Facts:

The petitioner, Makineni Venkata Sujatha, is the daughter of the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent filed a declaration under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act, 1973. The critical date for determining the ceiling on agricultural land holdings was January 1, 1975. The petitioner, being a minor as of that date, was included in her father's family unit. It was determined that her father's family unit had excess land that needed to be surrendered. The petitioner claimed that, based on Section 29A of the Hindu Succession Act, she should be treated as a coparcener and have equal rights as a son. Additionally, she relied on Section 4A of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act to assert her entitlement to a share as a major son.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner, as a daughter, could claim rights similar to a son under Section 29A of the Hindu Succession Act.

Whether Section 4A of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act entitled the petitioner to an increased share in her father's holdings.

Held:

The Court held that Section 29A of the Hindu Succession Act did not affect the excess land holdings of the father as of January 1, 1975. The petitioner, being a minor on that date, gained rights under Section 29A only from September 5, 1985. Thus, her rights did not impact the excess land computed for her father's family unit as of January 1, 1975.

The Court also determined that Section 4A of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act, introduced in 1977, did not apply to major daughters. As the petitioner was a minor daughter on January 1, 1975, her father's family unit did not receive any additional entitlement under Section 4A.

Facts:

The dispute arises from a construction contract with a contract value of Rs. 3,39,88,000.

The contract included a 'variation' clause allowing changes in the extent of work up to 25% of the contract price.

The key issue was how the 25% variation limit should be calculated, either based on net overall increase (additions minus deletions) or total variations exceeding 25% of the contract price.

Disputes between the parties, including delays and changes in work, led to arbitration.

The arbitrator issued an award in favor of the contractor, who claimed higher rates based on the total variations exceeding 25% of the contract price.

The appellant challenged the award, primarily arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction.

Issues:

Interpretation of the '+/-25%' escalation clause.

Whether the arbitrator's award was within his jurisdiction.

The validity of the contractor's claim for higher rates based on the 'escalation' clause.

Held:

The court held that the interpretation of the '+/-25%' escalation clause should consider both additions and deletions in the work, and it was reasonable to determine if the total variations (both plus and minus) exceeded 25% of the contract price.

The court found that the arbitrator's award of 50% of the escalation claim was not illegal, as it fell within the arbitrator's jurisdiction and was based on factual circumstances and recommendations from departmental officers.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the arbitrator's award, and any interim orders were vacated.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the arbitrator's award was upheld, affirming the interpretation of the '+/-25%' escalation clause and the award of 50% of the escalation claim.

Facts:

The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of Section 9(3) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. They argued that the levy of royalty on minerals is not a tax, and the Parliament lacks the power under Entry 54 of List I to enact such a law. They contended that this encroaches upon the State Legislature's authority to levy tax on mineral rights under Entry 50 of List II. Some appellants suggested referring the matter to a larger Bench based on a previous three-judge Bench decision. Additionally, they argued that Section 9(3) violates the provisions of Articles 268, 269, and 270 of the Constitution.

Issues:

The constitutional validity of Section 9(3) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, regarding the levy of royalty on minerals.

Whether Parliament has the authority under Entry 54 of List I to enact such a law, affecting the State Legislature's power under Entry 50 of List II.

Whether Section 9(3) violates Articles 268, 269, and 270 of the Constitution.

Held:

The appeals should not be referred to a larger Bench. Royalty on minerals is considered a tax, and the power of the State Legislature under Entry 50 in List II to impose taxes on minerals is outside its competence due to Sections 9 and 9(3) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957.

The validity of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 has been upheld under Article 265. The tax levied on minerals under Section 9(3) of the Act is due to valid legislation by Parliament under Entry 54 of List I, and it does not violate fundamental rights.

The Central Government alone has the power to legislate on the regulation of Mines and Mineral Development under Section 2 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957.

The doctrine of pith and substance of legislation applies, and as long as legislation is within permissible limits in substance, there is no issue with legislative competency. Entry 50 of List II must be read subject to the provisions of the Act of 1957, covering the field under Entry 50.

Facts:

The case involves six accused individuals, including a former Chief Minister of Karnataka (Mr. Bangrappa) and his Private Secretary (Mr. Suri Babu).

Charges under various sections of the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, were filed against these accused.

The trial court initially found sufficient evidence to frame charges against all the accused.

