Facts:

Criminal Appeal No. 602/1997 challenged directions issued by the Gujarat High Court, including strict timelines for obtaining sanctions and filing charge sheets in corruption cases.

Criminal Appeal No. 601/1997 involved strong language used in the High Court's judgment and the declaration of certain portions of the Vigilance Manual as ultra vires.

The Indian Administrative Service Officers' Association and the Union of India sought to be impleaded as parties in the case.

Issues:

Whether the directions issued by the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 602/1997 were unwarranted and without jurisdiction, especially concerning timelines for sanctions and charge sheets.

Whether the strong language used in the judgment of Criminal Appeal No. 601/1997 was appropriate.

Whether the declarations made by the High Court, including the one regarding the Vigilance Manual, were sustainable.

Whether it was within the jurisdiction of the High Court to take up matters of corruption cases involving influential public servants.

Held:

The Supreme Court acknowledged some justification in the criticism of the directions in Criminal Appeal No. 602/1997 and expunged the portion of the judgment that imposed strict timelines. The rest of the High Court's judgment was not disturbed.

The judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 601/1997 was strongly worded, and the Supreme Court did not concur with the use of such strong language by the High Court.

The declaration made by the High Court regarding the Vigilance Manual was not sustainable due to the lack of notice to the Advocate-General of the State and the violation of the principle of natural justice.

While corruption cases against influential public servants should not be withdrawn without basis, it was not within the jurisdiction of the High Court to usurp this function and forward such matters to other institutions available in the country for inquiries.

Decision:

The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside.

The matter was referred to the Central Vigilance Commission for further action regarding the sanction of prosecution in the eight instances mentioned in the judgment. Costs directed to be paid in terms of the judgment were not to be recovered.

Facts:

The respondent, Pradip Kumar Dey, filed a writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus directing the appellants (Union of India and Others) to proceed based on the recommendations made by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) to the Fourth Pay Commission. This recommendation aimed to remove disparities in the pay scales of Naik (Radio Operator) in CRPF and employees with similar duties in the Directorate of Coordination Police Wireless and other Central Government agencies. The respondent's claim was based on the principle of "equal pay for equal work." The appellants contested this claim, stating that the Fourth Pay Commission's recommendations had already been implemented and that the respondent's job could not be directly compared to other civil radio operators.

Issues:

Whether the respondent's claim for a higher pay scale based on the principle of "equal pay for equal work" was justified.

Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was correct in granting relief to the respondent without sufficient material for comparison and without considering the implications on other cadres.

Held:

The Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in granting relief to the respondent without sufficient material for comparison. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" requires a detailed evaluation of various factors, including qualifications, method of recruitment, degree of skill, experience, training, responsibilities, and additional facilities besides pay scales. Such a comparison was absent in this case.

The Pay Commission's recommendations are not binding on the government, and the court should not interfere in matters of fixing pay scales without adequate information and relevant details of comparable employees.

Granting the relief as per the High Court's directions would not only affect pay scales but could lead to changes in the hierarchical structure of posts, affecting various other Central Police Establishments. Such decisions require a more comprehensive evaluation by expert bodies like the Pay Commission or the government itself.

The rejection of the respondent's claim does not prevent the government from reconsidering the issue, either by referring it to the Pay Commission or by conducting a fresh evaluation. Similarly, the respondent can make further, more detailed representations.

Facts:

The respondents-plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land, delivery of vacant possession, and a declaration of ownership. During the trial, forensic examination of the original agreement of sale revealed evidence of interpolation.

Issues:

Whether the appellate court's refusal to permit the respondents-plaintiffs to adduce additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC was justified?

Whether the High Court had the authority to interfere with the appellate court's order in a revision petition filed under Section 115 CPC?

