Facts:

The appellant was challenging a detention order issued under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981.

The appellant was accused of extorting money from a businessman, making threats in public places, and engaging in activities affecting public order.

Issues:

Legibility of documents supplied to the appellant.

Whether the alleged activities amounted to a breach of public order.

The nature of the criminal proceeding against the appellant and its relevance to the detention.

Held:

The grounds of detention referred to a criminal proceeding against the appellant, involving an assault on Harishchandra Gupta and his brother. When seeking help, none came forward due to fear of the appellant, indicating disturbance to the life of the people in the area.( Para 5)

Referring to precedent cases, the court clarified that the disturbance caused by the appellant's activities must go beyond ordinary law, affecting the community at large or a significant section of society to qualify as a breach of public order.( Para 7)

The court determined that the appellant's actions, including extortion and threats, undoubtedly disturbed the even tempo of life in society, qualifying as a disturbance of public order.( Para 9)

The appellant argued that the criminal proceeding was for bailable offenses. However, the court noted that none dared to help the victims due to fear of the appellant, indicating a disturbance in public order.( Para 10)

Addressing the issue of delay, the court found that there was no undue delay in passing the detention order, and the actions were taken in a routine manner.( Para 12)

The High Court's dismissal of the petition was upheld, and there was no reason to interfere with the order.( Para 13)

The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The Bihar Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1951, framed under the proviso to Article 309, did not provide for reservation for recruitment to the cadre of district judges. The Bihar Judicial Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1955, framed by the Governor of Bihar, provided for reservation in the lower judiciary. Despite the High Court's disagreement with the State authorities on reservation in district and subordinate judges' posts, the State issued an advertisement in 1994, reserving 50% of the vacancies.

Issues:

The constitutional validity of the reservation provisions in the Bihar Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1991, as applied to the subordinate judiciary.

The conflict between legislative powers, consultation requirements with the High Court, and the authority to make appointments were key points of contention.

Held:

S.4 of the Bihar Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1991, is ultra vires and in direct conflict with Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution.

Articles 233 and 234 cover the entire field regarding recruitment and appointment of district judges and judges of the subordinate judiciary. Legislative power of the State in this field is excluded by the constitutional scheme.

No recruitment to the post of a district judge can be made without a recommendation from the High Court. Appointments to subordinate judiciary at the grass-root level also cannot be made without consultation with the High Court and adherence to rules framed by the Governor.

Reservations were not a stage anterior to recruitment and appointment. The Act does not apply to the cadre of district judges or the cadre of judiciary subordinate to the district judges.

Consultation with the High Court is essential for direct recruitment of judicial officers at the grass-root level. The second part of Article 235 permits State legislation only to govern the conditions of service of already recruited judicial officers.

Facts:

The assessee, a plantation company, entered into agreements for the sale of old rubber trees in 1975. The purchasers paid earnest money and advances, but the sales did not materialize, leading to the termination of agreements and forfeiture of amounts. The Assessing Officer deemed the forfeited amounts non-taxable, but the Commissioner of Income Tax revised the assessment, holding them as revenue income. The Tribunal initially ruled in favor of the assessee, but the High Court remanded the matter back, emphasizing the difference between earnest money and advances.

Issues:

Whether the forfeited amounts are to be considered capital or revenue receipts in the context of an abortive sale transaction of rubber trees.

Held:

The Tribunal, on reconsideration, determined that the receipt by way of the forfeiture of the advance was not assessable as revenue, but the earnest money was assessable as income under other sources. The High Court, in the first instance, focused on the forfeiture ending the agreement's character and declared the forfeited amounts as income receipts. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the cancellation of a sale of capital assets does not change the nature of the receipt of forfeited amounts. It emphasized Section 51 of the Income Tax Act, which deals with the computation of the cost of acquisition for determining capital gains. The Court clarified that the monies forfeited were related to the capital asset and preserved the rule that the character of a receipt is fixed when received. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Two claimants filed separate petitions for injuries in a motorcycle-car accident.

Awards were passed against the insurance company.

Insurance company alleged fraud, presenting evidence contradicting the claimants' accident description.

The Tribunal rejected the application for review, citing lack of power.

High Court expressed helplessness in considering fraud allegations.

Issues:

Whether the Tribunal has the power to review its order based on fraud allegations.

The legality of recalling an award on the grounds of newly discovered facts.

Held:

The court emphasized the maxim "Fraud and justice never dwell together" and the power of the court to recall its order if fraud is established.

The court asserted that the Tribunal and the High Court erred in not considering the fraud allegations, leading to a potential miscarriage of justice.

Fraud allegations should not be foreclosed, and the Insurance Company has the right to resist the claim on the grounds of fraud.

The judgment allows the appeals, sets aside the orders, and quashes the awards, directing the Tribunal to reconsider the claims, providing an opportunity for both parties to present their case.

Facts:

The case involves the appellant, R.K. Parasher, and the respondent, Dinesh Kumar, and others.

Dispute over the allotment of Shop No. 123-A, Madar Gate, Aligarh.

