Facts:

The Gai Ghat bridge was constructed by the State Government in 1968-69.

In 1985, the right to collect toll tax for the bridge was leased to Chhotai Yadav.

In 1988, a writ application challenged the State Government's right to recover toll beyond the actual construction cost.

In 1990, the Allahabad High Court held that interest on construction cost and maintenance charges could not be recovered under Section 2 of the Toll Act.

Issues:

Whether the State Government is entitled to recover interest on the construction cost of the Gai Ghat bridge through toll.

Whether maintenance charges can be included in toll recovery under Section 2 of the Toll Act.

Held:

The High Court's decision was based on earlier decisions (Jiya Lal and Lal Bahadur Ram) with principles not fully accepted.

The notification of June 2, 1976, allowed toll collection for 50 years or until the total construction cost is realized, including interest.

Toll can be levied to recover actual construction cost, interest on the expenditure, and maintenance cost, as per the notification.

The State Government, however, erroneously included stationery cost and interest on interest in toll recovery.

The High Court's denial of toll recovery for interest and maintenance charges was not in line with the notification's provisions.

Decision: The appeals were disposed of by setting aside the High Court's orders. It was declared that toll should not include stationery cost (unless incurred in toll realization), interest on stationery cost, maintenance, and interest on the interest on actual expenditure.

Facts:

The appellant, Steel Authority of India Ltd., challenged the constitutional validity of Section 13-AA of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, and its subsequent amendment. The original Section 13-AA was struck down by the High Court, leading to its amendment. The appellant, involved in works contracts, faced penalties for not deducting sales tax at source as per the amended section.

Issues:

Constitutional validity of Section 13-AA.

Applicability of the amended Section 13-AA to works contracts involving inter-State sales, outside sales, or sales in the course of import.

Standing of the appellant to challenge the validity.

Held:

The court held that the amended Section 13-AA, requiring a four percent deduction towards sales tax, was beyond the powers of the State legislature as it failed to exclude the value of inter-State sales, outside sales, or sales in the course of import. The provisions were deemed unconstitutional. The court acknowledged the appellant's standing to challenge the validity and ordered the refund of the collected amount.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the judgment and order under appeal were set aside. Section 13-AA of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, as amended with effect from 4th October 1993, was struck down as being beyond the purview of the Orissa State Legislature. The State was directed to refund the collected amount to the appellant.

Facts:

The appellant is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, incorporated in 1965.

Eimco Corporation Inc. (an American company) and K.C.P. Ltd. (an Indian company) promoted the appellant.

Appellant claimed a deduction of Rs. 2,35,000 as revenue expenditure paid to Eimco for technical know-how.

Income Tax Officer treated it as capital expenditure, allowing only 1/14th of the amount as allowable expenditure under Section 35A.

Commissioner of Income Tax, exercising powers under Section 263, revised the order, deeming the amount as not expendable and set aside the earlier decision.

Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the revision, directing the addition of 1/14th amount back to the assessee's income.

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, in 1975, allowed the appeals of the appellant, considering the amount as revenue expenditure.

Issues:

Whether the Commissioner could interfere under Section 263 while the matter was directly in appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.

Whether the sum of Rs. 2,35,000 paid by the assessee to the foreign collaborator constitutes revenue expenditure.

Held:

The High Court, answering the referred questions, favored the Revenue and held that the Commissioner could indeed interfere under Section 263. It also concluded that the amount paid did not qualify as revenue expenditure.

The Supreme Court, affirming the decision, stated that the allotment of equity shares by the appellant to Eimco was not an expenditure, especially one laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. It was a reimbursement for the contribution of know-how by Eimco. The Court dismissed the appeals.

Facts:

The film "Fire," produced by Ms. Deepa Mehta, received certification under the Cinematograph Act, 1952.

Released in November 1998, protests emerged against the film's content within two weeks.

Protests escalated to violence and vandalism in cinemas, particularly in Maharashtra, mainly Mumbai.

Issues:

The petitioners sought security for the film's exhibition and an investigation into violent acts.

Allegations against the Chief Minister of Maharashtra (first respondent) and Shiv Sena for instigating protests and violence.

Held:

The petition is considered in the context of changed political circumstances in Maharashtra post the last Assembly election.

With Shiv Sena no longer in power, and the new government not being lethargic in addressing the issues, the court deems it unnecessary to continue the petition.

The petition is closed without prejudice to any future motion related to the shown cause of action.

Facts:

The respondent No. 1 imported Tape Deck Mechanisms (TDMs) at a declared value of S $ 250.00 per set. The appellant alleged under-valuation and violations of Import and Export regulations, leading to interception and investigation by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI). Legal proceedings ensued, including a writ petition before the High Court.

Issues:

Alleged under-valuation of imported TDMs.

Violation of Import Control Order and Import and Export Act.

Legality of investigation and issuance of show cause notice.

Held:

The Collector found deliberate mis-declaration of value, manipulation of documents, and an attempt to evade customs duty by the respondent. The TDMs were valued at S $ 343.45 per set, and the respondent was held liable for duty evasion.

The Collector also held that the TDMs required an import license, and since none was produced, the goods were liable for confiscation.