Held:

The judgment emphasized the limited scope of Order 41, Rule 27 CPC, which allows the admission of additional evidence under specific circumstances. These circumstances include when the appellate court requires such evidence to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The High Court should not interfere with an order passed by the appellate court under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC unless the appellate court required additional evidence for pronouncing judgment. Mere difficulty in coming to a decision is not sufficient for the admission of evidence under this rule.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and restored the appellate court's decision. However, it made it clear that the correctness of the appellate court's decision could be challenged by the aggrieved party in the appeal pending before the High Court.

Facts:

The appellant was convicted under Section 161 of the IPC and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, for accepting an illegal gratification of Rs. 10. The appellant's advocate argued that the payment was not illegal gratification but rather for a legitimate purpose related to a soldiers' welfare fund.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's conviction under Section 161 of the IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was justified, considering the nature of the payment involved.

Held:

The court upheld the appellant's conviction but considered the purpose of punishment, which includes deterrence, prevention of repeat offenses, and reformation of the offender.

Due to the small amount involved (Rs. 10) and the appellant's four-month jail term, further punishment was deemed unnecessary.

The court reduced the sentence to the four months already served by the appellant, with the fine amount remaining the same.

Facts:

The case involved the long-standing criminal activities of Veerappan, who operated along the Karnataka-Tamil Nadu border, including elephant poaching, ivory and sandalwood smuggling, and heinous crimes like murder. In 2000, Veerappan kidnapped Rajkumar, a popular film actor, and demanded the withdrawal of TADA charges against his associates in jail and the release of some of his other associates detained under the NSA. The Karnataka government agreed to these demands, leading to a series of legal actions.

Issues:

Whether the Public Prosecutor (PP) followed proper procedures in seeking the withdrawal of TADA charges under Section 321 of the CrPC?

Whether the withdrawal of charges was in the public interest and did not stifle the legal process or result in manifest injustice?

Held:

The court emphasized that under Section 321 of the CrPC, the PP must independently assess the relevant material and determine, in good faith, that the withdrawal serves the public interest. The court's role is supervisory, ensuring the PP's good faith and the absence of harm to the legal process.

The PP's application did not provide sufficient material to demonstrate good faith and public interest. The affidavit suggested complicity with the accused, leading to the facilitation of their release on bail.

The court set aside the order granting consent for the withdrawal of TADA charges. Additionally, the order granting bail to the accused was also set aside.

The court expressed concerns about the government's handling of the situation and its potential impact on law and order. It noted that the decision to withdraw charges without proper consideration could undermine faith in the democratic process.

Facts:

The appellants were arrested following a raid by officers of the Central Bureau of Narcotics, resulting in the seizure of 132 kgs of opium.

They were charged under Sections 8/18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

The appellants sought bail, but their application was denied by the Addl. District Judge.

Subsequently, the appellants were detained under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988.

The appellants challenged their detention on various grounds, including claims that it was punitive in nature and lacked proper justification.

The High Court dismissed their petitions, stating that the detaining authority had considered their custody and provided compelling reasons, including the likelihood of their being released on bail.

Issues:

The legality and validity of the detention order.

Whether the detention order was based on proper reasoning and justification.

Whether the detention was punitive in nature.

Held:

The court referred to previous judgments, including Binod Singh Vs. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, Bihar and Others, which emphasized that a detention order should only be passed if there is a likelihood of the detenu being released on bail, supported by cogent material.

The court found that in this case, the reasoning provided by the concerned officer was based on the "likelihood of the detenu moving an application for bail," which is different from the "likelihood to be released on bail."

The court held that this reasoning did not meet the requirements for a valid detention order.

The court concluded that the order of detention was not in compliance with the law and quashed it.

Decision: The court quashed the detention order based on its finding that it did not meet the legal requirements. The appeals were disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The Himalayan Cooperative Milk Product Union Limited manufactured various dairy products, including butter, skimmed milk powder, and liquid nitrogen.

A notification (No. 105/80-C.E. dated 19.6.1980) exempted excise duty on goods under Item No. 68 (liquid nitrogen) for the first clearances of these goods for home consumption, provided the total capital investment on the machinery for manufacturing these goods did not exceed rupees ten lakhs.

