Criminal Law - Quashing of FIR – Offenses Against Society – Compromise Inadmissibility – FIR filed against a teacher for sexual assault on a minor under POCSO and SC/ST Acts – High Court quashed the FIR based on compromise between the accused and the victim’s father – Supreme Court held that heinous offenses with societal impact, such as sexual assault on minors, cannot be quashed merely due to a private settlement between the parties – Held: Such cases are offenses against society, not just individuals, and cannot be treated as private matters suitable for compromise [Paras 12-16, 33].

Locus Standi – Third-Party Intervention in Public Interest – Locus of Public-Spirited Citizens – Appellants, residents of the same area, challenged the quashment of the FIR – Court allowed locus for public-spirited citizens in cases where societal interests are implicated, reinforcing that societal concerns override strict party standing – Held: Third-party locus standi valid where societal interests and justice demand intervention against the quashing of heinous crimes [Paras 5, 10, 29].

Interpretation of Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Inherent Powers – Restriction on Quashing Serious Offenses – Supreme Court underscored that Section 482 powers are not to be exercised to quash serious crimes against society solely on private settlement grounds – Held: Courts must weigh the gravity and public impact of the offense before considering quashing based on compromise, particularly under special statutes like the POCSO Act [Paras 20-23, 30].

Decision:

Appeal allowed – Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the FIR, holding that sexual offenses against minors are serious societal offenses unsuitable for quashment on private compromise grounds. Investigative and judicial proceedings are to continue as per law.

Criminal Law - Conviction Modified from Murder to Culpable Homicide – Sudden Quarrel and Lack of Premeditation – Appeal Partly Allowed – The appellants were convicted under Section 302 IPC following a violent altercation over land, during which the deceased, Bahal, was fatally injured by the appellants using agricultural tools. Held: The Court found that although the appellants caused Bahal’s death, the incident stemmed from a sudden quarrel without premeditated intent, thus qualifying for conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC. The appellants acted in the heat of passion without cruelty or undue advantage. The Court modified the conviction, sentencing the appellants to the period already served (over 12 years) [Paras 17-21].

Principles Governing Downgrade of Murder to Culpable Homicide – Sudden Fight Without Intent to Kill – Relying on Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, and Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana, the Court noted that spontaneous acts from sudden quarrels without premeditation are treated with reduced culpability under Section 304. The use of agricultural tools, absence of intent to kill, and lack of cruel conduct were factors supporting the modification of conviction [Paras 19-20].

Direct Eyewitness Evidence – Consistent Testimonies – Testimonies from Rajni Bai (PW-1), Dhannu Das (PW-2), and other witnesses were found credible, affirming that the appellants caused the injuries in a sudden altercation, further supporting the charge modification [Paras 11-15].

Decision: The appeal is partly allowed. The Court altered the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC, with the sentence adjusted to the period already undergone. Bail bonds are discharged, and the appellants are released from further sentence.
 

Criminal Law - Sanction for Prosecution of Public Servants – Applicability of Section 197 CrPC under PMLA Proceedings – Overriding Effect of PMLA Provisions – The Enforcement Directorate challenged the High Court’s judgment, which quashed the cognizance order of the Special Court against respondents without obtaining prior sanction – Held: Section 197(1) CrPC applies to proceedings under the PMLA as per Section 65 of the PMLA, given that the provisions are consistent with the objectives of the PMLA; Section 71 of the PMLA does not override the CrPC provision for sanction requirements where the accused are public servants [Paras 5, 8, 15].

Scope of Official Duty and Protection Under Section 197 CrPC – Discharge of Official Duties Requirement – The respondents, public servants, argued that the alleged offenses were committed while discharging official duties, invoking protection under Section 197 CrPC – Held: Acts reasonably connected to official duties may qualify for protection under Section 197 CrPC, even if the acts are in excess of duty requirements; a sanction is still required for prosecution if the acts fall within the scope of official duties [Paras 5, 15, 38].

Definition of Public Servant in Government Corporations – Determination of Public Servant Status for Sanction – The first respondent, appointed by the State Government to a position in a state-owned corporation, was argued to fall within the public servant definition under Section 197(1) CrPC – Held: Officers appointed to government corporations on deputation from government service qualify as public servants for purposes of sanction requirements under Section 197(1) CrPC [Paras 8-15].

Impact of Section 65 and 71 of the PMLA – Harmonization of PMLA and CrPC Provisions – The Enforcement Directorate contended that Section 71 PMLA overrides CrPC requirements, making sanction unnecessary – Held: Section 65 PMLA allows the application of CrPC provisions where they align with PMLA, meaning Section 71 PMLA does not negate the applicability of CrPC sanction requirements where provisions are consistent; thus, the CrPC sanction requirements apply [Paras 8-15].

