.1 at the Supreme Court level, noting discrepancies in the documents provided. The documents presented did not inspire confidence, and the appellant failed to establish prima facie evidence of juvenility as required under the Act [Paras 46-48].

Decision – Appeal Partly Allowed – Held – The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence of Surajdeo Mahto (Appellant No.1) while acquitting Prakash Mahto (Appellant No.2) due to lack of evidence. The bail bonds of Appellant No.1 were cancelled, and he was directed to surrender. The bail bonds of Appellant No.2 were discharged [Paras 49].

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code – Section 7 – Limitation Period – The Supreme Court held that an application under Section 7 of the IBC would not be barred by limitation if the Corporate Debtor acknowledged the debt before the expiration of the limitation period of three years, thereby extending the period by another three years. An acknowledgment of debt in financial statements or communications, even if made after the account has been declared NPA, can extend the limitation period.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code – Fresh Cause of Action – The Court ruled that a judgment or decree in favor of the Financial Creditor, or the issuance of a Certificate of Recovery, provides a fresh cause of action for initiating proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC within three years from the date of such judgment, decree, or certificate.

Limitation Act – Section 18 – Acknowledgment of Debt – The judgment elaborates on the application of Section 18 of the Limitation Act to proceedings under the IBC, confirming that acknowledgment of a debt in the Corporate Debtor's financial statements or balance sheets extends the limitation period.

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Held – The appeal by Dena Bank was allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the NCLAT and restored the order of the NCLT admitting the application under Section 7 of the IBC. The acknowledgment of debt by the Corporate Debtor extended the limitation period, making the application timely .

Insecticides Act – Misbranding – Quashing of Complaint – The appellants challenged the criminal complaint on the grounds that the complaint was barred by limitation, that there were procedural delays in sample testing, and that the Magistrate did not follow the prescribed procedure under Section 202 CrPC. The Supreme Court held that the complaint was indeed barred by limitation as the report from the Insecticide Testing Laboratory was received on 14.03.2011, but the complaint was filed on 25.03.2014, beyond the three-year limitation period [Paras 1-10].

Criminal Procedure – Section 202 – Inquiry and Investigation – The Supreme Court noted that the complainant was a public servant filing the complaint in discharge of official duty. Thus, the Magistrate need not record the statement of the public servant or conduct an inquiry before taking cognizance. Additionally, reports from government scientific experts are admissible in evidence without further examination [Paras 9-10].

Offences by Companies – Vicarious Liability – The Court held that vicarious liability cannot be imposed on company officials without clear and categorical averments regarding their role. In this case, the Managing Director was not liable as the company had designated a responsible officer for quality control, and the complaint did not justify prosecuting the Managing Director [Paras 6-9].

Decision – Appeals Partly Allowed – Held – The Supreme Court quashed the complaint against the Managing Director of the company but upheld the proceedings against the company. The complaint was quashed due to being time-barred, and the Managing Director was absolved of liability due to the designation of another responsible officer by the company [Paras 11-12].

Penal Code – Section 193 – False Evidence – The Supreme Court held that prosecution for perjury cannot be ordered merely based on inconsistent statements. There must be a definite finding that the statements are irreconcilable and one is deliberately false. The Court must also consider whether initiating an inquiry is expedient in the interest of justice, taking into account the overall factual matrix and probable consequences of such prosecution [Paras 1-17].

Representation of the People Act – Section 100(1)(c) – Improper Rejection of Nomination Papers – The Court noted that the election of the appellant from the 151 K.R. Pura Legislative Assembly constituency was held void due to improper rejection of nomination papers. However, this became infructuous as the appellant completed the term of the Assembly [Paras 3-6].

Criminal Procedure Code – Section 340 – Opportunity to Respond – The Court emphasized that before directing prosecution for perjury, the person accused must be given an opportunity to respond to the allegations. In this case, no such opportunity was provided, and the appellant was examined as a witness by the election petitioner [Paras 10-14].

Decision – Appeals Disposed Of – Held – Civil Appeal No. 4821 of 2012 is disposed of as infructuous. Civil Appeal No. 6171 of 2012 is allowed, setting aside the direction to register a complaint against the appellant for prosecution under Section 193 IPC. The appellant's statements did not constitute deliberate falsehood justifying prosecution. The Registrar General of the High Court is directed not to register a complaint against the appellant [Paras 16-19].

Criminal Procedure Code – Section 433-A – Power of Remission – The Supreme Court held that the power of remission is to be exercised by the State Government if the prisoner has undergone 14 years of actual imprisonment in cases falling within the scope of Section 433-A of the CrPC. For imprisonment less than 14 years, the power of premature release can be exercised by the Governor on the aid and advice of the State Government [Paras 1-4].

Constitution of India – Article 161 – Exercise of Power – The Court emphasized that the power under Article 161 of the Constitution can be exercised by the State Governments, not by the Governor on his own. The advice of the appropriate Government binds the Head of the State. Policies of the State Government encompass both situations under Article 161 and Sections 432, 433, and 433-A of the CrPC [Paras 11-12].

Remission Policies – Statutory and Constitutional Powers – The Court clarified that policies of remission framed by the State Government are composite policies that apply both under Article 161 of the Constitution and the relevant sections of the CrPC. The power of the Governor to commute sentences under Article 161 is independent of the restrictions under Section 433-A of the CrPC [Paras 5-10].

Decision – Appeals Disposed Of – Held – The Supreme Court set aside the directions issued by the High Court, stating that policies must be read considering the period of imprisonment undergone by a prisoner. The power of remission by the State Government applies if the prisoner has completed 14 years of actual imprisonment. For periods less than 14 years, premature release can be considered under Article 161. The State Government is directed to consider the respondent's case for premature release under the applicable policy [Paras 21-24].

Motor Vehicle Act – Compensation for Prosthetic Limb – Continuing Mandamus – The Supreme Court held that compensation for future medical expenses, such as the maintenance and replacement of a prosthetic limb, must be awarded as a lump sum rather than through continuing directions. The Court emphasized that compensation should be determined at one go, taking into account future eventualities [Paras 6-10].

Motor Vehicle Act – Compensation for Attendants – Lump Sum Award – The Court ruled that compensation for the assistance of attendants must also be provided as a lump sum. The Court referred to previous judgments that support awarding a lump sum amount to cover future medical and attendant expenses, using a multiplier method to ensure fair compensation [Paras 17-24].

Decision – Appeals Allowed – Held – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's directions for a lifetime warranty and continuing maintenance of the prosthetic limb, as well as the provision for attendants. The Court directed that a lump sum amount be determined for these expenses. The case was remitted to the High Court for determination of the lump sum amount based on the principles laid down in the judgment [Paras 25-32].