Murder Conviction – Reliance on Witness Testimony: The mere fact that prosecution witnesses (PWs) are interested parties, being relatives, does not automatically render their evidence unreliable if it is otherwise trustworthy. The medical evidence consistent with the prosecution's case further corroborated their testimonies. The High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's acquittal and convicting the appellant based on credible witness evidence and consistent medical reports [Paras 6, 7, 9, 11].

High Court's Reversal of Acquittal: The High Court found the trial court's acquittal unreasonable and perverse. It re-appreciated the evidence, including medical reports, and concluded that the trial court had erred in its judgment. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, emphasizing that an appellate court is entitled to reassess evidence if the trial court's view is found to be unreasonable [Paras 10, 11].

Medical Evidence – Consistency with Prosecution Case: The medical evidence provided by PW6, Dr. K.K. Khanna, supported the prosecution's version of events. The post-mortem report confirmed the cause of death as a gunshot wound, consistent with the witness testimonies about the attack [Para 9].

Precedents on Interested Witnesses: The Court cited several precedents, including Brathi alias Sukhdev Singh vs. State of Punjab, State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. S. Mohan Singh, and Shyamal Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal, to emphasize that the credibility of interested witnesses should be assessed based on the overall trustworthiness of their evidence, not merely their relationship to the deceased [Para 8].

Decision: The appeals were dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision to convict the appellant, finding the prosecution's evidence credible and consistent with medical reports, thus overriding the trial court's acquittal [Para 11].

Prescribing Cut-off Marks – Legality: The Office Memorandum (OM) dated 7th January 2008, which was adopted by the Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission (APPSC) on 16th April 2008, introduced cut-off marks of 33% in each written examination paper. The Court held that Rule 11 of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Combined Civil Service Examination Rules 2001 does not mandate the Commission to fix and disclose minimum qualifying marks either in the advertisement or before conducting the examination. The Commission is empowered to fix such marks at its discretion after the examinations [Paras 14, 29].

Retrospective Application – Not Justified: The introduction of new criteria after the examination process had started was contested. The High Court had found that applying the OM retrospectively was not permissible. The Supreme Court, however, emphasized that the Commission's power to fix minimum qualifying marks at any stage of the examination process was within its discretion under Rule 11 [Para 23].

Shortlisting Candidates – Requirement: The Commission is required to have some criteria for shortlisting candidates for interviews. Fixing minimum qualifying marks ensures that only suitable candidates proceed to the interview stage. The Court found no illegality or arbitrariness in the Commission's action of prescribing 33% as the minimum qualifying marks for all subjects [Paras 28-30].

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the order of the Division Bench of the High Court was set aside. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the OM dated 7th January 2008 and its subsequent adoption by the APPSC, allowing the Commission to fix minimum qualifying marks during the recruitment process [Para 31].

Assessment of Stamp Duty – Court’s Role and Registrar’s Authority: The Court held that an instrument must be valued based on the market value at the time of its execution. The Civil Judge’s directive for the Sheristadar to assess stamp duty based on suit valuation was erroneous, as it did not meet the statutory requirements for registration valuation under the Indian Stamp Act and the West Bengal Rules. The registering authority is not compelled to follow the court's suit valuation for registration purposes​​.

Market Value – Definition and Application: The market value for stamp duty purposes is defined as the price the property would fetch in the open market at the time of the instrument's execution. This value may differ from the suit valuation used for jurisdiction and court fee purposes. The procedures for assessing stamp duty and registering an instrument are distinct, requiring adherence to specific statutory provisions and rules​​.

Registrar's Objection – Validity: The Additional District Sub-Registrar's objection to the decree's registration due to improper valuation was valid. The Registrar's role includes ensuring the correct assessment of stamp duty based on the market value, not merely following the court's suit valuation mechanically​​.

Court's Directive – Re-assessment Required: The Supreme Court set aside the lower court’s orders and directed a re-assessment of the stamp duty for registration. The Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Siliguri was instructed to reconsider the matter, involving the registering authority in the process to ensure a correct and lawful assessment of stamp duty​​.

Decision: The appeal was allowed. The impugned orders of the High Court of Calcutta and the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Siliguri were set aside. The case was remanded to the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Siliguri, for a fresh assessment of stamp duty for the purpose of registration, to be completed within three months​​.

Mercy Petition – Delay as Ground for Commutation: The Supreme Court examined whether the delay of 12 years in deciding the appellant's mercy petition was grounds for commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment. The Court held that such a delay, without reasonable explanation, constituted sufficient grounds for commutation. It noted that the delay caused unnecessary mental agony to the appellant and violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution [Paras 20-24].

Review of Executive Clemency – Judicial Intervention: The Court clarified that while the power of the President and Governors to grant clemency is subject to judicial review, the scope of such review is limited. It can interfere if the decision was made without proper application of mind, based on extraneous considerations, or was arbitrary. In this case, the inordinate delay and lack of transparency in processing the appellant's petition warranted judicial intervention [Paras 16-17].

