Condonation of Delay – Tribunal’s Power - The Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) has the discretionary power under Section 129A(5) of the Customs Act, 1962, to condone delays in filing appeals under Section 129D(4) if sufficient cause is shown - The High Court correctly upheld the Tribunal’s discretion to condone a 10-day delay in filing the appeal [Paras 13-21].

Application of Section 129A to Section 129D - The provisions of Section 129A of the Customs Act are applicable to applications made under Section 129D(4) - The Tribunal has the authority to condone delays in filing applications under Section 129D(4) by invoking the provisions of Section 129A(5) [Paras 12-14].

Legal Fiction and Interpretation - Legal fiction created by incorporating provisions of one section into another must be given full effect - The Tribunal’s power to condone delay under Section 129A(5) must be interpreted to apply to applications under Section 129D(4) [Paras 12-14].

Distinguishing Cases - Previous cases, such as Hongo India Pvt. Ltd. and others, that addressed condonation of delay under different statutory provisions do not apply here as the statutory framework of the Customs Act is distinct - The Tribunal's decision to condone the delay was appropriate given the specific statutory context [Paras 16-19].

Decision:

Appeal dismissed - High Court's decision upholding the Tribunal's power to condone the delay in filing under Section 129D(4) of the Customs Act confirmed [Para 21].

Commanding Officer's Role – Summary Court-Martial - The commanding officer who issued the charge sheet can also convene and preside over the summary court-martial as per the Army Act and Army Rules - There is no disqualification for such an officer in conducting summary court-martial proceedings [Paras 16-17].

Absence Without Leave – Court-Martial Procedure - The respondent was charged under Section 39(a) of the Army Act for unauthorized absence - He pleaded guilty and was dismissed from service by the summary court-martial, a procedure that followed Army Rules and was legally valid [Paras 19-20].

Fair Trial and Natural Justice - The argument that the respondent was denied a fair trial was not raised in the writ petition and lacked foundation - No violation of principles of natural justice occurred, and the proceedings were conducted according to the statutory provisions [Paras 18, 22].

Applicability of Precedents - The decision in Vidya Parkash v. Union of India was found applicable, affirming the legality of the commanding officer presiding over the summary court-martial - Other cited cases regarding principles of natural justice were not applicable to the facts of this case [Paras 20-22].

Decision:

Appeal allowed - The judgments of the Single Judge and the Division Bench were set aside - The order of dismissal from service was upheld [Para 23].

Murder Conviction – Circumstantial Evidence - The appellant was convicted for the murder of his wife, Remani, based on circumstantial evidence indicating forced administration of poison and smothering - Both the Trial Court and High Court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence of murder rather than suicide [Paras 24-34].

Motive and Domestic Abuse - Evidence of strained matrimonial relations and frequent physical abuse by the appellant provided a motive for the murder - Testimonies from family members and neighbors corroborated the history of domestic violence [Paras 2-7, 9-14, 17].

Medical Evidence – Cause of Death - Medical testimony indicated that Remani died from the combined effects of carbofuran poisoning and smothering - Injuries on her body suggested resistance to the forced administration of poison [Paras 15, 22-23, 31].

Interference by Supreme Court - The Supreme Court reaffirmed that it seldom interferes with concurrent findings of fact unless there is a substantial miscarriage of justice - No such exceptional circumstance was found in this case to warrant interference [Paras 24-27].

Decision:

Appeal dismissed - Conviction and sentence upheld - No merit found in the appeal [Paras 34-35].

High Court’s Jurisdiction – Post-Disposition Applications - The High Court erred in entertaining a criminal miscellaneous application in a disposed of writ petition and granting relief - The practice of filing such applications in disposed of cases is deprecated as it amounts to abuse of process and usurps the jurisdiction of regular criminal courts [Paras 11-13].

Bail and Arrest – Jurisdiction and Discretion - Granting bail or deciding on arrest lies within the powers of regular criminal courts - High Court’s inherent jurisdiction should not be used to usurp these powers except in exceptional circumstances [Paras 12-13].

Propriety of High Court’s Order – Review and Function - Once a writ petition is disposed of, the High Court becomes functus officio and cannot entertain review petitions or miscellaneous applications except for correcting typographical or clerical errors - The High Court's order preventing arrest until trial conclusion was impermissible [Paras 13-14].

Decision:

Appeal allowed - High Court's order set aside - Costs of Rs. 25,000 to be paid by the first respondent to the appellant within two months [Para 14].

Prosecution Evidence – Official Witnesses - Conviction based on testimonies of official witnesses upheld in the absence of animosity and independent corroboration - Independent witness Kaur Singh was not examined, but the absence did not vitiate the prosecution’s case due to corroborative evidence from official witnesses and documentary proof [Paras 8-9].

Procedural Fairness – Mixing of Contraband Samples - Argument that mixing of contraband from two bags constituted an irregularity was rejected - The total quantity of 69.50 kgs of poppy straw, even after taking samples, was well above the commercial quantity threshold, justifying the imposed sentence [Paras 10-11].

