Facts:

The respondent No. 1 imported Tape Deck Mechanisms (TDMs) at a declared value of S $ 250.00 per set. The appellant alleged under-valuation and violations of Import and Export regulations, leading to interception and investigation by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI). Legal proceedings ensued, including a writ petition before the High Court.

Issues:

Alleged under-valuation of imported TDMs.

Violation of Import Control Order and Import and Export Act.

Legality of investigation and issuance of show cause notice.

Held:

The Collector found deliberate mis-declaration of value, manipulation of documents, and an attempt to evade customs duty by the respondent. The TDMs were valued at S $ 343.45 per set, and the respondent was held liable for duty evasion.

The Collector also held that the TDMs required an import license, and since none was produced, the goods were liable for confiscation.

The Tribunal, on appeal, set aside the order of the Collector on the valuation issue but remanded the matter regarding the violation of Import Control Order to the Collector.

Decision: The decision of the Tribunal on the valuation issue is set aside.

The order of the Collector directing payment of differential duty is affirmed.

The adjudicating authority will decide the violation of the Import Control Order, and depending on the decision, the quantum of penalty will be redetermined.

Facts:

The appellant is charged with the murder of Abdulla, allegedly by inflicting dagger injuries. However, the dagger in question, found in a sheath near the place of occurrence, neither belonged to the accused nor had any blood-stains. The prosecution's version of the place of occurrence is also deemed improbable.

Issues:

Validity of the conviction under Section 302, IPC based on the prosecution's claim of dagger use.

Contradictions in the prosecution's case regarding the place of occurrence.

Held:

The court examines the dagger (M.O. 1) found sheathed near the basement of the shed. It highlights the lack of blood-stains and the improbability of the prosecution's version. The absence of another weapon of offense is noted.

The court questions the likelihood of the appellant dropping his dhoti and liquor bottle on the southern side of the pathway while trying to escape. The version of events gets tilted by the sheathed dagger, casting doubt on the prosecution's narrative.

The court emphasizes that if the dagger was used, it should have been found unsheathed with blood-stains. The appellant's drunken state and the presence of his belongings away from the alleged crime scene raise doubts about the shed being the actual place of occurrence.

The court concludes that the conviction of the accused is liable to be set aside due to the lack of a credible weapon of offense and inconsistencies in the prosecution's case.

Facts:

The appellant was charged with causing grievous injuries leading to the death of the deceased.

The appellant was initially convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act.

The High Court re-examined the evidence, convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC, and maintained the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act.

The appellant appealed against the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the injuries caused by the appellant were intentional and amounted to murder under Section 302 IPC.

Whether the appellant committed an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act based on caste discrimination.

Held:

The trial court's view was preferred, emphasizing that the appellant had the intention to cause only one serious injury (injury No. 1), while other injuries resulted from a scuffle.

The High Court's inference of an intention to cause all injuries was criticized, emphasizing that the medical evidence supports the possibility of injuries 2 to 10 occurring during a scuffle.

Section 3(2)(v) of the Act requires evidence that the offence was committed on the ground of the victim belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Tribe. As such evidence was lacking, the conviction under this section was set aside.

The conviction under Section 302 IPC was overturned, and the appellant was acquitted of that charge.

The original conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC was restored, with a punishment of five years of rigorous imprisonment. The appellant, having already served more than five years, was ordered to be set at liberty forthwith.

Facts:

Post-dated cheques issued by the company were dishonored.

The company was declared sick under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act.

Legal proceedings initiated against the company and its directors under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Issues:

Whether a company and its directors can be prosecuted under Section 138 NI Act after the company is declared sick under SICA.

Interpretation of Section 22 and 22A of SICA in relation to criminal proceedings.

Held:

The court established the prima facie case under Section 138 NI Act based on the dishonored cheques and legal requirements.

Section 22 SICA doesn't create a legal impediment for criminal proceedings; it pertains to recovery of money and winding up proceedings.

Section 22A SICA, restraining disposal of assets, may affect criminal cases depending on circumstances (e.g., if a restraint order was in effect before the cheque was drawn).

The court rejected the argument that a conviction leading to fines would impermissibly utilize the assets under Section 22 SICA.

The concern that the arrest of directors would thwart BIFR's efforts was dismissed as remote and far-fetched.

REFERRED CASES:

M/s. Electronics Trade and Technology Development Corpn. Ltd., Secunderabad Vs. M/s. Indian Technologists and Engineers (Electronics) Pvt. Ltd. and another, (1996) 1 AD 900 : AIR 1996 SC 2339 : (1996) 1 BC 271 : (1996) 86 CompCas 30 : (1996) CriLJ 1692 : (1996) 3 Crimes 82 : (1996) 1 CTC 193 : (1996) 1 JT 643 : (1996) 113 PLR 332 : (1996) 1 SCALE 636 : (1996) 2 SCC 739 : (1996) 1 SCR 843

Facts:

The appellant, a State Government Corporation, derived income from various sources, including interest, letting out warehouses, and administrative charges for foodgrain procurement. In the assessment year 1977-78, it claimed a deduction of expenditure under Section 37 of the Act. The dispute arose when the Income Tax Officer allowed only a portion of the expenditure attributable to taxable income.

