Facts:

A notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for the acquisition of certain land.

A batch of 73 writ petitions challenged this acquisition before the High Court.

The High Court initially allowed these petitions, quashing the acquisition proceedings.

Subsequently, the applicants also sought to quash the acquisition proceedings for their lands.

The Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's judgment.

The DDA had previously represented to the applicant that the acquisition proceedings were quashed, and the applicant had acted on this representation by constructing a building.

Issues:

Whether those claimants who did not file objections to the Section 4 notification can later challenge the Section 5A inquiry or seek the quashing of the Section 6 declaration.

The nature and sufficiency of reasons in the Section 6 declaration.

The scope and limitations of review applications.

The propriety of representing review applications as applications for 'clarification,' 'modification,' or 'recall' to bypass the circulation procedure.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that those claimants who had not filed objections to the Section 4 notification cannot later contend that the Section 5A inquiry is vitiated or seek the quashing of the Section 6 declaration.

The Court clarified that the Section 6 declaration need not contain reasons or refer to objections for every particular piece of land. It is sufficient if the authority conducting the Section 5A inquiry has considered the objections raised in relation to any particular land.

Review applications have a narrow scope, and parties should exercise restraint in filing them. The Court emphasized the need for seriousness and caution in filing review petitions.

The practice of filing review applications in the guise of applications for 'clarification,' 'modification,' or 'recall' to obtain a hearing in open court and bypass the circulation procedure is not permissible.

If the Court allows a writ petition and provides reasons later, the first order allowing the writ petition and issuing the writ absolute is the operative order. The later order containing reasons cannot go beyond the scope of the rule absolute already issued.

Facts:

The case involves multiple appeals filed against judgments related to the surrender of surplus land by landholders under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act. The central issue revolves around the landholders' rights to cut and remove trees from forest areas that were part of the surplus land. The landholders claimed that the forest land did not vest in the State Government, while the State argued that the entire surplus land, including forest growth, had vested in the State.

Issues:

Determination of when surplus land vests in the State under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act.

Whether forest produce standing on the surplus land vests in the State along with the land.

Entitlement of landholders to compensation for trees and forest produce on the surplus land.

Grant of permits for the removal of forest produce.

Held:

The judgment provides the following key findings and decisions:

The surplus land vests in the State on communication of the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer to take over possession of the land to the owner/holder/occupier of the land. The word "thereupon" in Section 11 refers to such an order.

There is no provision in the Act or Rules for payment of compensation for trees (other than fruit-bearing trees) or any other forest produce on vested land. Therefore, no claim for compensation for such trees or forest produce standing on the surplus land arises under the Act or Rules.

The judgment clarifies that even before the vesting of the surplus land in the State Government, landholders had no right to fell and remove standing trees or other forest produce from forest areas. They could do so only with a permit from the competent officer of the Forest Department.

The judgment does not provide any direction for the felling or removal of forest produce from surplus land as it falls outside the scope of the current proceedings related to the vesting of surplus land under the Act.

Facts:

A.C. Thalwal, an ex-serviceman, joined the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service after serving in the Indian Air Force.

He sought benefits for the period of his approved military service, including pay fixation and seniority.

The High Court initially granted pay fixation but not seniority, leading to further representations and changes in seniority.

Other judicial officers affected by these changes challenged the seniority adjustments through writ petitions.

The main issue was the validity of the Ex-Servicemen (Reservation of Vacancies in the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service) Rules, 1981, which allowed the counting of military service for seniority.

Issues:

Whether the Reservation Rules of 1981 were constitutionally valid.

Whether the High Court's decisions regarding the appellant's seniority were correct.

Held:

Article 234 mandates meaningful and effective consultation with the High Court for appointments to judicial service. This consultation is not a mere formality.

The Reservation Rules of 1981 were framed without proper consultation with the High Court, making them ultra vires the Constitution. Therefore, these Rules are void.

The High Court's orders granting the appellant the benefit of military service for seniority were based on the unconstitutional rules and were rightly struck down. The appeals were dismissed.

The Court allowed the appellant to continue holding his current post as a special case until he became eligible for promotion, irrespective of the benefit of seniority.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute related to a salvage contract and damages claimed for repudiation of the contract. The High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division, Admiralty Court, in England, passed a decree in favor of one party (respondent No. 1).

Issues:

The applicability of Section 44-A of the Civil Procedure Code for the enforcement of a foreign judgment in India, considering Section 112(2) CPC.

The nature of the English judgment (judgment in personam) and its compatibility with arrest of a vessel (arrest in rem) in admiralty law.

