Facts:

The appellant had been granted land under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969, for better cultivation as the land was adjacent to the disputed land. This grant was confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal. A Writ Petition was filed by the respondent challenging this grant, which was initially dismissed by the learned Single Judge but later allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench's direction to grant land based on priorities under Rule 5 and Rule 6 was in conformity with the Karnataka Land Grant Rules?

Whether the appellant met the eligibility criteria for grant under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4?

Held:

The Division Bench's direction to grant land based on priorities under Rule 5 and Rule 6 was not in conformity with the Rules. When granting land to a person under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4, the provisions of Rules 5 and 6, including percentage reservation and order of priority, would not apply.

The appellant fulfilled all the conditions required under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4, including not being a sufficient holder, as his landholding was less than four hectares. The appellant also met other eligibility criteria and paid the market price for the disputed land. Therefore, the grant of land to the appellant was in accordance with Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4, and the land had been rightly granted to the appellant.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the Division Bench, and imposed costs on the parties.

Facts:

The appellant filed a suit for a permanent injunction to restrain certain defendants from dispossessing him from a property in Chennai. Along with the suit, the appellant filed an application for an ex-parte interim injunction. The Assistant Judge granted an ex-parte interim injunction. The respondents challenged this order in the High Court, which set aside the injunction order. The matter reached the Supreme Court through a special leave petition.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the ex-parte interim injunction order.

Whether non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 3A of Order 39 has consequences for the party that obtained the injunction.

Held:

The power to pass interim ex-parte orders of injunction emanates from Order 39 Rule 1 of the CPC, and such orders are appealable under Order 43 Rule 1. The affected party can choose to move the appellate Court or approach the same Court that passed the ex-parte order for relief (Paragraph 10).

Rule 3 of Order 39 sets out certain requirements for parties obtaining ex-parte injunctions, including delivering copies of the application, affidavit, plaint, and relevant documents to the opposite party immediately after the order is made. Failure to comply with these requirements means the party cannot take advantage of the injunction order (Paragraph 12).

Rule 3A of Order 39 does not impose a restriction on the initial period of the injunction order; instead, it requires the court to pass final orders within thirty days from the date of the injunction. Non-compliance with Rule 3A does not automatically render the order illegal; however, the aggrieved party has a right to appeal (Paragraph 14).

When a court fails to pass final orders within the specified time under Rule 3A, it must record reasons for the delay. The affected party is not solely responsible for the consequences of such delay (Paragraph 16).

In cases where the court flouts the mandate of Rule 3A, the aggrieved party is entitled to the right of appeal against the order, even if the application for temporary injunction is pending (Paragraph 18).

Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction for the Trial Court to pass final orders on the interim application on merits and in accordance with the law. Until such final orders are passed by the Trial Court, the status quo as it existed immediately before the institution of the suit should be maintained (Paragraph 20).

Facts:

The appellant, Ravinder Singh, contested the 1997 elections for constituency No. 96, Ferozepur Cantt of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, representing the Congress Party.

He was defeated by respondent No. 1, Janmeja Singh, who was fielded by the Akali Dal (Badal group).

The appellant filed an election petition alleging two corrupt practices: one under Section 123(1)(A)(b) and the other under Section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Issues:

Whether the election petition contained the necessary averments and affidavit support required under Section 83(1) of the Act for the allegations of corrupt practices?

Whether the election petition met the essential elements to constitute a complete cause of action for setting aside the election?

Held:

The election petition lacked essential averments to support the charge under Section 123(4) of the Act. Specifically, it did not assert that the returned candidate had published false statements knowing them to be false or not believing them to be true. No evidence can be presented during trial on a plea not raised in the pleadings.

The affidavit filed in support of the election petition did not address the charge of bribery under Section 123(1) of the Act, as required by the proviso to Section 83(1). The absence of the requisite affidavit in the prescribed form was fatal to this allegation.

Section 83 of the Act is mandatory and requires a concise statement of material facts, full particulars, and a supporting affidavit to prevent a vague and roving inquiry. Failure to meet these requirements meant that no issue could be raised for trial.