The Collector of Central Excise rejected the manufacturer's claim for exemption, arguing that the total value of capital investment in all machinery in the factory, including that for manufacturing dairy products, should be considered to determine eligibility for the exemption.

The manufacturer contended that only the capital investment in machinery used for manufacturing liquid nitrogen (Item No. 68) should be considered.

Issues:

Whether the value of capital investment in machinery used for manufacturing dairy products should be taken into account when determining eligibility for the exemption from excise duty on liquid nitrogen (Item No. 68).

Held:

The notification specifically refers to goods falling under Item No. 68 as 'said goods.' The proviso to Clause (ii) of the Notification only mentions capital investment in the plant and machinery for the "said goods." Therefore, the value of investment in machinery for manufacturing other products is not relevant to eligibility for the exemption.

The Court endorsed the view taken in the case of Devidayal Electronics & Wires Ltd. v. Union of India, where the terms "factory" and "industrial unit" were interpreted differently, supporting the contention that only machinery related to the "said goods" should be considered.

Practical challenges, such as shared machinery in factory complexes, can be resolved by devising methods to apportion the value of machinery proportionally.

The Court emphasized that when interpreting notifications providing exemptions or benefits, the purpose and policy behind these benefits should be considered, and the purpose should not be defeated by interpreting the notification in a way that contradicts its clear and unambiguous language.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court found no merit in the appeals by the Collector of Central Excise and dismissed them.

Facts:

Multiple appeals were filed challenging the cancellation of appointments of Assistant Teachers of Primary Schools in Assam.

The appointments were made in 1990 and later canceled by the State Government due to irregularities and non-compliance with prescribed procedures.

Writ petitions were filed in the Gauhati High Court, where the Single Judge allowed the petitions.

The State government appealed this decision, leading to the Division Bench of the High Court reviewing the cases.

The Division Bench found widespread irregularities in the appointments and concluded that they were made in violation of statutory rules and fairness.

Issues:

Whether the appointments of Assistant Teachers were made in compliance with statutory rules and procedures?

Whether the cancellations of these appointments were legally valid?

Whether the appointees had the right to continue in their positions?

Held:

The Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court held that the appointments were not made in compliance with statutory rules and were fraught with irregularities. The appointments were canceled following due process, and the appointees did not have a legal right to continue in their positions. The Division Bench's decision to dismiss the appeals by the teachers was upheld by the Supreme Court.

The Court emphasized that appointments made in violation of statutory rules and in a highly arbitrary manner cannot be regularized or validated. The teachers could not claim a right or equitable relief in such circumstances. Previous decisions supported the conclusion that illegally made appointments do not confer rights on the appointees. Additionally, the Court noted that the appointees had not been allowed to continue for an extended period beyond six months.

Facts:

Roop Devi, the daughter of Bhagwan Sahai (PW1), was married to Shyam Mohan (respondent No. 2) on 6-6-1973. The accused included Hari Mohan (respondent No. 1), who was the elder brother of Shyam Mohan, along with other relatives and friends of Shyam Mohan. Roop Devi's father became concerned after receiving a letter from her expressing fear of being killed by her in-laws due to dowry demands. The investigation into Roop Devi's death was criticized for being defective, with the investigating officer allegedly helping the accused.

Issues:

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

How should the defective investigation be considered in relation to the acquittal of the accused?

Held:

The Court emphasized the importance of circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is lacking. It laid down the principles for evaluating circumstantial evidence, including the need for circumstances to be complete and inconsistent with the innocence of the accused. The Court cited various judgments to support these principles.

The Court criticized the defective investigation but noted that it could not be the sole basis for acquittal if a case had been made against the accused.

The Court found that the prosecution had established a chain of circumstances that were inconsistent with the innocence of Hari Mohan (respondent No. 1) and proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. His conviction under Section 302 of the IPC for murder was upheld, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

However, the Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the case against the other accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 or Section 201 of the IPC. Their acquittal by the High Court was upheld.