Facts:

In this case, a foreign national (H), a Bangladeshi citizen, was gang-raped by multiple individuals, including railway employees, at a railway station and a rented flat. A petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by a practicing advocate on behalf of the victim, seeking compensation and other reliefs.

Issues:

Whether compensation could be awarded in a writ petition under Article 226 for a rape offense involving railway employees.

Whether the victim, being a foreign national, was entitled to constitutional rights and relief under public law.

The extent of vicarious liability of the government for acts of its employees in commercial activities.

The concept of locus standi in public interest litigation.

Held:

The court held that public law remedies can be available even in cases involving public functionaries and the violation of fundamental rights, regardless of the availability of private law remedies (Bodhisatwa v. Ms. Subdhra Chakroborty; Common Cause v. Union of India).

The victim, despite being a foreign national, was entitled to constitutional rights, especially the right to life and dignity, under Article 21 of the Constitution and international human rights principles (Universal Declaration of Human Rights).

The government could be vicariously liable for acts of its employees, even in cases involving commercial activities, as railway operations were considered commercial activities (Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P.).

The argument that liability under the law of torts arises only when the act complained of was performed in the course of official duty was deemed invalid (Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P.).

The court affirmed that the concept of locus standi in public interest litigation allows individuals to file petitions in public interest, even if they are not directly connected to the victim (S.P. Gupta v. Union of India).

The appeal having no merit is dismissed.

Facts:

The first appellant is a practicing advocate, and the second appellant is his wife, who worked as the Matron of a Girls' Hostel run by the Social Welfare Department.

A complaint was filed by Kumari G. Swetha, a resident of the hostel, alleging that the first appellant had attempted to outrage her modesty on a specific date.

The police filed a charge-sheet directly before the Sessions Court, designated as the Special Court for offenses under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, within the territorial limits of the district.

The charge-sheet included charges under the Act as well as the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The police later revised the charge-sheet, removing one of the IPC charges.

Issues:

Whether the Special Court, designated under the Act, had the authority to take cognizance of offenses without the case being committed to it by a magistrate.

The secondary issue related to the procedure followed in filing the charge-sheet directly before the Special Court.

Held:

The Court established as a "Special Court" under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, is essentially a Court of Session. Its designation as a Special Court does not change its character or powers as a Court of Session.

The trial in such a Special Court can only be conducted in accordance with the procedures outlined in Chapter XVIII of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), which pertains to "Trial before a Court of Session."

Section 193 of the CrPC prohibits all Courts of Session from taking cognizance of any offense as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a magistrate.

The Special Court, even though designated as such under the Act, cannot take cognizance of offenses under the Act directly, without the case being committed to it by a magistrate. Neither the CrPC nor the Act provides otherwise.

Sections 4(2) and 5 of the CrPC, which deal with the application of the Code to offenses under other laws, do not negate the requirement of committal to a Special Court under the Act.

The judgment disapproves of a contrary view taken by the Kerala High Court and emphasizes that, in the absence of specific provisions in the Act, the CrPC's provisions, including Section 193, apply.

The High Court's order setting aside the proceedings initiated by the Special Court under the Act is affirmed. However, the direction given by the High Court regarding framing charges is not supported. The Special Court is to decide the appropriate action after hearing both sides and is free to pass appropriate orders, including considering pleas for discharge.

Facts:

In this case, the accused obtained a loan from the complainant company. They issued two cheques for the repayment of the loan, but these cheques were returned dishonored. Subsequently, the accused requested more time for repayment, issued two more cheques, which were also dishonored. The complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the accused. Later, a complaint was filed under Sections 406 and 420 IPC, alleging fraudulent conduct by the accused.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent proceedings under Sections 406 and 420 IPC against the accused are maintainable, considering the pending complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act?

Whether the filing of a separate First Information Report (FIR) for IPC offenses is an abuse of process of law?

Held:

The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the prosecution of the appellants under Sections 406/420 IPC in Criminal Case No. 674/97 was quashed. The Court held that the complainant's attempt to involve all members of the accused's family, including the parents, in the criminal case without regard to their actual role or participation in the alleged offenses was an abuse of process. Since a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was already pending against the accused, prosecuting them under Sections 406/420 IPC was unjustified.

The appellants would face consequences if the offense under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is proven against them. Therefore, there was no occasion for the complainant to prosecute them under Sections 406/420 IPC.