The decision of the High Court to dismiss the election petition without proceeding to trial was upheld.

Decision: The appeal lacked merit and was dismissed. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1 was charged with mishandling a customer's money and not refunding the excess amount received.

A domestic inquiry was conducted, during which three bank officers testified as witnesses. Respondent No. 1 did not provide any evidence or testify on his own behalf.

Based on the evidence presented during the domestic inquiry, respondent No. 1 was found guilty of the charges and dismissed from his position.

An industrial dispute was raised following respondent No. 1's dismissal and referred to the Central Industrial Tribunal.

The Tribunal determined that the domestic inquiry was fair and proper, but the evidence did not conclusively support the guilt of respondent No. 1. The Tribunal set aside the finding of guilt.

A learned Single Judge of the High Court quashed the Tribunal's award and ruled in favor of respondent No. 1.

The Division Bench of the High Court disagreed with the Single Judge's decision, stating that the Single Judge should not have interfered with the Tribunal's award.

Issues:

Whether the Tribunal, the Single Judge, or the Division Bench correctly interpreted and applied the principles governing disciplinary actions and interference in industrial disputes.

Another issue is the relevance of certain pieces of evidence, such as the non-examination of the complainant, non-production of money, and non-production of alleged confessional statements.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized that the Tribunal's interference should have been limited since the domestic inquiry was conducted fairly and properly.

Principles related to disciplinary actions were cited, emphasizing that interference should occur only if the findings were perverse or there was evidence of victimization, unfair labor practices, or mala fides.

The Court criticized the Tribunal and the Division Bench for ignoring the evidence presented by the bank officers during the domestic inquiry, which had established the guilt of respondent No. 1.

The Court rejected respondent No. 1's argument that the domestic inquiry did not allow for the presentation of all evidence, clarifying that withheld evidence would be significant only if it could have affected the outcome of the inquiry.

As a result, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Division Bench's order, and restoring the judgment of the learned Single Judge.

Facts:

Rakesh Kumar Singla was initially appointed as an Assistant Engineer on an ad hoc basis in 1980. Later, he applied to the Haryana Public Service Commission for regular appointment in accordance with statutory rules and was selected and appointed regularly in 1982. Rakesh Kumar sought the grant of a selection grade based on 12 years of service, including his ad hoc service, according to a circular from the Government of Haryana dated June 2, 1989. The State Government argued that the period of service as an ad hoc appointee should not be counted for the purpose of earning benefits under the circular because it was not in accordance with the Recruitment Rules.

Issues:

Whether the services rendered by an ad hoc appointee, outside the Recruitment Rules, can be counted for earning benefits under Government Memoranda when the appointee is later appointed regularly?

When should the 12-year period for eligibility for the selection grade commence for Rakesh Kumar Singla?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that:

Services rendered on an ad hoc basis or as a stopgap arrangement, not in accordance with the Recruitment Rules, cannot be considered regular service for earning benefits under Government Memoranda, specifically a higher scale of pay.

The 12-year period for eligibility for the selection grade should commence from Rakesh Kumar's regular appointment date in 1982, and his prior service as an ad hoc appointee should not be counted.

Facts:

The appellants were accused of the murder of an advocate's clerk who was cremated in the presence of his widow and son.

The prosecution's case alleged that the appellants, including Hukam Singh, were involved in the murder.

Eyewitnesses, including the deceased's son and widow, provided testimony.

Issues:

The primary issues revolved around the credibility of the eyewitnesses and the role of the Public Prosecutor in selecting witnesses.

The defense argued that the Public Prosecutor should have examined certain independent witnesses.

Held:

The Court upheld the conviction of the appellants for the murder based on the evidence provided by eyewitnesses.

The judgment emphasized the role of the Public Prosecutor in selecting witnesses, stating that the Public Prosecutor has the discretion to choose witnesses and is not obligated to examine every witness cited by the investigating agency.

The Court also highlighted that the decision of the Public Prosecutor should be fair to the court and to the trust placed in them.