Decision:  The appeals are dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision to quash cognizance against the respondents due to lack of sanction under Section 197(1) CrPC. However, the Directorate may seek cognizance in the future if sanction is obtained, subject to any legal objections by the respondents.

Land Acquisition – Determination of Compensation – Additional Compensation for Trees and Borewell – Review Jurisdiction – Appellant sought enhanced compensation for acquired land, including fruit-bearing trees and a borewell – High Court dismissed the award of compensation for these items granted by the reference court in a review application – Supreme Court upheld High Court’s decision, finding lack of admissible evidence supporting the existence of the claimed assets at the time of acquisition – Held: Compensation for the awala trees and borewell on Survey No. 17 set aside as inadmissible evidence was relied upon in review [Paras 2, 4, 6-8, 12].

Incremental Valuation – Cumulative Increase of Market Value – Applicability of Precedent – Appellant argued for a cumulative 10% annual increase in land valuation based on exemplar sale deeds from an earlier judgment – The court clarified that cumulative increase is discretionary and not an absolute rule – Held: Non-cumulative 10% increase in valuation affirmed as consistent with precedent and not arbitrary; cumulative increase was not granted in the exemplar judgment relied upon by the reference court [Paras 14-17].

Scope of Review – Limitations of Review Jurisdiction – Review as Appeal – Review court acted beyond its jurisdiction by granting compensation based on new evidence (2nd Joint Measurement Report) that was inadmissible and produced only at the review stage – Supreme Court ruled that review proceedings cannot serve as an appellate mechanism to re-evaluate facts or introduce new evidence – Held: High Court correctly quashed compensation for awala trees and borewell granted in review application as this exceeded the permissible scope of review jurisdiction [Paras 9-11].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s order setting aside the compensation for awala trees and borewell granted in the review by the reference court, finding no admissible evidence to justify the claim and affirming the lower court's exercise of discretion in denying cumulative market increase – No costs awarded.

Motor Vehicles Act – Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) – Definition and Scope – Transport Vehicles within LMV Classification - The term "light motor vehicle" (LMV) as defined under Section 2(21) of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act) includes both private and commercial vehicles, provided their gross weight does not exceed 7,500 kg – The Court held that LMV licenses extend to light transport vehicles within this weight limit – Use of the term “means” in Section 2(21) indicates an exhaustive and inclusive definition, encompassing both transport and non-transport vehicles without requiring additional endorsements under Section 10(2)(e) for driving transport vehicles under this weight [Paras 25, 30, 32, 125].

Licensing Requirements – Harmonious Interpretation – Transport Vehicle and LMV License Classes - Section 3(1) and Section 10 of the MV Act require a specific endorsement for “transport vehicles” – Court held that this requirement applies primarily to medium and heavy transport vehicles exceeding 7,500 kg – For light transport vehicles within the LMV category, no additional endorsement is necessary, ensuring a practical interpretation consistent with the legislative intent and simplifying the licensing process [Paras 35, 85, 126, 131(I)].

Conflicting Judgments – Mukund Dewangan – Upholding LMV Scope – Overruling of Contrary Decisions - The Court upheld Mukund Dewangan (2017), confirming that LMV licenses are valid for light transport vehicles not exceeding 7,500 kg – Overruled contrary judgments in Prabhu Lal, Roshanben Rahemansha Fakir, and Angad Kol, which required separate endorsements for light transport vehicles – Affirmed decisions in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha, S. Iyyapan, and Kulwant Singh, which aligned with this interpretation [Paras 91, 96, 96.3, 131(IV)].

Road Safety and Policy Considerations – Licensing Practicality – Empirical Data on Road Safety - Addressed concerns that LMV license holders operating light transport vehicles could compromise road safety – Court observed that driving skills for LMVs are sufficient for operating transport vehicles within the prescribed weight – Noted absence of empirical data linking LMV-licensed drivers to road accidents due to operating light transport vehicles, and emphasized that additional requirements should be limited to medium and heavy vehicles for road safety and regulatory coherence [Paras 123, 124, 130, 131(III)].

Legislative Intent and Recommendations – Scope for Amendment – Addressing Classification Ambiguities - Court recommended further classification within the LMV category to improve clarity (e.g., LMV Class 1 and LMV Class 2) – Encouraged the legislature to amend the MV Act to provide clearer distinctions between LMV and transport vehicle classes, which could prevent frequent litigation and reduce confusion in license classifications [Paras 120, 128, 129].

