Facts:

The appellant, a registered society representing farmers, challenged the tariff rates imposed by the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board for the agricultural sector. These tariff rates were revised by the Board following policy directions from the State Government issued under Section 78-A of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The impugned tariff rates were based on consumption of horsepower, leading to different slab rates for agriculturists.

Issues:

Whether the State Electricity Board had the authority to depart from the State Government's policy of providing electricity to the agricultural sector at a subsidized uniform flat rate, opting instead for a tariff system based on consumption (slab rates).

Whether the Board's differentiation of tariffs based on the size of motors used was rational and non-discriminatory.

Held:

The State Electricity Board and the State Government are statutory functionaries under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, each with its obligations. The State Government can issue policy directions to the Board under Section 78-A, but these directions must not compel the Board to act beyond the statutory limits of Sections 49 and 50. Policy directions cannot force the Board to perform its obligations in violation of its statutory duties.

Section 59 of the Act mandates the Board to maintain a surplus of not less than 3% of revenue after meeting expenses. Charging a uniform flat rate per horsepower per annum, as directed by the State Government, would have resulted in significant losses for the Board, which would have contradicted its obligations under Section 59. Therefore, the Board was justified in deviating from the flat rate policy to ensure its financial stability.

The policy direction of the State Government primarily aimed to supply electricity to farmers at subsidized and concessional rates. However, the aspect of providing electricity at a uniform fixed rate per horsepower per annum, which would have caused financial losses, was not considered part of the policy direction under Section 78-A.

The argument that the Board could have imposed flat rates at higher levels to overcome its deficit was rejected, as it would have disproportionately burdened small farmers who use minimal electricity. The tariff differentiation based on slab rates was deemed reasonable and not in violation of Section 49. Transmission and theft losses, while significant, were not a sufficient basis to invalidate the tariff. It was the duty of the Board to address these losses.

The Board had not disregarded the State Government's policy but had followed it by providing subsidized electricity rates to farmers. The imposition of tariff based on slab rates was found to be valid and non-discriminatory, particularly in the interest of smaller farmers.

Facts:

Prahlad Singh's services were terminated by the appellant, M/s. Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd.

A dispute was referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal to determine whether the termination was justified and what relief, if any, Prahlad Singh should receive.

The Tribunal found that Prahlad Singh had lost his lien on his appointment due to certain Standing Orders.

The Tribunal also noted that Prahlad Singh had waited for about 13 years to raise the dispute after receiving notice of termination, considering this delay significant.

Based on these findings, the Tribunal held that the termination was justified, and Prahlad Singh was not entitled to any relief.

Issues:

Whether the termination of Prahlad Singh's services was justified.

If not, what relief Prahlad Singh was entitled to.

Whether the delay of 13 years in raising the dispute affected Prahlad Singh's claim.

Held:

The single Judge of the High Court and the Division Bench did not provide sufficient reasons for overturning the Tribunal's award.

The Tribunal's decision was based on a proper and objective assessment of the facts and the relevant Standing Orders.

Relief could be declined due to delay and laches depending on the facts of each case.

In this case, Prahlad Singh had waited for 13 years to raise the dispute without any reasonable justification.

Therefore, the Tribunal's decision to deny relief was justified, and the High Court's orders were set aside.

The Supreme Court restored the Tribunal's award.

Facts:

Mr. Shib Kumar Dushad was initially employed by a private company, Chirkunda Coal Company, where his year of birth was recorded as 1932.

After the nationalization of coal mines in 1973, his employment was transferred to Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.

Mr. Dushad obtained certificates in 1973 and 1983 stating his date of birth as 9-2-1946, which differed from the date recorded in the company's service records.

In 1988, the company referred the matter to a Medical Board, which assessed Mr. Dushad's age as 52 years as of 13-10-1988.

The company, based on the Medical Board's assessment, considered his date of birth to be 13-10-1936.

Mr. Dushad filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court in 1991, seeking the correction of his date of birth to 9-2-1946.

The single judge of the High Court initially directed the company to consider Mr. Dushad's representation for correction of his date of birth.

After considering his representation, the company, in 1994, decided not to change the recorded date of birth.

Mr. Dushad then filed another writ petition, seeking the correction of his date of birth to 9-2-1946 and to allow him to work until 9-2-2006.

The Division Bench of the High Court modified the single judge's decision, determining that Mr. Dushad should superannuate in 2004 instead of 2006, as he joined the service in 1960 and the statutory age limit for employment was 16 years.