The appellant was allotted the shop by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, which was contested by the respondents.

Issues:

The primary issue is the validity of the order of allotment in favor of the appellant.

Consideration of Rule 10(5)(d) and Rule 10(8)(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Rules.

Held:

The High Court allowed the writ petitions and quashed the orders of allotment.

The rejection of the application of Chandra Pal, the father of one of the respondents, was upheld.

Respondent No. 1, Dinesh Kumar, had faced rejections for regularizing his tenancy, but the High Court held that he was not disqualified under Rule 10(5)(d).

The order of allotment was sent back to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for reconsideration.

The Court refrained from expressing an opinion on the appellant's contentions regarding the failures of respondent No. 1's previous attempts.

Civil Appeal No. 1472 of 1998 was dismissed, and Civil Appeal No. 1473 of 1998 was allowed.

Facts:

Appellant operated as a 100% Export Oriented Unit (EOU) for the manufacture of viscose staple fibre.

Appellant sought permission to debond its unit, i.e., withdraw from the 100% EOU Scheme.

The Ministry of Commerce agreed in principle to allow debonding, subject to certain conditions.

Dispute arose on the rate at which duty should be levied on finished goods upon debonding.

Issues:

Contention regarding the applicable duty rate – under the main Section 3(1) or the proviso to Section 3(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.

Interpretation of the expression "allowed to be sold in India" in the proviso to Section 3(1).

Held:

The bone of contention revolved around the interpretation of "allowed to be sold in India" in the proviso to Section 3(1). Appellant argued for cumulative satisfaction of two conditions, while the Revenue contended for a broader interpretation.

The Tribunal initially ruled in favor of the Revenue, applying the proviso to Section 3(1).

The Court, upon review, disagreed with the Tribunal's interpretation, emphasizing that debonding and permission to sell in India are distinct actions governed by different authorities.

The Court highlighted that the Board of Approvals (BOA) does not concern itself with the disposal of closing stock after debonding; the permission to sell in India is determined by the Development Commissioner, distinct from the BOA.

The Court emphasized that the expression "allowed to be sold in India" in the proviso applies specifically to sales made up to 25% by 100% EOU in DTA, subject to Development Commissioner's permission.

The Court rejected the Revenue's argument that debonding itself grants permission to sell in India, clarifying that the conditions for selling 25% of production by EOU and selling finished stock by a debonded 100% EOU are different.

The Court referred to Rule 9-A(1)(ii) of the Central Excise Rules, highlighting that duty is chargeable at the rate on the date of removal of the goods, not from the date of manufacture.

The Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment, restoring the Collector of Central Excise's decision in favor of the appellant.

Facts:

The respondent, initially acquitted but later convicted, claimed remission for the period spent on bail during the legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the period during which the respondent was on bail should be considered for remission.

Held:

Interpretation of Sections 432 and 389 of CrPC: Remission can only be granted with reference to an operative punishment. If there is no operative punishment, there is no need for remission. Parole and bail have distinct legal implications.

Distinction Between Parole and Bail: Parole is a temporary release from custody without suspending the sentence, whereas bail involves the release of an accused during trial, with the sentence being suspended.

Previous High Court Decisions: High Court decisions allowing remission for the period of bail were deemed erroneous. The court clarified that benefits intended for parole or furlough cannot be extended to those on bail.

Illustrations: Using examples, the court demonstrated the absurdity of allowing remission for the entire period a person is on bail, potentially rendering the criminal justice system a mockery.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the part of the judgment directing remission for the period the respondent was on bail is set aside.

Facts:

Bechan, a sirdar of agricultural land, filed an application under Section 134 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, paid an amount equal to 10 times the land revenue, and sought a declaration as a bhumidar. Before the order could be passed, Bechan sold the land to the appellants. Bechan passed away, and subsequently, his widow sold the same land to the respondents. The dispute arose over the timing of Bechan's acquisition of bhumidari rights.

Issues:

Whether the rights acquired by the appellants relate back to the date of deposit of the land revenue or only from the date of the official order under Section 137.

Held:

Section 134 explicitly states that upon the application and payment of 10 times the land revenue, the sirdar is entitled to a declaration, with the rights acquired from the date of deposit. This eliminates uncertainty by fixing the date as the one when the amount is deposited.( Para 7)

Sub-section (2) of Section 137, post-amendment in 1962, aligns with Section 134, indicating that the certificate must relate back and be effective from the date of deposit mentioned in Section 134(1).( Para 8)

The decisions running counter to this interpretation, including Banshidhar Vs. Smt. Dhirjadbari, Mobin Khan v. Chunnu Khan, and Raghunandan Singh v. Yashwant Singh, are deemed incorrect. The certificate issued under Section 137 recognizes the position as of the date of application and payment, with retrospective effect.( Para 9)

Analogy drawn to Order 22 Rule 6, C.P.C., supports the doctrine of relation back in Sections 134 and 137.( Para 10)

The lower appellate court's interpretation is upheld, and the High Court's decision is set aside. The suit filed by the appellants is decreed.( Para 11)