The prosecution against the appellants under Sections 406/420 IPC amounted to an abuse of the process of law and was quashed.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves the inheritance of Bhumidhari land by Smt. Kaushalya Devi, a female Hindu landholder who inherited the property from her father. After her marriage, she became the wife of the appellant, Mool Chand. Smt. Kaushalya Devi passed away in 1953, leading to a legal dispute regarding the devolution of her property. The central question was whether her property would be governed by Section 172(2)(a)(i) or Section 172(2)(a)(ii) of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, based on her personal law and the nature of her property rights.

Issues:

What was the nature of Smt. Kaushalya Devi's property rights under her personal law?

Which provision of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, would govern the inheritance of her Bhumidhari land?

Held:

The Court, after examining the relevant provisions and legal principles, held as follows:

Smt. Kaushalya Devi, as a female inheriting property from a male, typically held limited estate rights under customary Hindu law. Her rights to the property were akin to a life estate, as per customary Hindu law, unless the case fell under the Bombay School, which was not applicable in this instance.

Since Smt. Kaushalya Devi had passed away before the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 came into force, the conversion of her limited estate into an absolute estate, as provided in Section 14 of the Act, did not apply to her case. Consequently, the nature of her property rights was that of a limited estate under her personal law.

The Court found that Section 172(2)(a)(i) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, applied in this scenario. This provision dictated that the inheritance of the property would be determined based on her personal law, and since she had limited estate rights, the property would devolve according to Section 171.

Under Section 171, the husband was not considered an heir, and therefore, the property would not pass to the husband upon her death. Instead, the property would devolve as per Section 175 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, which stipulated that in the case of a female Bhumidhar who left no heirs, the property would pass by survivorship.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the decisions of the lower courts. It was determined that, in this case, the property of Smt. Kaushalya Devi would not pass to her husband but would devolve to the co-tenure holders by survivorship under the relevant provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.

Facts:

K.P. Madhavankutty, an employee of The Nedungadi Bank Ltd., was dismissed from service in 1972 due to allegations of misappropriation of funds and falsifying bank records.

Madhavankutty admitted his guilt during disciplinary proceedings and appealed to the Bank's Board of Directors for leniency. His appeal was dismissed in 1973.

In 1980, Madhavankutty claimed discrimination, arguing that two other employees in similar situations were reinstated by the Bank.

Madhavankutty filed an application under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act with the State Government in 1979 but was directed to the Central Government for jurisdiction.

The Assistant Labour Commissioner of the Central Government, in 1981, concluded that there was no scope for formal proceedings due to the delay.

Legal proceedings ensued, including writ petitions in the High Court, ultimately leading to a reference being made by the Central Government questioning Madhavankutty's dismissal.

Issues:

Whether the Central Government's exercise of power under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, made after a substantial delay and in the absence of a current industrial dispute, is valid.

Whether the reference in question is based on a stale dispute.

Held:

The Central Government's power under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act should be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. It emphasizes that there must be a rational basis for the Central Government's exercise of power and that a stale dispute cannot be the subject of reference under Section 10. The Court opines that the reference disrupted settled matters and was not in line with the purpose of maintaining industrial peace.

The Court allows the appeal, sets aside the Division Bench's judgment, and restores the judgment of the learned single Judge. No costs are awarded.

Facts:

The case concerned the allocation of seats for higher education and public employment in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The population was categorized into various groups, including tribals, pre-1942 settlers, post-1942 settlers, settlers with ten years of island education, and merit candidates. The Central Government had established a quota system, and the petitioners belonged to the category of settlers with ten years of island education (category v). An order had reduced their quota from 35% to 20% and increased the combined quota for pre-1942 and post-1942 settlers (category iii and iv) to 50%.

Issues:

Did the reduction of the quota for category v (settlers with ten years of island education) violate Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution?

Could pre-1942 and post-1942 settlers be allocated 50% of the quota?

Was there any provision for merit candidates in the allocation of seats?

Held:

The Court held that pre-1942 and post-1942 settlers constituted a separate category and were socially and educationally backward, albeit to a lesser degree than tribals. Their history included efforts to make the islands habitable and suffering during the Japanese occupation. They could not be equated with category v, which comprised voluntary migrants with greater social and educational advancement. The Central Government's decision to restore 50% quota for pre-1942 and post-1942 settlers was justified in light of this historical context.

The Court rejected the argument that the larger population of category v should result in a higher percentage of reservation. It stated that no reservation based on population within a particular category could be established. Allocation should consider social and economic backwardness, and the pre-1942 and post-1942 settlers were identified as backward in these aspects.