Whether Section 44-A CPC is exhaustive or if common law principles still apply to the execution of decrees for money.

Held:

The Admiralty jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is not frozen or atrophied in any way. Section 44-A makes the Andhra Pradesh High Court competent to entertain the execution proceeding for the foreign decree.

The High Court rightly decided that the Code of Civil Procedure applies even in Admiralty jurisdiction. Section 112(2) CPC does not render the Code completely inapplicable to admiralty cases, as indicated by Section 140 of the Code.

Section 4 is a general provision excluding the operation of the CPC in specific instances, and there is no general exclusion of the entire Code to admiralty jurisdiction.

Section 44-A of the CPC indicates an independent right for foreign decree holders to enforce their decree in India. It is a fresh cause of action and not limited by jurisdictional issues. The nature of the decree itself need not specify its jurisdiction.

The concept of proceeding in term and proceeding in personam in admiralty law are alternative methods related to the same claim and can coexist.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed, and it is clarified that the Andhra Pradesh High Court had the competency to entertain the execution proceeding for the foreign decree. Section 44-A of the CPC provides an independent right for foreign decree holders, irrespective of the nature of the decree or jurisdiction.

Facts:

A jeep and a lorry were seized for transporting Kiralbhogi logs, a forest produce, without the required permit, violating the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963.

The vehicles and the seized timber were presented before the authorized officer for action under Section 71-A of the Act.

The lorry owner's request for the release of his vehicle was initially denied but was later released on interim custody by an additional sessions judge.

The respondent (K. Krishnan) requested the release of the jeep, which was granted with certain conditions, including the requirement to provide an irrevocable bank guarantee.

Issues:

Whether a liberal approach in releasing property subject to confiscation under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, was in line with the Act's objectives, which aimed to protect and preserve forests and their produce.

Held:

The court emphasized that strict compliance with the provisions of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, was essential to achieve the Act's objectives.

Property seized and liable for forfeiture, including forest produce, tools, boats, vehicles, and cattle, should generally not be released. Exceptions may be made based on valid reasons in individual cases.

Vehicles involved in forest offenses should not be released before the conclusion of legal proceedings, and if released exceptionally, the furnishing of a bank guarantee should be a minimum requirement.

The court stressed the importance of protecting forests as they are not only the country's natural wealth but also essential for maintaining a clean and unpolluted environment.

The High Court's order was criticized for adopting a casual approach and not considering the significance of the Act's objectives.

Facts:

Lachmandas Naraindas Khanchandani held National Savings Certificates and other financial assets.

Appellant No. 1 is the deceased's brother, appellant No. 2 is his stepbrother, respondent No. 1 is the widow, and respondent No. 2 is the daughter of the deceased.

Respondent No. 1 filed a petition under Section 370 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, seeking a succession certificate for the debts and securities left by the deceased.

The dispute centered around National Savings Certificates in which the appellants were named as nominees by the deceased.

The Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thane, ruled in favor of the respondents for certain debts and securities but not for the National Savings Certificates with the appellants as nominees.

The respondents appealed to the High Court of Bombay, which granted the appeal and directed the issuance of a succession certificate for all debts, including the National Savings Certificates.

The appellants, as nominees of the National Savings Certificates, appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The interpretation of the Government Savings Certificate Act, 1959, particularly Sections 6, 7, and 8.

Whether the nominees of National Savings Certificates become the sole beneficiaries of the amounts upon the holder's death, excluding the legal heirs?

Whether Section 6 of the Act overrides other laws and legal succession?

Held:

The Supreme Court held as follows:

Section 6 of the Act, which deals with the nomination of holders of savings certificates, does not make the nominee the absolute owner of the amount but grants them the right to receive the sum due on the savings certificate.

The nominee acts as an intermediary who receives the amount on behalf of the deceased holder's estate, subject to valid deductions.

Section 8(2) of the Act clarifies that payment to the nominee does not preclude the legal representative (executor, administrator, or heirs) of the deceased holder from recovering the remaining amount after lawful deductions.

The nominee's rights are subject to the law of succession applicable to the deceased, whether testamentary or intestate.

Therefore, the respondents were entitled to the issuance of a succession certificate for the debts and securities, including National Savings Certificates, subject to necessary formalities and payments.

The appellants, as nominees, were entitled to receive the sums due on the National Savings Certificates but were obligated to return the amount to those legally entitled to it under the law of succession, after valid deductions.

Facts:

G.B. Pant University of Agriculture and Technology, a residential university, operated cafeterias to provide food services to students and residents.

