Facts:

In 1981, the Government of Gujarat declared a part of the forest area as a "Wild Life Sanctuary," covering 765.79 Sq. K.M.

The notification was cancelled in 1993, and a reduced area of 94.87 Sq. K.M. was declared as the "Chinkara Wild Life Sanctuary."

Petitioner challenged both notifications, and the High Court quashed them, reviving the 1981 notification.

State Government proposed a further reduction in sanctuary area for economic development, passed a resolution, and issued a notification in 1995.

Petitioner challenged again, leading to the current Supreme Court case.

Issues:

Legality of reducing the sanctuary area for economic development.

Consideration of ecological impact and economic development needs.

Held:

The State Legislature's decision, after due deliberation, is not to be invalidated unless substantial reasons exist.

The court directs a comprehensive study of the ecological impact, environmental aspects, and effects of limited mining over five years.

Permits restricted and controlled exploitation of mineral wealth, subject to court orders.

State Government to constitute an expert Committee for a comprehensive study, submit reports, and monitor pollution.

Restrains the State Government from allowing mining or cement plants within 10 kms of the old sanctuary area without court orders.

Facts:

Pursuant to the liberalization of the electricity sector in India, MOUs and Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) were entered into between the State Government, Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (MPEB), and independent power producers (IPPs). The agreements aimed at establishing power projects and selling generated electricity to MPEB.

Issues:

MPEB's decision to prioritize projects offering the least tariff, impacting ongoing negotiations and agreements with IPPs.

IPPs sought escrow coverage, and a writ petition was filed to compel the respondents to grant such facility.

Held:

The court clarified that contracts under Sections 43 and 43A of the Electricity Act are statutory only to the extent that they involve the determination of tariff and other statutory requirements. Escrow accounts and agreements are not statutory obligations.

The court emphasized that MOUs and PPAs, while concluded contracts, did not confer legal rights on IPPs regarding escrow agreements. The execution of such agreements depended on mutual agreement between the parties.

The court acknowledged the amendments to the notifications under Section 43-A of the Electricity Act. While prospective, these amendments were relevant for MPEB in negotiating better terms with IPPs.

The court justified MPEB's decision to prioritize projects based on least tariff, considering it a rational criterion in the context of benefiting MPEB and the general public. The court rejected claims of arbitrariness.

The court declined a detailed examination of assumptions made by the Expert Committee regarding project costs, deeming them technical matters. Valid assumptions, not fanciful or arbitrary, justified the decision based on them.

Facts:

Dacoity and murder occurred in the house of the informant, Bhupendra Mohan Singh, on 9th June 1985.

The informant witnessed the incident from a neighbor's house and identified several accused.

Villagers arrived at the scene, leading to a shootout with some dacoits. One villager died, and another was injured.

The police recorded the informant's statement, leading to the registration of the case against seven named accused and unidentified associates.

Issues:

Credibility of witness testimonies.

Reliability of the identification of accused individuals.

Doubts about the source of light and the manner of identification of evidence.

Held:

The court found doubts in the credibility of witness testimonies, especially regarding the involvement of some accused.

The identification of accused individuals was deemed untrustworthy, and doubts were raised about the source of light and the manner of identification of evidence.

The doubts led to the benefit of the doubt being given to the accused, resulting in their acquittal.

Facts:

Original plaintiff Suram Singh, a co-owner, filed a pre-emption suit in 1941 against the sale of an undivided share by another co-owner, Bassia.

The suit was decreed in 1942, with a specified pre-emption amount, duly deposited by Suram Singh.

A subsequent suit was filed by Suram Singh against successors of the vendees, seeking a declaration of ownership and an injunction against interference.

Issues:

Dispute over ownership and possession arising from the sale of an undivided share.

Defendants claimed adverse possession; plaintiff contested based on the pre-emption decree.

Held:

The High Court concluded that the pre-emption amount deposited in 1942 vested title in the plaintiff, despite no physical possession change.

No finding of partition; joint possession of the land by co-sharers; no actual possession required post-pre-emption decree.

Rule 14(1) of Order 20, CPC, emphasized that the title of the decree-holder accrued from the date of payment under the pre-emption decree.

Infirmity in the decision of the High Court not found; the appeal was dismissed with parties bearing their own costs.

Facts:

Sushil Sharma filed a writ petition seeking a writ of Habeas Corpus for the custody of his two minor children, Neil and Monica, alleging that they were in the illegal custody of Sarita Sharma, his estranged wife.

Sarita Sharma, in response, claimed that she had lawful custody of the children and had brought them to India with the knowledge of Sushil.

The divorce proceedings had been initiated in the U.S.A., and a decree was passed by the American Court granting sole custody of the children to Sushil Sharma.

Issues:

Whether the custody of the children became illegal due to Sarita's removal of them from the U.S.A. in violation of the American Court's order.