Issues:

The central issue in this case was whether Mr. Shib Kumar Dushad's date of birth should be considered as 1932 or 1946, which had implications for his superannuation date and entitlements.

Held:

In this judgment, the Supreme Court held:

Courts should be cautious about interfering with the determination of an employee's date of birth, particularly when raised close to retirement.

The burden of proof is on the employee to provide conclusive evidence to support a change in the recorded date of birth.

Changing an employee's date of birth after a long service career could disrupt promotions and cause injustice to junior employees.

The practice of employees seeking such changes near retirement could lead to complications and harm to junior employees.

Interim injunctions for continued service should not be granted in such cases, and monetary benefits could be provided if the claim for a corrected date of birth is later accepted.

The judgments of the single judge and the Division Bench were set aside, and the writ petition was dismissed. Mr. Dushad was not entitled to any service benefits based on the extended service beyond the original date/year of superannuation, except for the salary/wages already received.

Facts:

The Post-Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh (PGI) is in appeal against the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court.

The central issue in these appeals is whether the Labour Court was justified in awarding 60% of back wages while ordering reinstatement with continuity of service.

Three separate writ petitions were filed before the High Court by three affected workmen, and the High Court dealt with them in one common judgment.

The respondent (Raj Kumar) had joined PGI's service on September 1, 1986, as a helper and worked until July 18, 1987. His services were terminated on July 18, 1987, and the Labour Court later found that this termination was illegal.

Issues:

Whether the Labour Court's decision to award 60% of back wages was justified.

Whether the High Court correctly modified the Labour Court's order regarding back wages.

Held:

The judgment referred to the discretion of the Labour Tribunal in awarding back wages and emphasized that while full back wages are the normal rule when services are terminated in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, the discretion lies with the Tribunal to determine the appropriate amount based on the specific facts and circumstances of each case. This discretion must be exercised judicially.

The Labour Court, being the final court of facts, found that payment of 60% of back wages was compliant with the law in this particular case.

The High Court's judgment did not provide adequate reasoning for its interference with the Labour Court's decision on back wages, and it failed to identify any specific irregularities.

It was emphasized that a finding of perversity or an error of law must be recorded with reasons for the High Court to intervene in the decision of the Labour Court.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's orders, and restored the Labour Court's orders. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

The case involved an Assistant Manager (Quality Control) at Kakinada who challenged the imposition of a minor penalty for alleged dereliction of duties, which caused a loss to the Food Corporation of India. The High Court had interpreted Regulation 60 in a way that required a full-fledged departmental inquiry whenever an employee disputed their liability for the alleged misconduct or loss.

Issues:

The interpretation of Regulation 60 of the Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971, and whether a full departmental inquiry was mandatory when an employee disputed liability for alleged misconduct or loss.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Regulation 60 did not mandate a full departmental inquiry in all cases where an employee disputed their liability.

The Court emphasized that the discretion to determine the necessity of a regular departmental inquiry, as stipulated under Regulation 58 for major penalties, rested with the disciplinary authority.

The disciplinary authority could decide whether to conduct a regular departmental inquiry based on the facts and circumstances of each case.

The Court noted that the discretion of the disciplinary authority was not to be curtailed by an interpretation contrary to the language of the regulation.

The power of judicial review was limited, and the Court could only intervene if the authority conducted the inquiry proceedings inconsistently with the rules of natural justice, violated statutory rules, or if the disciplinary authority's conclusion lacked evidence or was unreasonably reached.

The appeal was allowed to the extent that the High Court's interpretation of Regulation 60 was found to be erroneous.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1, a practicing Advocate, filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. He sought various directions, including the registration of a criminal case against certain individuals, alleging a criminal conspiracy against him. The High Court disposed of his petition on 7-1-1999, ordering a preliminary inquiry by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Roopnagar. Subsequently, after the case had been disposed of, Respondent No. 1 filed a Miscellaneous Petition, which was disposed of on 30-4-1999, directing the SSP not to comply with the earlier directions. Appellant filed a petition to quash the latter order, which was dismissed by the High Court on 21st July 1999, leading to the present appeals.

Issues:

Does the High Court have the authority to review its judgments or pass fresh directions after a case has been disposed of in criminal matters?

Can the High Court exercise such powers under Section 482 of the CrPC?

Is the practice of filing miscellaneous petitions after the disposal of the main case and issuing fresh directions by the High Court valid under the law?

