Criminal Law – Appeal Against Conviction - Forgery and Fabrication – Lack of Primary Evidence – Conviction Set Aside – The appellant was convicted on the basis of allegations that he prepared the postal cover in which a forged marksheet was transmitted – The trial court relied on the testimony of a handwriting expert (PW-18) to establish the appellant’s involvement – Supreme Court noted that the original postal cover was never produced or exhibited as primary evidence – Held: Without proving the existence of the primary document, reliance on expert testimony alone was insufficient to sustain conviction – Appellant acquitted [Paras 13-15].

Handwriting Expert Evidence – Corroboration Required – Testimony Not Sufficient to Convict – The Supreme Court reiterated that while expert testimony is admissible under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, it must be corroborated by other substantive evidence – In this case, the expert’s reasoning sheet was not brought on record, and he did not identify the disputed document conclusively – Held: In the absence of supporting evidence, reliance solely on expert opinion was erroneous, rendering the conviction unsustainable [Paras 8-12].

Criminal Trial – Burden of Proof – Prosecution Failed to Establish Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt – The prosecution failed to prove that the postal cover, which allegedly contained the forged marksheet, was linked to the appellant – Supreme Court held that in criminal trials, the burden of proof lies with the prosecution, and any failure to prove material facts must result in acquittal – Held: The trial court, appellate court, and High Court erred in convicting the appellant without substantive evidence beyond expert opinion [Paras 15-16].

Decision: Appeal Allowed – Conviction Set Aside – Appellant Acquitted of All Charges – Trial Court, Appellate Court, and High Court Judgments Quashed.

Factories Act – Definition of Manufacturing Process – Laundry Services Covered – High Court’s Order Set Aside - The respondent was prosecuted for operating a laundry service without a factory license – The High Court quashed the complaint, holding that dry cleaning does not constitute a "manufacturing process" since it does not result in the creation of a new, marketable commodity – The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, holding that Section 2(k) of the Factories Act explicitly includes "washing" and "cleaning" within the definition of a manufacturing process – Held: The respondent’s laundry business, involving the cleaning of clothes for delivery, falls within the statutory definition of manufacturing process, and the premises qualifies as a factory under Section 2(m) of the Act [Paras 17, 23, 42].

Interpretation of Welfare Legislation – Strict Adherence to Statutory Definition – Application of Mischief Rule - The Court emphasized that the Factories Act is a welfare statute designed to regulate labor conditions and ensure worker safety – The High Court erroneously applied principles from taxation laws and the Central Excise Act, which require a transformation of goods for an activity to qualify as manufacturing – Held: The Factories Act defines "manufacturing process" in broad terms, and courts must interpret such social legislation in a manner that upholds worker rights rather than restricts regulatory oversight [Paras 21, 30, 35].

Order Issuing Process – Application of Mind – No Need for Detailed Reasons in Summons - The respondent challenged the Magistrate’s summons on the ground that it lacked detailed reasoning – The Supreme Court held that while a non-speaking order may be improper in certain cases, the present matter did not warrant quashing of the complaint – Held: The order issuing process was valid as the Magistrate had applied his mind to the complaint and inspection report, and the matter should be adjudicated in trial rather than dismissed at the threshold [Paras 48-49].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court’s Order Quashing Complaint Set Aside – Proceedings Restored - The Supreme Court found that the High Court’s interpretation of the Factories Act was erroneous and contrary to legislative intent – Held: The complaint against the respondent, along with the order issuing process, is restored before the JMFC, Panaji, for trial in accordance with law [Para 49].

Limitation Law - Condonation of Delay – No Sufficient Cause – High Court’s Order Set Aside - The respondents sought to set aside an ex-parte decree after a delay of 1312 days, citing misplaced case files and delayed handover by counsel – The Supreme Court held that no reasonable explanation was provided for the delay, especially since the legal heirs of the defendant were aware of the decree when they appeared in execution proceedings – Held: The High Court erred in condoning the delay without sufficient cause, and the Trial Court rightly rejected the application [Paras 6-10].

Ex-Parte Decree – Absence of Due Diligence – Application to Set Aside Decree Rejected - The first defendant, though appearing in the suit, failed to file a written statement and later passed away – His legal heirs contested execution proceedings but did not immediately seek to set aside the decree – The Supreme Court emphasized that a litigant must act diligently – Held: The attempt to set aside the decree after prolonged inaction was an afterthought and could not be entertained [Paras 8-12].