The Court emphasized that, generally, reserved categories should not exceed 50% of the total quota, with the remainder going to merit candidates. However, the Court found that the present classification and quota did not violate this principle. The impugned order specifically provided that unutilized quota from other categories would be allocated to merit candidates. Adequate provisions were made in favor of merit candidates. Writ petition is dismissed.

Facts:

Narain Lal, a government employee, had two wives, Rameshwari Devi (the first wife) and Yogmaya Devi (the second wife). He had children from both marriages. Narain Lal passed away in 1987, while serving as Managing Director of the Rural Development Authority of Bihar. A dispute arose regarding the entitlement to family pension, death-cum-retirement gratuity, and property rights between his two wives and their respective children. The first wife, Rameshwari Devi, claimed sole entitlement to these benefits, arguing that the second marriage between Narain Lal and Yogmaya Devi was invalid.

Issues:

Whether the second marriage between Narain Lal and Yogmaya Devi was valid under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Whether children born from the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage were legitimate and entitled to a share of the family pension, death-cum-retirement gratuity, and property of the deceased government employee.

If legitimate, until what age were the minor children from the second marriage entitled to receive family pension.

Held:

The court held that the second marriage between Narain Lal and Yogmaya Devi was in contravention of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, making it a void marriage.

Despite the void nature of the second marriage, Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, deems children of void marriages as legitimate. Under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, property of a male Hindu dying intestate devolves firstly on heirs, including the widow and son. In this context, the legitimate sons born from the second marriage were entitled to a share in the family pension, death-cum-retirement gratuity, and property of Narain Lal, along with the first wife's son and property rights.

Family pension would be admissible to the minor children born from the second marriage until they reached the age of majority. Yogmaya Devi, as the second wife, was not entitled to any portion of these benefits.

An inquiry conducted by the State Government to determine the legitimacy of the marriage and the children was valid. Witnesses testified to the existence of the marriage and the legitimacy of the sons, and documentary evidence supported this. The presumption in favor of marriage duly performed between Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal was not rebutted.

The court emphasized that disbursement of pension could not wait for a civil court to decide the respective rights of the parties. While the matter could ultimately be resolved by a civil court, the government had the authority to conduct an inquiry and make determinations for the purpose of granting pensionary benefits.

The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

This appeal was referred to a Full Bench of three Judges due to a conflict in views regarding the nature of Explanation (2) to Section 40(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The central question was whether this Explanation, introduced on April 1, 1985, should be applied prospectively or if it is merely declaratory.

Issues:

The interpretation of Explanation (2) to Section 40(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, specifically whether it had a prospective or declaratory effect.

Held:

In previous cases, the Supreme Court had considered this issue. In Brij Mohan Das Laxman Das vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Allahabad, two Judges concluded that Explanation (2) was declaratory, and this view was upheld by a Bench of three Judges in M/s. Suwalal Anadilal Jain vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar-II, Ranchi. The Full Bench held that these earlier decisions still represented the correct interpretation of the law, meaning that Explanation (2) to Section 40(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, should be considered declaratory.

Decision: The civil appeal was dismissed, and no order was given regarding the costs of the appeal.

Facts:

The case pertains to the aftermath of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy. The petitioner, Krishna Mohan Shukla, raised concerns about the functioning of the Bhopal Gas Relief Tribunal and issues related to medical facilities. The compensation scheme established by the Government of India in 1985 was at the center of the dispute. The petitioner alleged that Deputy Commissioners responsible for compensation had applied arbitrary criteria, and Lok Adalats' decisions were questioned.

Issues:

The alleged arbitrary functioning of the Bhopal Gas Relief Tribunal.

Concerns regarding medical facilities.

The application of the compensation scheme and the role of Deputy Commissioners.

The legitimacy of Lok Adalats' decisions.

Held:

The court recognized the need for fair compensation for claimants and the importance of adhering to the established system for determining compensation through Deputy Commissioners, Additional Commissioners, and the Welfare Commissioner. The court suggested that aggrieved claimants should initially seek judicial review at the High Court level rather than directly approaching the Supreme Court under Article 32 or Article 136.

The court upheld the validity of Lok Adalats' decisions. It clarified that the order of November 7, 1997, allowing review petitions for claimants in Medical Category 'C' and above, was appropriate to address grievances.

The court deferred addressing medical facility issues and directed the petitioner to assist in a related writ petition (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 50 of 1998), where pleadings were complete and orders had been passed.