Facts:

The respondent-landlord filed an application before the Rent Controller u/s 13(3) (ii), (iii) and (vi) of the Rent Control Order seeking permission to determine the tenancy of the appellant.

The Controller granted permission for determining the tenancy of the tenant based on grounds of habitual default, subletting, and landlord's bona fide need.

On appeal, the Appellate Authority under the Control Order set aside the Controller's findings.

The High Court, in a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, reviewed the case and found errors in the Appellate Authority's decision.

Issues:

Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 in interfering with the findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority.

Whether the tenant was a habitual defaulter in rent payments.

Whether subletting of the premises by the tenant was established.

Held:

The jurisdiction of the High Court is supervisory and not appellate. However, the High Court can interfere if there are manifest errors in the lower tribunal's decision.

The Court held that the tenant's continuous delays in rent payment, even within the stipulated time frame, constituted habitual default under Section 13(3) (ii) of the Control Order.

On the issue of subletting, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the tenant had indeed sublet the premises.

The High Court did not exceed its jurisdiction and had corrected errors in the lower tribunal's findings.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

FACTS:

Dispute between the appellant union and the respondent led to a reference to the Industrial Tribunal.

The respondent was alleged to have coerced individual workmen into entering settlements under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Two workmen, Balanarsimha and Mallesh, refused to sign the settlement.

Subsequently, the respondent notified a seniority list and transferred Mallesh. Orders of termination were issued for Balanarsimha and another employee.

Balanarsimha and Mallesh filed a complaint under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, alleging violations of Section 33.

ISSUES:

Whether the awards made by the Industrial Tribunal could be considered res judicata in this case.

Whether the complaint under Section 33A of the Act is competent without establishing a violation of Section 33.

Whether the Industrial Tribunal properly examined the violation of Section 33 before determining the validity of the termination of services.

HELD:

The lower courts failed to consider the scope of proceedings under Section 33A and the requirement of finding a violation of Section 33.

Section 33A involves two aspects: violation of Section 33 and whether the act complained of is justified. Violation of Section 33 is essential for invoking Section 33A.

The violation or contravention of Section 33 forms the foundation for the exercise of power under Section 33A.

A complaint under Section 33A is incompetent without proof of a contravention of Section 33.

The awards by the Industrial Tribunal did not focus on the violation of Section 33, and therefore, they could not be treated as res judicata.

DECISION: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's orders, and directed the government to make a reference for adjudication of the dispute raised before it within a specified period.

REFERRED CASES:

Syndicate Bank Ltd. Vs. K.R.V. Bhat, AIR 1968 SC 231 : (1968) 16 FLR 39 : (1968) LabIC 207 : (1967) 2 LLJ 745 : (1968) 1 SCR 327

Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Chandigarh Vs. Suresh Chand and Another, AIR 1978 SC 995 : (1978) 36 FLR 383 : (1978) LabIC 693 : (1978) 2 LLJ 1 : (1978) 2 SCC 144 : (1978) 3 SCR 370

The Punjab National Bank Ltd. Vs. Its Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 160 : (1961) 2 FLR 212 : (1959) 2 LLJ 666 : (1960) 1 SCR 806

Facts:

The case involves a love affair between two men (Soman and A1) with one woman (Krishna Kumari, A2), leading to the murder of Soman. A1 and A2 were convicted for various offenses under the IPC. Accused No. 3 was also convicted under different sections of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether there was enough evidence to prove a criminal conspiracy between A1 and A2 to murder Soman.

Held:

The court discussed the legal framework for proving criminal conspiracy in India, emphasizing that it can be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. It cited relevant sections of the IPC and the Evidence Act.

The court referred to previous judgments and summarized the requirements to establish the charge of conspiracy. It emphasized the importance of intent and knowledge in conspiracy cases.

The court mentioned that the prosecution had relied on various circumstances to prove the existence of a conspiracy. These circumstances included motive, last seen together, disposal of the body, post-dated letters, and other pieces of evidence.