Conclusion – LMV License Validity for Transport Vehicles under 7,500 kg – Key Findings

Held that:

(I) A driver holding an LMV license is legally authorized to operate a transport vehicle with gross weight not exceeding 7,500 kg without requiring a separate endorsement for transport vehicle operation;

(II) Section 3(1) requirement for specific licenses for transport vehicles does not override the comprehensive LMV definition under Section 2(21);

(III) Additional eligibility and training requirements apply only to those intending to operate medium and heavy transport vehicles exceeding 7,500 kg;

(IV) Mukund Dewangan (2017) is upheld, not per incuriam, as the judgment's conclusions align with a harmonious interpretation of the MV Act and Rules, despite certain overlooked provisions [Paras 131, 132].

Decision: Reference questions answered to affirm the applicability of LMV licenses to light transport vehicles within the 7,500 kg weight limit, obviating the need for a separate transport endorsement for such vehicles.

Criminal Law – Acquittal – Appeal against Armed Forces Tribunal’s order setting aside conviction – Respondent, an Air Force officer, charged under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149, and alternatively under Sections 325, 342 IPC, along with charges under Sections 45, 65, and 71 of the Air Force Act, 1950 (AFA) – General Court Martial (GCM) initially convicted the respondent under Section 304 Part II IPC read with Section 149 and sentenced him to five years imprisonment with cashiering – Chief of Air Staff confirmed conviction but reduced imprisonment to two years – Tribunal set aside conviction, granting consequential reliefs to respondent, excluding back wages – Supreme Court dismissed appeal against Tribunal’s acquittal order, affirming lack of evidence connecting respondent to deceased’s death – Held: Tribunal’s findings upheld, appeal dismissed [Paras 1, 5, 6, 11, 13].

Evidence of Alleged Assault and Wrongful Confinement – Sufficiency of Evidence – The appellants argued that the respondent was responsible for confining and assaulting the deceased signalman, resulting in his fatal injuries – Held: The evidence failed to establish the respondent’s intent to cause harm; the Tribunal’s findings showed no assault by the respondent, and injuries were attributable to a fall from the vehicle, negating the charges of wrongful confinement and assault [Paras 15-18].

Wrongful Confinement – Applicability of Section 342 IPC – It was contended that the respondent directed the confinement of the deceased, constituting wrongful confinement – Held: The respondent’s intent was not to confine the deceased indefinitely but rather to secure his presence for identification. The evidence did not substantiate any restriction of liberty, as required under Section 342 IPC [Paras 25-27].

Presumption of Innocence in Acquittal Appeals – Judicial Deference to Tribunal Findings – The Court emphasized that in appeals against acquittal, deference is given to findings favoring the presumption of innocence unless there are compelling grounds to overturn the decision – Held: The Tribunal’s judgment was found to be plausible and based on reasonable interpretation of evidence, precluding interference by the Supreme Court [Para 30].

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, affirming the Armed Forces Tribunal's acquittal of Wing Commander M.S. Mander on all charges.

Judicial Independence – Financial Independence of Judges – Non-discrimination based on Source of Appointment – Held: High Court judges, irrespective of their recruitment source (Bar or judicial service), are entitled to uniform financial benefits to maintain judicial independence – Differentiation between judges based on their pre-appointment service violates Articles 14 and 217 – Directed all judges to have access to the General Provident Fund – The communication dated 13 December 2022 was quashed as unconstitutional [Paras 10-20].

Provident Fund – Section 20 of the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 – Scope of Proviso – Mandate to extend GPF benefits to all judges of the High Court – Proviso interpreted as preserving benefits accrued before High Court appointment without creating a discriminatory regime – Directed refund of New Pension Scheme contributions and opening of GPF accounts for petitioners [Paras 22-28].

Constitutional Interpretation – Uniform Service Conditions – Financial Security as Integral to Judicial Independence – Emphasized: Salaries, allowances, and pensions of High Court judges determined by parliamentary enactments to ensure uniformity – Article 221 prohibits discriminatory service terms – Equality in post-retirement benefits like GPF underlines judiciary’s homogeneity [Paras 30-33].

Decision: The petitions were allowed, directing that:

A General Provident Fund account be opened for the petitioners, effective from their date of appointment as High Court judges.

Contributions under the New Pension Scheme be refunded to petitioners within four weeks.

The impugned communication dated 13 December 2022 be quashed.