It was noted that the decision in this regard should be taken by the Public Prosecutor in a fair manner, and they can interview witnesses beforehand to understand their anticipated testimony.

Facts:

The case involves a criminal appeal against the conviction of the appellants under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The main appeal, Criminal Appeal No. 5/99, is pending before the VIth Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Secunderabad. The appellants had filed interlocutory applications, which were dismissed. A revision case was filed in the High Court against the order of dismissal. During the proceedings, a settlement was reached, and the appellants deposited a specific sum of money in the court.

Issues:

Whether the settlement reached between the parties during the appeal proceedings affects the conviction and sentence of the appellants.

Whether the interlocutory applications filed by the appellants hold any merit or should be set aside.

Whether the High Court's order in the interlocutory proceedings should be upheld or set aside.

Held:

The Supreme Court held as follows:

The order related to the interlocutory applications filed by the appellants was set aside.

The matter was remitted to the Appellate Court (VIth Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Secunderabad), where the appeal against the conviction was pending.

The Appellate Court was directed to consider the subsequent events, particularly the payment made by the appellants as part of the settlement, and dispose of the appeal in accordance with the law, which could include setting aside the conviction, convicting the appellants, or imposing imprisonment or a fine as deemed fit under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The complainant (first respondent) was allowed to withdraw the deposited amount, and their statement regarding not pressing for a conviction or specific sentence before the Appellate Court was noted.

Facts:

The appellants, proprietors of certain land in Mehgaon, filed a suit for possession, claiming that they were dispossessed and were entitled to recover possession.

Appellants' possession was recorded in the annual village papers (khasra) for specific years, while respondents claimed the land had been possessed by Gayadeen.

The trial court and appellate court ruled against the appellants.

Issues:

Interpretation of Section 4(2) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act.

The importance of entries in annual village papers (khasra) as evidence of possession.

Correct procedure for correcting entries in annual village papers.

Held:

Section 4(2) vests the right in a proprietor to remain in possession of khud-kasht land, recorded in annual village papers before the date of vesting. Entries in the khasra before the date of vesting are relevant.

The legislative policy aims to protect a proprietor's right to remain in possession if they personally cultivate the land. The entries in the khasra before the date of vesting are crucial for this determination.

The criteria for possession rights under the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act differ from the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (M.P. Act). While the language is similar, the Abolition Act relies on entries in annual village papers.

Entries in annual village papers create a rebuttable presumption in favor of the recorded possessor. Correcting wrong entries is possible under Section 50 of the Land Revenue Act. Subsequent entries, not corrected per the prescribed procedure, are inconsequential.

Decision: The judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside. The appellants are entitled to continue in possession as their names were recorded in the khasra for years before the date of vesting. The appellants can also seek recovery of possession from unauthorized occupants. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The appellant, Karnail Singh, a truck driver, was apprehended on 21st August 1992 by a Preventive Party on the Kota-Bundi Road in Rajasthan. He was found to be carrying 96.600 kgs. of opium concealed in his truck. A case was registered under Sections 8/18 of the NDPS Act, and the appellant was subsequently convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. The appeal challenged the conviction.

Issues:

Whether the procedural requirements of the NDPS Act, particularly Section 42 and Section 55, were adhered to in the case?

Whether the appellant had discharged the burden of proof to rebut the presumption under Section 35 of the NDPS Act regarding possession of illicit articles?

Held:

The court clarified that the applicability of Section 42 of the NDPS Act depends on whether the officer has a reason to believe from personal knowledge or information regarding the movement of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. If the action is not based on personal knowledge or information, Section 42 does not apply. The court further explained the distinction between the officer in charge of the nearest police station and the officer empowered under Section 53, stating that Section 55's applicability depends on which procedure is followed.

The court noted that the appellant had not discharged the burden of proof to rebut the presumption under Section 35 of the NDPS Act. The appellant was found to be transporting the opium with a conscious mind and full knowledge, and all elements of the offenses were proven by the prosecution.

The appeal was found to be without merit, and the conviction and sentence of the appellant were upheld.