Evacuee Property Act, 1950 – Declaration of Evacuee Property – Admitted Position – Adverse Consequence of Non-Evacuation – Clarification: The appellant-State of Himachal Pradesh claimed that the property held by Sultan Mohammad, the predecessor-in-title of the respondents, fell under the purview of Section 2(f) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (“the 1950 Act”), asserting that Sultan Mohammad was an evacuee under Section 2(d) of the same Act. However, the Court noted that it was an admitted position, as observed by the learned Single Judge, that Sultan Mohammad never left India and was not an evacuee within the meaning of the 1950 Act. [Para 3, 4]

High Court Appeal – Inconclusive Grounds – Disapprobation of State’s Action: Despite the unequivocal admission by the State and a concession made by the learned Additional Advocate General regarding Sultan Mohammad’s non-evacuation, the appellant-State chose to appeal against the orders of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court. The Court expressed disapproval of the State’s decision to contest the matter further, even in light of the clear facts. [Para 5]

Evacuee Property Status – Upholding Lower Court Findings: In dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the findings of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, affirming that the property held by Sultan Mohammad was not an evacuee property under the 1950 Act due to his continued residence in India until his demise. [Para 6]

Costs Imposed: As a consequence of the State’s unwarranted appeal, the appellant-State of Himachal Pradesh was directed to pay costs amounting to Rs. 25,000/- to the Writ Petitioners before the High Court within two months from the date of the judgment. [Para 7]

Evacuee Property Act, 1950 – Declaration of Evacuee Property – Admitted Position – Adverse Consequence of Non-Evacuation – Clarification: The appellant-State of Himachal Pradesh claimed that the property held by Sultan Mohammad, the predecessor-in-title of the respondents, fell under the purview of Section 2(f) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (“the 1950 Act”), asserting that Sultan Mohammad was an evacuee under Section 2(d) of the same Act. However, the Court noted that it was an admitted position, as observed by the learned Single Judge, that Sultan Mohammad never left India and was not an evacuee within the meaning of the 1950 Act. [Para 3, 4]

High Court Appeal – Inconclusive Grounds – Disapprobation of State’s Action: Despite the unequivocal admission by the State and a concession made by the learned Additional Advocate General regarding Sultan Mohammad’s non-evacuation, the appellant-State chose to appeal against the orders of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court. The Court expressed disapproval of the State’s decision to contest the matter further, even in light of the clear facts. [Para 5]

Evacuee Property Status – Upholding Lower Court Findings: In dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the findings of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, affirming that the property held by Sultan Mohammad was not an evacuee property under the 1950 Act due to his continued residence in India until his demise. [Para 6]

Costs Imposed: As a consequence of the State’s unwarranted appeal, the appellant-State of Himachal Pradesh was directed to pay costs amounting to Rs. 25,000/- to the Writ Petitioners before the High Court within two months from the date of the judgment. [Para 7]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Anticipatory Bail - Interim Protection - Contradictory Orders - Self-contradictory order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court - Grant of anticipatory bail rejected while simultaneously providing interim protection to the respondents for two months - Appeal against such order - Held, the High Court erred in granting interim protection after denying anticipatory bail - Interim protection quashed and set aside. [Para 6 to 11]

Bench observed that the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court was self-contradictory as it rejected the application for anticipatory bail but granted interim protection to the respondents for a period of two months.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the part of the order that granted interim protection to the respondents for two months.

Service Tax – Video Production Agency – Video-Tape Production – Interpretation of Definitions – Nature of services rendered during Video-Tape Production – Circular dated 09.07.2001 – Expressions “services relating thereto” – Conjoint reading of Sections 65(119) and 65(120) of the Finance Act, 1994 – Correctness of Tribunal’s interpretation – Relevant definitions in operation until 01.07.2000 – Appeal filed by Commissioner of Service Tax-IV against Prime Focus Ltd. – Delay condoned – Arguments presented by the learned ASG for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent – Court examined the definitions and concluded that services like editing, cutting, coloring, etc. Are applicable only after recording of any programme, event, or function on a magnetic tape or any other media or device – Held that Video-Tape Production when done by a professional videographer or a commercial concern engaged in rendering such services falls under the definition of a ‘Video Production Agency’ – Impugned order of the Tribunal upheld – Civil Appeal dismissed.

Criminal Appeal against conviction and sentence - Appellant acquitted of offense under Section 366 IPC - Conviction under Section 6 of the POCSO Act affirmed but sentence reduced - Appeal filed challenging the conviction and sentence. Kidnapping and sexual offenses alleged - Victim's statement contradicts prosecution's case - Victim's statement under Section 164 Cr. PC states that she eloped with the appellant voluntarily and married him as per her wishes - Prosecution failed to establish coercion or force. [Para 1&6]

Burden of proof regarding victim's age - Prosecution's failure to produce necessary documents - Only a transfer certificate presented, which does not meet the requirements of the law - Prosecution did not establish victim's age as under 18 years. [Para 8]

Procedure for age determination under the JJ Act and POCSO Act - Importance of considering school records, birth certificates, or ossification test - Absence of proper documents to determine victim's age - Prosecution's reliance on a transfer certificate, which is insufficient to prove the victim's age. [Para 13]