Equitable Jurisdiction – Delay Must Be Non-Deliberate – No Exceptional Hardship Proven - The respondents claimed the suit was collusive and the sale consideration inadequate – The Court found that such contentions were raised belatedly and lacked merit – Held: The law favors diligent litigants, and mere allegations of hardship do not justify setting aside a decree after an unexplained delay [Paras 10-11].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court’s Order Set Aside – Trial Court’s Order Restored - The Supreme Court found that the application to set aside the ex-parte decree was an afterthought and that the High Court’s reasoning was flawed – Held: The order of the High Court condoning the delay is set aside, and the Trial Court’s order rejecting the application for condonation of delay is restored [Para 12].

Matrimonial Law - Divorce – Amicable Settlement – Invocation of Article 142 of the Constitution – Decree of Divorce by Mutual Consent - The Family Court granted divorce to the respondent-husband on the ground of cruelty—The High Court upheld the decree—During the appeal before the Supreme Court, the parties opted for mediation and reached a Final Settlement Agreement—Held: Since the parties had been living separately since 2013 and had resolved their disputes amicably, the Supreme Court invoked Article 142 to dissolve the marriage by mutual consent—Decision: Divorce granted under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act; previous findings on cruelty set aside [Paras 9-14].

Child Custody and Maintenance – ₹2.11 Crores Settlement for Minor Child – Visitation Rights Granted - The parties agreed on financial terms for the minor child's maintenance—The respondent-husband paid ₹2.11 crores to the appellant-wife—Visitation rights were established, allowing the father periodic access to the child, including overnight visits—Held: The agreed settlement for maintenance and visitation was binding on both parties—Decision: Settlement upheld; visitation rights enforced as per agreement [Paras 10-18].

Quashing of Criminal and Civil Cases – Parties Barred from Future Litigation – No Further Claims - As part of the settlement, both parties agreed to withdraw all pending cases, including FIRs and domestic violence proceedings—Held: All pending litigation, including FIR No. 364/2022 under Section 498A IPC, were quashed—Decision: No future claims shall be entertained; all legal disputes between the parties stand resolved [Paras 15-18].

Criminal Law – Conviction for Grievous Hurt – High Court’s Conviction under Section 326 IPC Modified to Section 325 IPC - The appellants were convicted under Section 307 IPC by the Sessions Court—High Court altered the conviction to Section 326 IPC but retained imprisonment—Supreme Court found doubt regarding whether the weapons used (bamboo sticks and wooden logs) were "dangerous weapons" under Section 326 IPC—Held: The evidence warranted conviction under Section 325 IPC (grievous hurt) instead—Decision: Conviction modified from Section 326 IPC to Section 325 IPC [Paras 7-11].

Sentencing – Reduction of Punishment – Period Already Undergone Considered Sufficient - The incident occurred in 1994—Appellants had already spent six months in custody and had no other criminal record—Held: Sentencing them to further imprisonment after decades would not serve justice—Decision: Sentence reduced to period already undergone, with fine imposed [Paras 12-13].

Penalty for Default – Additional Imprisonment in Case of Non-Payment of Fine - Supreme Court directed the appellants to deposit the fine within one month—Held: Failure to pay would result in an additional imprisonment of one year minus the period already served [Para 14].

Constitutional Law - Disability Rights – Judicial Service – Visually Impaired Candidates – Petitions challenging exclusion of visually impaired candidates from judicial service – Issue raised regarding the validity of Rules excluding such candidates and absence of reasonable accommodation – Supreme Court emphasizes equality doctrine under Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution and the RPwD Act, 2016 – Highlighted that disability discrimination should be recognized as a fundamental right violation – The RPwD Act termed a ‘super-statute’ providing quasi-constitutional protections [Paras 31-36].

International Obligations – United Nations Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) – Cited as binding and affirming principles of non-discrimination, accessibility, reasonable accommodation, and participation in justice – Highlighted India's commitment under Articles 5, 9, 13, and 27 of the UNCRPD – Affirmed that disability-based discrimination contravenes India’s international obligations [Paras 37-38].

RPwD Act, 2016 – Rights, Definitions & Obligations – The Act defines discrimination, reasonable accommodation, and benchmark disabilities – Provisions mandate equality, non-discrimination, inclusive education, reservation, and reasonable accommodation in employment and public services – Statutory obligation on State and establishments to promote accessibility and inclusive participation [Paras 39].

