Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the time limit for filing an election petition challenging the election of the appellant, who was declared elected to the Legislative Assembly on 28-11-1996. The respondent filed an Election Petition under Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951, on 12-1-1999, which was more than 45 days after the date of the election of the appellant.

Issues:

Whether Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, applies to the computation of the period of limitation under Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951,

Whether the date of election of the returned candidate should be excluded from the calculation of the 45-day period.

Held:

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, applies to the computation of the period of limitation under Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951. The Court rejected the argument that the specific language used in Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951, ("within forty-five days from, but not earlier than the date of election of the returned candidate") indicates a different intention and that Section 9 does not apply.

The Court emphasized that Section 9 requires the exclusion of the first day when a period has both a starting point (terminus a quo) and an ending point (terminus ad quern). Excluding the first day from the computation of the period of limitation ensures that candidates and electors have the full 45-day period for filing an election petition, even if the declaration of election results is delayed. Therefore, the Election Petition filed on 12-1-1999 was considered to be within the period of limitation, as the first day (25-11-1998, the date of the election) was excluded from the calculation.

As a result, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding it without merit.

Facts:

The appellant contested the election for the position of President of Vannavalkudi Village Panchayat, Pudukkottai District, Tamil Nadu.

The polling took place on 12-10-96, and the votes were counted on 14-10-96.

The 1st respondent, Sundaram, secured 1011 votes, while the appellant Vadivelu secured 1010 votes. The 1st respondent was declared elected.

The appellant filed an Election Petition challenging the election of the 1st respondent, alleging irregularities during the vote counting process.

Issues:

Whether the Election Tribunal was justified in ordering a recount of votes based on the allegations of irregularities made by the appellant in the Election Petition.

Held:

The court discussed various legal principles related to election disputes, particularly the circumstances under which a recount of votes can be ordered.

Emphasized that a recount should not be ordered lightly and should be based on specific and substantiated allegations of irregularities that materially affected the election result.

Highlighted the requirements for filing an application for a recount and the importance of adhering to the rules governing the electoral process.

Concluded that the Election Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence of irregularities that would warrant a recount of votes.

Upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge, who found that the Election Tribunal erred in ordering a recount.

As a result, the appeal was dismissed, and there was no order for costs.

Facts:

The appellant, Badrinath, was an officer in the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). He had been promoted to the selection grade in 1972. However, when his name was considered for promotion to the super time scale, he was found unsuitable due to pending disciplinary cases and a censure recommended by the State Government. Subsequently, his juniors were promoted, leading to the appellant's challenge through a writ petition.

Issues:

The validity of a 'censure' order issued against the appellant.

The fairness of the assessment made by the Departmental Promotion Committee.

The weight to be given to adverse remarks, especially those from the distant past.

The role of the Chief Secretary in the Screening Committee and the application of the doctrine of necessity.

Held:

The Court held that under Article 356 of the Constitution, during President's Rule, the Governor can exercise all the powers of the State Government, including statutory powers. The Governor's order to drop disciplinary cases, including the one treated as pending, should be considered final for the State. The subsequent 'censure' order was invalid and without jurisdiction.

The Court emphasized that while it generally does not interfere with assessments made by Departmental Promotion Committees, it may do so in exceptional cases. Judicial review can be exercised if the assessment is proven to be mala fide or based on inadmissible or irrelevant material, or if it fails to consider the positive aspects of an officer's career.

Every officer has the right to be considered for promotion under Article 16 of the Constitution, but this consideration must be 'fair' according to established service jurisprudence principles. Adverse remarks can be considered, but their weight depends on certain principles of fairness. Adverse remarks from a distant past may carry less weight, particularly if they were not present before the officer's earlier promotion.

The Court found fault with the Joint Screening Committee for relying on very old adverse remarks and comments made before the appellant's earlier promotion to the selection grade. This was considered a breach of fairness principles.

The Court discussed the issue of bias when the Chief Secretary, who had made adverse remarks against the appellant in the past, was a member of the Screening Committee. The Court stated that the doctrine of necessity did not apply in this case, and appropriate steps should have been taken to ensure fairness.

Facts:

The respondent-plaintiff, a buyer, had entered into a contract with sellers for the purchase of reinforced steel bars and structural steel. A Letter of Credit (LC) was opened by the buyer with the "Issuing Bank," which required specific documents for payment, following the Uniform Customs and Practice of Documentary Credits, 1983 (UCP).

The appellant-defendant, the Negotiating Bank, received documents from the sellers, including delivery challans acknowledging receipt of goods. The seller submitted a Bill of Exchange for encashment against the LC taken out by the buyer. The Negotiating Bank endorsed the Bill of Exchange, along with the LC and related documents received from the seller, to the Issuing Bank, which confirmed the genuineness of the documents. Subsequently, the Negotiating Bank made payment to the seller, deducting its commission.