Whether the decree of divorce and custody granted by the American Court should override considerations of the welfare of the minor children.

Held:

The judgment emphasizes that the fact of Sarita removing the children from the U.S.A. does not entirely guide the decision, and the welfare of the children must be paramount. The court questions the husband's ability to care for the children, considering factors such as alcohol consumption.

The High Court is criticized for not thoroughly considering the welfare of the children and allowing the Habeas Corpus writ petition without a full inquiry. The court suggests that the respondent initiates appropriate proceedings for a thorough inquiry into the best interest of the children.

The appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the High Court are set aside, and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed.

Facts:

Respondents, ex-employees of the State of Punjab, retired before 31st March 1985.

Pensionary benefits were calculated based on rules at the time of their retirement.

A notification/order on 9th July 1985 decided to treat certain allowances as dearness pay for pensionary benefits.

Respondents claimed the benefit of this notification and filed a writ petition when not granted.

Issues:

Applicability of the notification dated 9th July 1985 to pre-31st March 1985 retirees.

High Court's judgment directing the state to pay dues based on the said notification.

Held:

The decision in Boota Singh's case clarified that benefits under the 1985 notification apply only to post-notification retirees.

The High Court judgment cannot be sustained; respondents are not entitled to benefits under the 1985 notification.

Expressing dissatisfaction with the casual approach leading to unnecessary litigation, the appeals are allowed, the High Court judgment set aside, and writ petitions dismissed. Parties bear their own costs.

Facts:

The incident involved firing on the first floor, witnessed by PW-2, a resident of the deceased Dr. Dubey's house. Accused-"A" was known to PW-2, while accused-"C" was not. Material omissions in PW-2's statement raised questions about the identification of the accused. Accused-"A" was a regular visitor to Dr. Dubey's house.

Issues:

The key issues included omissions in the eyewitness testimony, the lack of a test identification parade for accused-"C," and the reliability of the identification made in court by a child witness, PW-3.

Held:

Omissions in PW-2's statement were deemed fatal for the prosecution, especially considering the accused-"A" was a regular visitor to the victim's house.

Lack of a test identification parade for accused-"C" and the delayed identification in court by PW-2 rendered the identification unreliable.

Concerns raised about the credibility of the child witness (PW-3) due to her age, lack of corroboration, and the circumstances of the occurrence.

Decision: The court acquitted the accused-respondents based on the identified discrepancies, omissions, and lack of reliable evidence.

Facts:

The case involves questions related to the computation of the period of preventive detention under Sections 10 and 12 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. Additionally, it addresses the effect of parole on the detention period and the authority of the Supreme Court to order arrest and detention following an erroneous release by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the period of detention is fixed from the specified dates in the detention order or automatically extended by any period of parole.

In cases where the High Court releases a detenu, and the Supreme Court reverses the decision on appeal, can the Supreme Court order the arrest and detention of the detenu for the remaining period?

Held:

The majority opinion, led by Chief Justice Dr. A.S. Anand, establishes that the period of detention is computed from the date of actual detention, not the date of the detention order. It emphasizes that parole does not interrupt the period of detention unless explicitly stated in the terms for grant of parole, rules, or instructions.

The judgment distinguishes between parole and bail, affirming that parole is a temporary release subject to administrative rules. The court underscores the importance of personal liberty and the strict construction of laws allowing preventive detention.

The judgment clarifies that the quashing of a detention order by the High Court ends the order, and if the Supreme Court reverses the decision on appeal, further detention depends on various factors, including the lapse of time. It establishes that parole is a temporary arrangement, and its period counts towards the total detention period unless specified otherwise.

Considering the specific circumstances of the cases, the court rules that, due to a significant lapse of time and no provided justification for further detention, the detenus need not undergo the remaining period of detention.

Facts:

TISCO (TATA Iron and Steel Company Ltd.) imported equipment and documentation from Siderugia National of Portugal.

SNP (Siderugia National Portugal) canceled its investment plan and sold unused equipment to TISCO.

Contracts MD 301 and MD 302 were entered into between SNP and TISCO, relating to technical documentation and sale of equipment.

Issues:

Valuation of technical documentation and equipment.

Alleged under-valuation of blast furnace equipment.

Application of Customs Valuation Rules, 1988.

Held:

The Tribunal's order was set aside due to errors in interpretation.

Rule 9(1)(b)(iv) was inapplicable as the buyer did not supply goods or services for use in the production and sale of imported goods.

Rule 9(1)(e) was not applicable as there was no payment made as a condition of the sale to satisfy an obligation of the seller.

Interpretative Note to Rule 4 did not support inclusion of charges for technical documents in the value of imported goods.

The matter was remanded to the Tribunal to examine the Revenue's plea of under-valuation of blast furnace equipment.