Jurisdiction and Sentence - The trial court and High Court’s findings were upheld, affirming the appellant’s conviction and the sentence of 10 years RI with a fine of Rs. 1 lakh under Section 15(c) of the NDPS Act - No prejudice was caused to the appellant by the mixing of samples [Paras 10-11].

Decision:

Appeals dismissed - The conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court were upheld [Paras 11-12].

Sale of Mortgaged Property – Powers of Financial Corporations - The UPFC, under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, has the authority to sell mortgaged properties upon default in loan repayment - The sale in question was advertised, and the highest bid was accepted after due process [Paras 13-14].

Validity of Mortgages and Subsequent Sales - Property sold by the original owner during the mortgage period to a third party, who then sold it to the writ petitioner, was invalid as the mortgage subsisted - The High Court’s order favoring the writ petitioner’s claim was incorrect [Paras 12-15].

Public Law Remedy – Appropriate Forum - Issues pertaining to property rights and sale validity should be adjudicated in civil courts, not under public law remedies - The High Court’s intervention in a writ petition for such issues was inappropriate [Paras 15-16].

Decision:

Appeals allowed - The High Court's order dated 5th December 2006 is set aside - The parties were directed to seek remedies through appropriate civil forums [Para 17].

Quo Warranto – Validity of Appointment - The High Court was justified in issuing a writ of quo warranto, holding that the appellant had no authority to continue as the Chairperson of the U.P. State Electricity Regulatory Commission due to non-compliance with Section 85(5) of the Electricity Act, 2003 - The Selection Committee must satisfy itself that a person does not have any financial or other interests likely to affect prejudicially his functions before recommending him for the appointment [Paras 2-22].

Selection Committee’s Responsibilities - The Selection Committee must comply with the provisions of Section 85(5) of the Electricity Act, which mandates the Committee to ensure that the appointee does not have interests that would prejudicially affect his functions - The Committee failed to exercise this duty, resulting in a void appointment [Paras 9-15].

Locus Standi and Delay - The writ petitioner had the locus standi to challenge the appointment, and delay in filing the petition did not bar the High Court from examining the validity of the appointment [Paras 8, 11-12].

**Writ of Quo Warranto

– Discretionary Remedy - The writ of quo warranto is a discretionary remedy used to challenge appointments made contrary to statutory provisions - Given the clear violation of Section 85(5), the High Court rightly exercised its discretion in issuing the writ [Paras 16-18, 20-22].

Decision:

Appeal dismissed - The High Court's decision to issue a writ of quo warranto and invalidate the appellant's appointment as Chairperson of the U.P. State Electricity Regulatory Commission was upheld - The appointment process was found to be in violation of statutory requirements [Paras 22].

Bail under MCOCA – Statutory Restrictions - Section 21(4) of MCOCA imposes stringent conditions for granting bail, requiring the court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail - The High Court's order granting bail without adhering to these statutory mandates was erroneous [Paras 5-14, 21-23].

Reasonable Grounds for Belief – Confessional Statements and Evidence - The prosecution's evidence, including the confessional statements of co-accused and financial transactions, indicated the respondent's involvement in the organized crime syndicate and handling of funds for criminal activities - These materials satisfied the requirement of "reasonable grounds" under Section 21(4) of MCOCA [Paras 12-18].

High Court's Error – Non-Compliance with Section 21(4) - The High Court failed to appreciate the statutory mandate of Section 21(4) and granted bail based on an incorrect understanding of the law and the materials on record - The order was set aside, and the special court's order rejecting bail was restored [Paras 20-23].

Decision:

Appeal allowed - The High Court's order granting bail to the respondent was set aside - The respondent was directed to surrender before the special court within two weeks, failing which the special court was directed to take appropriate steps for his arrest [Paras 23-24].

Statutory Bail – Right Under Section 167(2) CrPC - The appellant's right to statutory bail under Section 167(2) CrPC was established due to the prosecution's failure to file a charge-sheet within the stipulated 90 days - The subsequent application by the prosecution to extend the custody period did not negate the appellant's accrued right to bail [Paras 24-27].

Custody and Investigation Extension – Invalid Retrospective Order - The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate's retrospective extension of custody and investigation from 2nd June 2012 was deemed untenable - The appellant’s right to statutory bail was unaffected by the later application for custody extension [Paras 24-27].

Concurrent Findings and Precedent - Reference to the decisions in Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra and Sanjay Dutt v. State through C.B.I. Bombay reinforced the principle that the right to statutory bail is indefeasible upon the expiry of the stipulated period without a charge-sheet, unless availed of before filing [Paras 19-20, 24].

Decision:

Appeal allowed - The orders of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and the High Court extending the investigation and custody period were set aside - The appellant was granted statutory bail with conditions including surrender of passport and reporting to the local police station [Paras 27].