The Tribunal, on appeal, set aside the order of the Collector on the valuation issue but remanded the matter regarding the violation of Import Control Order to the Collector.

Decision: The decision of the Tribunal on the valuation issue is set aside.

The order of the Collector directing payment of differential duty is affirmed.

The adjudicating authority will decide the violation of the Import Control Order, and depending on the decision, the quantum of penalty will be redetermined.

Facts:

The appellant is charged with the murder of Abdulla, allegedly by inflicting dagger injuries. However, the dagger in question, found in a sheath near the place of occurrence, neither belonged to the accused nor had any blood-stains. The prosecution's version of the place of occurrence is also deemed improbable.

Issues:

Validity of the conviction under Section 302, IPC based on the prosecution's claim of dagger use.

Contradictions in the prosecution's case regarding the place of occurrence.

Held:

The court examines the dagger (M.O. 1) found sheathed near the basement of the shed. It highlights the lack of blood-stains and the improbability of the prosecution's version. The absence of another weapon of offense is noted.

The court questions the likelihood of the appellant dropping his dhoti and liquor bottle on the southern side of the pathway while trying to escape. The version of events gets tilted by the sheathed dagger, casting doubt on the prosecution's narrative.

The court emphasizes that if the dagger was used, it should have been found unsheathed with blood-stains. The appellant's drunken state and the presence of his belongings away from the alleged crime scene raise doubts about the shed being the actual place of occurrence.

The court concludes that the conviction of the accused is liable to be set aside due to the lack of a credible weapon of offense and inconsistencies in the prosecution's case.

Facts:

The appellant was charged with causing grievous injuries leading to the death of the deceased.

The appellant was initially convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act.

The High Court re-examined the evidence, convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC, and maintained the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act.

The appellant appealed against the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the injuries caused by the appellant were intentional and amounted to murder under Section 302 IPC.

Whether the appellant committed an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act based on caste discrimination.

Held:

The trial court's view was preferred, emphasizing that the appellant had the intention to cause only one serious injury (injury No. 1), while other injuries resulted from a scuffle.

The High Court's inference of an intention to cause all injuries was criticized, emphasizing that the medical evidence supports the possibility of injuries 2 to 10 occurring during a scuffle.

Section 3(2)(v) of the Act requires evidence that the offence was committed on the ground of the victim belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Tribe. As such evidence was lacking, the conviction under this section was set aside.

The conviction under Section 302 IPC was overturned, and the appellant was acquitted of that charge.

The original conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC was restored, with a punishment of five years of rigorous imprisonment. The appellant, having already served more than five years, was ordered to be set at liberty forthwith.

Facts:

Post-dated cheques issued by the company were dishonored.

The company was declared sick under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act.

Legal proceedings initiated against the company and its directors under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Issues:

Whether a company and its directors can be prosecuted under Section 138 NI Act after the company is declared sick under SICA.

Interpretation of Section 22 and 22A of SICA in relation to criminal proceedings.

Held:

The court established the prima facie case under Section 138 NI Act based on the dishonored cheques and legal requirements.

Section 22 SICA doesn't create a legal impediment for criminal proceedings; it pertains to recovery of money and winding up proceedings.

Section 22A SICA, restraining disposal of assets, may affect criminal cases depending on circumstances (e.g., if a restraint order was in effect before the cheque was drawn).

The court rejected the argument that a conviction leading to fines would impermissibly utilize the assets under Section 22 SICA.

The concern that the arrest of directors would thwart BIFR's efforts was dismissed as remote and far-fetched.

REFERRED CASES:

M/s. Electronics Trade and Technology Development Corpn. Ltd., Secunderabad Vs. M/s. Indian Technologists and Engineers (Electronics) Pvt. Ltd. and another, (1996) 1 AD 900 : AIR 1996 SC 2339 : (1996) 1 BC 271 : (1996) 86 CompCas 30 : (1996) CriLJ 1692 : (1996) 3 Crimes 82 : (1996) 1 CTC 193 : (1996) 1 JT 643 : (1996) 113 PLR 332 : (1996) 1 SCALE 636 : (1996) 2 SCC 739 : (1996) 1 SCR 843

Facts:

The appellant, a State Government Corporation, derived income from various sources, including interest, letting out warehouses, and administrative charges for foodgrain procurement. In the assessment year 1977-78, it claimed a deduction of expenditure under Section 37 of the Act. The dispute arose when the Income Tax Officer allowed only a portion of the expenditure attributable to taxable income.

Issues:

Whether the Tribunal's decision to allocate expenses in the same percentage as different sources of income, rather than allowing them entirely, was legally justified.

Held:

The High Court answered the question in the affirmative, favoring the Revenue. However, the Supreme Court, upon examination, found that the expenditure was disallowed not due to non-compliance with Section 37(1) but because it was incurred on an activity exempted under the Act. The Court referred to precedents, including Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras Vs. Indian Bank Ltd., and Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay Vs. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd., to establish that the entire permissible expenditure is deductible if it fulfills the requirements of Section 37(1) and is incurred in one indivisible business.

Decision: The order of the High Court was set aside, and the appeal was allowed in favor of the assessee.