Previous Judgments on Delay – Precedents: The Court referenced its previous rulings in cases such as Triveniben vs. State of Gujarat, Sher Singh vs. State of Punjab, and Daya Singh vs. Union of India, which established that undue delay in execution of the death sentence could be grounds for commutation. The principles from these cases were applied to determine that the appellant's prolonged wait constituted cruel and inhuman treatment [Paras 18-19].

Decision: The appeal was allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Gauhati High Court and commuted the death sentence of the appellant to life imprisonment due to the unexplained 12-year delay in the disposal of his mercy petition [Para 24].

Tenancy – Eviction – Sections 14(3)(c) and 14(4) of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act 1987 – Availability of building plans duly sanctioned by local authorities is not an ingredient of Section 14(3)(c) and could not be a condition precedent to entitlement of landlord for eviction of tenant – Once High Court maintained order of eviction passed by Controller, tenants were obliged to give vacant possession of building to landlord and could only ask for reasonable time to deliver vacant possession of building to landlord – Direction of High Court that order of eviction could only be executed on revised plan of building being approved was clearly contrary to provisions of Section 14(4) and proviso thereto – Impugned directions set aside [Paras 1-14].

Procedure under Section 14(4) of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act – Requirement for reasonable time for tenants to vacate – High Court's addition of requirement for revised sanctioned plan as a precondition for eviction found contrary to statute – Appeals allowed, directions modified to remove requirement for revised plan [Paras 7-13].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Held – Orders by High Court modified to grant three months to vacate without condition of revised plan – Tenants granted liberty to apply for re-entry under amended provisions of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act [Para 12].

Execution of Decree – Civil Procedure Code, Order 21 Rules 5 and 6, Section 47 – Appellant faced significant challenges in executing a decree for partition passed in her favor – High Court erred in confirming Executing Court’s order which was based on contradictory reports – Supreme Court emphasizes that delays in execution deny justice to the decree-holder – Order set aside, directing prompt execution of decree based on initial local commissioner’s report and sketch [Paras 1-14].

Execution Delays – Judicial Observations – Recognizes the longstanding issue of execution delays as highlighted by Privy Council and reiterated in subsequent Supreme Court judgments – Affirms that procedural laws should not be used to thwart execution of decrees – Calls for efficiency in executing decrees to uphold justice [Paras 2-17].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Held – Impugned orders by High Court and Executing Court set aside – Directed Executing Court to expedite execution based on original local commissioner’s report – No order as to costs [Paras 18-19].

Pension – Eligibility – Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Employees Pension Regulations 1989, Clause 3(1) – Employees did not deposit employer's share of CPF with interest within stipulated time – No right to claim pensionary benefits without compliance – Orders by Single Judge and Division Bench set aside as not in consonance with conditions prescribed in Regulations [Paras 1-7].

Regulations Compliance – Failure to comply with conditions for pension under the Regulations – Employees retired before regulations came into force but did not refund employer's share of CPF with interest – High Court's direction to grant pension benefits by deducting CPF amount incorrect [Paras 6-7].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Impugned orders set aside – No order as to costs [Paras 9-10].

Criminal Law – Murder – Intention to cause death with knowledge that death will probably be caused is crucial for concluding murder – Accused intended to cause bodily harm knowing it could likely result in death – The incident occurred suddenly without premeditation – Modified conviction to Section 304 Part II IPC for culpable homicide not amounting to murder [Paras 1-22].

Witness Testimony – Credibility – Relatives of the deceased, PW-1 and PW-2, and another witness, PW-3, were reliable despite minor exaggerations – Non-examination of one eyewitness not fatal as other testimonies sufficiently established the prosecution's case [Paras 6-10].

Section 304 Part II IPC – Conviction – Appellants had knowledge that their actions could likely cause death, but lacked premeditated intent to kill – Sentence modified from life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC to ten years' imprisonment under Section 304 Part II IPC [Paras 20-22].

Decision – Appeal allowed in part – Conviction modified from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC – Sentence reduced to ten years' imprisonment [Para 22].

Juvenile Justice – Rape – Minor victim – Appellant aged between 16 and 18 at the time of the offence – Entitlement to the benefits under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2000 wrongly denied by the High Court – Conviction upheld, but appellant ordered to be released from custody considering age and circumstances [Paras 1-21].

Plea of Juvenility – Appellant’s age at the time of the offence was above 16 but below 18 – High Court incorrectly denied benefits of the Juvenile Justice Act based on outdated legal precedent – Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but set aside the sentence, directing release due to passage of time and appellant’s current life circumstances [Paras 8-20].

Decision – Appeals partly allowed – Conviction under Section 376 IPC upheld – Sentence set aside – Appellant to be released from custody unless required in another case [Paras 20-21].