Issues:

Whether the Issuing Bank was bound to reimburse the Negotiating Bank once it had certified the genuineness of the documents related to the LC.

Whether a temporary injunction restraining the Issuing Bank from making payments under the LC was valid.

Whether the Negotiating Bank's role in the transaction made it a holder in due course.

Whether there were allegations of fraud or knowledge of fraud against the Negotiating Bank.

The circumstances under which injunctions can be granted in LC disputes.

Held:

In credit operations, all parties involved deal primarily with documents, not with the actual goods or services. Article 10 of the Uniform Customs and Practice of Documentary Credits, 1983 (UCP) outlines the duty of the Bank to honor its commitments under the LC. According to Article 11(d) of UCP, it is sufficient if the Negotiating Bank is satisfied that the documents, on their face, comply with the terms and conditions of the LC. If the Negotiating Bank makes payment based on this satisfaction, the Issuing Bank is obligated to reimburse it.

Article 15 of the UCP emphasizes the importance of "reasonable care" in document examination. The bank must take reasonable care when examining documents. It is not permissible for the bank to refuse payment on the grounds of a breach of contract between the buyer and seller. The bank's obligation is solely to verify document compliance, not to determine the breach of the main contract.

Courts should generally refrain from granting injunctions to restrain the encashment of bank guarantees or LCs. Exceptions include cases of fraud or irretrievable damage. If there are no allegations of fraud or knowledge of fraud against the Negotiating Bank, it is impermissible for the Issuing Bank to refuse payment.

The contract of an LC is independent of the underlying contract between the buyer and seller. The bank is obligated to honor the demand for encashment if the seller complies with the terms of the LC. If the bank is satisfied that the documents are in conformity with the LC, it must honor the demand. Its obligation has nothing to do with disputes between the buyer and seller.

If the Negotiating Bank is in the position of a holder in due course, based on the clearance given by the Issuing Bank regarding document genuineness, it can claim that the buyer's suit must fail if it seeks to restrain the Issuing Bank from reimbursing the Negotiating Bank.

Facts:

The facts of the case involve the estate of Ms. Raj Mohini, who executed two different wills at different times, one in favor of the Indian Red Cross Society and another in favor of Joginder Pal, the appellant. The dispute arose when the Indian Red Cross Society applied for a Succession Certificate to claim movable assets under the will dated April 2, 1985. Joginder Pal intervened in the application and filed a petition for the probate of the will dated June 12, 1987. Subsequent legal proceedings ensued.

Issues:

Whether the findings in the proceedings for the grant of a Succession Certificate operate as res judicata and bar a subsequent suit on the same issue?

Whether the principles of res judicata apply when issues have been raised and evidence led in the Succession Certificate proceedings?

Held:

The Court held that the findings in the proceedings for the grant of a Succession Certificate are not final and do not operate as res judicata. Section 387 of the Indian Succession Act explicitly permits the filing of a subsequent suit or proceeding on the same issue between the same parties, regardless of whether issues were raised and evidence led in the Succession Certificate proceedings.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that Section 387 of the Indian Succession Act shields such decisions from the principles of res judicata. The Court emphasized that Succession Certificate proceedings are summary in nature, and the findings therein do not preclude parties from pursuing a subsequent suit on the same issue.

Facts:

The appellant, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, sought to establish a mandi and its office complex. Land acquisition proceedings were initiated for this purpose, and a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was issued. The landowners challenged the acquisition. Possession of the land was taken urgently under Section 17(1) of the Act. An award was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, followed by a reference under Section 18. The landowners claimed Rs. 10,000 per Bigha as compensation. The Special Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation at a different rate, which was subsequently challenged in the reference. The High Court, acting as the first appellate court, increased the compensation. The issues in question were whether the High Court had the authority to exceed the claimed compensation and whether the interest rates applied by the High Court were correct.

Issues:

Whether the High Court could legally award compensation exceeding the amount claimed by the landowners in the reference.

Whether the High Court was correct in awarding interest rates in a case where the original award was made before the 1984 amendment to the Land Acquisition Act.

Held:

The judgment refers to Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act, which stipulated that compensation awarded by the court should not exceed the amount claimed by the landowners and should not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11. Since the award and reference in this case were concluded before the 1984 amendment, the unamended Section 25 applied. The High Court erred in exceeding the claimed compensation, but the enhancement up to Rs. 10,000 per Bigha (as claimed by the landowners) was deemed valid.

Regarding interest, the 1984 amendment increased the rate from 6% to 9%, but this amendment should only apply to cases where the award and reference were made between specific dates (April 30, 1982, and September 24, 1984). Since the award and reference in this case predated these dates, the old interest rate of 6% applied. The High Court's decision to award interest at 9% and 15% was not justified. The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, M.S. Jayaraj, successfully bid for the privilege of operating a liquor shop within the "Changanassery Excise Range" in Kerala.