The accused challenged this decision in the High Court through Criminal Revision Petitions.

The High Court, in a common order, discharged two of the accused individuals and directed the case to proceed against the remaining accused.

The CBI appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, raising various grounds to challenge the High Court's order.

During the Supreme Court proceedings, the discharged accused individuals decided to withdraw their revision petitions filed before the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court should reach a finding on the contentious issues raised in the appeal.

The implications of the withdrawn revision petitions by the discharged accused individuals.

Held:

In light of the withdrawal of the revision petitions by the discharged accused individuals, the Supreme Court did not delve into the specific contentions or grounds raised in the appeals challenging the High Court's order.

As a result of the withdrawal, the High Court's order discharging the accused individuals was erased .

The trial court was directed to frame charges against the respondents (accused individuals) along with the other accused and proceed with the trial expeditiously.

Appeals are disposed of.

Facts:

Respondent accepted the final bill for a construction project without objection.

Later, the respondent claimed additional works and requested arbitration under Clause 25 of the agreement.

Arbitration proceedings took place, with both parties participating.

The arbitrator issued an award.

Issues:

Did an arbitrable dispute exist, given that the respondent had accepted the final bill without protest?

Can the objection regarding the absence of an arbitrable dispute be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court?

Held:

The existence of a dispute is a condition precedent for appointing an arbitrator under Clause 25.

The respondent accepted the final bill without protest.

The objection raised by the Union of India regarding the absence of an arbitrable dispute could not be entirely rejected.

For claim item No. 2, the arbitrable dispute did not exist, and the award for that claim was set aside.

The objection regarding the absence of an arbitrable dispute could not be raised for other claim items.

Decision:

The appeal was partially allowed, setting aside the award for claim item No. 2 while affirming the rest of the award amount.

REFERRED CASES:

P.K. Ramaiah and Company Vs. Chairman and Managing Director, National Thermal Power Corpn., (1994) 1 SCALE 1 : (1994) 3 SCC 126 Supp

Facts:

The case revolved around allegations of cheating by a Mumbai-based company against another company headquartered in Shillong, Meghalaya, regarding the ownership of land in Mumbai. The Shillong company filed a complaint with the Shillong police, but they were dissatisfied with the pace of the investigation. The High Court of Guwahati, in response to a writ petition, directed the complainant to supply funds to the police to expedite the investigation. Subsequently, the Director General of Police of Meghalaya and the State appealed this decision but were unsuccessful. The appellant, who was not initially involved in the case, learned of these developments when called by the police for questioning in Shillong. He then filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court, seeking to quash the FIR and related proceedings. The Bombay High Court dismissed the petition on the grounds of territorial jurisdiction.

Issues:

Whether a complainant could be directed to provide funds to the police to cover the expenses of a criminal investigation, given that the police claimed a financial crunch in the state treasury.

Held:

The judgment emphasized that a criminal investigation is a statutory duty assigned to the police, and it must be carried out impartially and without external influence. It pointed out that private investigating agencies are not recognized by the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), and any investigation conducted by such private agencies is not regarded as valid under the law.

The court highlighted that financial constraints of the state treasury cannot justify allowing private parties to fund police investigations. It stressed that all complaints must be investigated with equal fairness, irrespective of the financial capacity of the complainant.

The court concluded by setting aside the directions issued by the High Court, which allowed the complainant to supply funds to the police for the investigation. This was done to prevent the establishment of a precedent that permits private parties to provide financial assistance to the police for investigations.

Facts:

Bank of India filed a suit for recovery against Vijay Transport (respondent No. 1).

Respondent No. 1 raised a counterclaim, leading to a partial decree in favor of the bank and the allowance of the counterclaim by the trial court.

The High Court subsequently stayed the counterclaim, with a condition for the bank to deposit a specified amount.

Respondent No. 1 was allowed to withdraw the deposited amount upon furnishing a bank guarantee.

Issues:

Revolved around unauthorized dealings with property in custodia legis (property under court protection) and the violation of court orders by the respondents.

Held:

The court held that the respondents were guilty of unauthorized dealing with property in custodia legis. Property in custodia legis refers to property kept in the possession and under the protection of the court. Any interference with such property without court permission amounts to contempt of court. The respondents' actions were deliberate and aimed at unlawfully benefiting from the situation.

