Facts:

The respondent, a Stipendiary Engineer, was suspended by the Collector of Koraput, Orissa, due to disciplinary proceedings in contemplation.

The respondent challenged the suspension order before the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, asserting that the Collector lacked the authority to suspend him during disciplinary inquiries.

Issues:

Whether the Collector, as the appointing authority, had the power to suspend the government servant under Rule 12 of the Orissa Civil Service Rules.

Held:

The court referred to Rule 12 of the Orissa Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1992, which empowers the appointing authority or any authority empowered by the Governor to suspend a government servant during disciplinary proceedings.

The Governor had delegated the power to suspend to the Collector of the district through an order dated 6.2.87.

The tribunal's view that the power of suspension could not be delegated to the Collector because the Collector could only impose minor punishments was rejected by the court.

The court held that the power to suspend, once delegated to the Collector, continued to be exercisable even after the delegation of power for minor punishments.

Consequently, the order of the tribunal was set aside, and the appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

Appellant (Vaneet Jain) filed for eviction of tenant (Jagjit Singh) on the grounds of bona fide need for premises.

Appellant claimed unemployment, intent to start a business, and health concerns.

Rent Controller and appellate authority found the landlord's need bona fide.

High Court, in revision, disagreed, setting aside the previous decisions.

Issues:

Whether High Court can reassess evidence in revisional jurisdiction.

Validity of landlord's claim for eviction based on bona fide need.

Held:

Appellate authority found landlord's need genuine, considering unemployment and intent to start a business.

High Court's reassessment deemed impermissible, limited to legality and propriety.

Enrollment in Employment Exchange at Orissa does not invalidate the landlord's bona fide need.

High Court's conclusion, after reassessment, found not permissible under law.

Judgment under appeal set aside, allowing the landlord's appeal.

Facts:

The appellant, a Chartered Accountant, joined the Punjab State Electricity Board in 1988.

Allegations of discrimination and victimization against the appellant.

Claims of being ignored for promotions and allegations of malafides against specific respondents.

Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) showing a decline in performance over the years.

Order of premature retirement based on Regulation 3(i)(e) of the Punjab State Electricity Board Services (Pre-mature Retirement) Regulations, 1982.

Issues:

Malafides and discrimination against the appellant.

Authority of the person passing the premature retirement order.

Compliance with relevant rules and regulations.

Validity of the appellant's performance as reflected in the ACRs.

Whether the premature retirement decision is in the public interest.

Held:

The authority of the person passing the order of compulsory retirement is considered in detail. The Member/Finance & Accounts is found to have the authority based on the relevant rules and regulations.

The ACRs of the appellant are presented, indicating a decline in performance over the years. The High Empowered Integrity Committee's observations support the decision for premature retirement.

The challenge of malafides is rejected by the High Court, considering the overall record of the petitioner.

The Court emphasizes the importance of factual support for allegations of malafides and notes the petitioner's extensive history of litigation against the Board.

The Court finds no evidence of tampering with the ACRs or any link between the respondents and alleged malafides.

The Court upholds the use of Punjab State Electricity Board Services (Pre-mature Retirement) Regulations, 1982, and the formation of an opinion in public interest for premature retirement.

The appeal is dismissed, and no costs are awarded.

Facts:

The accused, Siriyans Kumar Jain, along with others, was convicted for a murder committed during municipal elections in 1987.

The High Court upheld the conviction of some accused but acquitted Siriyans Kumar Jain.

The Supreme Court set aside the acquittal, directing Siriyans Kumar Jain to surrender to serve the remaining sentence.

Issues:

Validity of the Governor's order granting pardon and remission of sentence.

Lack of application of mind by the Governor.

Procedural irregularities and haste in processing the pardon.

Held:

The Governor's order lacked proper application of mind, being issued hastily and without consideration of crucial information regarding the convict's imprisonment status.

The Governor must be made aware of the period of sentence undergone and the convict's behavior during imprisonment.

The order indicating the prisoner's confinement in jail contradicted the fact that the convict was free at the time of the order.

Decision: The court quashed the Governor's order dated 25-01-1999, citing a lack of proper advice and consideration of relevant materials. The judgment does not debar the Governor from reconsidering the matter in light of the relevant materials, ensuring compliance with constitutional provisions.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged a criminal conspiracy leading to the abduction and murder of children for human sacrifice based on a belief in unearthing hidden treasure. A child witness (PW 31) managed to escape the abduction twice, narrating the incidents later. A confessional statement by A-4 was recorded before a Judicial Magistrate (Exh.38), and the Trial Court, relying on this statement and the testimony of the child witness, convicted and sentenced the accused to death.

Issues:

The High Court, on appeal, disbelieved the confessional statement and rejected the child witness's testimony, leading to the acquittal of the accused. The key issues include the voluntariness of the confessional statement, reliability of the child witness, and the correctness of the High Court's decision.

Held:

The circumstances sufficiently establish a criminal conspiracy by the accused to abduct and murder children. The High Court erred in acquitting the accused by disregarding established circumstances.

The Division Bench's doubts regarding the voluntariness of A-4's confession are unfounded. The Trial Court's reliance on the voluntary and true nature of the confession is upheld.

A Magistrate must ensure a confession is free from police influence. The geographical distance between the sub-jail and the police station is not a decisive factor in determining police control.