Lack of evidence of penetrative sexual assault or coercion - Victim's statement found to be truthful - Lack of evidence supporting charges under the POCSO Act - Prosecution's failure to establish the offense. [Para 21]

Appellant's acquittal - Charges under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 10 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act set aside - Insufficient evidence to support the charges - Appellant acquitted of all charges. [Para 22]

Criminal Appeal – Appeal against conviction under Section 302 of IPC – Accused-appellant challenges his conviction for intentional firing resulting in the death of a constable – Accused-appellant claims accidental firing – High Court confirms conviction – Appeal filed in Supreme Court. (Para 1)

Factual Background – Appellant was a guard at a police station – During a scuffle with a constable, appellant’s firearm accidentally fired five rounds, causing the constable’s death – Prosecution alleged intentional firing, appellant claimed accidental firing – Motive alleged but not proved – Eyewitness testimonies support appellant’s defense. (Para 2-4)

Analysis of Evidence – Ballistic expert reports confirm firearm could be accidentally cocked if safety lever not in place – Appellant’s firearm got entangled in a chain during scuffle, leading to accidental firing – Statements attributed to appellant and police officer after the incident do not inspire confidence – Failure to prove appellant’s intention to cause death or bodily harm. (Para 13-18)

Lesser Offense – Appellant’s negligence in not keeping the firearm’s safety lever in place resulted in loss of life – Guilty of offense under Section 304A of IPC (causing death by negligence) – Maximum sentence is two years – Appellant served over eight years in prison – Further detention not required – Bail bonds canceled. (Para 20-21)

CRIMINAL APPEAL– ACQUITTAL - Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) as the appellant – Shyam Bihari & Others as the respondents – Appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital dated 26.07.2012 – Delay in preferring the appeal condoned – Application seeking leave to appeal rejected – Acquittal of the accused by the trial court in C. No. RC-5/87-SIU.II – Assessment of evidence – Ocular accounts and circumstances – Witness identification – Ballistic expert report – Presence of accused at the scene of the crime – Use of service rifles and recovery of empty cartridges – Cause of death by a gunshot from a .12 bore weapon, not a rifle – Incomplete chain of circumstances – Benefit of doubt given to the accused.

EVIDENCE – Ocular accounts and circumstances – Failure of eyewitnesses to positively identify the accused as the perpetrators – Reliability of witnesses questioned – Delayed disclosure and suspicious circumstances surrounding one witness’s affidavit – Incomplete chain of circumstances to establish the accused’s involvement beyond a reasonable doubt. (Para 28-30)

BALLISTIC EXPERT REPORT – Recovery of empty cartridges from the crime scene – Some cartridges matched the service rifles issued to the accused, while others did not – Discrepancy raises doubts about the involvement of other persons and the exact circumstances of the incident. (Para 31)

CAUSE OF DEATH – Gunshot wound determined to be from a .12 bore weapon, not a rifle – Inconsistency with the use of service rifles by the accused – Failure to establish a direct link between the accused and the cause of death. (Para 32)

ACQUITTAL – Benefit of doubt given to the accused by the trial court – Plausible judgment based on a proper appreciation of the evidence – Lack of a complete chain of circumstances to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt – High Court’s decision to uphold the acquittal affirmed by the Supreme Court. (Para 33)

Section 30 of the Act – Appeal against Commissioner’s order – Substantial question of law – When arises – Permanent disability assessment – Whether a substantial question of law arises in assessing the extent of permanent disability – Held, permanent disability assessment is a question of fact, and in the absence of perversity in the reasoning, a substantial question of law does not arise. (Para 21)

Total disablement – Definition and assessment – Functional disability as the determining factor – The term “total disablement” defined in Section 2(1)(l) of the Act – Incapacity of a workman for all work he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement – Functional disability, not just physical disability, is the determining factor in assessing whether the claimant has incurred total disablement. (Para 28)

Compensation calculation – Workman’s incapacity for labor – Loading/unloading laborer – Use of both hands required – Workman declared unfit for labor – Compensation assessed at 100% permanent disability – Held, for the purposes of loading/unloading labor, the use of both hands/arms is required, and the appellant’s left hand was rendered useless, making her unfit for labor – Commissioner’s assessment of 100% permanent disability justified. (Para 31)

High Court’s reassessment of disability and reduction of compensation – Error in applying previous judgments – High Court erred in reassessing the disability as 40% instead of 100% - Commissioner’s assessment based on functional disability was supported by the evidence and findings – High Court’s decision to reduce compensation set aside. (Para 32)

Recovery mechanism under the 2003 Act and 2005 Code - Licensees empowered to disconnect electricity supply for non-payment - State Commissions authorized to frame regulations - Outstanding dues constituting a charge on assets - PVVNL considered a secured creditor. [Para 39-43]

Distinction between government dues and dues to secured creditors - Priority of clearance - Dues owed to PVVNL not considered government dues - PVVNL's functions replicable by other entities - PVVNL's dues given higher priority than government dues. [Para 44-50]

Effect of Section 77 of the Companies Act - Duty to register charges - Liquidator's argument regarding non-registration not considered at this stage due to the determination of PVVNL as a secured creditor. [Para 51-56]

Direction to the liquidator - PVVNL's claim to be decided in accordance with the law within 10 weeks. [Para 57-58]