Secularism and Minority Rights – Constitutional Validity of Madarsa Act – The Court analyzed whether the Madarsa Act violates secularism, a core principle of the Constitution, by establishing a board that regulates Islamic educational institutions – Held: The Act, being regulatory and aiming at educational standardization, does not per se contravene secularism if balanced with minority rights under Article 30. However, provisions granting legislative discretion in the membership structure were adjusted to reinforce neutrality and inclusivity. The Act remains largely valid under Entry 25, List III [Paras 29-45, 51].

Legislative Competence – Entry 25, List III vis-à-vis Entry 66, List I – The Act’s provisions were scrutinized for potential overlap with the UGC’s powers under Entry 66, List I, particularly concerning higher education standards – Held: State law is constitutionally valid under Entry 25, List III for primary and secondary education; higher education must comply with UGC standards without contravening Entry 66, List I. Only provisions that exceed state competence or conflict with UGC norms require revision [Paras 54-59].

Right to Education – Exemption of Madarsas from the RTE Act – Section 1(5) of the RTE Act exempts religious institutions, including madarsas, from compliance – Held: While exclusion of madarsas from the RTE Act is constitutional, States should ensure curriculum standards and educational quality to facilitate secular and skill-based learning for greater integration of minority students into the broader socio-economic framework [Paras 25-28].

Equality and Non-Discrimination – Article 14 and Discrimination based on Religion – The composition of the Madarsa Board, largely drawn from members of a specific religious community, was challenged for violating Article 14’s equality mandate – Held: The selection process is permitted under Article 30 but requires adjustments to include educational experts regardless of religious affiliation to maintain neutrality in regulatory oversight [Paras 36-39].

Right to Establish and Administer Educational Institutions – Article 30 and Minority Rights – The Court examined whether the Act infringes upon the minority community's rights to administer educational institutions – Held: Regulation by the State is constitutionally sound as it aims to enhance educational quality while respecting minority rights under Article 30 [Paras 41-45].

Judgment – Legislation Upheld with Modifications – The Court upheld the Madarsa Act with stipulations to ensure adherence to secular principles in governance while allowing state oversight for standardizing educational standards in minority institutions [Paras 69-70].
 

Eligibility for Public Employment – Requirement of CCC Certificate at Interview Stage – Termination of Candidates' Services Deemed Arbitrary – Candidates selected under the 2014 recruitment for the post of Technician Grade-II in Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited challenged their termination on the ground that they fulfilled the CCC (Computer Concepts Course) certification requirement at the time of interview, as stipulated in the Corporation’s regulations – Held: Candidates possessing CCC certificates by the interview stage were eligible, and their termination by the Corporation based on the lack of the certificate by the application deadline was erroneous – Court directed reinstatement of candidates meeting the CCC certification requirements at interview stage [Paras 15-16, 26].

Role of Recognized Certification in Public Appointments – Compliance with Article 16 and Requirement of DOEACC/NIELIT Certification – The requirement of a CCC certificate by DOEACC/NIELIT was deemed necessary for entry into public service under Article 16 – Court upheld that self-certification of equivalency was inadequate and that recognized certifications from DOEACC/NIELIT or equivalent qualifications should govern eligibility – Equivalence of certificates must follow formal inquiry and standards; informal certifications were disallowed [Paras 14-15, 19-20].

Interpretation of Advertisement and Service Regulations – Validity of CCC Certification Obtained Before Interview Date – Division Bench’s Order Overturned – Despite conflicting stances by the Corporation, the Court found that the 2014 advertisement and the 1995 Regulations mandated CCC certification only by the interview date – The Court dismissed the contention that the last date for application controlled eligibility, ruling that eligibility compliance at interview suffices under the amended service regulations [Paras 24-25, 27].

Doctrine of Legal Consistency – Contradictory Positions of Respondent Corporation – Respondent Corporation’s shifting stances on eligibility, first accepting DOEACC/NIELIT and later rejecting equivalent self-certified qualifications, constituted a breach of consistent legal approach in hiring practices – Court exercised Article 142 powers to rectify Corporation’s misinterpretation, ruling that candidates were entitled to continued service if CCC certified by interview date [Paras 23, 28].

Equitable Relief Under Article 142 of the Constitution – Reinstatement Without Back Wages but With Service Continuity – Recognizing the misinterpretation of eligibility standards by the Corporation, the Court exercised Article 142 to reinstate the applicants without back wages, but with continuity of service and placement in the seniority list as per the original select list – Relief limited to non-back wage compensation but includes seniority and consequential benefits [Para 29].

Decision:

Appeal allowed, with the Supreme Court ordering the reinstatement of candidates who had obtained the CCC certificate by the interview date, rejecting the Corporation’s termination based on application date eligibility. Candidates were denied back wages but granted continuity in service and benefits, including seniority adjustments, as per the 2015 select list [Para 30].