Denial of recovery by the accused is considered a sufficient link in the chain of circumstances, as seen in A-2's case regarding a blood-stained article.

Information supplied by A-3 about the mode of transportation of the dead body is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

Section 10 permits the use of a confessional statement against co-accused in a conspiracy case. In this instance, all accused are reasonably believed to have conspired together.

Despite the horrendous acts, the accused's belief in a superstitious ritual is considered, leading to the conversion of the death sentence to life imprisonment for the offense under Section 302.

Facts:

The application by the Amicus Curiae seeks clarification on the working of the High Power Committee (HPC), especially in relation to the orders passed by the HPC imposing penalties based on actual adjudication.

Issues:

The validity and permissibility of penalties, including additional penalties, imposed by the HPC based on documents produced by the units, even if they result in penalties larger than the originally imposed ones.

Held:

The HPC, after fixing normal recovery norms, proceeded to examine records of different units. The court agrees with the norms adopted by the HPC and holds that penalties larger than originally imposed are valid as long as they are based on the records produced.

Decision: The HPC is entitled to look into records and pass orders in cases where documents were submitted by January 15, 1998. Units with imposed penalties can approach the HPC for reconsideration within one month of the order, based on new material. The HPC is required to briefly indicate reasons for its orders.

Facts:

Respondents allotted 7.06 acres of Government land in 1961, subject to conditions of use and non-alienation.

Laoni Rules, 1950, and Revised Assessment Policy imposed restrictions on alienation of assigned lands.

In 1991, respondents executed a Power of Attorney, empowering a builder for various actions regarding the land.

Government initiated proceedings to cancel the land assignments due to alleged irregularities.

Issues:

Validity of the land assignments made in 1961.

Actions of the Collector in initiating proceedings and subsequent government ratification.

Held:

The High Court observed that the District Revenue Officer lacked jurisdiction in considering the matter, as a mandamus was issued to the Collector to hear and dispose of the explanation.

The Court directed the Collector to complete the proceedings initiated by his order dated 3rd of January, 1995, as ratified by the Government, in accordance with the law.

The High Court's observation on the District Revenue Officer's lack of jurisdiction.( Paragraph 15)

The Court's decision to dispose of the appeal, directing the Collector to complete the proceedings.( Paragraph 16)

Facts:

The respondent claimed eviction of the appellants under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, asserting a bona fide requirement. The appellants resisted, contending that the property was vested in the Custodian of Enemy Properties for India, and therefore, could not be sold. They relied on Section 18 of the Enemy Property Act, 1968, and argued that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction under Section 19 of the said Act. The appellants also challenged the legality and genuineness of the sale deed.

Issues:

Whether the property was vested in the Custodian of Enemy Properties for India.

Jurisdiction of the Rent Controller under the Enemy Property Act.

Validity of the sale deed.

Applicability of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

Held:

The court highlighted the legislative intent behind rent control laws, emphasizing their role as social legislation to protect tenants from unjust eviction. It stressed that a hyper-technical interpretation of the laws should be avoided to prevent frustration of the legislative objectives.( Para 5)

The appellants argued that the property was vested in the Custodian of Enemy Properties for India, citing communication from the Custodian. The Rent Controller had overlooked the distinction between the Evacuee Property Act and the Enemy Property Act. The court held that questions regarding vesting, authenticity of the sale deed, and consequences of vesting/non-vesting should be determined at trial. The appellants' claims were not baseless, and they should have been granted leave to defend.( Para 6)

The court considered the appellants' reliance on Annexure P-1, an intimation by the Custodian confirming the vesting of the property. The Rent Controller's failure to recognize the difference between the acts led to legal infirmities in the orders.( Para 8)

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the orders of the Rent Controller and the High Court. The appellants were granted leave to defend the eviction petition, and the Rent Controller was directed to expedite the case's disposal.( Para 10)

FACTS:

The court had previously directed, in M.C. Mehta v. Union and Others, that certain industries relocate in compliance with the Master Plan of Delhi.

The Master Plan required hazardous industries to shift within three years, and heavy/large industries were directed to shift to Delhi Metropolitan Area and the National Capital Region.

The owners were instructed to surrender excess land, and the court specified the manner in which surrendered land should be used.

The court, in its previous order, did not direct compensation for the surrendered land.

ISSUES:

Failure of industries to surrender excess land as per the court's previous order.

Contention by industries that surrender should involve compensation under Section 15 of the Delhi Development Act.

HELD:

The court rejects the contention that DDA is bound to acquire the land under Section 15 and pay compensation. The court notes that the absence of a compensation directive was deliberate, as an implicit compensation element was present in the increased FAR granted.( Para 5)

No indication or affidavit shows that there was a demand for compensation at any point during the proceedings. The court emphasizes the importance of obeying the law for the profitability of the owners.( Para 6)

The Master Plan of 1990 made it obligatory for hazardous industries to shift within three years, and the spirit was for existing heavy and large industries to relocate within a reasonable time. Industries not complying have themselves to blame.( Para 8)

Directs all industries to voluntarily surrender excess land within one month; otherwise, DDA should file execution applications. The District Judge, Delhi, to execute the court's order and report compliance within four weeks of filing.( Para 10)

Clarifies that the direction in the order dated 10th May 1996 only pertains to the surrender of land. Another order on 4th December 1996 addresses the procedure for industries wanting to start new conforming activities.( Para 12)