Held:

The impugned orders were passed without regard for basic principles of criminal law. No review of an order is contemplated under the CrPC. After the disposal of the main petition on 7-1-1999, there was no lis pending in the High Court wherein Respondent No. 1 could have filed any miscellaneous petition. The practice of filing a miscellaneous petition not referable to any provision of CrPC or the rules of the Court cannot be used as a substitute for fresh litigation. The impugned orders dated 30th April, 1999, and 21st July, 1999, could not have been passed by the High Court under its inherent power u/s 482 of the CrPC. Such practices are unwarranted and constitute an abuse of the court's processes.( Para 8)

There is no provision in the CrPC authorizing the High Court to review its judgments, whether in exercise of its appellate, revisional, or original criminal jurisdiction. Such a power cannot be exercised with the aid or under the cloak of Section 482 of the Code. Section 362 of the Code mandates that no Court, once it has signed its judgment or final order in a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. The reliance on the case of Talab Haji Hussain's case (supra) is misconceived, as inherent powers conferred on High Courts u/s 482 of the Code must be exercised sparingly and only as justified by the tests laid down in the section itself. The appeals are allowed, and the impugned orders are set aside, restoring the original order dated 7-1-1999.( Para 9)

The new Section 362 of the Code has extended the bar on review not only to judgments but also to final orders other than judgments.( Para 10)

Facts:

The appellant, Ram Lal, was charged with selling adulterated milk, specifically camel's milk, under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Ram Lal argued that no standards had been set for camel's milk under the Act. The trial court initially acquitted him, but the High Court reversed the decision, convicting Ram Lal and sentencing him to imprisonment and a fine. The High Court also declared that camel's milk was not fit for human consumption.

Issues:

Whether camel's milk falls within the definition of milk under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

Whether selling camel's milk for human consumption is permissible.

Whether Ram Lal's conviction was appropriate under the Act.

Held:

The definition of milk under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules did not differentiate between milk from different animals, indicating that camel's milk fell within the definition. The question of whether camel's milk is suitable for human consumption was not relevant to the case.( Para 5)

The Court decided to reduce Ram Lal's sentence to three months of imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500, with an additional 15-day imprisonment in case of default in payment. This reduction was due to Ram Lal's age at the time of the offense, the lack of opportunity to present his case on the sentence, and the delay in the legal process.

The appeal is disposed of.

Facts:

The Appellant and Respondent are brothers involved in a property dispute in Patna.

The dispute was referred to arbitration, and the arbitrator issued an award on 21st January, 1996.

On 14th May, 1996, the arbitrator sent a registered notice to both parties, informing them of the award and filed the award in the Court of Sub Judge I, Patna.

On 11th June, 1996, the Respondent filed a caveat, acknowledging receipt of the notice about the award.

On 16th July, 1996, the Court sent a formal notice to both parties regarding the award filing, received by the Respondent on 25th July, 1996.

Both parties applied for inspection of the award on 1st August, 1996, and the Respondent filed objections on 21st August, 1996.

Issues:

When does the period of limitation for filing objections to an arbitration award commence?

Does the filing of a caveat initiate the limitation period?

What is the significance of the formal notice issued by the Court in this context?

Held:

The Court held that the period of limitation for filing objections to an arbitration award commences from the date when the Court gives formal notice to the parties, as per Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940.

In this case, notice from the Court was received by the Respondent on 25th July, 1996. Therefore, objections filed on 21st August, 1996, were within the 30-day limitation period prescribed by Article 119 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Court rejected the argument that the Respondent's filing of the caveat initiated the limitation period, emphasizing that filing a caveat merely constitutes a request for the Court to provide notice and does not replace the Court's statutory duty to issue notice.

The Appeal stands dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant-Corporation sanctioned a term loan to the respondents for the construction of a hotel unit. The respondents defaulted on the loan payments, leading the Corporation to take possession of the hotel under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. The hotel's assets were sold, and the excess amount received from the sale, after deducting the loan amount, was kept in the Corporation's Current Account. The High Court ordered the refund of the excess amount to the respondents along with interest at the rate of 13%, which was the rate at which the Corporation had charged interest on the loan.

Issues:

Whether the respondents are entitled to interest on the excess amount refunded from the sale of their industrial unit.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that the Corporation, while not statutorily obliged to pay interest on the excess amount, could award interest on equitable grounds in certain cases, such as compensation or damages for wrongfully retaining funds. However, the Court found that the High Court had not provided any justification for awarding interest to the respondents, and the respondents had not presented any circumstances warranting the exercise of equitable powers in their favor. Given the lack of an agreement or statutory provision, the Supreme Court concluded that the respondents could not claim interest as a right.

Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order to pay interest at the rate of 13% along with the excess amount was set aside.