Judicial Precedents – Reasonable Accommodation – Case law including Union of India v. National Federation of Blind, Jeeja Ghosh, Vikash Kumar, and others reaffirming the principle of reasonable accommodation – Judicial recognition that employment and participation of PwDs require adaptation of rules and practices – Exclusion based solely on disability without assessing capabilities after reasonable accommodation violates fundamental rights [Paras 40].

Reasonable Accommodation – Principle Explained – The concept is to create enabling conditions tailored to individual disabilities – Recognized as an enforceable right to ensure effective participation of PwDs in society and employment – Exclusion without reasonable accommodation amounts to discrimination and is inconsistent with the RPwD Act and international law [Paras 41-42].

Indirect Discrimination – Rule 7 Challenge – Rules prescribing three-year practice or 70% marks in the first attempt for judicial service aspirants held as indirectly discriminatory – Although facially neutral, these conditions disproportionately impact PwD candidates – Applied principle of indirect discrimination as developed in Indian and international jurisprudence – Rule struck down to the extent it applies such conditions to PwDs [Paras 43-46].

Relaxation of Marks – Permissibility – Recognized that relaxation of cut-off marks for PwDs is permissible – Affirmed that PwDs deserve similar relaxation benefits as SC/ST candidates – Relied on precedents like Indra Sawhney, Aryan Raj, Anamol Bhandari – Directed framing of separate cut-offs for PwDs during selection stages to ensure substantive equality [Paras 47-63].

Separate Cut-Off and Merit List – Mandate – Directed that PwD candidates must have separate cut-off marks and merit lists at every stage of judicial selection – Non-declaration of such cut-offs defeats reservation purpose and violates RPwD Act – Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules interpreted to mandate such separate cut-offs [Paras 63.3].

No Distinction Between PwD and PwBD – Clarified that rights under RPwD Act apply equally to all PwDs, including those below the benchmark threshold – Denial of rights based on benchmark distinction is impermissible [Para 64].

Global Examples – Judicial Service by Visually Impaired Professionals – Cited several successful judges and lawyers globally who have excelled despite visual impairments – Reinforces that visual disability is no bar to judicial competence [Paras 65-66].

Conclusion and Directions – Visually impaired candidates are eligible to participate in judicial service – Rule 6A and Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules struck down insofar as they exclude or indirectly discriminate against PwDs – Directed authorities to relax marks for PwDs and maintain separate cut-offs – Directed expeditious completion of selection process within three months [Paras 67-69].
 

Bail - Dowry Death – Grant of Bail – Stringent Scrutiny Required – Bail of In-Laws Cancelled – The appellant, brother of the deceased, challenged the bail granted by the High Court to four accused persons (the deceased’s in-laws) – The deceased had allegedly been harassed for dowry, with demands escalating from a motorcycle to a car – The post-mortem report confirmed multiple ante-mortem injuries and strangulation, ruling out suicide – The trial court had denied bail considering the gravity of the offence, but the High Court granted bail citing lack of prior criminal history and gender considerations – Supreme Court held that in cases of dowry deaths, courts must adopt stricter scrutiny in bail matters, particularly when forensic evidence indicates foul play – Bail of the mother-in-law and father-in-law cancelled, as they played a primary role in harassment and dowry demands [Paras 7-13].

Judicial Approach in Dowry Death Cases – High Court’s Mechanical Bail Grant Criticized – Supreme Court expressed concern over the High Court’s superficial approach in granting bail, stating that courts must reflect heightened vigilance in such cases – It emphasized that judicial orders in dowry death cases carry a broader social message and should deter systemic crimes against women – Held: Granting bail mechanically in serious offences like dowry death undermines the deterrent effect of the law and erodes public confidence in the justice system [Paras 15-16].

Cancellation of Bail – Role of Accused Considered – Limited Leniency for Sisters-in-Law – The Supreme Court distinguished between the roles of the accused – The father-in-law and mother-in-law were found to have played an active role in the dowry harassment and thus their bail was cancelled – However, the accused sisters-in-law were granted the benefit of doubt due to their relatively minor role, educational background, and personal circumstances – Held: The High Court’s order granting bail to the sisters-in-law upheld, subject to strict compliance with bail conditions [Paras 14, 18].