Approximately 170 cafeteria employees sought regularization of their services as regular university employees.

Disputes arose when the university refused to accept their claims, leading to references under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act.

The Labor Court ruled in favor of cafeteria employees, declaring them as regular university employees entitled to equal benefits.

The university challenged these awards in the High Court, which upheld the Labor Court's decisions.

Issues:

Whether cafeteria workers were considered regular employees of the university or under the control of the Food Committee.

Whether the university was obligated to regularize the cafeteria employees' services and provide them with equitable wages and benefits.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the university had control and supervision over cafeteria employees based on regulations framed under the U.P. Agricultural University Act.

These regulations demonstrated the university's authority in managing and supervising cafeteria operations.

The cafeteria and its staff were deemed essential for the university, as students residing in hostels were obliged to use its food services.

The Court emphasized the principles of social and economic justice and the obligation to provide economic justice to the weaker sections of society.

The university was directed to regularize cafeteria employees' services by August 31, 2000, and provide them with monthly wages on par with other university employees.

Any arrears of salary were to be paid in twelve equal monthly installments alongside regularized salary.

The Court also noted that the university could establish a separate cadre of cafeteria staff employees with suitable pay scales in accordance with relevant regulations as part of its managerial functions.

Facts:

The Marwari Kumhar Community filed a representative suit claiming ownership of a temple property and the right to use a Dharamshala. They engaged Ganeshpuri as a Pujari. After Ganeshpuri's death, the respondents (heirs of Ganeshpuri) asserted ownership. The community filed a suit for a declaration of their title, which was decreed in their favor. The respondents appealed, and the appellate court allowed their appeal. However, the community's second appeal to the High Court restored the trial court's decree.

Issues:

Admissibility of secondary evidence, specifically the ordinary copy of the judgment from an earlier suit.

Whether the respondents were precluded from denying the community's title based on principles of res judicata.

Whether the respondents had established adverse possession over the property.

Whether the appellate courts erred in dismissing the suit.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that an ordinary copy of the earlier judgment was admissible as secondary evidence under Section 65(c) of the Evidence Act. The court emphasized that Sub-clause (c) was independent of Sub-clause (f) and allowed secondary evidence of a public document when the original was lost or destroyed.

The court also noted that the respondents did not deny the existence of the earlier judgment or claim that the copy produced was incorrect. Therefore, the earlier judgment affirming the community's title was binding on the respondents.

The appellate courts had erred in dismissing the suit. They failed to consider the principles of res judicata, and the respondents did not provide evidence to establish adverse possession after May 7, 1948. The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the appellate courts and restored the trial court's decree, affirming the community's title.

Facts:

In 1939, Krishnan Nair obtained ownership of a property through a family partition.

Due to debts from a chit fund business, Krishnan Nair executed a sale deed in 1940, transferring the property to Parameswaran Nair.

Legal issues arose, leading to the property being sold in execution.

Krishnan Nair attempted to regain the property by depositing the debt amount, interest, and commission.

To raise funds for this deposit, Krishnan Nair executed a sale deed in favor of Kesavan Channar for Rs. 1,200, with a condition that the property be resold after 10 years.

Simultaneously, Kesavan Channar entered into an agreement to sell the property to Kochu Kunja Nair after 10 years.

After Kesavan Channar's death, the property came into the possession of his daughter, Lakshmikutty.

Kochu Kunja Nair assigned his rights under the agreement to the predecessor of the appellant.

When Lakshmikutty did not sell the property as per the agreement, the predecessor of the appellant filed a suit for specific performance.

Issues:

The interpretation of the property-related documents, including sale deeds (Exts. A-5) and agreements (Exts. A-6 and A-7).

Whether the transactions represented a genuine sale, a mortgage by conditional sale, or another legal arrangement.

Held:

The trial court held that Exts. A-5, A-6, and A-7 were not genuine, with Exts. A-6 and A-7 being benami transactions. The trial court also indicated that the transactions resembled a mortgage by conditional sale.

The first Appellate Court upheld the trial court's decision, seemingly concluding that if Ext. A-5 was genuine, Exts. A-6 and A-7 were also genuine.

The High Court determined that the transactions indicated Krishnan Nair had no intention of a permanent sale but rather resembled a mortgage by conditional sale. It passed a preliminary decree for redemption and ordered accounts to be taken.

The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's interpretation of the documents, stating that the transactions resembled a mortgage by conditional sale and were not perverse or illogical. It found that this interpretation did not reverse concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court, therefore, dismissed the appeal.