The court examined the circumstances and found that they were not sufficient to conclusively prove A2's involvement in the conspiracy. It noted that the evidence did not support the existence of a conspiracy between A1 and A2 before the murder.

The court discussed the corroborative evidence presented in the case, emphasizing that A1's involvement in the murder was established through circumstantial evidence and witness testimony.

The court rejected the argument that A1's conviction was solely based on the testimony of an approver (PW1). It stated that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to connect A1 to the murder.

The court concluded that A2's acquittal on the murder charge and her conviction under Section 201 IPC were justified. A1's conviction for murder and related offenses was also upheld.

Facts:

The case involves temporary employees of the Agricultural Produce Market Committee who were terminated from service. The Labour Court had set aside the termination orders and directed their reinstatement. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee (the appellant) contested that it was not an "industry" as defined by the Central Act, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to try the cases of its employees.

Issues:

Whether the Agricultural Produce Market Committee qualified as an "industry" under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Held:

The court held that the Agricultural Produce Market Committee did qualify as an "industry" under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The court emphasized that not all government functions are necessarily "sovereign" and that state activities encompass a wide range of functions, some of which could be performed by private individuals or bodies.

The court clarified that being a statutory corporation created under a statute did not automatically exempt the entity from being considered an "industry." The critical factor was whether the functions of the entity, as detailed in the statute, included those that could be undertaken by private individuals or bodies.

The court noted that the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966, did exclude the application of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to some extent, but this exclusion was limited. Section 59(3) of the State Act indicated that the exclusion of the Central Act applied only to the payment of compensation to the officers or servants of the transferred employees, implying that the Central Act was applicable in other areas.

Decision: The decision affirmed the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to hear the cases of the terminated employees.

Facts:

Dr. Vijayapurapu Subbayamma, a Lady Medical Officer, retired on November 13, 1980, with less than the required 20 years of service for pension eligibility. The Fourth Pay Commission later recommended reducing the qualifying years for a pension from 20 to 10, effective from January 1, 1986. Dr. Subbayamma sought pro-rata pension from January 1, 1986, despite retiring before that date.

Issues:

Whether Dr. Subbayamma is entitled to pro-rata pension based on the Fourth Pay Commission's recommendations, even though she retired before the effective date of the change.

Whether such denial of pro-rata pension would constitute an arbitrary act and violate Article 14 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court referred to the case of V. Kasturi vs. Managing Director, State Bank of India, which established that an employee not eligible for pension at the time of retirement cannot claim benefits from subsequent amendments unless such amendments are expressly retrospective.

The Court cited Commander Head Quarter, Calcutta vs. Capt. Biplabendra Chanda, emphasizing that the Fourth Pay Commission's recommendations were not given retrospective effect. Applying these principles, Dr. Subbayamma was not eligible for pro-rata pension under the Fourth Pay Commission's recommendations.

The Court concluded that Dr. Subbayamma was not entitled to a pro-rata pension based on the Fourth Pay Commission's recommendations, as they were not retroactive. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the Tribunal's judgment in favor of Dr. Subbayamma was set aside.

Facts:

The case involved four employees of Janatha Bazar (South Kanara Central Co-operative Wholesale Stores Limited) who were accused of breach of trust and misappropriation of goods valued at specific amounts during a particular period. The management of Janatha Bazar dismissed these employees based on these charges, leading to an industrial dispute.

Issues:

Whether the Labour Court's decision to reinstate the accused employees with 25% back wages was justified, despite clear findings of breach of trust and misappropriation of goods against them.

Held:

In this judgment, the Supreme Court held that when an act of misappropriation is proven, regardless of the amount involved, there is no justification for reinstating the employees in service. The Court cited legal precedents to support this position, emphasizing that misappropriation cannot be rewarded or legalized by reinstatement with full or part back wages.

The Court found that the Labour Court had erred in setting aside the order of dismissal and reinstating the employees with 25% back wages. It stated that there is no need to consider an employee's past record when there is a proven case of misappropriation. The discretion to consider past records rests with the employer, and the Labour Court cannot substitute the employer's penalty in such cases.