He later applied to the Excise Commissioner for permission to relocate his shop to the nearby "Karukachal" range.

The Excise Commissioner granted the appellant's request to relocate the shop.

A hotelier operating within the Karukachal Panchayat area, holding an FL-3 License, challenged the Excise Commissioner's permission through a writ petition in the Kerala High Court.

The single judge initially dismissed the writ petition, finding that the Excise Commissioner had the authority to grant such permission under Rule 6(2) of the Kerala Abkari Shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules, 1974.

The Division Bench, on appeal, reversed the single judge's decision, holding that the Excise Commissioner lacked the authority to permit the relocation of a liquor shop from one range to another.

Issues:

Whether the Excise Commissioner had the authority under Rule 6(2) to permit the relocation of a liquor shop from one geographical range to another within Kerala.

Whether the hotelier, as a petitioner, had the locus standi to challenge the Excise Commissioner's order.

Held:

The Court concurs with the interpretation placed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court on the scope of the proviso to Rule 6(2) of the Auction Rules. It affirms that the Excise Commissioner lacked the authority to permit the shifting of a foreign liquor shop from one range to a totally different range. Consequently, the order passed by the Excise Commissioner is deemed unauthorized and has been rightly struck down by the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is dismissed.

The appellant is directed to apply for a refund of the deposited bid amount, as he was unable to operate the liquor shop due to the unauthorized order passed by the Excise Commissioner. The government is directed to process this refund within one month of the application. The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellants challenged a steep increase in license fees imposed by the government under the Andhra Pradesh Factories Rules, 1950. They contended that there was no quid pro quo in the revision of fees, and the fees were unreasonably high and arbitrary.

Issues:

Whether the license fee in question was a regulatory fee or a fee for special services rendered under the Factories Act, 1948 and the Andhra Pradesh Factories Rules, 1950?

Whether the increase in license fees from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 18,00,000 was justified and reasonable, considering the government's expenditure for enforcing the Act and Rules?

Held:

From the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 and the Andhra Pradesh Factories Rules, 1950, it is evident that the license fee in this case is a regulatory fee and not a fee for special services rendered. No mention of any special service to be provided to the fee payer is found in these provisions. The purpose of the license is to enable the authorities to supervise, regulate, and monitor factory activities for proper enforcement of the provisions. Therefore, the fee is regulatory, and the quid pro quo principle does not apply.

Initially, the increase from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 18,00,000 appeared excessive. However, there was no evidence to justify this fee hike or to establish a correlation between government expenditure for enforcing the Act and the fee increase. When the State Government was questioned about reconsideration, it indicated a decision to revise the fee structure with maximum fees limited to Rs. 2,50,000 per annum for certain factories.

While the government's statement suggested a revision of the fee structure using slab rates, it lacked specific details such as the new fee slabs, effective date, and whether it would be prospective or retrospective. Therefore, the information provided was insufficient to decide the case.

The revision of the license fee introduced by the government order was quashed. The judgment clarified that this decision would have prospective operation only, with no refunds for fees collected under the previous government order.

Facts:

The case pertains to the selection process for the posts of Principals and Headmasters in various regions, including Meerut, under the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982. The selection was conducted through interviews, and candidates were awarded quality points based on their performance in the interviews and other criteria outlined in guidelines provided by the Commission.

Issues:

The constitutionality of Sections 9 and 10 of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982.

The validity of the selection process based primarily on interviews.

Allegations of ante-dating of the panel of selected candidates.

Claims for regularization under specific sections of the Act.

Held:

1. Constitutionality of Sections 9 and 10: The Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 9(a) of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982. It found that there was no excessive delegation of essential legislative functions, as the Commission, composed of experts, was authorized to establish guidelines related to recruitment and promotion methods. The Court cited previous legal precedents in support of its decision.

2. Validity of the Selection Process: The Court determined that selecting candidates based solely on interviews was not inherently arbitrary or illegal. It emphasized that the percentage of marks allocated for interviews could vary depending on the specific circumstances of each case. The Court referred to various legal precedents that supported this approach.

3. Allegations of Ante-dating: The Court addressed allegations of ante-dating regarding the panel of selected candidates. It found no conclusive evidence to support this claim and noted that the delay in the panel reaching its destination did not necessarily indicate ante-dating.

4. Claims for Regularization: The Court clarified the conditions under which candidates could be regularized under specific sections of the Act. It left the examination of individual claims for regularization to the Director of Education, with a requirement to review and respond to such claims within a specified timeframe.

Decision: The case decided on September 28, 2000, upheld the constitutionality of Section 9(a) of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982. It also validated the interview-based selection process for Principals and Headmasters, dismissed ante-dating allegations, and clarified conditions for regularization under the Act. Legal precedents supported these decisions.