Impact of Strangulation and Ante-Mortem Injuries – Importance of Medical Evidence – The post-mortem report documented ligature marks and severe physical trauma on the deceased’s body – Supreme Court held that such evidence is a crucial factor in assessing culpability in dowry death cases – Courts must be cautious in granting bail when medical evidence strongly suggests homicide rather than suicide – Held: The presence of significant ante-mortem injuries justified a stricter approach in bail considerations [Paras 6-7].

Decision: Appeals Allowed in Part – Bail of Accused No. 2 (Father-in-Law) and Accused No. 3 (Mother-in-Law) Cancelled – Bail of Accused No. 4 and Accused No. 5 (Sisters-in-Law) Upheld with Conditions – Trial to be Expedited.

Service Law - Constitution of India – Article 311(2) – Termination of Judicial Officers – Probation Termination – Petitioners, Ms. Sarita Choudhary and Ms. Aditi Kumar Sharma, terminated from service under Rule 11(c) of the M.P. Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 – Administrative Committee and Full Court resolutions based termination citing poor performance and complaints – Petitioners challenged the termination orders as punitive and stigmatic – Held: Termination was not based on consistent poor performance but on complaints and adverse entries not properly communicated or considered – Violated Articles 14, 16 and 311 of the Constitution – Orders of termination held to be punitive and arbitrary – Termination orders set aside and reinstatement ordered [Paras 1 to 18].

Probationer’s Rights – Termination during Probation – Law laid down that a probationer can be terminated simpliciter for unsuitability – However, if termination is founded on allegations of misconduct without proper inquiry or opportunity, it becomes punitive – In the instant case, reliance on complaints and adverse ACRs without timely communication or opportunity rendered termination punitive – Termination order, though styled as simpliciter, caused civil consequences and stigma affecting future prospects – Violated principles of natural justice [Paras 12 to 16].

Women Judicial Officers – Gender Sensitive Approach – Court emphasized the importance of creating a sensitive working environment for women in the judiciary – Highlighted that medical issues like miscarriage and health complications due to COVID-19 affecting performance should be considered compassionately – Faulted High Court for overlooking such considerations while evaluating the petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma’s performance – Reiterated the transformative role of judiciary in ensuring gender-sensitive decision-making [Paras 17 to 17.7].

Administrative Process – Deficiency in ACR Communication – Delay in communicating adverse remarks deprived officers of timely opportunity to improve – Use of unapproved ACRs and pending complaints in termination decision was legally untenable – Lack of proper application of mind by Administrative Committee vitiated the entire decision-making process – Recommendations of the Full Court and State Government based on such flawed consideration are liable to be set aside [Paras 14.11, 15.8, 16].

Decision: Relief Granted – Termination orders, Resolutions of Administrative Committee and Full Court, and consequential Government Orders quashed – Petitioners reinstated with continuity of service and all consequential benefits – Probation to be declared in accordance with seniority as on the date juniors were confirmed – No back salary but notional benefits for pensionary purposes allowed – Complaints kept in abeyance to be processed as per law [Paras 18].

Matrimonial Law - Transfer of Divorce Proceedings – Settlement During Mediation – Article 142 of the Constitution of India – Transfer Petition Disposed - The petitioner-husband sought transfer of the divorce petition filed by the respondent-wife from Family Court, Bandra, Mumbai, to Family Court, Karkardooma, Delhi – During pendency of the petition, mediation led to a mutual settlement – Both parties filed applications under Article 142 of the Constitution seeking divorce by mutual consent – Held: Marriage dissolved by mutual consent, and transfer petition disposed of accordingly [Paras 1-2, 8-10].

Property Settlement – Jointly Owned Flat – Transfer Without Alimony – Absolute Ownership Granted to Respondent-Wife - The dispute revolved around a jointly owned flat, with claims and counterclaims on the source of funds – Husband agreed to relinquish his rights over the flat in favor of the wife, who in turn waived any claim to alimony – Held: The respondent-wife shall have absolute ownership over the flat without any encumbrances, and the husband shall have no further rights over it [Paras 3-5].

Exemption from Stamp Duty – Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908 – Court Order Valid for Property Transfer Without Registration Fees - The Court examined whether the wife was required to pay stamp duty for registration of the flat in her name – Referred to Mukesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine 3832 – Held: Since the flat was the subject matter of the compromise and the proceedings before the Court, it falls within the exemption under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908 – The transfer of ownership does not require payment of stamp duty [Paras 6-7].