The court also found that the respondents violated court orders. They were aware that the High Court's order allowed respondent No. 1 to withdraw the money only against a bank guarantee for the same amount. Despite this, they withdrew the amount without the requisite bank guarantee. The respondents enjoyed this wrongfully obtained money for approximately 15 years, and they breached their undertaking to the court.

The respondents' conduct compounded their contemptuous behavior. They repeatedly sought adjournments, made assurances of payment and settlement that they had no intention of fulfilling, and resiled from an unconditional offer to pay the decretal amount with interest. Their actions demonstrated a lack of respect for the court's authority.

The court emphasized that the jurisdiction exercised in cases of alleged contempt is quasi-criminal, and the court must be satisfied that contempt of court has occurred. The events that took place after the issuance of the contempt notices were considered relevant for determining the appropriate sentence.

Given the gravity of the contemptuous conduct and the respondents' unrepentant behavior, the court sentenced both respondents to simple imprisonment for two years in addition to the payment of a fine.

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the Constitutional validity of Section 32A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, which prohibited the suspension, remission, or commutation of sentences awarded under the Act. The appellants, who were convicts under the Act, argued that Section 32A created an unreasonable distinction between prisoners convicted under the Act and those convicted under other statutes, violating Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether Section 32A of the Act was Constitutional, considering its impact on the suspension of sentences.

Whether the distinction between convicts under the Act and those under other statutes, in relation to Executive Powers, was arbitrary or discriminatory.

Held:

The court held that Section 32A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, which prevented courts from suspending sentences awarded to convicts under the Act, was unconstitutional. This meant that courts had the power to suspend such sentences, subject to certain conditions.

The court emphasized that the awarding of a sentence was a judicial function, and the power to suspend a sentence pending the disposal of an appeal was an essential aspect of judicial review. Not providing for at least one right of appeal would violate due process of law.

Section 32 of the Act was not enacted to fulfill international obligations. International agreements did not intend to oust or curtail the court's jurisdiction regarding offenses related to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

Section 32A of the Act, insofar as it took away the Executive's right to suspend, remit, or commute sentences under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was held to be valid and in accordance with the Constitution. The distinction between convicts under the Act and those under other statutes was not considered arbitrary or discriminatory.

The court clarified that Section 32A did not affect the powers of authorities to grant parole. Parole was distinct from the suspension, remission, or commutation of sentences and could still be granted to individuals convicted under the Act.

Facts:

The case involved a complaint by the respondent against the appellants, including her husband and in-laws, alleging mistreatment and persistent demands for dowry. Charges were framed against the appellants under Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. During the trial, at the stage of examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the trial court exempted some of the accused from personal examination. Subsequently, all the accused were acquitted. The respondent challenged this acquittal in the High Court, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 313(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. regarding the obligation of the court to examine the accused personally.

Whether exceptions could be made when the accused faced significant hardships in appearing personally before the court.

Held:

Per Justice K.T. Thomas and Justice S.N. Variava (Majority):

The term "shall" in Section 313(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. is mandatory, but the court can exempt the accused from personal examination if it causes great prejudice or disadvantage to the accused. This exemption may be granted in cases where the accused demonstrates genuine difficulties, such as financial burdens or physical incapacity.

If the accused applies to the court for permission to answer questions without personal presence due to justifiable reasons, the court can consider the request. The application must be accompanied by an affidavit sworn by the accused, outlining their difficulties, assuring no prejudice, and undertaking not to raise objections later. If the court finds the application genuine, it can provide a questionnaire to the accused's advocate with Section 313 questions. The accused must return the answered questionnaire with a properly authenticated affidavit. Failure to comply within the specified time forfeits the right to seek personal exemption.

Per Justice R.P. Sethi (Dissenting):

Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. requires the personal examination of the accused, and the counsel's responses cannot be a substitute for the accused's statements.

Non-compliance with Section 313 can result in prejudice to the accused, vitiating the trial, and cannot be rectified under Section 465 of the Cr.P.C.

Decision: The Supreme Court, by a majority opinion, clarified that while Section 313(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. is mandatory, the court has the discretion to exempt the accused from personal examination if the accused demonstrates genuine difficulties. However, this exemption should not undermine the essential purpose of Section 313, which is to provide the accused with an opportunity to explain circumstances appearing in the evidence against them.