As a result, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's order, and directed that there be no order as to costs.

Facts:

The Municipal Corporation of Delhi had been passing resolutions since 1970 for transferring municipal quarters to its employees. However, the Municipal Commissioner objected to these resolutions on various grounds. The Corporation had sought amendments to Section 200 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act to empower it to transfer immovable property. The dispute revolved around whether the Corporation's resolutions held legal authority, given the objections raised by the Municipal Commissioner.

Issues:

Whether the resolutions passed by the Municipal Corporation for the transfer of municipal quarters to employees were legally valid, even if objected to by the Municipal Commissioner.

The extent of authority and power of the Municipal Commissioner in disposing of municipal property.

The interpretation and application of Section 200 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.

Held:

The Court interpreted Section 200 of the Act, which deals with the disposal of property belonging to the Corporation. It emphasized that the entire executive power for carrying out the provisions of the Act vested in the Commissioner. The Commissioner had the power to transfer immovable property, but this power required the sanction of the Corporation. The consideration for such transfer should not be less than the value at which the immovable property could be sold in normal and fair competition.

The judgment clarified that the power to transfer immovable property exceeding a certain value vested in the Commissioner, but this power required the sanction of the Corporation. It also emphasized that the resolutions passed by the Corporation alone did not confer any legal right to claim ownership, as they lacked the necessary authority and power.

The Court granted some time for the occupants of the disputed quarters to vacate the premises. They were allowed to stay until the end of the academic year 2001, provided they furnished an undertaking to hand over peaceful and vacant possession by that date and paid the required license fee.

The special leave petitions are dismissed accordingly.

Facts:

Charan Singh had undergone medical treatment at Healing Touch Hospital in 1993 and alleged medical negligence, leading to paralysis and the illegal removal of a kidney. He filed a complaint in 1993, seeking compensation of Rs. 34 lakhs under various heads. The complaint remained pending for six years.

Issues:

Whether the National Consumer Forum's dismissal of the appellant's complaint without a proper evaluation and reasons was fair.

Whether the claim for compensation of Rs. 34 lakhs was "excessive" and "exaggerated."

Held:

The National Consumer Forum's dismissal of the complaint was not fair, as it termed the claim as "excessive" or "exaggerated" without giving the appellant an opportunity to substantiate his case.

Consumer forums must provide reasons for their conclusions and ensure a fair evaluation of claims. Loss of salary is not the sole factor to be considered in assessing the claim's reasonableness.

The complaint had been pending for six years, violating the legislative intent of a speedy summary trial under the Consumer Protection Act. The appellant had virtually been condemned unheard.

The Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the National Consumer Forum's order, and remanded the complaint for proper disposal in accordance with the law.

The Court clarified that this decision did not express any opinion on the merits of the case or the rights of the parties.

Facts:

The assessment year was 1973-74.

The respondent, T.M. Louiz, retired from two partnership firms effective from April 1, 1972.

The Gift Tax Officer assessed him for gift tax, arguing that his retirement constituted a gift as he surrendered his rights in the firms.

Issues:

Whether the respondent's retirement from the partnership firms constituted a gift for the purpose of gift tax assessment?

Held:

The definition of "gift" in the Gift Tax Act requires a voluntary transfer of existing movable or immovable property without consideration in money or money's worth.

The definition of "transfer of property" in the Gift Tax Act includes various dispositions and alienations of property.

When a partner retires from a partnership, they receive the value of their share in the partnership assets, minus liabilities.

The assets and goodwill of the partnership continue to belong to the firm after a partner's retirement.

Merely receiving the value of one's share in partnership assets upon retirement does not constitute a gift as defined by the Gift Tax Act.

The term 'settlement' in the definition of 'transfer of property' refers to a settlement upon trust, not a settlement of accounts in the context of partnership retirement.

Decision: The civil appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.