Issues:

Whether the Tribunal's decision to allocate expenses in the same percentage as different sources of income, rather than allowing them entirely, was legally justified.

Held:

The High Court answered the question in the affirmative, favoring the Revenue. However, the Supreme Court, upon examination, found that the expenditure was disallowed not due to non-compliance with Section 37(1) but because it was incurred on an activity exempted under the Act. The Court referred to precedents, including Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras Vs. Indian Bank Ltd., and Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay Vs. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd., to establish that the entire permissible expenditure is deductible if it fulfills the requirements of Section 37(1) and is incurred in one indivisible business.

Decision: The order of the High Court was set aside, and the appeal was allowed in favor of the assessee.

Facts:

In Regular Suit No. 201 of 1928, the plaintiffs contested the legal appointment of the father of the appellant as sajjadanashin and alleged mismanagement of trust funds. The District Court held the wakf as private, emphasizing the sajjadanashin's ability to use income for family maintenance. Subsequent proceedings under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, saw conflicting decisions on the nature of the wakf.

Issues:

Whether the wakf was private or public, with collateral disputes emerging regarding res judicata based on previous judgments.

Held:

The court established that an issue is 'directly and substantially' in a prior litigation if it is necessary for deciding the principal issue. Estoppel by judgment does not extend to collateral matters unless incidentally or necessarily adjudicated upon.

The judgment from Regular Suit No. 201 of 1928 did not operate as res judicata, given the subsequent changes in the definition of public trusts under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.

Decisions rendered by the Assistant Charity Commissioner were superseded by later judgments of the High Court, emphasizing that an earlier decision loses its binding force if a subsequent decision decides to the contrary.

Decision: The appeal against the rejection of the plea of res judicata was dismissed, affirming the findings that the wakf in question was a public trust.

Facts:

The appeal arises from arbitration proceedings, where the Arbitrator granted escalation charges despite the absence of an escalation clause in the agreement. The dispute also involves the award of pendente lite interest and interest for the pre-reference period.

Issues:

Could the Arbitrator have granted an award for escalation in favor of the contractor?

Could the Arbitrator have awarded pendente lite interest in favor of the contractor?

Could the Arbitrator have granted interest for the pre-reference period?

Held:

The Arbitrator's award for escalation charges is deemed unsustainable and erroneous, as the arbitration agreement contained no escalation clause. Without such a clause, the Arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to make such an award.

Regarding pendente lite interest, it is conceded that the Arbitrator had the power to grant it when the agreement didn't prohibit it. This aligns with the precedent set in Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa v. G.C. Roy. The challenge against this award fails.

For interest for the pre-reference period, considering the prolonged proceedings, the court suggests the respondent execute the decree upon furnishing a bank guarantee. The guarantee should include an undertaking that, in the event of an adverse decision by the Constitution Bench, the state can encash the bank guarantee.

Decision: The appeal is disposed of. The impugned judgment and decree stand modified. No costs are awarded.

FACTS:

The appellant, M/S. Modern Insulators Ltd., held an insurance policy with The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. for a factory manufacturing high tension insulators. After damage to the equipment, a dispute arose regarding coverage under the insurance policy. The State Commission ruled in favor of the appellant.

ISSUES:

Adequacy of communication of exclusion clause to the appellant.

Admissibility of a new plea in appeal regarding the violation of insurance policy terms and conditions.

HELD:

The court found that the exclusion clause was not communicated to the appellant, rendering the insurance company unable to claim its benefits. The obligation of good faith applies to both parties in an insurance contract.

The National Commission's decision to allow a new plea in appeal was criticized. Parties cannot introduce new facts in an appeal.

DECISION: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the National Commission's judgment, and restoring the State Commission's judgment. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Facts:

Appellant sought relief after alleged contempt by respondents following an undertaking in a civil writ petition.

Court issued a notice to show cause why contempt proceedings should not be initiated against the respondents.

High Court dropped the proceedings as barred by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act.

Issues:

Whether the notice to show cause amounted to the initiation of contempt proceedings?

Whether Section 20's limitation applied to the given circumstances?

Held:

The term "initiate any proceedings for contempt" involves a conscious application of the court's mind to the facts and material, forming an opinion that a prima facie case for contempt exists. Initiation occurs when the court decides to take action and begins a proceeding for contempt. The issuance of a notice to show cause is an essential step in the initiation process. Section 20 imposes a limitation on the court's jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings, emphasizing the need for a timely initiation.

Decision: The order dropping proceedings based on the view that mere issuance of a notice did not constitute initiation was erroneous. The proceedings were, in fact, initiated on 6-1-1988 when the court applied its mind and directed the issuance of notices to show cause. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside. The proceedings were restored to the file of the High Court for further consideration.